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Abstract
ABSTRACT
While a few years ago, mobile phones were mainly used for making phone calls and texting
short messages, the functionality of mobile devices has massively grown. We are surfing the
web, sending emails and we are checking our bank accounts on the go. As a consequence,
these internet-enabled devices store a lot of potentially sensitive data and require enhanced
protection. We argue that authentication often represents the only countermeasure to protect
mobile devices from unwanted access.
Knowledge-based concepts (e.g., PIN) are the most used authentication schemes on mobile
devices. They serve as the main protection barrier for many users and represent the fallback
solution whenever alternative mechanisms fail (e.g., fingerprint recognition). This thesis
focuses on the risks and potentials of gesture-based authentication concepts that particu-
larly exploit the touch feature of mobile devices. The contribution of our work is threefold.
Firstly, the problem space of mobile authentication is explored. Secondly, the design space is
systematically evaluated utilizing interactive prototypes. Finally, we provide generalized in-
sights into the impact of specific design factors and present recommendations for the design
and the evaluation of graphical gesture-based authentication mechanisms.
The problem space exploration is based on four research projects that reveal important real-
world issues of gesture-based authentication on mobile devices. The first part focuses on
authentication behavior in the wild and shows that the mobile context makes great demands
on the usability of authentication concepts. The second part explores usability features of
established concepts and indicates that gesture-based approaches have several benefits in
the mobile context. The third part focuses on observability and presents a prediction model
for the vulnerability of a given grid-based gesture. Finally, the fourth part investigates the
predictability of user-selected gesture-based secrets.
The design space exploration is based on a design-oriented research approach and presents
several practical solutions to existing real-world problems. The novel authentication mech-
anisms are implemented into working prototypes and evaluated in the lab and the field. In
the first part, we discuss smudge attacks and present alternative authentication concepts that
are significantly more secure against such attacks. The second part focuses on observation
attacks. We illustrate how relative touch gestures can support eyes-free authentication and
how they can be utilized to make traditional PIN-entry secure against observation attacks.
The third part addresses the problem of predictable gesture choice and presents two concepts
which nudge users to select a more diverse set of gestures.
Finally, the results of the basic research and the design-oriented applied research are com-
bined to discuss the interconnection of design space and problem space. We contribute
by outlining crucial requirements for mobile authentication mechanisms and present em-
pirically proven objectives for future designs. In addition, we illustrate a systematic goal-
oriented development process and provide recommendations for the evaluation of authenti-
cation on mobile devices.
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Zusammenfassung
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Während Mobiltelefone vor einigen Jahren noch fast ausschließlich zum Telefonieren und
zum SMS schreiben genutzt wurden, sind die Anwendungsmöglichkeiten von Mobilgeräten
in den letzten Jahren erheblich gewachsen. Wir surfen unterwegs im Netz, senden E-Mails
und überprüfen Bankkonten. In der Folge speichern moderne internetfähigen Mobilgerä-
te eine Vielfalt potenziell sensibler Daten und erfordern einen erhöhten Schutz. In diesem
Zusammenhang stellen Authentifizierungsmethoden häufig die einzige Möglichkeit dar, um
Mobilgeräte vor ungewolltem Zugriff zu schützen.
Wissensbasierte Konzepte (bspw. PIN) sind die meistgenutzten Authentifizierungssysteme
auf Mobilgeräten. Sie stellen für viele Nutzer den einzigen Schutzmechanismus dar und die-
nen als Ersatzlösung, wenn alternative Systeme (bspw. Fingerabdruckerkennung) versagen.
Diese Dissertation befasst sich mit den Risiken und Potenzialen gestenbasierter Konzepte,
welche insbesondere die Touch-Funktion moderner Mobilgeräte ausschöpfen. Der wissen-
schaftliche Beitrag dieser Arbeit ist vielschichtig. Zum einen wird der Problemraum mobi-
ler Authentifizierung erforscht. Zum anderen wird der Gestaltungsraum anhand interaktiver
Prototypen systematisch evaluiert. Schließlich stellen wir generelle Einsichten bezüglich des
Einflusses bestimmter Gestaltungsaspekte dar und geben Empfehlungen für die Gestaltung
und Bewertung grafischer gestenbasierter Authentifizierungsmechanismen.
Die Untersuchung des Problemraums basiert auf vier Forschungsprojekten, welche prak-
tische Probleme gestenbasierter Authentifizierung offenbaren. Der erste Teil befasst sich
mit dem Authentifizierungsverhalten im Alltag und zeigt, dass der mobile Kontext hohe
Ansprüche an die Benutzerfreundlichkeit eines Authentifizierungssystems stellt. Der zweite
Teil beschäftigt sich mit der Benutzerfreundlichkeit etablierter Methoden und deutet darauf
hin, dass gestenbasierte Konzepte vor allem im mobilen Bereich besondere Vorzüge bieten.
Im dritten Teil untersuchen wir die Beobachtbarkeit gestenbasierter Eingabe und präsentie-
ren ein Vorhersagemodell, welches die Angreifbarkeit einer gegebenen rasterbasierten Geste
abschätzt. Schließlich beschäftigen wir uns mit der Erratbarkeit nutzerselektierter Gesten.
Die Untersuchung des Gestaltungsraums basiert auf einem gestaltungsorientierten For-
schungsansatz, welcher zu mehreren praxisgerechte Lösungen führt. Die neuartigen Authen-
tifizierungskonzepte werden als interaktive Prototypen umgesetzt und in Labor- und Feldver-
suchen evaluiert. Im ersten Teil diskutieren wir Fettfingerattacken (“smudge attacks”) und
präsentieren alternative Authentifizierungskonzepte, welche effektiv vor diesen Angriffen
schützen. Der zweite Teil beschäftigt sich mit Angriffen durch Beobachtung und verdeut-
licht wie relative Gesten dazu genutzt werden können, um blickfreie Authentifizierung zu
gewährleisten oder um PIN-Eingaben vor Beobachtung zu schützen. Der dritte Teil beschäf-
tigt sich mit dem Problem der vorhersehbaren Gestenwahl und präsentiert zwei Konzepte,
welche Nutzer dazu bringen verschiedenartige Gesten zu wählen.
Die Ergebnisse der Grundlagenforschung und der gestaltungsorientierten angewandten For-
schung werden schließlich verknüpft, um die Verzahnung von Gestaltungsraum und Pro-
blemraum zu diskutieren. Wir präsentieren wichtige Anforderungen für mobile Authentifi-
vii
zierungsmechanismen und erläutern empirisch nachgewiesene Zielvorgaben für zukünftige
Konzepte. Zusätzlich zeigen wir einen zielgerichteten Entwicklungsprozess auf, welcher bei
der Entwicklung neuartiger Konzepte helfen wird und geben Empfehlungen für die Evalua-
tion mobiler Authentifizierungsmethoden.
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INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND

Chapter1
Introduction
We are stuck with technology when
what we really want is just stuff that works.
– Douglas Adams, Writer (2002) –
In 2014, “The Independent”1 claimed that “there are officially more mobile devices than
people in the world”. Indeed, the number of mobile devices has massively grown over the
last decade. Especially the smartphone has become our everyday companion. We use it to
play games, to communicate with friends or to perform bank transactions. With reference
to Douglas Adams’ quote, it finally feels like we have got rid of technology and use “stuff
that works”. Unfortunately, the easy usage of mobile devices is only one side of the coin.
Smartphones store a lot of personal data and despite all the technological progress, the us-
ability and security of mobile authentication mechanisms did not significantly evolve. As a
consequence, data protection is still an annoying and sometimes difficult task which requires
an active contribution of the user. This thesis investigates how authentication can be tailored
to mobile devices to transform it from “technology” to “stuff that works”.
This Chapter introduces the research topic and provides an overview of the thesis. After a
general introduction (Section 1.1), Section 1.2 motivates the efforts taken to improve usabil-
ity and security of authentication on mobile devices. In addition, we describe the research
approach (Section 1.3) and outline the main contributions (Section 1.4). Finally, Section 1.5
presents the structure of the thesis and gives an overview of its content.
1 http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/there-are-
officially-more-mobile-devices-than-people-in-the-world-9780518.html – last accessed:
2016/08/06.
1.1 Mobile Devices and Authentication
Before we investigate the risks and potentials of graphical and gesture-based authentication
for touchscreen mobile devices, we introduce general aspects of authentication and mobile
devices and set the scope of this thesis. First of all, we define the term “mobile devices”
and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of such devices. Secondly, we give a short intro-
duction to authentication and illustrate available authentication factors. Finally, we motivate
the investigation of graphical gesture-based secrets and explain why we assume that such
concepts have the potential to enable usable and secure authentication on mobile devices.
Strengths and Weaknesses of Mobile Devices
The NIST Special Publication 800-124 [233] defines mobile devices by having a (a) “small
form factor”, by providing (b) “at least one wireless network interface”, by having a (c) “lo-
cal built-in (non-removable) data storage”, by using (d) “an operating system that is not a
full-fledged desktop or laptop operating system” and by supporting (e) “applications avail-
able through multiple methods”. Our definition of mobile devices builds upon the definition
of the National Institute of Standards and Technology. However, as we are specifically focus-
ing on mobile devices which support touch-based user interaction and store personal data,
we define that mobile devices considered in this thesis provide (f) a visual display with a
touchscreen and are primarily used to (g) manage personal data or business data.
The definition excludes laptops, devices with minimal computing power (e.g., cell phones)
and devices with a limited scope of application (e.g., handheld game consoles). However,
it includes smartphones, tablet computers and touch-based wearable computers (e.g., smart-
watches). While the research covered in this thesis is relevant for all three mobile device
classes, we opted to focus on the most prominent representative, that is, the smartphone.
In 2007, Apple released the first multi-touch enabled smartphone2. Eight years later, Google
announced that 1.4 billion people are using smart Android devices3. In 2016, the Ericsson
Mobility Report announced 3.4 billion smartphone subscriptions worldwide4. Such numbers
show that mobile devices have become ubiquitous and people started living in a mobile soci-
ety. While a decade ago, cell phones have been mainly used for calling and texting, phones
of 2016 are universal computing devices with almost endless application areas [201]. They
are used to take photos, to carry out banking transactions and to surf the web. Mobile In-
ternet enables users to edit, store and access a myriad of data anywhere and anytime. The
development of the Internet of Things [110] is likely to drive this process forward and create
an interconnected world of even more mobile devices and more opportunities.
2 http://www.apple.com/de/pr/library/2007/01/09Apple-Reinvents-the-Phone-with-
iPhone.html – last accessed: 2016/08/06.
3 http://www.ubergizmo.com/2015/09/over-1-4-billion-people-are-now-using-android/
?utm_source~=~mainrss – last access: 2016/08/02
4 https://www.ericsson.com/mobility-report/mobile-subscriptions – last access: 2016/08/02
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However, the use of smart mobile devices introduces several security and privacy threats.
The user’s digital life is often either directly stored on the device (e.g., photos) or accessible
through cloud-based services (e.g., e-mails). In addition, mobile devices are carried around
and face greater risks of getting lost or stolen than stationary home computers. Finally, mo-
bile devices are often used in public spaces where user interaction is easy to observe and
unauthorized access is more likely. Authentication often represents the only countermea-
sure to protect unattended devices from unwanted access. However, the specific form factor
of mobile devices and the mobile context pose special demands on feasible authentication
mechanisms. It has already been shown that many users underestimate the risks and do not
accept putting extra effort in using secure lock screens [84]. In addition, even if authenti-
cation methods are used, established concepts are easy to attack [254, 262], not usable on
mobile devices [178] or demand the exposure of personal information [117]. Section 1.2 dis-
cusses these problems in more detail. We argue that adequate usability can only be achieved
if authentication methods are tailored to the specific needs of mobile device users. Instead of
transferring existing methods from other authentication scenarios (e.g., ATMs), developers
need to consider real-world user behavior and understand real-world threats. The next Sec-
tion gives a brief introduction to the authentication factors which can be exploited to build
authentication mechanisms for mobile devices.
A Brief Introduction to Authentication
Authentication, the act of confirming the identity of a person or a document, has been impor-
tant long before computers existed. For example, Ali Baba and the Forty Thieves5, which
was published over 200 years ago, tells the story of Ali Baba, who gains access to a cave
by using the words “open sesame”. Technically speaking, the tale describes the use of a
password-based authentication system. Over 50 years ago, authentication was introduced
to computers [62]. The MIT Compatible Time-Sharing System (CTSS) was the first com-
puter system which requested a text-based password [63]. Over the next decades, passwords
were only required for specific application areas and used by computer experts. However,
with the broad introduction of home computers in the 1980s and the World Wide Web in
the 1990s [190], password-based authentication became part of most people’s everyday life.
Finally, with the introduction of smartphones, authentication has entered the mobile context.
Authentication methods can be categorized according to the used authentication factor.
In general, we distinguish knowledge-based, token-based and biometric concepts [196].
Knowledge-based authentication can be referred to as “something the user knows” [196].
While text-based passwords are the most prominent representatives, several alternative con-
cepts (e.g., graphical passwords) have been discussed over the last two decades [32]. In
the context of mobile devices, PINs and gestures [266, 295] have become widely accepted.
Token-based concepts authenticate users based on the possession of certain objects (e.g., a
physical key). Such concepts are also referred to as “something the user has” [196]. Repre-
sentatives of this class are widely deployed in form of bank cards which need to be provided
5 http://www.bartleby.com/16/905.html – last accessed: 2016/08/03.
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to authenticate with automatic teller machines. In the mobile context, the “NFC ring” was
proposed as a commercially available product6. However, even though the vendor claims
that “it couldn’t be easier”, token-based mechanisms are still uncommon in the context of
mobile devices. Finally, biometric authentication is based on the analysis of physical fea-
tures or behavioral characteristics. It is often referred to as “something the user is” [196].
Based on the considered cues, biometric systems are distinguished into physical or behav-
ioral approaches. While the latter is not suited for ad-hoc authentication scenarios (i.e.,
mobile lock screens), it was already proposed as a second layer of security [69]. In the
mobile context, biometric approaches have been introduced in form of face recognition and
fingerprint recognition [70].
The next Section outlines the advantages and disadvantages of the presented authentication
factors and illustrates that knowledge is still an indispensable authentication factor.
Knowledge: An Indispensable Authentication Factor
The previous Section presented the basic authentication approaches. While each authen-
tication factor has specific advantages and disadvantages, we claim that knowledge-based
approaches are still indispensable.
Tokens are easy to use and require little effort. However, they are prone to be forgotten or
stolen [196]. This is especially true in the mobile context, which requires security tokens
to be carried around. As the possession of a security token is sufficient to authenticate its
owner, such concepts usually require a second security factor. For example, authentication
on automatic teller machines requires a bank card (token) and a PIN (knowledge) [134]. We
therefore argue that tokens are not suited as standalone authentication factor. However, they
can complement other factors to improve the overall security and usability of an authentica-
tion system [36].
Biometric authentication mechanisms like fingerprint recognition are easy to use and require
little effort. This is especially true, when fingerprint readers are integrated into buttons
which would be activated anyway7. However, there are fundamental arguments against the
extensive use of biometric features. Firstly, physical biometric information represents highly
personal data which is directly liked to the user. On the one hand, this means that the
biometric information could be used to identify users in any other context. On the other
hand, this means that users cannot change the information if it falls into the wrong hands.
Secondly, it has already been shown that biometric cues are easy to fake 8. As Frank Rieger,
a security expert and hacker of the Chaos Computer Club (CCC) puts it, “It is plain stupid to
use something that you can’t change and that you leave everywhere every day as a security
token” 9. However, even if we ignore these threats and assume that the biometric data will be
6 http://store.nfcring.com – last accessed: 2016/08/03.
7 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201371 – last accessed: 2016/08/21.
8 http://www.ccc.de/en/updates/2014/ursel – last accessed: 2016/08/21.
9 https://www.ccc.de/en/updates/2013/ccc-breaks-apple-touchid – last accessed: 2016/08/21.
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securely stored on the device, biometric concepts are hardly suitable as standalone solution.
As the recognition of biometric features is prone to errors, biometric authentication requires
a second factor as fallback solution [114]. For example, Apple’s TouchID10 is combined with
a knowledge-based authentication system and requires the user to enter a passcode after (a)
restarting the device, if (b) fingerprint recognition failed five times or if the (c) device was
not unlocked for more than 48 hours. We argue that biometric solutions can complement
knowledge-based authentication mechanisms but they are unlikely to replace such concepts.
For example, behavioral cues can be used as a second factor to improve the overall security
and usability of authentication on mobile devices [137].
Even though knowledge-based authentication mechanisms are far from perfect as they de-
mand physical and mental effort and are prone to several attacks [18, 38, 207], they remain
indispensable [247]. Nevertheless, we argue that knowledge-based concepts need to be tai-
lored to the respective application area to enable usable and secure authentication. In the
context of smart mobile devices, knowledge-based authentication must not be restricted to
pressing buttons. In contrast, authentication concepts need to exploit the specific features
of mobile devices which provide rich input and output capabilities. In the scope of this the-
sis, we specifically focus on graphical gesture-based solutions and investigate how mobile
authentication can be improved in terms of usability and security.
1.2 Problem Statement and Research Questions
As already indicated in Section 1.1, unwanted access on mobile devices can have serious
consequences for the device owner. Since smart mobile devices can store any kind of per-
sonal information or business-related data, the threat model comprises a wide range of risks.
To classify such risks, we can distinguish between different attacker types [279], different
attack scenarios [269] and different consequences [118]. Since applications are usually not
protected, device access enables attackers to steal data, to modify data or to perform ac-
tions which cause damage in the physical world (e.g., identity theft). In order to reduce the
risk of unwanted access, mobile devices can be protected by secure lock screens. As out-
lined in Section 1.1, such lock screens require users to authenticate before access is granted.
Besides PIN and biometric solutions, gesture-based unlock mechanisms have gained accep-
tance. The most prominent representative of this type of authentication is the Android pattern
unlock [18]. In 2015, the mechanism was available on 83% of all smartphones11.
In theory, such unlock methods provide high security at low cost. In the case of unlock
patterns, the user would select one out of 389.112 [18] available gestures, ideally one that
is quick and easy to perform. Since mobile devices limit the number of failed authentica-
tions12, a potential attacker would have very little chance to guess the right gesture to unlock
10https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201371 – last accessed: 2016/08/06.
11http://www.idc.com/prodserv/smartphone-os-market-share.jsp – last accessed: 2016/08/04.
12https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204306 – last access: 2016/08/06.
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the device. However, the reality is different. Firstly, many users claim that secure lock
screens are too cumbersome and deliberately sacrifice security for usability. Secondly, even
if lock screens are used, security is not guaranteed as the theoretical protection of current
solutions is jeopardized by various real-world factors. For instance, password selection is
predictable [38] which makes user-chosen secrets easy to guess. In addition, the input of cur-
rent secrets is easy to observe and makes so-called shoulder surfing attacks effective. This
is particularly critical in the mobile context where shoulder surfing is facilitated by uncon-
trolled environments. Finally, touchscreens enable so-called smudge attacks [18], a threat
which is based on the analysis of oily residues which are left on the display.
As these threats are known for several years [32], alternative concepts have already been
proposed to increase the practical security. Most of these mechanisms aim at protecting
user input from observation attacks (e.g., [27, 246, 258, 278]). Other methods try to increase
guessing-resistance (e.g., [83, 232, 251]). However, despite the numerous efforts made in
terms of improving security, none of the methods achieved a breakthrough. Section 2 gives
a detailed overview of previous work. The literature review indicates that usability is often
the main limiting factor. Since the mobile context makes great demands on usability and the
use of secure authentication mechanisms is optional, user acceptance can only be achieved
by designing satisfying authentication mechanisms which are tailored to the mobile context.
However, many real-world aspects of mobile authentication mechanisms are still unknown.
This is especially true, when considering graphical gesture-based authentication. In addition,
the development of novel authentication mechanisms is often characterized by explorative
approaches and lacks comparable design and evaluation processes.
Derived from the problems stated above, this thesis aims at providing in-depth knowledge
on the risks and potentials of graphical gesture-based authentication on mobile devices by
answering the following main research questions:
RQ1 How do established gesture-based concepts perform in terms of usability and security
[current state]?
RQ2 What are the requirements for improved authentication on mobile devices [goal state]?
RQ3 How must graphical gesture-based concepts be designed (and evaluated) to meet the
requirements of mobile devices [process] ?
1.3 Research Approach
The research problem is investigated based on an empirical approach involving both basic
research and applied research. While the basic research aims at gathering an in-depth un-
derstanding of the authentication context and the impact of specific design and evaluation
strategies, the applied research focuses on the development of feasible authentication mech-
anisms for mobile devices.
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Following the recommendations by Goel and Pirolli [108], we structure authentication on
mobile devices as a design problem space. Consequently, we can address the research prob-
lem by investigating the interconnection of the design space and the problem space. The
problem space of mobile devices comprises usability (e.g., efficiency) and security (e.g., ob-
servation resistance) aspects. While the current state of the problem space is given by the
status quo of mobile device authentication, its goal state will be defined in this thesis and
represents the ultimate research goal. The design space is given by the set of design factors
which describe a graphical gesture-based authentication system.
Based on the framework of triangulation by Mackay and Fayard [168], the research ques-
tions are addressed in different ways. Firstly, the problem space is explored to define the
current state of authentication on mobile devices. The basic research involves explorative
and descriptive studies and gathers qualitative and quantitative data. We perform natural and
controlled field studies to analyze the usability of currently used methods and to understand
the context of mobile authentication. In addition, we perform online experiments to investi-
gate the security of currently used gestures and describe their guessability and observability.
The results of the problem space exploration are complemented by a systematic analysis of
the design space. The design space of graphical gesture-based authentication is investigated
following an experimental design-oriented research approach [91, 297]. Based on a user-
centered design process [193], we develop various concepts which are intended to solve
specific subproblems in isolation [108]. The iterative development process involves focus
group discussions, low-fidelity prototypes and interactive high-fidelity prototypes. The con-
cepts are evaluated in controlled lab studies and field studies to prove their usability and
security. The explanatory research gathers qualitative and quantitative data and provides
valuable insights into the impact of specific design decisions.
Finally, the insights of the problem space exploration and the design space exploration are
combined to describe the interconnection of the design factors and the usability and security
of graphical gesture-based authentication mechanisms.
1.4 Main Contributions
The presented work contributes to the field of usable security by providing both fundamen-
tal insights and practical solutions. Firstly, we contribute to the understanding of the current
state of mobile authentication. The thesis presents important insights into authentication
context, user behavior and the usability and security of currently deployed systems. Sec-
ondly, we present practical solutions in form of novel authentication mechanisms which
were proven to be more secure but yet usable in the mobile context. Finally, we provide
generalized insights into the impact of specific design factors and present recommendations
for the design and the evaluation of graphical gesture-based authentication mechanisms. In
the following, we give an overview of the main contributions.
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In addition to an extensive literature review which provides insights into the current state
of research, we investigate the real-world demands of mobile authentications. For this pur-
pose, we specify the problem space of gesture-based authentication on mobile devices and
discuss its goal state. In addition, we provide valuable insights into the usability and secu-
rity of currently used authentication methods. We analyze the real-world behavior and risk
perception of smartphone users and investigate the usability and security of current gesture-
based solutions in the field. In addition to the qualitative and the quantitative findings, we
present theoretical models which describe the usability and the security of currently used
concepts. In this regard, we present a taxonomy of gesture-based input errors, a predic-
tion model for the observability of grid-based gesture input and a novel metric to assess the
practical password space of grid-based gestures. Overall, the in-depth description of both
real-world factors and essential requirements will assist in developing new solutions which
are particularly tailored to the context of mobile devices.
Feasible Authentication Methods for Mobile Devices
We present a systematic exploration of the design space of graphical gesture-based authen-
tication. For this purpose, we firstly specify important design factors and discuss their main
characteristics. The investigation is based on a design-oriented research approach which
results in several practical solutions for existing real-world problems. We analyze how
gesture-based authentication can be improved to prevent smudge attacks, observation at-
tacks and guessing attacks. The novel authentication concepts are implemented as working
prototypes and evaluated in the lab and in the field. The results indicate that the presented
concepts are significantly more secure than current solutions and provide good usability in
the context of mobile devices. In addition to the presentation of concrete solutions, we con-
tribute by discussing general implications of the effects of both specific design decisions and
evaluation strategies.
The Interconnection of Design and Problem Space
The results of the basic research and the design-oriented applied research are combined to
discuss the interconnection of design space and problem space. First of all, we contribute by
outlining crucial requirements for mobile authentication mechanisms and present ten empir-
ically proven objectives for future designs. The design objectives will help researchers and
designers in defining concrete goals for their projects. In addition, we provide an in-depth
discussion of the observed interaction effects between design factors and problem space. The
insights are presented in a way that enables a systematic goal-directed development process
for mobile authentication mechanisms. Finally, we outline two potential application areas
for such a process and show how the insights of this thesis can facilitate both bottom-up
design approaches and top-down analysis. Overall, the presented insights contribute to the
field by providing assistance to researchers and developers who design and evaluate mobile
authentication systems. Moreover, the applied methodology is in principle transferable to
very different research questions, in particular in the area of usable security and privacy.
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Figure 1.1: The thesis comprises six main chapters. After an introduction to the research prob-
lem, we investigate the problem space and the design space. Chapter 5 discusses the implications
of the results before Chapter 6 concludes the thesis.
1.5 Thesis Structure
Figure 1.1 illustrates the structure of the thesis which is organized in three parts and six
chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the research problem and the research approach. Chapter 2
provides an extensive review of previous work and identifies open questions. Chapter 3 and
Chapter 4 provide an in-depth investigation of authentication on mobile devices to bridge
the identified gaps in knowledge. While Chapter 3 presents field studies which analyze
the current state of authentication on mobile devices, Chapter 4 explores how the current
state can be improved. Chapter 5 combines the insights of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 and
provides general recommendations for the design and evaluation of feasible authentication
mechanisms. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the thesis. In the following, we summarize the
content of the remaining chapters in more detail:
Chapter 2: Related Work This Chapter presents an extensive review of related work. Sec-
tion 2.1 presents the most important insights of traditional usable security research. It dis-
cusses what we can learn from text-based passwords and illustrates crucial findings concern-
ing user behavior, password management, strength metrics and password selection. Sec-
tion 2.3 illustrates the evolution of graphical and gesture-based authentication mechanisms
which were proposed as an alternative to text-based passwords. It introduces common ap-
proaches and discusses their general strengths and weaknesses. Consequently, Section 2.3
presents several research projects which aim at improving the security and usability. The pre-
sented concepts illustrate how graphical elements and gesture-based interaction can be used
to prevent guessing attacks, smudge attacks and observation attacks. Finally, Section 2.4
summarizes the lessons learned and points out open questions.
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Chapter 3: Problem Space This Chapter presents four research projects which explore the
problem space of gesture-based authentication. Section 3.1 provides a definition of the prob-
lem space and gives an overview of the research covered. Section 3.2 presents a natural field
study which investigates unlocking behavior and risk perception in the wild. Section 3.3 in-
vestigates the usability of grid-based gestures by comparing PIN and unlock gestures in the
field. It presents important insights into the real-world usability of established concepts and
provides a taxonomy for gesture-based input errors. Section 3.4 analyses the observation re-
sistance of an established gesture-based authentication mechanism. It presents the results of
an online experiment which indicate that established grid-based authentication concepts are
prone to observation attacks. In addition, it provides a prediction model which can be used
to assess the observability of a given gesture. Section 3.5 investigates the practical password
space of grid-based gestures. It presents a novel metric to quantify the similarity of a given
gesture set and indicates that user-chosen secrets are very predictable. Finally, Section 3.6
aggregates the acquired knowledge and discusses the implications for future developments.
Chapter 4: Design Space This Chapter presents a systematic exploration of the design space
of gesture-based authentication. Section 4.1 defines the design space and illustrates the in-
dividual design factors. In addition, it gives an overview of the research projects which are
grouped according to the considered threat model. Section 4.2 investigates the prevention of
smudge attacks and presents spatially randomized authentication mechanisms which ham-
per the interpretation of smudge traces. Section 4.3 addresses the problem of observation
attacks and illustrates how gestures can be utilized to design usable authentication mech-
anisms which allow users to increase security on demand. Section 4.4 investigates if the
practical password space of gesture-based authentication can be increased through implicit
nudging effects. The results indicate that visual guidance can effectively influence gesture
selection. Finally, Section 4.5 summarizes the results.
Chapter 5: Implications This Chapter discusses the implications of the interconnection of
design space and problem space. Section 5.1 revisits the problem space and discusses the
requirements of usable and secure authentication on mobile devices. In addition, it sug-
gests ten concrete design objectives for future developments. Section 5.2 provides design
assistance for gesture-based authentication mechanisms on mobile devices. We map design
factors and design objectives and discuss observed interaction effects between design space
and problem space. In addition, we provide recommendations for or a goal-oriented design
process. Finally, Section 5.3 addresses the evaluation of mobile authentication and presents
the lessons learned according to exploratory, descriptive and explanatory approaches.
Chapter 6: Conclusion This Chapter summarizes the thesis and discusses future work. Sec-
tion 6.1 provides a short summary of the thesis and points out the main contributions. Sec-
tion 6.2 illustrates directions for future work and discusses how the presented insights can be
useful in other contexts. Finally, Section 6.3 concludes the thesis with a visionary outlook
on authentication on mobile devices.
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Chapter2
Background and Related Work
Study the past if you would define the future.
– Confucius, teacher and philosopher (551 BC - 479 BC) –
In 1975, Saltzer and Schroeder argue that “It is essential that the human interface be designed
for ease of use, so that users routinely and automatically apply the protection mechanisms
correctly [..]" [209]. This claim can be seen as the starting point of a whole research area
concerning usable security and privacy [106]. Over the last decades, usable security re-
search kept constantly growing and a nearly unmanageable amount of research papers was
published. This Chapter presents the most relevant work, identifies unsolved problems and
discusses how these gaps can be filled.
Section 2.1 presents results concerning text-based passwords: We will learn that usabil-
ity features have a massive impact on the security of the respective authentication system.
The discussion sheds light on user behavior in the wild and password management strate-
gies. Motivated by the usability issues of text-based passwords, research began designing
alternative authentication mechanisms: Graphical and gesture-based authentication systems.
Section 2.2 illustrates the evolution of such systems and presents the general approach. The
discussion will show that usability and security problems are not automatically solved by
eliminating text-based secrets. On the contrary, authentication times are often high and
practical security is jeopardized due to increased observability. As a consequence, Section
2.3 focuses on improving the practical security of gesture-based graphical passwords. We
will learn that design decisions have a significant impact on the performance of an authen-
tication system. Finally, Section 2.4 summarizes the insights gained from this Chapter and
discusses both lessons learned and open questions.
2.1 Learning from Text-based Passwords
The basis for the thorough design of improved authentication concepts must be a profound
understanding of existing problems and solutions. This Section gives important insight into
user behavior and password selection strategies in the context of desktop computers. As most
of the fundamental research presented in this Section is concerning text-based passwords
entered with a physical QWERTY keyboard, not all results can be directly transferred to
the context of mobile devices. However, the knowledge gained from this Section will both
motivate the effort and help with the development of usable and secure concepts which are
tailored to touch-based mobile devices.
2.1.1 User Behavior and Password Management
User behavior regarding alphanumeric passwords has been extensively investigated for over
20 years [2]. It was shown early that users are overstrained by the large number of required
passwords [1, 212]. In 2014, an average user had to manage 27 password protected online
accounts [238]. It is obvious that memorizing a unique and complex alphanumeric string
for each of those accounts would significantly exceed the capacity of the human brain [1,
98, 194]. Over the years, the password problem becomes worse as the number of required
secrets increases with every registered service [194].
While a few users simply think that hacking is not a problem [2], Herley and van Oorschot
[129] note that most users are indeed aware of security risks. Still, the direct usability costs
of using unique and complex passwords are usually much higher than the indirect threat
of potential attacks [126]. As a consequence, people start optimizing usability by reusing
passwords [107, 133, 205], by writing down passwords [132, 135, 212, 286] and by sharing
their secrets with other persons [1, 143, 225].
Password Reuse
Password reuse is the main coping strategy for most users [95, 109, 225]. Gaw and Felten
[107] found out that the number of reused passwords positively correlates with the number
of protected accounts. Stobert and Biddle [238] report that 96% of the participants reused
passwords. More precisely, they used a median of five passwords to manage 27 accounts.
88% of the participants stated to reuse more than one password and 73% acknowledged to
reuse passwords frequently. However, users do not randomly reuse passwords but cluster
their accounts into different categories [98, 205, 238]. For this purpose, users usually hold a
(primitive) primary password for most of their accounts and use more complex secrets for
sensitive services [205,238,263]. Unfortunately, the same composition strategies are used to
select low security and high security passwords [225] and therefore these primary passwords
are good predictors for more complex ones [263]. In addition, von Zezschwitz et al. [263]
revealed that such composition strategies remain stable over time as new passwords often
have roots in the very first passwords ever chosen.
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Ives et al. [135] published one of the first works which pointed out the security risk of
password reuse and argued that no account can be more secure than the weakest one using
the same secret. Das et al. [65] quantified this risk and presented a cross-site password-
guessing algorithm which exploits password reuse for attacks. The algorithm was able to
guess 30% of the transformed passwords within 100 attempts. This was significantly better
than a compared traditional guessing algorithm. A similar attack was proposed by Haque et
al. [116]. Florencio et al. [98] point out that password reuse cannot be avoided even when
memorability-optimized passwords are assumed. As a consequence, several researchers [98,
133, 191] postulate the need for usable guidelines which illustrate how to reuse and recycle
passwords in an optimal and secure way. While it generally can be assumed that the same
reuse behavior exists for (remote) services accessed on mobile devices, Egelman et al. [85]
recently reported that password reuse is also common for primary unlock screens.
Password Storage Behavior
In 1999, Adams and Sasse [1] published one of the first extensive surveys concerning au-
thentication behavior and reported that all users regularly wrote down their passwords. In
the same year, Zviran at al. [298] interviewed 860 password users and found out that 35%
of the users wrote down passwords. They criticized that most people store their passwords
in unsecure places like wallets, notebooks and calendars. While in 2006, physical record
was still reported to be most common [44,107], in 2014, most people stored passwords digi-
tally [238]. Despite the use of password managers and cookies, the storage behavior is quite
diverse. Stobert and Biddle [238] report the use of spreadsheets, cloud services or e-mail
accounts. However, physical storage is still common [225, 238].
Komanduri et al. [155] argue that strict password policies are the primary reason for writing
down passwords. Zezschwitz et al. [263] found that password storage behavior correlates
with the number of used passwords. Zviran and Haga [298] state that password complexity
and frequency of use influence storage rates, but length has no significant impact. Komanduri
et al. [155] quantified the relationship of password complexity and password storage and
found out that users wrote down 17% of the simple passwords, but 50% of the complex
ones. Grawemeyer and Johnson [109] performed a seven days diary study and found that
the odds of writing a password down were 18 times higher if it was unique, and ten times
higher if it was rarely used. As a consequence, research came to the conclusion that writing
down passwords can also have positive effects [98,212]. As long as the passwords are stored
in a secure place, it allows users to use a more diverse set of more complex passwords
[98]. Mobile device use further increases storage rates [86]. As typing on such devices is
significantly more cumbersome and error prone than on desktop computers [102, 174, 264],
most mobile applications store passwords digitally and remain logged in per default [86,
171]. Therefore, the unlock mechanism of mobile devices often represents the only barrier
of protection from unauthorized access to the user’s digital life [142].
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Password Sharing
While password reuse and password storage represent personal coping strategies which are
first of all triggered by the number of required passwords, password sharing is usually influ-
enced by social and organizational factors [116, 143, 274]. Kaye [143] analyzed the sharing
behavior of 122 internet users and found out that e-mail and social media passwords were
the most shared types when the private context was considered. In the working environment,
colleagues often shared passwords for joint workspaces or for shared accounts of commercial
sites. In addition to such traditional online accounts, people share passwords in various other
cases. PIN codes for bank accounts are commonly shared between partners [143, 230], flat
mates share passwords for WiFi access or for Netflix accounts [116] and colleagues share
passwords of zipped files [133]. In general, sharing can be distinguished into long-term
and ad-hoc instances [133]. Inglesant and Sasse [133] state that especially ad-hoc sharing
induces insecure password behavior. For example, users quickly choose secrets based on
common dictionary words to protect shared files and then email those passwords to the re-
cipient. Beside organizational factors like shared accounts [109] or higher orders [274], the
social context has a significant impact on sharing behavior. Sharing a password is often a
sign of trust and someone not sharing a password can be seen as someone who has something
to hide [212, 274]. Counteracting such behavior is difficult. Adams and Sasse [1] claim that
secure behavior only becomes possible when authentication mechanisms fit into the social
context of use.
While password sharing is primarily influenced by social factors, it can cause similar security
problems as password reuse. Haque et al. [116] revealed that most users utilize the same
composition strategies for shared passwords as for the rest of their passwords. Therefore,
shared passwords can expose information on the composition of more secure individual
secrets. In the mobile context, device sharing has become very common [115, 124, 142].
Mobile devices are shared with friends and colleagues for various reasons. Karlson et al.
[142] state that a smartphone is used by up to eleven different guests. Since current mobile
devices rely on all-or-nothing access [234], the device owner faces the risk of unintentionally
exposing sensitive data each time she shares her device. In addition, it was shown that users
intentionally reveal their unlock codes to make device sharing easier [85, 257].
2.1.2 Strength Metrics and Password Selection
Alongside to insecure password management, predictable password selection represents one
of the main problems of alphanumeric authentication systems [39]. It was found out early
that user-selected secrets are often optimized for good memorability [2, 184, 298]. People
choose easy-to-remember secrets which are often based on meaningful dictionary words,
birthdays or names. Unfortunately, such memorable passwords are also easy to guess as
the selection behavior is predictable and thus, the search space is limited to a fraction of its
possible size [37]. This induces a significant difference between the theoretical security of
alphanumeric authentication and the practical security in the real world.
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The first part of this Section presents various password strength metrics and provides in-
sights into the question what makes a password secure. In the second part, we take a closer
look on password composition strategies and discuss externalities which influence password
selection. Recent work has shown that mobile devices have become one of those externali-
ties and that password input on mobile devices is likely to downgrade the usability and the
security of traditional authentication mechanisms [264].
Password Strength Metrics
Password strength is traditionally defined by the chance that a secret is guessed by an at-
tacker. If users chose passwords randomly from the set of given characters, the task of
quantifying password strength would be straightforward [97]. When assuming a character
set C and a password length of L, the chance to guess a random password would be C−L.
However, users do not choose characters randomly, but the set of used secrets is skewed to-
wards a subset of all possible combinations [2]. This makes assessing the strength of a given
password an exceptionally hard task [87, 97].
One common approach to estimate the security of a given password is based on informa-
tion entropy which was formalized by Claude Shannon [223] in 1948. Shannon entropy
describes the expected value (given in bits) of information in a received message by mea-
suring the information that is unknown due to random variables [97]. The National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) [47] proposed to combine the concept of information
theory with the characteristics of password selection to assess the strength of human-chosen
secrets against online guessing attacks [97]. According to the NIST guideline, “password
strength is determined by a password’s length and its complexity, which is determined by the
unpredictability of its characters” [213]. The Electronic Authentication Guideline [47] gives
concrete estimates for the entropy of user-selected passwords. For example, “the entropy of
the first character is taken to be 4 bits [...], the entropy of the next 7 characters are 2 bits per
character” and “a bonus of 6 bits of entropy is assigned” when the use of upper-case letters
and non-alphabetic characters is forced or the use of dictionary words is blocked.
Entropy-based strength metrics have become the standard for most password policies [96]
and have been the basis for various scientific evaluations (e.g., [95, 219, 263]). However,
since password entropy is a statistical measure, it does not reflect actual user choice. NIST
measurements were already proven to insufficiently estimate the difficulty of guessing user-
selected secrets [97,145,177]. Weir et al. [272] argue that guessing entropy tends to overes-
timate the security of most passwords, while the strength of some individual but short pass-
words is drastically underestimated. For this reason, various researchers claim that entropy
is not a valid metric to estimate password strength and propose using guessability instead
(e.g., [38, 76, 145, 167, 177, 188, 272]). In 1979, Morris and Thomson [184] published the
first analysis based on an educated guessing attack. They attacked 3000 passwords with a
basic dictionary containing 250,000 words and were able to expose one third of the password
corpus. In 2005, Narayanan and Shmatikov [188] exposed 67.6% of the passwords exploit-
ing the contextual frequency of characters in natural language based on Markov chains.
Such Markov modeling techniques can replicate often chosen passwords that are not based
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on dictionary words and are especially effective in breaking strong passwords [76]. Weir et
al. [273] propose to analyze the structure from training data and then apply mangling rules.
Such attacks use probabilistic context-free grammars based on known composition strate-
gies and benefit from password reuse and leaked password lists [177]. Joseph Bonneau [38]
introduces partial guessing metrics which define password strength based on the number of
cracked passwords before one specific password is exposed. Kelley et al. [145] propose to
count the number of guesses required to guess a specific password.
In summary, password strength is still very difficult to define [87] as information entropy
has very limited value in predicting password strength and the estimated guessability of a
password depends on the system setup and the training data [145, 272]. Florencio et al. [97]
generally challenge the importance of complex passwords in real life and note that guessing
resistance is often irrelevant. They argue that online attacks are usually prevented through
automatic lockouts and offline guessing attacks are often unnecessary or impossible. Fur-
thermore, even the strongest password cannot protect from threats like observation attacks,
key-logging or social engineering. Still, consent can be seen in the fact that a secure pass-
word must not be popular [167, 215], that length is usually more important than complex-
ity [224] and that single meaningful strings should be avoided [131]. In addition, specific
recommendations for usable and secure alphanumeric passwords were published. Examples
are mnemonic passphrases [159, 286], cognitive or associative passwords [46, 125].
Password Selection
Password selection has been extensively studied for over 35 years [184, 247]. The projects
can be distinguished into three different categories [106]: (a) surveys which are based on
self-reported data, (b) controlled lab- and field studies where users are asked to select a
password (c) and the analysis of real-world data from leaked databases or running systems.
Early studies were mostly based on surveys and focused on the semantic content of pass-
words. Adams et al. [2] analyzed 139 questionnaires and found out that most users selected
names and common dictionary words. In 1999, Zviran and Haga [298] analyzed the answers
of 860 computer users of the Department of Defense. They revealed that most passwords
were based on six characters and represented meaningful strings. Furthermore, 80% of
the participants preferred alphabetic characters while only 0.7% stated to exploit the whole
ASCII set. In the following years, several other studies (e.g., [42, 44, 205, 238]) confirmed
user preferences for short, meaningful and therefore memorable passwords.
To increase the strength of user-chosen passwords, proactive password checkers (password
meters) [33, 255, 287] and composition policies [96, 180, 240] were introduced. The ef-
fects of such countermeasures were mostly evaluated in controlled lab- and field studies
(e.g., [133, 240, 255, 286]). Proctor et al. [203] claim that a minimum length requirement
is more important for password meters than other restrictions. Ur et al. [255] ran an online
experiment with 2,931 participants and 14 proactive password checkers. They found out that
the pure presence of password meters resulted in significantly longer passwords. In addition,
some password meters were able to nudge users to use more numbers, upper-case letters or
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symbols. However, Egelman et al. [87] argue that such positive effects can only be expected
when users are actually forced to change their passwords and when the protected account is
perceived to be important. Furthermore, it was shown that most password policies do not in-
crease security [225,272] but are very likely to create additional burdens on the users [155].
Some policies even reduce the possible password strength by restricting the number of char-
acters or by banning certain symbols [133]. In addition, it was shown that the insertion of
special characters, numbers and upper-case letters is predictable [97, 155, 263, 272]. Policy-
complying passwords usually start with upper-case letters and end with predictable number
sequences (e.g., “123”) [224]. Most users employ only a subset of possible special characters
and use them as a replacement for similar looking letters (e.g., “@” as “a”) [136]. Conse-
quently, most of today’s passwords are based on similar variations of meaningful words (e.g.,
P@ssword123) and remain easy to guess [109, 266].
While controlled user studies give valuable insights into the impact of different policy condi-
tions, they often lack ecological validity [87, 247]. This drawback can be overcome by ana-
lyzing real-world passwords of running systems [95] or of exposed databases [38,170,219].
Florencio and Herley [95] analyzed the password composition behavior of 544,960 web
users and confirmed that most passwords were based on lower-case letters as upper-case let-
ters or special characters were hardly used. Bruce Schneier [219] analyzed 34,000 MySpace
passwords and stated that 81% of the passwords were alphanumeric, most of them were
based on lower-case letters and a single digit. Malone and Maher [170] analyzed various
password lists and found out that simple secrets as “123456” and “password” were very
common. They furthermore state that passwords often show features which are specific to
the protected website. Joseph Bonneau [38] analyzed a corpus of 70,000,000 passwords
and revealed that the entropy in the password space is low and that password composition
is hardly influenced by the sensitivity of the protected data. Mazurek et al. [177] showed
that experienced computer users choose significantly stronger passwords. In addition, they
confirmed that the use of digits, symbols, and upper-case letters increases security, but the
insertion of such character classes is easy to predict.
Further literature reviews indicate that even if user-selected passwords are still easy to guess,
they became stronger over the last decades [205, 219, 266]. However, recent work revealed
that the increasing use of passwords on mobile devices is likely to stop this positive trend
[264,290]. Maydebura et al. [174] state that the input of alphanumeric passwords on mobile
devices is significantly more error-prone. Nevertheless, password protected services are
increasingly used on smartphones [171]. In a recent survey by von Zezschwitz et al. [264],
69% of the participants stated that they already had created alphanumeric passwords on a
mobile device. 20% of them acknowledged to have used simpler versions of already known
PC passwords. Yang et al. [290] confirmed that mobile devices have a negative impact on
the password structure. Users tend to select easy-to-enter passwords which comprise more
lower-case letters and significantly less upper-case letters or symbols [264].
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2.2 The Evolution of Graphical and Gesture-based Au-
thentication
Section 2.1 illustrated several critical issues of alphanumeric passwords. Most of these prob-
lems result from the fact that humans are not able to memorize a great number of cryptic
alphanumeric strings. For this reason, researchers started looking for alternative secrets that
better support the specific skills of the human brain. While most humans might struggle
with remembering random strings, the ability to recognize previously seen images and to
reproduce trained gestures is widely spread.
In 1996, Blonder [35] was the first to come up with the idea of utilizing pictures instead
of alphanumeric characters. In the following years, various graphical and gesture-based
password schemes were proposed. Until today, all published methods rely on at least one
of the following principles [32]: (a) recognizing objects of a challenge set, (b) localizing
specific areas within a given picture or (c) recalling a shape or a gesture. The first two
classes are primarily relying on the findings that humans perform better in remembering
pictures than words (e.g., [189, 226, 235, 236]). In contrast, concepts of the third category
are mainly exploiting the effects of motor learning [3, 94, 221] which indicate that humans
are exceptionally good in memorizing consistently repeated movements. As a consequence,
some concepts of the latter category actually completely forgo visual feedback [243]. In
addition to motor memory effects and the pictorial superiority effect, all three categories can
support dual-coding [175,198,237]. According to the dual-coding theory, information recall
is improved when visual and verbal aspects were used for memorization. This might for
example be the case, when a picture illustrates an object which can be named (e.g., a car).
Several user studies have indicated that graphical passwords are easier to remember
[32, 104, 183] and that users are in favor of these concepts [53, 68]. According to security,
graphical passwords were shown to be less vulnerable to brute-force attacks [32, 104] but
password selection remains predictable [66]. In addition, the input of graphical or gesture-
based secrets is usually easy to observe. In terms of usability, it was shown that most graph-
ical authentication mechanisms are easy to use [41] as success rates are usually high. On
the downside, the input often takes significantly more time compared to traditional pass-
words [32, 104]. This Section presents the most relevant examples of each category, dis-
cusses particular assets and drawbacks and the applicability to touchscreen mobile devices.
2.2.1 Recognizing Objects
Recognition-based systems are sometimes also referred to as cognometric [68, 104] or
searchmetric [204] concepts. Such systems generally rely on identifying previously seen
images [32, 104]. As the recognition of an item is usually easier than its recall [189, 235],
such passwords are assumed to be particularly easy to remember. During enrollment, users
memorize several pictures. While authenticating, these pictures are provided in line with a
number of decoy images and users have to identify the previously memorized image set [32].
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Figure 2.1: Representative recognition-based authentication concepts. (A) Passfaces [41], (B)
Déjà Vu [77], (C) VIP [68], (D) Story [66] and (E) Awase-E [245].
Figure 2.1 illustrates five representative systems. Typical design factors, which are likely to
have an impact on the usability and on the security of the resulting system, are image type,
the number of presented images and the relationship of the images (e.g., similarity). While
the image type influences the memorability of the passwords [41, 77, 245], a large number
of decoy images significantly increases search times and therefore reduces the overall per-
formance [68]. Similar images are harder to attack, but also harder to memorize [81]. The
following examples will illustrate the effects of different design decisions in detail.
Representative Examples
Passfaces [41] which is commercially sold by the Passfaces Corporation1 is the most re-
searched recognition-based authentication system [204]. The Passfaces system is based on
the recognition of human faces since they are assumed to be “[..] much easier to remember
than passwords or PINS” [89]. During enrollment, the user selects four faces (see Fig-
ure 2.1 A). During authentication, the user needs to correctly identify all four faces, each
within a grid of nine images. While the challenging sets are fixed, the faces are randomly
positioned each round [41]. Brostoff and Sasse [41] claimed that Passfaces are significantly
1 http://www.passfaces.com – last accessed: 2015/07/22
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less error-prone than alphanumeric passwords. Valintine [256] indicated improved memora-
bility. However, Davis et al. [66] revealed that the selection of Passfaces is very predictable.
Their experiment showed significant effects of attraction, gender and race. Both genders se-
lected female faces more often than male ones. Furthermore, attractive persons were selected
more often and participants preferred people of their own race.
Dhamija and Perrig [77] propose Déjà Vu which is based on abstract random art images (see
Figure 2.1 B). Since such pictures can be automatically generated, Déjà Vu does not require
large image databases. A comparison to photographic pictures revealed that abstract images
are harder to describe (which hampers password sharing) and that password selection is less
predictable. A comparison to alphanumeric passwords showed that Déjà Vu is less error-
prone, but authentication takes more time (< 30 seconds). De Angeli et al. [67,68] designed
the VIP system which provides “detailed, colorful and meaningful photos of objects” (see
Figure 2.1 C). To prevent predictable password selection, images were randomly assigned to
each user. A user study indicated that users prefer VIP to PIN, but no memorability benefits
were found and the authentication process was significantly slower [68]. The authors tested
different configurations using random and fixed token sets and concluded that a randomized
presentation significantly decreases usability. Davis et al. [66] proposed to improve mem-
orability and password selection by supporting story-based portfolios. Therefore, the user
selects a sequence of unique images illustrating everyday objects to make a story (see Fig-
ure 2.1 D). Takada et al. [245] presented “Awase-E”, a recognition-based scheme based on
the user’s personal photo collections (see Figure 2.1, D). They showed that using personal
photos improves memorability, but at the same time makes guessing attacks more effective.
Assets and Drawbacks
Recognition-based approaches constantly outperform alphanumeric passwords in terms of
memorability and success rates. This is especially true whenever meaningful objects or
personal images are used. The biggest drawback according to usability is a high authenti-
cation time as multiple rounds of slow visual search tasks are usually required. This search
time increases with more complex images and larger image sets [204]. While nameable and
meaningful images increase usability, security might be downgraded through predictable
password choice and password sharing. The use of similar and abstract images can increase
security but makes the recall harder and further slows down the process [82].
While these concepts provide increased phishing protection as they present a predefined
challenging set which is hard to fake [32, 104], secrets usually cannot be hashed. This is a
significant drawback as secure sever-side storage is not possible and the information is usu-
ally available to anyone who gains access to the database [32]. In addition, the theoretical
password space is usually small [32, 104, 113] which makes simple brute-force attacks effi-
cient. Renaud and De Angeli [204] further note that observation attacks are often a problem,
especially when touch screens are used [249].
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Mobile Device Applicability
De Angeli et al. [67] argue that the “touch-screen is the ideal solution for the VIP paradigm”,
Dhamija and Perrig [77] recommend Déjà Vu especially for settings where text input is diffi-
cult. Indeed, some recognition-based authentication mechanisms were specifically designed
for mobile devices (e.g., [122, 138, 245, 270]) and interacting with images on touchscreens
is a common task. Dunphy et al. [80] analyzed the usability and the security of recognition-
based systems on mobile devices in detail and found out that these concepts are indeed easy
to use and actually less easy to observe than expected. However, long authentication times
make these concepts infeasible. Dunphy et al. [80] note that “login durations of approxi-
mately 20 seconds are unattractive to many users”. This should be especially true in the
mobile context where device unlocks are usually performed many times a day.
2.2.2 Localizing Regions
Concepts which are based on the localization of specific regions within a given picture are
generally referred to as cued-recall [32], click-based [57] or locimetric [104] systems. In
such concepts a picture is given as an external cue to support the recall of specific click-
points within the picture. The cues should only support the user and not the attacker [32].
During the enrollment, the user selects multiple regions within one or more pictures. When
authenticating, the user needs to provide the right click-points, usually in a specific order
[104]. Examples of such systems are given in Figure 2.2.
Typical design factors, which impact the usability and the security of the resulting system,
are the tolerance level [277], the number of pictures [57] and the visual properties of the
used image [78]. As humans are unable to accurately select single pixels of a given picture,
the tolerance level is the main adjuster for the security and the usability [277]. Higher
tolerance levels increase the ease of use while lower tolerance levels increase the theoretical
password space. The number and visual properties of the images have significant effects on
the practical security of the system in form of guessability [78] and observability [57]. The
next Section will present example concepts to illustrate these factors.
Representative Examples
The oldest graphical password scheme proposed by Blonder in 1996 [35] is a locimetric
concept. Passwords were based on predefined sequences of clicks in specific regions of an
image [104]. The proposed interface is depicted in Figure 2.2 A. While Blonder’s scheme
was not further evaluated, its successor, the PassPoints authentication system was analyzed
in detail [276]. PassPoints [276] is based on Blonder’s idea but does not restrict the click-
able area and supports a wider range of image types. Instead of providing predefined click
areas, Wiedenbeck et al. [276] discretize the image to allow free selection. Furthermore,
this mechanism supports securely hashed storage of the passwords. The authors performed
a longitudinal user study using the interface illustrated in Figure 2.2 B. They found out that
memorability and ease of use were similar to alphanumeric passwords, but authentication
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Figure 2.2: Representative cued-recall-based authentication concepts. (A) Blonder’s patent
[35], (B) PassPoints [276] and (C) Cued Click-Points [54].
took more time (19 seconds). In a second experiment, Wiedenbeck et al. [277] found that
small tolerance values significantly reduce usability and memorability and thus a minimum
tolerance of 14x14 pixels should be provided. In addition, a “hot spot” problem was dis-
covered. This problem is based on the fact that humans do not click on all pixels of a given
image with the same probability, but prefer specific attributes like objects, strong colors and
high contrasts [78]. In a later experiment, Dirik et al. [78] modeled the user choice for a
given image based on such visual properties. They were able to correctly predict up to 80%
of the users’ click positions. Chiasson et al. [57] proposed the Cued Click-Point concept [57]
where users select one single click point on a sequence of five distinct images. The mech-
anism, which is illustrated in Figure 2.2 C, provides implicit feedback to the user as the
presented images are determined by the click position in the current image. On the other
hand, attackers cannot gain any information. A lab study revealed that the one to one rela-
tionship between images and click-points is easier to use (96% success rate) and at the same
time more secure. On average, users needed seven seconds to successfully authenticate. The
good usability was confirmed in a field study [53].
24
The Evolution of Graphical and Gesture-based Authentication
Assets and Drawbacks
Cued-recall systems provide good memorability and high success rates. The authentication
process is faster compared to recognition-based concepts but remains slower than alphanu-
meric input. Furthermore, users seem to cope better with multiple accounts when using
click-based passwords, as they select a more diverse set of passwords compared to the text-
based scenario [55]. Finally, locimetric passwords support secure (hashed) storage [276].
On the downside, the input of click-based passwords is usually easy to observe [104]. This
is especially true when the concept is based on one single image (e.g., PassPoints). In addi-
tion, users follow distinct patterns when creating click-based passwords [54]. The focus on
specific hot spots (e.g., objects) within the image and the use of simple geometric patterns
make cued-recall systems vulnerable to automatic dictionary attacks [259,296]. Renaud and
De Angeli [204] conclude that “[..] any picture has a limited number of distinct objects [..]
and this makes locimetric systems untenable”.
Mobile Device Applicability
Current mobile devices provide relatively small touch-based interfaces [214]. Therefore,
precisely selecting small regions of a picture becomes a usability problem [52,146]. Schaub
et al. [214] developed a mobile version of the Cued Click-Points concept and reported that
the tolerance squares had to be increased to 98x98 pixels which resulted in a significantly
reduced theoretical password space. Suo [243] tested click-based passwords on iPads and
achieved success rates of 80% using a 30 pixels tolerance. Stobert et al. [239] analyzed the
interplay of image size and the number of click-points. They found no usability drawbacks in
using more click-points with smaller pictures and therefore suggest using this configuration
on mobile devices. However, the reduced resolution in combination with biased password
selection generally questions the applicability of such concepts to mobile devices.
2.2.3 Recalling Shapes and Gestures
Recall-based graphical password systems are also referred to as drawmetric schemes [204].
Such systems are based on the recall of previously memorized information without addi-
tional cues [32]. Most of these systems are based on reproducing graphical shapes on a
grid-based canvas (e.g., [103, 140, 248]). Figure 2.3 illustrates prominent representatives.
Simple shapes can also be seen as two-dimensional touch gestures [227]. More recently
published concepts indeed forgo visual feedback and should therefore be categorized as
gesture-based concepts (e.g., [208, 227]). Please note that apart from touch gestures, other
three-dimensional gesture-based systems were proposed. However, such schemes which uti-
lize in-air hand gestures (e.g., [59, 111, 165, 176]) or full body movements (e.g., [123, 173])
are out of scope of this work and will not be discussed.
Important design factors, which influence the usability and the security, are the matching
tolerance [103], the degree-of-freedom of the input [248] and the provided visual feed-
back [260]. As precisely reproducing previously entered shapes is very difficult, a relaxed
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matching mechanism increases usability. On the other hand, the theoretical password space
is reduced. The degree-of-freedom determines if shapes are freely drawn or if the drawing
is bounded to a grid. Finally, visual feedback can ease the reproduction of shapes but at the
same time increases observability. The different factors are illustrated in the next Section.
Representative Examples
In 1999, Jermyn et al. [140] published the first drawmetric password system with the goal
to achieve better security on personal digital assistants (PDAs). The proposed system which
was called Draw-a-Secret (DAS) is depicted in Figure 2.3 A. Draw-a-Secret passwords con-
sist of an arbitrary number of strokes which are drawn on a 5x5 grid. The resulting password
is mapped to a sequence of grid coordinates and allows hashing. While the theoretical pass-
word space of DAS is comparable to alphanumerical passwords (258) [140], it was shown
that user choice is predictable and DAS is vulnerable to dictionary attacks [187, 252]. User-
selected drawings are usually short [252] and placed in the center of the grid [187]. In
addition, users tend to choose symmetric shapes [187]. Varenhorst et al. [260] presented
Passdoodles which allows free-form drawing. In contrast to DAS, drawings are based on
a canvas without visible grid and can be composed of different colors. Qualitative Draw-
A-Secret (QDAS) [164] encodes drawings based on qualitative direction changes instead of
relying on grid-cells. As a consequence, users are not required to memorize concrete grids
but recall the starting cell and the order of direction changes.
Gao et al. [103] proposed another modification of DAS, called YAGP (Yet Another Graph-
ical Password). YAGP provides a larger grid (48x64) and allows position-free and size-
independent drawings (see Figure 2.3 C). First results indicated that users were able to fend
off observation attacks by drawing smaller versions of their passwords at covered positions.
On the downside, the matching algorithm of YAGP does not support hashed storage of se-
crets. Finally, PassShapes [275] combines the ideas of Passdoodles, QDAS and YAGP. The
PassShape interface does not provide a grid as the algorithm allows to draw on any position
of the canvas. As indicated in Figure 2.3 D, PassShapes are based on a predefined set of
eight different directions. The evaluation showed that this aspect simplified the input and
improved memorability. At the same time, the theoretical password space was scaled down.
Tao and Adams [248] presented Pass-Go. In contrast to earlier concepts which were based
grid cells, Pass-Go utilized the intersecting lines (see Figure 2.3 E). When a sensitive area at
an intersection is touched, a predefined shape appears. For single touches, a dot is displayed,
continuous touches are indicated by lines. As a consequence, the visualization of Pass-Go
passwords is unaffected from (small) trace variations and the indicators can be optimized
for good perceptibility. The concept furthermore supports switching off the indicators to in-
crease security. A three-month field study revealed an average password composition of five
strokes and two dots [32, 248]. The semantic analysis of the drawings revealed predictable
selection patterns. Users based their passwords on alphanumeric forms or used symmetric
shapes. In addition, many users started their pattern in the upper left corner and finished
in the lower right. While only three percent of the logins were performed without visual
indicators, 76% of them were successful.
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Figure 2.3: Representative recall-based authentication concepts. (A) Draw-a-Secret (DAS)
[140], (B) Qualitative Draw-A-Secret (QDAS) [164], (C) Yet Another Graphical Password
Strategy (YAGP) [103], (D) PassShapes [275], (E) Pass-Go [248] and (F) Android unlock pat-
tern [18].
In recent years, the Android unlock pattern became the first graphical password scheme
which was widely accepted [104]. The authentication mechanism which is available on
all mobile devices with Google’s Android operating system is a simplified version of Pass-
Go [104]. As seen in Figure 2.3 F, Android unlock patterns describe simple continuous
shapes which are entered on a 3x3 grid. The input is usually visualized through line and
point indicators. A valid pattern must comprise a minimum of four grid cells. As each point
can only be activated once and stays activated thereafter, the maximum length of a pattern
is nine. In addition, points which are orthogonal neighbors cannot be bypassed without
activation [18]. Due to these restrictions, the theoretical password space of the Android
pattern unlock is 389,112 [18]. Uellenbreck et al. [254] analyzed the selection strategies of
113 users and found that most users start their patterns on the left side of the matrix and end
on the right side. In addition, the upper left corner was the most used starting point. The
results indicated that Android patterns are vulnerable to dictionary attacks. Aviv et al. [18]
revealed the feasibility of smudge attacks. These attacks exploit oily traces (smudge) which
the user’s fingers leave on the touchscreen. In a user study, 68% of the unlock patterns were
exposed through such an attack. Andriotis et al. [11] confirmed the predictability of user-
selected Android patterns and claim that combining this knowledge with physical attacks
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based on smudge or observation makes unlock patterns very vulnerable. Due to the reduced
degree-of-freedom, Android unlock patterns rather represent gestures than drawings. This is
especially true when visual indicators are switched off.
Finally, some systems generally forgo visual feedback. Sherman et al. [227] proposed to
use free-form multi touch gestures on mobile devices without visual indicators to prevent
observation attacks. Niu and Chen [192] base the password on simple taps and argue that
this gesture class is easy to reproduce for the user, but hard to do for the attacker. Sae-
Bae et al. [208] evaluated five-finger gestures on touchscreens and additionally analyzed the
user’s input characteristics. A similar concept was proposed by Sun et al. [242]. Azenkot
et al. [20] presented PassChords, a tap based authentication system specifically designed for
blind users.
Assets and Drawbacks
Graphical recall-based authentication systems fundamentally differ from the other two cat-
egories. As the authentication is based on un-cued recall, these concepts have typically no
need for external images. This aspect increases the theoretical password space and makes
most drawmetric concepts more secure against brute force attacks [104, 113]. In addition,
most concepts allow hashed storage of passwords [32]. Beside the pictorial superiority ef-
fect [226, 235, 236], the repeated reproduction of the same shape or gesture can stimulate
the muscle memory [3, 94, 221] and therefore further improve memorability [204]. Further-
more, such concepts allow faster authentication than other graphical password systems [14].
This is especially true, when the input is based on simple shapes and gestures [275]. Fi-
nally, gesture-based authentication mechanisms allow eyes-free input and therefore support
visually impaired users [20].
On the downside, drawmetric concepts suffer from similar problems like alphanumeric pass-
words. Password selection is often predictable which makes the secrets vulnerable to dictio-
nary attacks [146,197,254] and users can easily “write down” or describe their passwords as
drawing them is part of the concept [32]. Furthermore, pure recall concepts cannot provide
improved phishing protection like the other two schemes [104]. As precisely reproducing the
same shapes or gestures is a difficult task [146,204,248], the complexity of feasible secrets is
restricted. In addition, this class of concepts is vulnerable to physical attacks [18, 104, 214].
Firstly, the direct input of simple drawings or gestures is usually easy to observe [104, 214].
Secondly, when gestures are entered using a touchscreen, smudge attacks become a serious
problem [11, 18]. This is especially true when the input is based on a fixed grid.
Mobile Device Applicability
The literature review reveals that all drawmetric systems were specifically designed for the
application on mobile devices. However, earlier concepts assumed that users interact with
mobile devices using a stylus and therefore required detailed drawings. As current mobile
devices are providing touch interfaces and finger-based interaction has become common,
the reproduction of complex drawings is more difficult and significantly slower. This was
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confirmed by Chiang and Chiasson [52] who tested Draw-a-Secret on smartphones. Schaub
et al. [214] adapted Pass-Go to mobile device and reported that the grid resolution had to
be reduced to 5x5 and the sensitive areas had to be increased. These modifications made
Pass-Go more similar to Android’s unlock patterns. Indeed, usability-optimized drawmetric
systems like Android patterns which are focusing on simple gestures and not on detailed
drawings seem well suited for mobile devices. However, current solutions are prone to
several threats like smudge attacks and observation. Therefore, the practical security must be
improved to make gesture-based schemes a promising alternative for PINs and alphanumeric
passwords on mobile devices.
2.2.4 Hybrid Approaches
Hybrid concepts comprise two or more aspects of recognition-based, cued-recall or pure
recall schemes [104]. According to the used combination, such systems provide similar us-
ability and security characteristics like single concepts [104]. Therefore, this Section merely
illustrates some examples, but does not provide a detailed discussion of usability and security
features. Some examples of hybrid authentication concepts are depicted in Figure 2.4.
Alsulaiman and Saddik [5] proposed the 3D Graphical password, an authentication scheme
which is based on the interaction with virtual objects in a three-dimensional environment. It
is one of the first hybrid concepts where input can involve mouse gestures (recall), switch-
ing of virtual lights (cued-recall) or recognizing objects. Thus, the concept comprises all
three mechanisms and allows the user to freely combine these aspects in a password. On the
downside, navigating through virtual worlds is a time-consuming task which requires the un-
divided attention of the user. Therefore, even if 3D passwords were specifically designed for
mobile devices, they seem to be unhandy for daily use. Citty and Hutchings [61] presented
TAPI which combines cued-recall and recognition-based aspects. TAPI presents a sequence
of four challenging sets. As illustrated in Figure 2.4 A, each set consists of 16 images which
are segmented into four parts. To authenticate, the user has to recognize the right objects
and then indicate the correct segment within each image. TAPI was found to be more secure
against observation attacks with authentication times from three to eleven seconds. Yuxin
Meng [179] combined object recognition with gesture recall. According to Meng’s concept,
a user first recognizes and selects four images in a specific order. In a second step, the user
performs a gesture on one of the selected images. Preliminary results indicated high success
rates but login times over 13 seconds. Gao et al. [105] presented a recognition-based scheme
which utilizes drawmetric elements as input method. To authenticate, the user draws a line
through a predefined sequence of images resulting in a shape. As images are presented in
random order, the resulting shape changes at each login. Since the drawn line activates both,
secret images and decoy images, the system is resistant against observation (see Section 2.3).
However, as for most recognition-based concepts, passwords need to be stored unencrypted.
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Figure 2.4: Examples of hybrid graphical authentication concepts. (A) TAPI [61], (B) Gesture-
Puzzle [216] and (C) Picture Gesture Authentication (PGA) [295].
Schlöglhofer and Sametinger [216] proposed GesturePuzzle, a cued-recall mechanism for
simple gestures. During enrollment, the user selects one or more objects and combines the
set of objects with a specific gestures. During authentication, the displayed objects indicate
the requested gesture. Figure 2.4 B illustrates the mechanism: the icon set is presented in
the highlighted area. The user would recognize the specific set and perform a rectangle ges-
ture (which was defined during enrollment). With Windows 8, Microsoft widely deployed
a hybrid concept called Picture Gesture Authentication (PGA) [295]. PGA combines the
original idea of PassPoints with discrete gestures. Instead of tapping, users perform gestures
on specific regions of a background image. As indicated in Figure 2.4 C, the gesture set
comprises circles, straight lines and taps. While PGA provides a large theoretical password
space, Zhao et al. [295] revealed that PGA has the same problem like traditional locimetric
systems. Users tend to perform their gestures on specific hotspots of the image which makes
the system vulnerable to dictionary attacks. At the same time, the authors claim that the
system provides more usability benefits than most other graphical password schemes.
2.3 Improving Security through Graphical and Gesture-
based Concepts
Section 2.2 indicated that graphical mechanisms indeed have advantages over traditional
text-based passwords. For example, graphical password systems are harder to break with
traditional attacks like social engineering [104] and are often easier to remember [32]. At the
same time, the evaluation revealed that simply using graphics instead of letters and symbols
does not solve the password problem [64, 90]. User choice remains predictable for many
concepts and observation attacks are a significant threat [104]. In addition, the use of such
concepts on touch-based devices can open new security holes like smudge attacks [19].
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To reduce these problems, researchers started to follow HCI principles to find more secure
but yet usable interaction methods and presentation styles [104]. The following Section
presents authentication concepts which where designed to reduce the threats of guessability,
smudge attacks and observability. We illustrate that increasing the practical security is a rel-
atively easy task, but becomes exceptionally hard when usability benefits shall be preserved.
Beside the presented concepts, other approaches exist which for example exploit biometric
features to provide additional security (e.g., [12, 69, 222]). As pointed out in Chapter 1,
biometric solutions are out of scope of this work and will not be discussed.
2.3.1 Resistance against Guessing Attacks
Section 2.2 indicated that all presented graphical and gesture-based password systems are
vulnerable to guessing attacks. Most recognition-based approaches provide a small pass-
word space and are vulnerable to brute force attacks. Locimetric schemes suffer from hot
spot problems and allow for fully automatic guessing attacks. Drawmetric schemes are
vulnerable to dictionary attacks as users choose predictable shapes and gestures. Though
these problems are known for several years, related work concerning the secure selection of
graphical or gesture-based secrets is relatively sparse. Conservative solutions imply system-
generated password assignments (e.g., [67, 89]) and password policies [197]. However, the
lessons learned from text-based passwords (see Section 2.1) indicate that such restrictive
countermeasures reduce memorability and introduce insecure behavior. As a consequence,
we are interested in concepts which exploit the possibilities of user-centered interaction de-
sign to positively influence selection behavior and to support users in creating better secrets.
This Section presents such approaches and categorizes the mechanisms based on the Per-
suasive Authentication Framework by Forget et al. [99]. The Persuasive Authentication
Framework provides five principles which can be used to positively influence password se-
lection. The presented concepts are categorized based on four of these principles, namely
monitoring, personalization, simplification and conditioning.
Monitoring the Input
The monitoring principle is based on the idea that users who are being observed are more
likely to behave in the desired way [99]. A special type of monitoring is the self-monitoring
where users get feedback to their behavior. Password meters which are already known from
alphanumeric passwords are one example of this category as the user gets feedback on the
strength of the password input. Several projects have considered this mechanism for gesture-
based authentication mechanisms, more precisely for Android unlock patterns. As depicted
in Figure 2.5 A, the visual appearance of such concepts matches the design of alphanumeric
password meters. However, the assessment of pattern strength differs between the concepts.
Sun et al. [241] calculate pattern strength based on the number of straight lines, the number
of dots (length), intersections and overlapping dots. Andriotis et al. [10] base the pattern
strength on length, direction changes, knight moves and overlaps. Finally, Song et al. [232]
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Figure 2.5: Designs to improve graphical password selection. (A) Pattern Meter [232], (B)
Saliency Masks [45] and (C) the Presentation Effect [251].
proposed to evaluate pattern length, the number of non-repeated sub-patterns and intersec-
tions. The relative weights of such pattern characteristics have not been evaluated. However,
it was shown that users react by selecting more complex gestures [10,229,232,241]. Siadati
and Memon [229] simulated guessing attacks on traditional unlock patterns and patterns se-
lected with a pattern meter. They report that 50% of the traditional patterns could be guessed
within 1000 guesses, while only 22.6% of the passwords of the meter condition were re-
vealed. Song et al. [232] attacked 101 patterns of both groups and required 16 guesses to
expose 10% of the traditional patterns and 48 guesses to reveal the same number under the
pattern meter condition. Unfortunately, the user studies also revealed that the choice of the
starting point of the gesture is not influenced by pattern meters. Apart from these concepts
concerning unlock patterns, the monitoring principle has not been proposed for graphical
password systems.
Personalizing the Interface
The personalization principle is based on the idea that personalized information is more
persuasive than generic information. Forget et al. [99] distinguish this principle in suggestion
and tailoring. Personalized interfaces have been proposed for the enrollment of drawmetric
and locimetric passwords.
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Dunphy et al. [83] proposed Background Draw a Secret (BDAS). BDAS is a modification
of Draw a Secret (DAS) which allows users to select personal background images. The
authors compared DAS and BDAS in a lab-based user study and found out that users se-
lected more complex and less symmetric patterns. In addition, the selected secrets were
significantly longer and less centered. A recall test after one week indicated that back-
ground images additionally improved memorability. On the downside, the authors note that
the images might introduce hot spot problems known from locimetric approaches and some
participants claimed that the colored background was distracting. Nevertheless, the BDAS
project indicates that simple changes in the user interface (like personal background images)
significantly influence password security. Por et al. [202] confirmed these positive effects
with a version of Pass-Go which also utilized personal background images.
Thorpe et al. [251] evaluated presentation effects on graphical password selection using Pass-
Points. For this purpose, they modified the presentation of the background image. Instead
of displaying the whole image at once, they opened a white curtain either from the left or
from the right side of the screen. The effect took 20 seconds and the image was revealed at
constant rate (see Figure 2.5 C). The evaluation of the system revealed a significant impact
on the click-point selection. Users choose the first click point at the side of the screen which
was first revealed. The authors conclude that such simple modifications can result in a sig-
nificantly different password distribution and note that the specific presentation used during
enrollment should be unknown to the attacker. Siadati and Memon [229] proposed a similar
effect for Android unlock patterns. During enrollment, one random point of the 3x3 matrix
starts blinking to nudge users to select this specific point first. The effect resulted in nearly
equally distributed starting points. However, pattern composition remained predicable.
Chiasson et al. [54] presented a modification of the Cued Click-Points (CCP) scheme called
Persuasive Cued Click-Points (PCCP). The evaluation of CCP had already indicated that the
sequential ordering of multiple pictures can reduce the hotspot problem. PCCP was designed
to further eliminate hotspots by persuading users to select more random click-points [56].
During enrollment the system highlights a small rectangle which is randomly positioned on
the background image. Users are required to select a click-point within the given rectangle.
To ease the selection, the rectangle can be shuffled. The analysis of the concept revealed that
users are indeed nudged to select more random click-points and thus the practical password
space can be significantly increased. Since the active selection area is reduced and shuffling
the rectangle implies additional effort, the system also comprises aspects of simplification
and conditioning [99]. These principles are discussed in the next Section.
Simplifying the Selection
Forget et al. [99] distinguish the simplification principle in tunneling and reduction effects.
The main goal of such strategies is to reduce the complexity and the number of required
interactions. This can be done by suggesting secrets or by reducing the number of avail-
able options. In contrast to personalized strategies like PCCP [56] which provide personal-
ized suggestions for each user, concepts of this category display the same set of options to
all users.
33
Bulling et al. [45] proposed a simplification approach for PassPoints. The concept is based
on a computational model for visual attention and masks areas of an image which are most
likely selected by the user (see Figure 2.5 B). However, these saliency masks are only present
during enrollment. During authentication, the whole image is displayed. A user study indi-
cated that saliency masks indeed reduce hotspot selections and increase the practical security
of PassPoints. Uellenbeck et al. [254] proposed to change the layout of the Android pattern
unlock to reduce the predictability of user-selected secrets. One idea was to remove the up-
per left cell as this cell is most often chosen as a starting point. However, the change did
not have the desired impact as users simply chose the point next to the removed cell. Other
proposed layouts were quasi-random or based on a circular design. While these layouts ef-
fectively prevented selection patterns known from the matrix layout, they introduced other
predictable selection behavior. This shows that simply changing from one layout to another
is not an effective solution and interface changes need to be thoroughly thought through.
Bicakci et al. [31] proposed to solve the hot spot problem of click-based password schemes
by assigning random passwords. Therefore, the background image provides a set of well
distinguishable icons. During enrollment, the system called GPIS randomly generates a set
of icons (click-points) and suggests the secret to the user. If the user is not satisfied with
the generated password, she can ask the system to generate a new one. This procedure
can be infinitely repeated. The evaluation showed that the system effectively eliminates the
hotspot problem. The concept is similar to the Persuasive Cued Click-Points (PCCP) scheme
but further restricts user choice [56]. Finally, both concepts may exploit the principle of
conditioning as not accepting the suggested viewport (PCCP) or icon set (GPIS) results in
additional effort for the user. According to the conditioning principle, desired behavior shall
be reinforced. As accepting the suggested click-points results in a faster enrollment, both
systems reinforce the compliance with the recommendations.
2.3.2 Resistance against Smudge Attacks
The design of authentication systems which are particularly resistant against smudge attacks
is a relatively new discipline as the susceptibility of grid-based passwords to smudge attacks
was just recently revealed [19]. Searchmetric concepts (e.g., Passfaces [41]) usually rely
on a randomized presentation of challenging sets, and thus provide inherent smudge attack
security. In contrast, the static input of locimetric and drawmetric concepts allows the in-
terpretation of smudge traces to derive the entered secret. Up to now, there are only three
publications specifically focusing on secure designs against smudge attacks [4, 161, 218].
The presented concepts prevent smudge attacks through the introduction of randomization
and additional tasks.
Airowaily and Alrubaian [4] presented WhisperCore which is based on the generic idea of
blurring smudge traces. For this purpose, the user is required to wipe a presented figure as
a final step before the smartphone is unlocked (see Figure 2.6 A). The mechanism works
independently from the used authentication mechanism and can be added to any vulnerable
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Figure 2.6: Smudge attack resistant concepts. (A) WhisperCore [4], (B) TinyLock [161] and
(C) SmudgeSafe [218].
system. The authors did not report any evaluation data. However, it can be assumed that
the introduction of an additional wiping task will annoy most users. Kwon and Na [161]
proposed TinyLock, a smudge attack resistant concept for unlock patterns. As indicated in
Figure 2.6 B, the concept introduces a minimized 3x3 grid and an additional wiping task.
Unlock patterns are entered using the minimized grid. After the pattern is entered, a vir-
tual wheel needs to be rotated at the same position to blur smudge traces. TinyLock was
compared to the original unlock pattern scheme. Even if TinyLock slowed down the authen-
tication process, it was equally easy to use as the original scheme. The security analysis
showed that TinyLock was remarkably secure against smudge attacks as none of the entered
patterns was exposed. Schneegass et al. [218] presented SmudgeSafe, a drawmetric system
based on background images. Similar to PGA [295], the user performs a gesture on specific
regions of the background image to authenticate [202]. To increase the resistance to smudge
attacks, geometric image transformations are randomly applied during authentication (see
Figure 2.6 C). The authors tested a transformation set consisting of translation, rotation,
scaling, shearing, and flipping. The security analysis revealed that 5-30% (avg. 12.7%) of
the smudge traces could be interpreted depending on the used transformation. The usability
analysis revealed an average authentication time of 3.6 seconds and an error rate of 25%.
2.3.3 Resistance against Observation Attacks
Observation attacks, also called shoulder surfing attacks, can be distinguished into cognitive
attacks and video-based observations [276]. While the use of technical equipment like video
cameras allows a detailed analysis of the observed input, cognitive attacks are restricted
by the attackers short-term memory. In general, all knowledge-based authentication mech-
anisms are prone to such attacks [249]. However, graphical and gesture-based password
systems are often exceptionally easy to observe as they are based on the direct interaction
with graphical elements [104,249]. While the entry of alphanumeric passwords can be some-
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what disguised using asterisk-based password fields, the input of a touch gesture is harder to
shield [292]. The same is true for the selection of click-points [276] or pass-icons [81]. As
a consequence, the development of graphical and gesture-based authentication mechanisms
which are resistant to shoulder surfing became an active research area [279].
The design of hard-to-observe authentication mechanisms nicely illustrates the interplay of
usability and security features. Proposed concepts often rely on complex selection tasks
(e.g., [160, 246, 278]), cognitive detours (e.g., [112, 130, 147]) or the recall of additional
secrets (e.g., [72,244,283]). While these strategies make the input indeed harder to observe,
they also tend to increase the mental load and input times. Other concepts require additional
hardware or increased computational power (e.g., [100, 281]). The discussed concepts are
classified according to the used strategy. We distinguish three different approaches: The first
approach establishes invisible communication channels. The second class is based on the
indirect selection of tokens or on multiplexed input. The last concept type applies distraction
strategies or visually overloads the graphical user interface. The following explains the three
strategies in detail and discusses their usability and security.
Invisible Communication Channels
Perhaps the most obvious solution for the shoulder surfing problem is making (parts of) the
authentication process invisible. Such invisible channels are established through nudging
users to shield their display, through multi-modal interaction and by exploiting micro ges-
tures like touch pressure or eye movements. Kim et al. [151] proposed ShieldPIN to protect
the PIN entry on tabletops. To authenticate, the user has to perform a shield gesture in a
specific area on the screen. As soon as the shield gesture is performed, the keypad appears
and the PIN can be entered. Qiang Yan [288] proposed CoverPad, a similar approach for
mobile devices (see Figure 2.7 A). CoverPad additionally delivers hidden transformation
messages (e.g., “add 3 to every digit”) whenever the shielding gesture is recognized. As
the user transforms her input according to the presented message, the observable interaction
with the keypad does not reveal the memorized secret.
Sasamoto et al. [211] were the first to present a multi-modal authentication approach relying
on sensory cues. The searchmetric system, called Undercover, is based on a portfolio of
five previously memorized pictures. In several rounds, the user is asked to identify her
picture within a presented challenge set. The challenge set consists of four pictures and a
“none” option. To secure this visual channel, the user establishes a secret channel by placing
the left hand on a machine which delivers sensory cues. The final prototype is depicted in
Figure 2.7 B. According to the sensed cue, the user gives the right or a wrong answer (binary
cue) or transforms the answer. The authors tested contact-based, friction-based and tactile
cues and claimed that Undercover is secure against repeated observation and video-attacks
assuming that hand movements and motor noises cannot be interpreted. De Luca et al. [73]
presented a similar concept for the secure input of alphanumeric secrets on public terminals.
Similar to Undercover, Vibrapass delivers binary haptic cues to indicate fake input (so called
lies). The authors proposed to exploit the vibration function of the user’s mobile device to
establish the secret channel.
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Figure 2.7: Observation resistant concepts based on a secret channel. (A) CoverPad [288], (B)
Undercover [211], (C) PhoneLock [27], (D) Audio Instructions for Multisensory Authentication
[120], (E) Spinlock [28] and (F) GlassUnlock [281]
While Undercover and Vibrapass were designed to protect the input on public terminals,
multi-modal concepts were also proposed for mobile devices. Bianchi et al. [29] designed
PhoneLock [27] which allows secure PIN-entry on smartphones. As illustrated in Fig-
ure 2.7 C, the system provides a graphical wheel which is composed of ten equally sized
targets, each representing a digit (0-9). Although the orientation of the wheel is randomized,
the internal order of the segments stays the same. As soon as the user touches one segment,
one out of ten specific cues is delivered indicating the underlying digit. The authors tested
haptic and audio cues and reported average authentication times between 12 (audio) and 28
(haptic) seconds depending on the modality. Hasegawa et al. [120] tested different audio
cues on a similar wheel-based input system. Instead of simple peeps, the authors proposed
to use animal sounds, colors or clock-based instructions. As depicted in Figure 2.7 D, the
graphical wheel is illustrated according to the given cues. For example, when animal sounds
are delivered, images of the corresponding animals are provided (see Figure 2.7 D(a)). The
evaluation indicated that concrete sounds and images are less error prone and allow faster au-
thentication times than abstract cues (e.g., peeps). Kuribara et al. [160] published VibraInput
which is based on a reduced set of distinct vibration patterns. Instead of ten cues, VibraInput
provides only four distinguishable patterns. Each digit is entered in two distinct steps using
a graphical wheel. The entered digit is derived by the intersection of both steps.
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To further reduce the effort of recognizing and interpreting distinct cues, Bianchi et al. [28,
29] proposed a set of authentication concepts which are based on counting simple cues.
Spinlock is one example of this class. Similar to the prior concepts, Spinlock is also based
on a graphical wheel (see Figure 2.7 E). As soon as the user starts rotating the wheel, the
system delivers single cues (haptic or audio). After the intended number of cues has been
received, the user stops the input and the number of cues is translated into a single digit and
sent to the system. The evaluation of such single-cue systems indicated that counting is faster
and less error prone [29]. Instead of relying on haptic or audio cues, Winkler et al. [281]
presented GlassUnlock which secretly delivers visual cues through a private near-eye display
(e.g., smart glasses). For example, the user would see the current mapping of a randomized
PIN-pad through her smart glasses while the input would be performed on the empty buttons
of the smartphone (see Figure 2.7 F). The authors claimed that authentication times were
comparable fast to standard PIN-entry. The downside of the concept is the requirement of
additional hardware.
In addition to shielding gestures and multi-modal interaction, the use of micro gestures has
been proposed to protect authentication from observation attacks. TinyLock [161] which
was discussed in connection with smudge attacks (Section 2.3.2) is one representative of this
concept class. Kim et al. [151] proposed Pressure-Grid which allows the entry of graphical
and numeric passwords. To authenticate, the user places three fingers on distinct areas of a
touchscreen and presses the fingers to select specific items of a grid. The evaluation showed
that pressure-based input is significantly harder to observe. Malek et al. [169] proposed to
use pressure-based input for grid-based gestures. A performed lab study revealed only lim-
ited observation resistance. While most participants included pressure into their gestures, the
qualitative feedback indicated that using the additional pressure information was annoying
for some users. Gaze-input can be seen as another class of micro gestures as the selection
of screen items requires very small eye movements. Weiss and De Luca [275] evaluated
the input of PassShapes based on relative eye-gestures and reported that this input method
slows down the authentication process but at the same time increases observation resistance.
In a simulated video-based observation attack, 100% of the traditional PassShapes were ex-
posed, but only 55% of the secrets entered with eye-gestures could be identified. Forget
et al. [100] proposed Cued Gaze-Points, a version of PassPoints relying on eye-gaze input.
To authenticate, the user looks at the desired point of the image and presses the space bar
to confirm. Arianezhad et al. [15] applied eye-gaze input to grid-based graphical password
schemes. The latter two concepts are significantly harder to observe, since the observed eye
movements need to be mapped to specific regions on the display.
Indirect Input and Multiplexed Secrets
Authentication systems of this category are based on the indirect selection of secret tokens.
Therefore, the user either touches an area distant from the actual secret or selects a larger set
of tokens to disguise the actual secret. Roth et al. [207] presented the first representatives
of this class, referred to as cognitive trapdoor games. The systems allowed shoulder surfing
resistant PIN-entry. As indicated in Figure 2.8 A, the system provided a PIN pad, where half
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of the digits were colored in black and the other half was colored in white. To authenticate,
the user repeatedly indicates the set (color) which comprises the intended digit by pressing
one of the buttons labeled “black” and “white”. The system calculates the intersection of
the subsets and derives the entered digit. As 16 challenges are required to enter a 4-digit
PIN, authentication times are high (> 20 seconds). Takada [244] proposed to augment digits
with shapes. According to the FakePointer concept, the user memorizes her PIN and one
distinct shape per digit. During authentication different shapes are randomly assigned to the
ten buttons of the PIN pad (see Figure 2.8 B). To authenticate, the user shifts the numbers
using the left and right keys of the keyboard. As soon as the intended digit matches the
memorized shape, the process is completed. De Luca et al. [72] added color information to
each digit to allow the indirect input of PINs. The system, called ColorPIN, displays each
digit with three differently colored letters. To enter a digit, the user presses the respective
letter that matches the previously memorized color. In the example of Figure 2.8 C, the
user would have memorized “4, black” and would therefore press the “L” on the keyboard.
The main advantage of ColorPIN is the one-to-one relationship between user input and the
length of the entered PIN. Like FakePointers, the downside is that the user has to memorize
one additional secret per digit. A performed user study showed that ColorPIN is significantly
more secure, but entering a four digit PIN took about 12 seconds.
One of the first shoulder surfing resistant authentication schemes for the input of graphical
secrets was proposed by Wiedenbeck et al. [278]. The convex hull scheme is based on the
recognition of multiple pass-icons. The pass-icons are randomly positioned within a larger
set of decoy icons. Instead of directly clicking on the icons, the user is required to click
somewhere inside the area which results from mentally connecting the outer borders of the
pass icons (as indicated in Figure 2.8 D). As this procedure must be repeated several times
and each round comprises a complex search task, users needed over one minute to success-
fully authenticate. Zhao and Li [294] designed a similar system for the entry of alphanumeric
passwords. Khot et al. [147] designed WYSWYE (Where You See is What You Enter) to al-
low the indirect input of recognition-based secrets. Using WYSEYE, the user identifies her
previously memorized pass icons in a larger grid and maps the identified patterns of these
pass icons into a smaller grid (see Figure 2.8 E). As the user thereby mentally eliminates the
rows and columns which do not comprise pass icons, the process is very hard to follow for
observers. Nevertheless, a controlled lab study indicated long authentication times (> 100
seconds) and high mental load. Altiok et al. [6] proposed Graph Neighbors where users are
required to memorize a symbol, a color and a direction. To authenticate, the user has to find
the secret which matches the previously memorized shape and color and then clicks on a
neighbor of this symbol. The respective neighbor is indicated by the memorized direction.
The authors tested different versions of the system providing different complexities and re-
ported success rates from 74% to 96%. Input times and empirical shoulder surfing data was
not provided. Ho et al. [130] published a recognition-based authentication system which is
based on the indirect selection of a specific sequence of images. To authenticate, the user
clicks on a target picture which is derived from a starting picture and a cueing picture. In
contrast to the starting and the cueing pictures, the targets are generally not part of the user’s
pass images. The evaluation of the system indicated authentication times over 50 seconds.
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Figure 2.8: Observation resistant concepts based on indirect input and multiplexed secrets. (A)
Cognitive Trapdoor Games [207], (B) FakePointer [244], (C) ColorPIN [72], (D) Convex Hull
Scheme [278], (E) WYSWYE (Where You See is What You Enter) [147] and (F) Picassopass
[258]
In addition to indirect selection, several concepts make use of multiplexed input. In such
concepts, the user never selects a single token, but touches a set of objects comprising the
secret. Therefore, these concepts have their origin in the cognitive trapdoor games by Roth
et al. [207]. The hybrid authentication scheme by Gao et al. [105] which was discussed
in Section 2.2.4 is a representative of this concept class. As the user draws a line through
both pass-icons and decoy images, the actual secret remains hidden in the set of activated
icons. Based on the same idea, Kita et al. [152] designed the Secret Tap Method. The user
interface presents 16 icons, the user repeatedly indicates a subset of four icons comprising
his secret icon. In addition, a predefined shift value allows the indirect selection of the
icon set. Bianchi et al. [26] proposed ShaPIN, where secrets are composed of an arbitrary
sequence of numbers, letters, colors and shapes. During authentication, the graphical user
interface presents different combinations of these elements. The user selects the button
which comprises the intended element. The authors reported authentication times of over
10 seconds. At the same time, the system was significantly more secure than ColorPIN.
van Eekelen et al. [258] presented Picassopass which is, like ShaPIN, based on the layered
combination of different graphical elements. As depicted in Figure 2.8 F, each token is
a combination of a basic shape, a color, a letter and a shape based on a specific theme
(e.g., horses). The specific character or the used elements shall support story-based secret
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selection. The authors claim that multiple observations are required to expose the entered
secret. As any selection of such multiplexed tokens sends variable information to the system
and the system has to deduce the user’s secret, such concepts do usually not support hashed
storage which opens other security holes.
Distraction and Visual Overload
Such concepts confuse potential observers by visually overloading the graphical user inter-
face. Systems of this class are usually not resistant against video-based attacks. However,
visually overloading the graphical interface can be a feasible strategy to overcharge an at-
tacker’s short-term memory and therefore fends off cognitive observers. Tan et al. [246]
designed the Spy-resistant keyboard which allows observation resistant password entry on
public touchscreens. The concept breaks the entry of a letter into two distinct phases: the
mapping phase and the selection phase. All characters are randomly assigned to a position
of the virtual keyboard. As illustrated in Figure 2.9 A, the characters are grouped to sets
of three items. In addition, a red line is randomly assigned to one of the characters of each
set. If the user wants to enter an character, she needs to find the respective set and then
shift the red indicator line until it matches the intended character. In the selection phase,
the user starts dragging to the respective position of the character set. At the moment, the
interaction starts, the mapping disappears. Hence, an attacker would have to memorize the
whole mapping before the selection phase starts to reconstruct the user’s input. While a user
study indicated good protection against cognitive shoulder surfing, the input time for single
characters was more than doubled. De Luca et al. [75] proposed the use of fake cursors
to protect mouse-based on-screen password entry via virtual keyboards. The concept intro-
duces multiple dummy cursors which mimic the movements of the real user-operated mouse
cursor. As a result, the real mouse cursor is hard to identify for observers (see Figure 2.9 B).
On the other hand, the user can easily follow the real mouse cursor as it accurately follows
the movements of her hand. A similar approach was published by Watanabe et al. [271].
Zakaria et al. [292] evaluated different techniques to protect the Draw-a-Secret (DAS) mech-
anism from observation attacks: They tested decoy strokes, disappearing strokes and line
snaking. Decoy strokes are based on a similar idea like dummy cursors. While the user
draws a line, decoy lines appear on screen and mimic the movements of the input. Please
note that this strategy is only feasible for indirect input. Line snaking and disappearing
strokes are based the idea that drawn lines disappear and therefore, the observer needs to
memorize the whole process. While all three techniques had only medium effects in terms
of security, it became apparent that disappearing lines worked better than decoy lines. While
the imitation strategy of the decoy lines did not work well enough to distract observers, they
irritated the eligible user and therefore downgraded the usability. Gugenheimer et al. [112]
proposed ColorSnakes, a gesture-based PIN concept which is also based on fake paths (de-
coy lines). A ColorSnake password consists of a colored starting digit and four consecutive
digits. To authenticate, the user searches the first digit in the memorized color and then in-
directly selects the remaining digits by indicating the direction using touch gestures. Figure
2.9 C illustrates the visually confusing user interface. ColorSnakes was evaluated in lab and
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Figure 2.9: Observation resistant concepts based on visual overload and distraction. (A) Spy-
resistant keyboard [246], (B) Fake Cursors [75], (C) ColorSnakes [112], (D)Color-Rings [151]
and (E) Indirect Image-based Authentication (I-IBA) [285]
field studies and achieved good observation protection, especially when additional counter-
measures were taken (e.g., obfuscating the digits after the selection). The authentication
times could be reduced to seven seconds after one week of usage.
Kim et al. [151] designed two authentication concepts for tabletops which are based on visual
overload. Color-Rings provides four rings to select multiple pass icons. All rings have to be
placed at the same time. While only one ring makes the actual input, the other three rings
make decoy selections (see Figure 2.9 D). The other concept, called SlotPIN, introduced
redundant reels with randomly positioned digits to conceal the PIN entry. Yamamoto et
al. [285] proposed a system called I-IBA which simultaneously presents several sideshows.
As depicted in Figure 2.9 E, one of the slideshows comprises at least one previously mem-
orized image which needs to be identified by the user. The authors claim that an observer
would need multiple video-based attacks to reveal the pass images within a slideshows. Wu
et al. [283] combined the idea of the Convex Hull Scheme with elements of dummy cursors.
According to their concept, multiple colored balls are randomly moving across the screen.
The user has to follow one predefined color, the rest of the balls are decoy elements. When-
ever, the predefined ball is moving in the respective area given by the pass-icons, the user
presses the space bar. While the concept is robust even against video-based attacks, input
times were high (>40 seconds).
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2.4 Lessons Learned and Open Questions
The literature review gave important insights into the design, the evaluation and the use of
authentication mechanisms. At the same time, it revealed important unsolved problems. In
this Section, we summarize the lessons learned and point out open questions.
Usability is an Often Unmet Requirement for Security
Usability is a precondition for feasible authentication concepts. While early work consid-
ered usability and security as opponents, the literature review revealed that usability is an
indispensable supporter for security. Most security problems discussed in connection with
text-based passwords are the result of insufficient usability features. We learned that mem-
orability plays the most important role for text-based passwords: To cope with the large
number of accounts, users follow predictable selection strategies and use passwords across
multiple services. Graphical and gesture-based authentication mechanisms were shown to
reduce the memory burden due to supporting the specific skills of the human brain. At the
same time, such concepts are often not feasible due to high input times and are therefore not
accepted in the wild.
We conclude that there is usually a trade-off between usability and security, but security
cannot exist without usability. This aspect becomes crucial in connection with mobile de-
vices. As users cannot be forced to use security mechanisms, inadequate performance will
most likely result in non-usage and therefore completely abolish security. In addition, we
assume that the frequent use of mobile devices makes efficiency even more important than
memorability.
Theoretical Security is Indispensable but Sometimes Neglected
The discussion revealed that theoretical security is an indispensable requirement for any
feasible authentication system. We learned from text-based authentication mechanisms that
complex passwords and considerate security behavior become irrelevant as soon as theoret-
ical security fails. This is either the case when clear-text secrets can be accessed by attack-
ers or when a small password space makes exhaustive guessing attacks effective. While
disclosed databases provide a great opportunity for password research, they represent a
significant security problem for the user. The review of alternative authentication mecha-
nisms showed that the requirement of adequate theoretical security is often neglected. Most
recognition-based concepts provide a small theoretical password space and do not support
securely encrypted storage. The same is true for gesture-based and drawmetric systems when
the matching algorithm does not support password encryption. Section 2.3 revealed that the-
oretical security is sometimes sacrificed for improved practical security as some concepts
achieve observation resistance based on the unencrypted storage of passwords.
We conclude that independent of the context, feasible concepts must not sacrifice theoretical
security for improved practical security. Therefore, encrypted storage of secrets must be a
precondition for authentication mechanisms on mobile devices.
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Practical Security is Vital but Hard to Measure
The literature review indicated an inherent difference between the theoretical protection and
the practical security of a system. While theoretical security can be mathematically as-
sessed, practical security is significantly influenced by user behavior and by the context of
use and thus requires empirical analysis. After over 30 years of research, the real-world
strength of a text-based password is still hard to define. Section 2.2 indicates that the di-
versity of graphical and gesture-based authentication mechanisms makes the assessment of
password strength even more complex. However, as both text-based and alternative secrets
were shown to result in a predictable password choice, password popularity was identified as
an important security factor. With the increasing number of graphical authentication mech-
anisms, password capturing (e.g., observation attacks) became another major research topic
and various solutions were proposed. Nevertheless, the literature review reveals that despite
the large corpus of observation-resistant designs, the practical threat of such attacks and the
vulnerability of current concepts are not well understood.
We conclude that it is vital that feasible authentication concepts actually provide the intended
security in the wild and thus relevant factors need to be assessed in the actual context of
use. For mobile authentication methods, observation-resistance was identified as a major
requirement but guessing-resistance is still a crucial feature. Finally, lessons learned from
text-based passwords need to be respected when developing novel concepts. While password
reuse might be less an issue considering unlock screens, password sharing might become a
serious problem [142].
(Mobile) Context Matters but is Not Well Understood
The context is a critical factor for the assessment of the feasibility, security and usability
of authentication mechanisms. From text-based passwords, we learned that authentication
methods need to fit into the social context of use: Most important, using a specific authen-
tication mechanism should not feel awkward or communicate mistrust. The usage pattern
and risk perception are important contextual factors which influence the perceived suitability
of a system. Finally, feasible authentication concepts should be tailored to both the target
hardware and the target user group to maximize accessibility and acceptability. Mobile de-
vices have special demands which need to be satisfied by feasible authentication systems.
Interaction is usually based on rather small touchscreens and frequency of use is high. Au-
thentication may take place in various uncontrolled environments and situations. In addition,
the concept must support a diverse set of devices and a heterogeneously skilled target group.
The literature review indicates that gestures are well suited for mobile devices: They natu-
rally support touch-based interaction and may even allow eyes-free interaction. At the same
time, gestures were also shown to be vulnerable. The literature review revealed that pro-
posed solutions sometimes neglect the special demands of the mobile context. For example,
security-optimized designs were often based on additional hardware or resulted in high au-
thentication times. We argue that both aspects do not satisfy the demands of mobile devices:
High usage frequency requires efficient authentication tasks and additional hardware seems
unhandy and may exclude a huge set of devices.
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Lessons Learned and Open Questions
We conclude that feasible authentication mechanisms need to fit into the context of mobile
devices. However, this context comprises various dimension which are not yet understood.
It is crucial to understand the usage patterns and the risk perception of users to be able to
tailor authentication concepts to the context of use and to meet the users’ expectations.
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EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

Chapter3
Exploring the Problem Space of
Gesture-based Authentication
All truths are easy to understand once they are discovered;
the point is to discover them.
– Galileo Galilei, astronomer (1564 - 1642) –
Following an inductive research approach [168], we start by analyzing the current state of
gesture-based authentication on mobile devices. This Chapter defines the problem space
of gesture-based authentication and presents four research projects which aim to understand
real-world behavior and real-world problems. The outcome of this Chapter will answer most
of the questions that were identified in Chapter 2. In addition, the insights gained from field
observation are essential to draw the right implications for future designs.
Section 3.1 defines the problem space and gives an overview of the research covered in this
Chapter. In Section 3.2, we investigate risk perception in the wild and gain valuable insights
into real-life unlock behavior. Section 3.3 focuses on the comparison of PIN and gestures.
The analysis of both concepts in a controlled field study shows important differences in user
experience and error handling. Section 3.4 systematically investigates the observability of
grid-based gestures and presents a prediction model which can be used to assess the specific
risk of a given gesture. In Section 3.5, we present a similarity metric for grid-based gestures
and apply it to a corpus of user-defined gestures. The results confirm the vulnerability of
current concepts and reveal interesting insights into human preferences regarding geometric
properties. Finally, Section 3.6 aggregates the results and draws implications for future
designs.
3.1 The Problem Space
The literature review in Chapter 2 revealed a list of requirements for feasible authentication
mechanisms. This Section summarizes these requirements and defines the problem space of
graphical gesture-based authentication on mobile devices.
The first part of this Section describes the problem space and points out the most important
issues. While the problem space could theoretically imply an unlimited number of factors,
we focus on relevant aspects that can be improved through enhanced interaction concepts
and thorough design decisions. For each factor, we define the goal state (the ideal solution)
and assess the current state. The ultimate goal is to achieve a matching of the current state
and the goal state [8]. Chapter 4 will discuss potential steps to achieve this research goal.
The second part of this Section gives an overview over four research projects that explore
the defined problem space and gather important insights into the current state of graphical
gesture-based authentication on mobile devices. The current state is mainly assessed uti-
lizing Android unlock patterns, a widely accepted graphical gesture-based authentication
mechanisms. In 2015, such grid-based gestures were available on over 80%1 of all smart-
phones and consequently represent the perfect test bed to explore real-world problems.
3.1.1 Definition
Chapter 2 shows that feasible authentication mechanisms must provide both usability and
security [1,32]. An ideal authentication system would provide perfect security at zero costs.
However, this goal has not yet been achieved and current authentication systems usually
comprise a tradeoff between usability and security.
This Section defines the problem space of gesture-based authentication mechanisms on mo-
bile devices. The context is important as the relative weights of usability aspects and security
features are likely to change depending on the use case. While most aspects are precondi-
tions for all authentication mechanisms (e.g., effectiveness), others are primarily important
for gesture-based authentication (e.g., smudge resistance). Even though single factors are
discussed in isolation, it is important to keep in mind that most factors interact with each
other: For example, memorability problems may negatively influence practical security.
Usability
Usability is an important factor for all security systems [1]. The usability features determine
the direct costs that a user has to pay when using the system. As a consequence, authentica-
tion systems which offer insufficient usability will most probably be bypassed. In the context
of mobile devices, (perceived) efficiency and effectiveness are exceptionally important for
mainly two reasons: First of all, authentication takes place many times a day and therefore,
1 http://www.idc.com/prodserv/smartphone-os-market-share.jsp – last accessed: 2015/11/02.
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Figure 3.1: The Figure illustrates the most important aspects of the problem space of graphical
gesture-based authentication mechanisms on mobile devices.
increased effort quickly adds up to unacceptable costs. Secondly, in contrast to other envi-
ronments (e.g., ATM), security is optional and therefore authentication systems demanding
unacceptable effort will most probably not be used.
Efficiency describes the additional effort a person faces by using an authentication system.
While this may imply both mental effort and physical effort, efficiency is usually assessed
by the time it takes to successfully authenticate (e.g., [276]). As authentication time may
exceed input time due to preparation effort or clean up phases (e.g., [112]), it is important
to investigate all possible steps of the authentication process.
The ideal authentication system (goal state) allows authentication without additional effort.
Behavioral authentication mechanisms can theoretically fulfill this requirement as the user
is authenticated based on tasks which would be performed anyway [137]. However, such
solutions do not support ad-hoc authentication. In the context of mobile devices, efficiency
is exceptionally important as authentication usually takes place many times a day. Section
3.2 will show that PIN and Android unlock patterns are satisfactorily efficient for most users
while some users still refrain from using unlock screens, claiming that current solutions are
too slow. Section 3.3 presents a comparison of unlock gestures and PINs and indicates that
perceived efficiency is even more important than measured efficiency.
Effectiveness from the usability point of view describes if a user is able to successfully
authenticate. Usually, the error rate is analyzed to assess effectiveness (e.g., [100]). Errors
can be examined in various dimensions: A user may fail in a single authentication attempt
or fail completely meaning that the device gets blocked and a fallback authentication system
is required [114]. Section 3.3 will show that the number of corrected attempts should be
assessed as well, whenever error correction methods are provided. Finally, it is important
to distinguish the source of errors: While inaccurate input indicates interaction problems,
incorrect recall indicates memorability issues.
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The ideal authentication system (goal state) eliminates all possible sources of error and guar-
antees successful authentication. Similarly to efficiency, high success rates are prerequisites
for acceptable authentication systems. This is particularly true in the context of mobile de-
vices as authentication is performed in various situations (e.g., walking, talking) and often
represents a secondary task. Just like efficiency, the in the wild effectiveness of current
authentication methods has not yet been evaluated systematically. It is investigated in Sec-
tion 3.3.
Memorability describes how well secrets (e.g., gestures) are remembered and recalled.
Even though memorability is categorized as a usability feature, it directly influences the
security of a system [286]. Since long-term evaluations are costly and time-consuming, eval-
uations are often limited to short-term (minutes) or mid-term (days) recall tasks (e.g., [55]).
The memorability of a secret is mainly influenced by its meaningfulness and the frequency of
use [40]. That is, a frequently used secret is easier to recall than a rarely used one and a self-
selected and meaningful secret can be easier recalled than an abstract and system-assigned
one. In addition, internal processing (visual, motor, linguistic) and the retrieval strategy
(recognition, recall) play an important role [32]. In addition to the persistence of a learned
secret, the learnability itself is an important aspect: It describes the required effort to learn a
new secret or a new authentication concept.
The ideal authentication system (goal state) empowers users to create and to immediately
memorize an infinite number of different secrets. In reality, there is an upper bound for mem-
orized tokens. Even if memorability can be assumed to be a minor problem in the context
of mobile devices as unlocks are usually performed many times a day, the memorability of
current unlock mechanisms has not yet been evaluated systematically. Section 3.3 presents
first insights and indicates good memorability for both PIN and unlock gestures.
Perception is a critical factor for the usability assessment of authentication systems. It is
usually measured through user feedback collected via questionnaires and interviews (e.g.,
[73]). User perception can be distinguished into satisfaction and likeability. The first aspect
describes how users perceive efficiency, effectiveness, memorability and security of a given
system. The second aspect deals with user experience and describes if people enjoy the
system. Both aspects are strongly influenced by the context of use and by social factors
[1]. For example, the perceived risk may determine how much people are willing to pay
(perceived effort) for additional security [23].
The ideal authentication system is both satisfying and joyful to use (goal state). In addition,
this should only be the case if the system is used in its most secure configuration. To design
feasible authentication mechanisms which people will use, it is important to understand how
risks are perceived and how unlock mechanisms are used in the wild. Section 3.2 provides
insights into real-world behavior while Section 3.3 sheds light on the perception of PIN and
unlock gestures.
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Accessibility is important to support a maximum range of users in a maximum extent of
situations. The most important factors are mental effort, physical effort and hardware re-
quirements. Increased mental effort or high physical demand might exclude a huge portion
of users (e.g., elderly people). The same is true for authentication mechanisms with special
hardware requirements. Even though “accessibility” is often discussed in connection with
disabled persons, we define accessibility as an important aspect for all users.
An ideal authentication mechanism (goal state) supports all users in all situations. Consid-
ering mobile devices, the accessibility of an authentication mechanism is often determined
through its touchscreen feasibility. In addition, eyes-free interaction and one-handed input
can increase the accessibility in certain situations. Currently deployed knowledge-based
authentication mechanisms are accessible for most users. However, improved security fea-
tures often reduce accessibility due to increased effort or due to the requirement of specific
hardware. When designing novel authentication systems, it is important to keep in mind
that feasible concepts must improve security without giving up accessibility. Section 3.2
gives insights into some of the barriers people face with current authentication systems. In
addition, accessibility is a prerequisite for all systems discussed in Chapter 4.
Security
Security is the essential factor for authentication systems and the only reason why an authen-
tication system is used. However, the actual security level of a system depends on the used
threat model and remains remarkably hard to define. In contrast to usability costs, security
benefits are hardly directly perceived. As a consequence, users tend to sacrifice security for
usability. Therefore, it is indispensable to assess the practical security which is influenced by
the user’s real-life behavior. In the context of mobile devices, practical security is mainly de-
termined by two factors: (1) by the practical password space that describes the vulnerability
to guessing attacks and (2) by the risk of exposing the used secret to potential attackers.
Theoretical Password Security is mainly defined by the maximum number of available se-
crets (theoretical password space). A small theoretical password space allows exhaustive
brute force attacks. Furthermore, a feasible concept needs to support securely encrypted
storage of secrets to prevent eavesdropping. Both aspects are determined by the design of an
authentication mechanism (e.g., composition rules, available elements, matching algorithms)
and not influenced by user behavior.
The ideal authentication system (goal state) provides an unlimited pool of secrets. However,
recent tests2 indicate that adequate protection is already achieved by providing 1018 differ-
ent secrets. To provide such a large theoretical password space, PIN users would need to
memorize 18 digits. In real life, most PINs are based on four digits which corresponds to a
significantly smaller space of 10,000 tokens. The upper bound of Android unlock gestures
is limited by design. Overall, it provides only 389,112 different gestures [18] and can be
exhaustively searched within seconds [200]. We therefore conclude that current methods
2 http://cgi.distributed.net/speed/ – last accessed: 2015/10/28
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do not provide adequate brute force protection by themselves. However, mobile devices
usually prevent brute force attacks by disallowing larger numbers of successive authentica-
tion attempts. Nevertheless, a minimum number of n > 104 secrets will be defined as the
precondition for the design of novel concepts.
Practical Password Security is determined by the strength and the diversity of the passwords
which are actually in use. The practical password space is usually significantly smaller than
the theoretical password space as users often opt for secrets which are both easy to remember
and easy to use [38]. The practical password space is the main security measure to assess the
vulnerability of a system according to educated guessing attacks (e.g., dictionary attacks).
The strength of an individual secret is usually hard to define but it is widely accepted that
the popularity of a chosen password plays an important role [167].
The ideal authentication system (goal state) provides an infinite pool of secrets that are all
equally easy to remember and equally easy to use. As a consequence, users select any pos-
sible secret with the same chance and the practical password space matches its theoretical
size. However, current knowledge-based authentication systems comprise a tradeoff be-
tween password composition and password usability. First results indicate that the selection
of Android unlock patterns is very predictable [254]. Section 3.5 will provide a systematic
evaluation of pattern similarity and shed light on user preferences and gesture strength.
Observation Resistance describes the resistance against both internal capturing (e.g., touch
loggers) and external observations (e.g., shoulder surfing). The threat of internal capturing
is usually independent from the used authentication mechanism and can be prevented by
keeping the operating system up to date and by performing regular malware scans [127].
In contrast, external observability is determined by the design of an authentication concept
(e.g., [207]). The level of resistance is significantly influenced by the interaction style and
by the interface design. Observation attacks are categorized into cognitive and technical
(e.g., camera-based) approaches3. Furthermore, the number of observations plays an im-
portant role as some concepts are resistant to single observations but vulnerable to multiple
attacks (e.g., [244]).
The ideal authentication system (goal state) makes it impossible to derive the entered secret
from observing the input. Observation resistance is an important security feature for mo-
bile authentication as interaction often takes place in public and uncontrolled environments.
Current knowledge-based authentication systems seem to be prone even to single cognitive
observation attacks. However, the real-world risk level and the impact of composition factors
have not yet been evaluated. Section 3.2 will investigate the perceived risk of observation
attacks, Section 3.4 will analyze the vulnerability of Android unlock patterns and present a
prediction model to assess the security of a given gesture.
3 “observation” can also describe other modalities than sight (e.g., with a microphone)
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Smudge Attack Resistance is a security factor which becomes crucial with touch-based
interaction. In contrast to direct observation attacks, smudge attacks are not bound to the
act of authentication and can be performed any time, especially in the absence of the device
owner [18]. As smudge traces are constantly overwritten and modified with every touch, the
threat of smudge attacks drops with the number of touches that are performed after a secret
was entered. Similar to observation resistance, the number of attacks plays an important role
as different parts of a secret might be interpretable at different stages.
The ideal authentication system (goal state) leaves smudge traces in a way that makes inter-
pretation impossible. In the context of mobile devices, smudge attacks are a critical threat
since interaction usually takes place via touch input. Currently used gesture-based authenti-
cation methods were already shown to be very prone to such attacks, they even allow inter-
preting the temporal order of the input [18]. So far, smudge attacks have only been evaluated
in lab experiments simulating worst case scenarios4. The real-world threat of smudge attacks
in the users’ daily life is still unknown. Chapter 4 will present several interaction concepts
which leave smudge traces that are harder to interpret.
Divulgation Resistance describes the level of protection concerning the manipulation of
users (social engineering). Even if it is an important security factor of authentication sys-
tems, it is not limited to the context of passwords and may address the disclosure of any
private information. Attacks can be categorized into technical approaches (e.g., phishing)
and approaches that are based on individual interaction [1]. The vulnerability to individual
attacks is influenced by the characteristics of the used passwords as secrets which are easy
to describe or based on personal attributes comprise a higher risk to be divulged.
The ideal authentication system (goal state) prevents any kind of unintended divulgation.
Mobile unlock mechanisms are usually protected from phishing attacks as the authentication
process is physically bound to the mobile device. Phishing attacks may, however, become
a problem when secrets are reused for remote services. Since gestures are not based on
personal attributes or natural language, gesture-based authentication mechanisms usually
comprise lower risk for unintended divulgation than text-based passwords. However, the
vulnerability of Android unlock patterns to social engineering attacks (current state) has not
yet been evaluated.
4 The authentication is performed on a clean surface and no further interaction takes place.
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3.1.2 Overview
The remainder of this Section presents four research projects which were conducted to ex-
plore the current state of gesture-based authentication on mobile devices. The first and the
second project mainly deal with usability issues and provide important insights into real-
world efficiency, effectiveness, memorability and perception. The third and fourth projects
focus on security and investigate the practical password space as well as the observation
resistance of current gesture-based authentication systems.
Unlocking Behavior and Risk Perception in the Wild
Section 3.2 sheds light on risk perception and unlocking behav-
ior in the wild. The evaluation is based on an online survey
(n = 260) and on a field study (n = 52). The results reveal impor-
tant insights into the real-world efficiency of current solutions.
We learn how users perceive often discussed threats and for what
reasons people decide to or not to use security mechanisms.
Usability of Grid-based Gestures in the Wild
Section 3.3 gives empirical evidence for the real-world usability
of gesture-based authentication systems. The evaluation is based
on a controlled field study (n = 60) which compared gestures to
PIN and collected both qualitative and quantitative data. The re-
sults reveal important insights into the relationship of perceived
usability and measured performance data.
Observation Resistance of Grid-based Gestures
Section 3.4 quantifies the observation resistance of current
gesture-based passwords, that is of Android unlock patterns. The
evaluation is based on 5960 observation attacks which were sim-
ulated in an online study (n = 298). The results reveal that An-
droid unlock patterns are prone to such attacks but at the same
time the composition strategy has a significant impact on obser-
vation resistance.
Practical Password Space of Grid-based Gestures
Section 3.5 quantifies the practical password space of current
gesture-based passwords, that is of Android unlock patterns. A
novel similarity metric is introduced and applied to a dataset of
506 user-defined unlock patterns. The results reveal that most
users prefer very similar shapes and indicate that currently used
secrets are vulnerable to dictionary attacks.
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3.2 Unlocking Behavior and Risk Perception in the Wild
Chapter 2 illustrates that a lot of research is being conducted to improve the status quo of
(mobile) authentication. At the same time, little is known about users’ attitudes towards cur-
rently deployed solutions (e.g., PIN). As novel concepts are usually evaluated in controlled
lab experiments where current methods only serve as a baseline condition, we still lack im-
portant insights on users’ unlocking behavior and risk perception in the wild. However, a
profound understanding of these factors is a precondition to design feasible authentication
mechanisms which fit in the context of use and meet the expectations of the user. This
Section will define the basic requirements for feasible mobile authentication concepts by
shedding light on the following research questions.
RQ1 Why do or do not users lock their phone?
RQ2 How often and in which situations do people use secure lock screens?
RQ3 How often and in which situations do people access sensitive data?
RQ4 How do people perceive the risks of observation or unwanted access?
We based the evaluation on an online survey (n = 260) and on a field study (n = 52). While the
online study gave a broad overview of general locking motivations and protection strategies,
the four-week field study allowed analyzing risk perception and user behavior while actually
interacting with unlock mechanisms. Overall, we captured one month of locking activities
and sampled 6582 in-situ experiences. This Section contributes to the understanding of risk
perception, sheds light on satisfaction and delivers insights into real-world efficiency features
of current solutions.
We will learn that the decision for not using a secure lock screen is often based on reasonable
justifications and as a consequence unlock mechanisms must provide superior usability to
get adopted (RQ1). This is especially true since the specific pattern of use is described by
frequent unlocks combined with brief periods of use (RQ2). Even with PIN and pattern,
we found that users were often dissatisfied and desired the presence of Slide-to-Unlock. In
addition, the results reveal that sensitive data is seldom accessed (RQ3) which questions the
necessity of a good portion of unlock operations. Finally, we show that often discussed risks
like observation attacks or unwanted access were rarely perceived (RQ4).
This Section is partly based on Harbach, M., von Zezschwitz, E., Fichtner, A., De Luca, A., &
Smith, M. (2014, July). It’s a hard lock life: A field study of smartphone (un)locking behavior
and risk perception. In Proceedings of SOUPS’14 [118]. Please refer to the beginning of
this thesis for a detailed statement of collaboration.
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3.2.1 Research Context and Motivation
It has already been shown that individual goals and perceptions are significant factors for
the adoption and the use of security mechanisms [1]. According to Beautement et al. [23],
users have a limited “compliance budget” and permanently evaluate the cost-benefit trade-
off of using a security system. Security systems which are rated to comprise more costs than
benefits are usually not accepted. The perceived costs which mostly imply additional effort
(e.g., physical load, cognitive load) are directly perceived. The benefit is, however, difficult
to quantify and depends on previous experiences and risk perception [128].
Risk perception is generally hard to measure and influenced by various factors [231]. Becher
et al. [24] claim that mobile devices comprise specific risks which differ from traditional de-
vices. Felt et al. [92] conducted a large-scale survey on smartphone users’ concerns and
defined 99 potential risks (e.g., phone damage, location sharing). Chin et al. [58] revealed
that privacy risks are perceived more critical when using mobile devices. Theoharidou et
al. [250] suggest various quantitative (e.g., loss, theft) and qualitative (e.g., integrity, avail-
ability) factors to assess the practical risk of smartphones. Muslukhov et al. [185] investigate
user practices in protecting mobile device data and reported that existing solutions require
too much effort. Van Bruggen et al. [257] found out that over 30% of the users refrain from
using authentication on mobile devices. Finally, Mylonas et al. [186] present a taxonomy
for sensitive data found on mobile devices and assess the actual risk of a threat based on the
combination of likelihood and estimated consequences.
Despite such risk assessment, usage patterns of mobile device users have already been quan-
titatively analyzed. Andrews at al. [9] report that the average user checks the smartphone
85 times a day and that even though most sessions are shorter than 30 seconds, the overall
usage time adds up to five hours each day. Furthermore, mobile device use has been reported
in non-academic studies. A recent Gallup panel survey5 found that 52% of the users in the
US check their smartphone at least once an hour. The Nielsen Company6 reports a monthly
use of 37 hours and 28 minutes. The app company Locket7 found that users unlock their
devices 110 times a day. Finally, specific applications have been released which allow users
to monitor their own usage behavior (e.g., checky8).
In addition to the prior work mentioned above, relevant work has been published after the
herein reported results had been released. Volkamer et al. [261] performed semi-structured
interviews to assess the justifications for the non-use of security measures and confirmed
most of the findings presented here. De Luca et al. [70] analyzed why people use or not use
5 http://www.gallup.com/poll/184046/smartphone-owners-check-phone-least-hourly.aspx
– last accessed: 2015/11/11.
6 http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/news/2015/so-many-apps-so-much-more-time-
for-entertainment.html – last accessed: 2015/11/11.
7 http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2013/10/09/230867952/new-numbers-back-
up-our-obsession-with-phones – accessed 2015/11/11.
8 http://www.checkyapp.com – last accessed: 2015/11/11.
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biometric unlock screens. The results motivated Micallef et al. [181] to evaluate the usability
of context-sensitive concepts. Finally, Egelman et al. [85] analyzed the reasons for locking
or not locking smartphones and investigated more qualitatively how lock screens are used.
3.2.2 Online Survey
The results of the online survey particularly shed light on users’ locking motivations, risk
perceptions and performed countermeasures.
Method
The survey was distributed using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Participants were
required to use a smartphone regularly for at least three months. MTurk has been shown
to be suited for usable security evaluations [145] if specific precautions are taken [79]. To
control the inclusion criteria, the ownership of a smartphone had to be proven by opening
a provided link using a mobile device. The link checked if the HTTP user agent string
matched a known mobile browser. In addition, we included several attention check questions
to validate participants’ carefulness. Participants who passed both the device check and the
attention check were paid $0.70 of compensation.
The survey consisted of three main parts: We investigated risk attitudes, extra measures
and critical incidents. In addition, we collected demographic information and inquired IT
experience. Answers concerning extra measures, locking motivations and critical incidents
were collected using open ended questions and were inductively coded by two researchers.
The preliminary code plans were then discussed and merged. Finally, both researchers coded
the responses, possibly assigning multiple codes to each statement. Conflicting decisions
were discussed and resolved before a third coder independently coded all responses using
the final code plan.
Participants
From originally 320 participants, we had to remove 60 subjects due to incorrect completion
codes or due to wrong answers to two or more attention checks. On average, participants
were 33 (SD = 10; 18-67) years old, 54.6% were male. Most (74%) participants were em-
ployed, 9% were students and 17% indicated unemployment or “other”. Almost a quarter
of the participants indicated an IT background and 40% reported a very good understand-
ing of computers. On average, participants had used smartphones for 35 (SD = 21; 3-144)
months. All subjects reported daily use and the majority (79%) checked their smartphones at
least once per hour. 49% used iOS devices, 48% used Android and 3% used other operating
systems. 51% reported to have experienced smartphone related privacy or security incidents
before. Most (30%) of them reported device loss (or theft), 29% reported a broken phone
or data loss and 12% reported unwanted access. Overall, 43% of participants indicated to
use secure lock screens, including PIN (78%), unlock patterns (20%) and passwords (2%).
Furthermore, 41% used Slide-to-Unlock and 16% had no lock screen activated.
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Figure 3.2: Users of secure lock screens indicated their attitudes based on 5-point Likert scales.
Results
Satisfaction with current lock mechanisms was evaluated using 5-point Likert scales. The
results are depicted in Figure 3.2. We focused on the 111 users that reported to use secure
locking mechanisms. 95% of the participants stated that they liked the idea that the unlock
screen protects from unwanted access. While only 2% agreed that unlocking the phone is
difficult, 47% still somewhat or fully agreed that it can be annoying sometimes. In addition,
25% somewhat or fully agreed that easier authentication mechanisms were desired.
Motivation for using or not using a secure lock mechanism was evaluated based on open
ended questions. The use of lock mechanisms was most often motivated by general protec-
tion goals (79%) like “access control” (29%) or “security” (23%). In addition, 68% wanted
to protect certain information (e.g., photos), 56% mentioned specific scenarios (e.g., loss)
and 50% referred to attackers (e.g., room-mates, children). In particular cases, the use of
secure lock screens was the consequence of external factors (e.g., required by the company).
NOT using a secure lock mechanism was mostly (79%) justified by the absence of threats.
17% indicated “no need for security”, 15% argued “they had nothing to hide” and 11% said
they “did not store any sensitive data”. Interestingly, 19% of the participants explained
the absence of threat with physical protection: “My phone is always right beside me or in
my pocket [..]”. Beyond that, inconvenience was an important factor for 57% of the users:
15% specifically stated that it took “too much time”, 9% said they would use the “device
too frequently”. Finally, some participants reported specific barriers like device sharing,
emergency situations or reduced chances of being contacted in case of hardware loss.
Risk perception concerning mobile device threats was assessed using 5-point numeric
scales. Most (65%) participants were not or mostly not concerned about someone observing
their unlock. In addition, we provided a list of six common incidents and asked participants
to indicate the worst scenario. Overall, 53% identified “losing the phone itself, because I
would have to buy a new one” as the worst scenario. This indicates that most users value
hardware costs higher than privacy and security risks. Data loss was selected by 20%, 12%
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chose account abuse as a consequence of a lost phone and 9% were most afraid of data abuse
on a lost phone. Finally, 4% indicated app abuse on an unattended phone as most critical
and 1% was most afraid of data abuse on an unattended phone.
In addition, we assessed the risk perception concerning specific attackers. First, participants
rated the probability of known malicious, known curious, unknown malicious and unknown
curious attackers on a 5-point scale. Known curious and unknown malicious attackers were
considered more likely than the other two types. In a second step, all participants who had
rated known attackers as neutral to likely were asked to assign one of the following aspects
to eight presented types of known persons: ‘‘potentially curious”, “potentially malicious”
and “I did not consider this group of people”. The results reveal that closely related persons
are mostly considered as curious. Close friends were most often (73%) reported. Further-
more, 54% of the participants selected acquaintances, 53% parents, 52% children and 46%
friends of friends. In contrast, more remotely known people were considered as potentially
malicious attackers. In this category, “other known people” (67%), co-workers (29%), ac-
quaintances (25%) and friends of friends (23%) were most often chosen.
Extra measures besides using a secure lock screen were analyzed based on free text and
predefined answers. When we asked participants if they sometimes take one or more specific
countermeasures, 84% selected that they “conceal [the] smartphone in [their] clothes or in
a bag”, 51% indicated to leave the device at “a safe place before going somewhere” and 34%
“enable a lock screen for this situation or choose a harder PIN/password/pattern”.
Furthermore, we asked for up to three other situations in which additional measures are
taken. “Paying extra attention” was mentioned most often (45 instances), but also technical
measures (e.g., turning off the device) and physical extra measures (e.g., privacy foil) were
indicated. Concerning risky environments, participants mentioned public and semi-public
spaces and situations like going “out” (59), during parties (39) or at work (52). In addition,
dangerous neighborhoods were frequently mentioned (24). Only 16 participants reported
private spaces (e.g., home). Despite location-dependent events, participants reported gen-
erally unattended situations (71) and phases of less caution (102). Finally, person-related
situations like unfamiliar or untrusted persons (20), kids (9) or (ex-)partners were mentioned.
In addition, we asked for extra measures which were taken against shoulder surfing. We
provided five answers and allowed multiple selections. Most (28%) participants indicated
that they tilt their screen away while entering their unlock code, 16% claimed to wait a
moment before entering the secret, 11% turn around and 9% cover the display. Only 7%
acknowledged to have changed their unlock code after a potential shoulder surfing attack.
Critical incidents related to unwanted access were reported by 31 participants. Due to
the small sample size, the answers were not coded. Participants mentioned snooping
(ex)partners as well as children or siblings fooling around with the devices. In addition,
friends playing pranks and thievery were mentioned. Reported harm included invasion of
privacy, conflicts with other persons and account abuse.
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3.2.3 Field Study
The online survey provided valuable insights into users’ reasoning concerning the use or
non-use of lock screens. Nevertheless, the data was based on retrospective self-reports and
therefore influenced by participants’ memory. To collect unfiltered real-world data of unlock
behavior and risk perceptions, we additionally performed a four-week field study (n = 52).
The study design was informed by the results of the online survey and allowed to answer the
main research questions while ensuring ecological validity.
Method
The main goal of the field study was to evaluate real world behavior. Therefore, we needed
a user study design which allowed unobtrusive data collection and would most probably
not influence user behavior. For this purpose, we developed an application which collected
quantitative information about the unlock behavior. In addition, we followed an experience
sampling approach similar to Cherubini and Oliver [51] and displayed mini-questionnaires
after certain unlocks to collect qualitative data. In a first meeting, we helped to install the
application and explained the study goal as well as the procedure. After the study was
finished, participants were invited for debriefing. We performed a short interview to assess
if the user study had an impact on the observed behavior and to gain insights into potential
problems. Finally, we helped uninstalling the study app. The following provides detailed
information about the most important aspects.
Unlock behavior was analyzed based on four events: activation, unlock, lock and deactiva-
tion. Whenever a new state was entered, a timestamp was logged. The state model comprised
four states:
Off Locked The display is off and the device is locked.
On Locked The display is on and the device is locked.
On Unlocked The display is off and the device is unlocked.
Off Unlocked The display is off and the device is unlocked.
Transitions are possible between all four states. Transitions from Unlocked to Locked are
mainly depending on the device configurations: Common configurations are "lock imme-
diately" or "lock after x minutes". The same is true for screen-off events (Off ). Screen-on
events (On) are usually triggered by user interaction (e.g., button presses) or might be trig-
gered by the operating systems (e.g., incoming call). The transitions from Locked to Un-
locked require interaction with the unlock screen (e.g., Slide-to-Unlock, PIN, Pattern). Log-
ging the transitions between the four states allowed a detailed analysis of the users’ unlock
behavior. However, it is important to note that the unlock times computed with this model
represent a worst-case estimate as they may include time-consuming interaction performed
on a locked screen (e.g., viewing notifications).
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Figure 3.3: Two examples of the graphical user interface used in the field study. While one
questionnaire (unlock risk survey) focused on the unlock process (left), the other questionnaire
(data risk survey) investigated the time frame between the current unlock and the previous one
(right). The questions were originally posed in German.
Mini-Questionnaires were designed and optimized for quick and easy interaction. Figure
3.3 illustrates two examples of the graphical interface. The questionnaires were both based
on seven multiple choice questions and randomly displayed after device unlocks. One ques-
tionnaire, called unlock survey, focused on the actual unlocking procedure. It investigated
the perceived shoulder surfing risk, additional measures and the satisfaction with the per-
formed unlock. In addition, we asked participants to rate the sensitivity of the accessed data.
The second questionnaire, called data survey, focused on the time span between two un-
locks. Participants were asked to indicate if additional measures were taken since the last
unlock and reported the risk that someone else could have had unwanted access. Finally,
both questionnaires ended with an assessment of the current environment based on three
categories: private, semi-public and public.
Sample Rate plays a significant role for the outcome of the study as it comprises the main
trade-off between the additional effort and the amount of collected data. A too high sam-
ple rate is likely to cause negative effects in terms of changing the observed user behavior
and would therefore decrease ecological validity. A too low sample rate would exclude a
huge number of interesting day-to-day situations and lead to an invalid data collection. We
decided to randomly select unlock events after which one of the two questionnaires was pre-
sented. In addition, we added a mandatory break of one hour after a questionnaire was filled
in. Based on pre-study results, we started with a probability of 20% for all users. After one
week, we adjusted the sample rate to the actual user behavior. We therefore categorized the
participants into three groups and chose a sample rate which resulted in five to six presented
questionnaires per day. Heavy users with at least nine unlocks per hour were sampled with a
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Figure 3.4: This Figure maps the collected data to the time of the day. Overall, we logged
116601 activations, 66874 unlocks, 3410 unlock surveys and 3172 data surveys.
chance of 10%, users with four to eight unlocks per hour received an update to 15%, all other
participants remained at 20%. In addition, users were allowed to dismiss questionnaires by
pressing a “Not Now” button (as indicated in Figure 3.3, left.).
Participants
The user study was performed at two locations in Germany. In Munich, we recruited 27 par-
ticipants through mailing lists and social media. In Hanover, 30 participants were recruited
using a specific study participation mailing list. All participants owned a smartphone with
Android 2.3 or higher and had used it for at least three month. For compensation, we offered
a 10 Euro base-salary plus 14 Euro-cent per completed mini-questionnaire.
Five participants had to be removed due to logging errors (n = 4) and due to missing out the
debriefing (n = 1). The average age of the remaining 52 participants was 24 (SD = 3; 19-32)
years. 29 were male and 23 were female. The sample was skewed towards high education
as 47 participants indicated to be (under)grad students and the remaining five subjects were
PhD students or academic employees, 48% indicated an IT background. All participants
were experienced smartphone users with an average prior use of 34 months (SD = 20; 5-
120). The sample comprised the most important lock mechanisms: 13 PIN users, 22 pattern
users and 17 Slide-to-Unlock users. PIN users indicated an average PIN-length of 4.5 digits
(SD = 0.8; 4-6), pattern users based their secrets on 5.2 cells (SD = 1.3; 4-8) on average.
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Results
Each data set was truncated to the first 27 complete days ranging from midnight to midnight.
Since unlock behavior naturally differs between subjects and the sample rate was influenced
by the number of unlocks, each participant contributed a different number of data points. To
counteract over-representation of heavy users, data sets were aggregated on user level and
analysis was based on the average across these aggregates whenever appropriate.
In 27 days, we logged an average of 2242.3 activations per participant (SD = 1160.2,
651-5419). 1286.0 (57.4%) of these screen on events were followed by a device unlock
(SD = 711.8, 215-3545). In addition, each user contributed an average of 65.6 unlock risk
surveys (SD = 3.0; 15-110) and an average of 61.0 data risk questionnaires (SD = 2.7; 15-
105). Figure 3.4 illustrates the collected data according to the 24 hours of the day. The
mapping indicates that indeed all times of the day were sampled and that the number of
samples seems to match common daily routines (e.g., less activity at night time). In the fol-
lowing, we present the results considering effort, context, sensitive data and risk perception.
Effort and Session Length
On average, participants checked their mobile devices (screen on) 83.3 times a day
(SD = 43.0, 24.2-201.1). 57.4% (Mn = 47.8, SD = 26.4, 8.0-131.5) of these device checks
included a device unlock. Figure 3.4 shows that users followed daily routines and were most
active between eight in the morning and midnight which at the same time indicates an aver-
age sleep of eight hours. Therefore, we assumed that the average user is awake 16 hours per
day. This translates to a device activation every twelve minutes (Mn = 5.2/h, SD = 2.7) and
an unlock every 20 minutes (Mn = 3.0/h, SD = 1.7). Figure 3.6 (left) indicates a bimodal
distribution of unlock events. We find that half of the users unlock their device up to three
times per hour, while the rest unlocked the device more than three times including heavy
users which unlocked their device at least every ten minutes. Within the first meeting, we
asked participants to estimate their average number of unlocks. Figure 3.5 compares these
pre-study guesses with the actual numbers derived from the log data. The analysis shows
that most users underestimated the daily number of device unlocks.
In addition to unlock frequency, unlock time plays an important role when assessing unlock
effort. On average, participants needed 2.67 seconds (SD = 8.46s) using Slide-to-Unlock,
3.0 seconds (SD = 13.3) using a unlock patterns, and 4.7 seconds (SD = 20.72) using a
numeric PIN. For exploratory investigation, we grouped participants post-hoc into regular
users (unlocks/h≤3) and heavy users (unlocks/h>3). A user-type ∗ lock-screen between-
subjects ANOVA based on the average unlock times per user found a significant main effect
for lock-screen (F(2,46) = 11.37, p < .001) and a significant main effect for user-type
(F(1,46) = 6.39, p = .002). A Bonferroni-corrected pairwise t-test revealed that heavy
users spent significantly less time on unlocking (Mn = 2.9 sec, SD = 1.2) than regular users
(Mn = 3.8 sec, SD = 1.6), p< .05. In addition, PIN users (Mn = 4.9 sec, SD = 1.9) performed
significantly slower than both pattern users (Mn = 3.2 sec, SD = 0.9, p < .001) and Slide-
to-Unlock users (Mn = 2.6 sec, SD = 1.0, p < .001). However, no significant differences
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Figure 3.5: The comparison of guessed and actual activation numbers indicates that most users
underestimate unlock frequency.
were found between pattern and Slide-to-Unlock (p > .05). Over the course of 27 days,
participants spent an average of 1.17 hours (SD=.87, 0.2-5.1) unlocking their devices.
We assume that the perceived unlock effort is related to session length as the relative over-
head caused by the lock screen grows with decreasing session times. Analyzing the time
between all Screen ON and Screen OFF events indicates an average session length of 71.1
seconds (SD = 245.4). The average session length on locked devices was 12.8 (SD = 315.2)
seconds, on unlocked devices sessions lasted 104.5 (SD = 186.2) seconds on average. Figure
3.6 (right) illustrated the session lengths for both states. The black bars which illustrate the
session length on locked devices show a bimodal distribution. We assume that the first peak
at approximately one second results from common short tasks (e.g., checking the time) while
the second peak may be the result of longer interactions (e.g., reading notifications). Over
the course of the 27 days, participants spent 43.0 hours on average (SD = 22.1,10.3-121.8)
using their smartphone, 2.9 hours (SD = 22.1,10.3-121.8) on locked devices. Overall, lock
screens resulted in an average overhead of 2.9% (0.6- 9%).
Context and Satisfaction
Most (62.4%) device unlocks were sampled in private context. In 19.5% of the samples,
participants indicated a semi-public setting, 18.2% of the environments were rated public.
This is inline with previous work which found that mobile device interaction often takes
place in private environments [121].
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Figure 3.6: Unlock Frequency versus session length: Most sessions are very short.
Environment # Situations Slide-to-Unlock Pin, Pattern overall
private 2115 (62.0 %) 5.0 % (sd = 14.9 %) 32.7 % (sd = 36.0 %) 23.6 % (sd = 33.2 %)
semi-public 690 (20.2 %) 4.6 % (sd = 12.2 %) 23.0 % (sd = 29.3 %) 17.0 % (sd = 26.3 %)
public 605 (17.7 %) 6.2 % (sd = 20.1 %) 16.6 % (sd = 26.9 %) 13.2 % (sd = 25.2 %)
Overall 3410 5.3 % (sd = 15.8 %) 24.1 % (sd = 31.4 %) 17.9 % (sd = 28.6 %)
Table 3.1: Participants’ dissatisfaction with their locking mechanisms by environment.
Within the data risk survey, participants rated the annoyance of the current unlock using
a five-point Likert scale. Answers ranged from “not annoying at all” to “very annoying”.
Overall, participants were quite happy with most unlocks as 65.8% of all unlocks were rated
“not annoying” or “not annoying at all”. Nevertheless, 24.7% of the sampled unlocks were
rated “annoying” or “very annoying”. An analysis on user level reveals that only 12 of 52
participants indicated to be annoyed in more than 50% of the sampled situations. Figure 3.7
illustrates the answers grouped by unlock mechanism: While Slide-to-Unlock users rated
92.9% of all unlocks “not annoying” or “not annoying at all”, only 56.0% of the pattern
unlocks and only 49.7% of the PIN unlocks were rated the same. In contrast one third of all
unlocks using PIN (33.1%) or Pattern (33.4%) were rated annoying. Using Slide-to-Unlock,
only 5.5% of the unlocks were rated this way. An analysis considering usage frequency and
the unlock context showed no clear trends.
In addition, we assessed satisfaction by asking Slide-to-Unlock users if they would have
rather wished to have a secure lock screen in the current situation. Vice versa, we asked pat-
tern and PIN users if a Slide-to-Unlock screen would have been desired. Table 3.1 illustrates
the results which were gathered using five-point Likert scales clustered by environment. We
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Figure 3.7: Unlock annoyance grouped by system (indicated using 5-point scales).
found that PIN and pattern users were more often dissatisfied with their current configuration
while Slide-to-Unlock users indicated less dissatisfaction. While the analysis of unlock fre-
quency and data sensitivity showed no trend, unlock context seems to influence satisfaction.
The results indicate that code screen user (PIN, patterns) wished to have Slide-to-Unlock
especially in private spaces and were more often satisfied when unlocking in public. In
contrast, Slide-to-Unlock users were mostly satisfied with the status quo, even in public.
Data Sensitivity and Risk Perception
With the unlock risk survey, we asked participants to indicate the sensitivity of the data they
are going to access. The answers were collected based on a five point scale ranging from “not
sensitive at all” to “very sensitive”. In 20.1% of the cases participants were not able to assess
the sensitivity of the data and pressed a “do not know” button. Figure 3.8 illustrates the cases
in which data sensitivity could be rated. For each user, we mapped the proportion of sensitive
data accesses across the average time spent for unlocking each day. Overall, participants
indicated in 25.3% of all sampled situations that the accessed data was “sensitive” or “very
sensitive”. Figure 3.8 shows that only ten (19.2%) users accessed sensitive data in more
than 50% of their (sampled) unlocks. Additionally, we find interesting individual cases:
The participant who spent most time for unlocking the device (highest value on the y-axis)
indicated to access sensitive data in less than every fifth unlock. In addition, we find two
Slide-to-Unlock users who indicated to access sensitive data in more than 50% of all cases.
In the debriefing, we additionally asked participants to generally rate the sensitivity of their
device’s data. While almost half (48.6%) of the PIN and pattern users considered the stored
data sensitive, only a quarter (23.5%) of users without a code-lock stated the same.
In addition, we investigated perceived risk concerning observation attacks and unwanted
access. Therefore, we asked participants to indicate if the risk was present and if the potential
attacker was known or unknown. Whenever the risk was present, participants additionally
assessed the likelihood of an attack and indicated the severity if the attack was actually
performed. Table 3.2 gives an overview of the results.
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Figure 3.8: Accessed sensitive data by unlock system (indicated using 5-point scales).
The risk of unwanted access was reported in 7.7% of all sampled situations. While eleven
participants did not indicate any risky situation, the individual count of participants who
reported such risk ranged from one to 20 occasions. Table 3.2 shows that unwanted access
was most often reported in private environments and potential attackers were known to the
participants in most cases. Over 90% of all indicated occasions were reported unlikely. In
addition, participants did hardly expect severe consequences. However, participants tended
to rate unwanted access more likely and more severe when risk was perceived in public.
During debriefing, some participants mentioned that probably not all cases had been sampled
but confirmed that the sampled proportion matched their risk perception.
Observation risk was perceived more often than the risk of unwanted access. In 17% of
all sampled situations participants reported that someone could have had "a view on the
contents of [the] screen”. Table 3.2 shows that this was most often possible (68.7%) for
known people. Naturally, the proportion of unknown observers increases when unlocks are
performed in more public environments. Overall, participants rated observations likely in
40.8% of all sampled situations. However, the severity of such observation events was rated
low in most cases, ranging from 68.3% in public settings to 92.9% in private environments.
Only 11 of the 3410 (0.3%) sampled situations were perceived likely and “severe” or “very
severe” at the same time. Seven (63.6%) of these critical situations were reported in public
spaces. Furthermore, additional countermeasures (e.g., covering the screen) were reported
in only 52 (2.8%) sampled situations. Again, participants mentioned during debriefing that
probably not all situations were sampled but agreed that the sampled data was representative.
69
Environment # Situations Known Unknown Unlikely Low Severity
Unwanted Access
private 131 (53.5 %) 97.7 % (128) 2.3 % (3) 92.4 % (121) 86.3 % (113)
semi-public 75 (30.6 %) 70.7 % (53) 29.3 % (22) 93.4 % (70) 64.0 % (48)
public 39 (15.9 %) 23.1 % (9) 76.9 % (30) 79.5 % (31) 18.2 % (11)
Overall 245 (7.7 %) 77.6 % (190) 22.4 % (55) 90.6 % (222) 70.2 % (172)
Shoulder Surfing
private 182 (31.5 %) 99.5 % (181) 0.0 % (1) 56.6 % (103) 92.9 % (169)
semi-public 185 (31.0 %) 82.7 % (153) 17.3 % (32) 65.4 % (121) 84.9 % (157)
public 211 (36.5 %) 29.9 % (63) 70.1 % (148) 56.0 % (118) 68.3 % (144)
Overall 578 (17.0 % ) 68.7 % (397) 31.3 % (181) 59.2 % (342) 81.3 % (470)
Table 3.2: Unwanted access and observation occasions by environments and potential attackers.
The last two columns give percentages of likelihood and severity of consequences.
3.2.4 Discussion and Implications
In this Section, we summarize the main findings and discuss the implications for feasible
unlock mechanisms for mobile devices.
Many Short Periods of Use Create a High Authentication Overhead
The comparison of the assessed unlock frequency and the measured data revealed that many
users tend to underestimate their daily unlock numbers. This indicates that current solu-
tions support subliminal interaction and that the perceived effort is often kept adequately
low. Concerning the speed of single unlock events, “adequately” would stand for unlock
times between 2.7 seconds (Slide to Unlock) and 4.7 seconds (PIN). At the same time, we
found that the common unlock behavior comprises a high number of unlocks combined with
relatively short periods of use. Over the course of 27 days, current solutions generated an
average overhead of 1.2 hours (2.9%) for all users and up to 5.1 hours (9%) for heavy users.
Such numbers show that every additional second has a high impact on the overall unlock ef-
fort. However, this is often neglected as novel authentication concepts are usually evaluated
in lab experiments and in the wild unlock behavior is seldom considered. Chapter 2 revealed
that most alternative authentication concepts demand authentication times of ten seconds
and more. While ten seconds might be rated acceptable in short-term lab tests, actual unlock
behavior would translate this time to a monthly additional effort of several hours. Consider-
ing the short periods of use, this would easily introduce authentication overheads over 10%,
probably more than the average user is willing to invest. We therefore conclude that feasi-
ble unlock mechanisms must consider actual usage patterns and thus allow fast interaction
which is comparable to PIN and patterns.
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Sensitive Data is Seldom Accessed
According to our online survey, most participants motivate the use of secure unlock screens
by general protection goals: “access control” was most often mentioned. In addition, the goal
to “protect information” was frequently stated. In practice, we observed that only a quarter
(25.3%) of all sampled unlocks was actually performed to access sensitive data. In most
cases, participants stated they would interact with non-sensitive data which presumably not
required protection. This indicates that only a subset of the demanded unlocks is actually
justified by the protection goals. As a consequence, users might judge a good portion of
the unlock effort unnecessary and rather decide to completely forgo secure unlock screens.
Indeed, “inconvenience” was often stated as a reason for not using secure lock screens. At
the same time, we found that the proportion of accessed sensitive data is not a predictor for
the use of secure lock mechanisms. Several participants frequently accessed sensitive data
but still relied on the insecure Slide-to-Unlock mechanism.
We conclude that even if the all-or-nothing lock paradigm is not a main factor for the adop-
tion of secure concepts, it may indeed prevent some users from using such systems. We
argue that content-dependent security models (e.g., on application level) could decrease in-
convenience caused by the authentication overhead and would simultaneously couple the
additional effort with users’ primary protection goals. Finally, reducing the number of time-
consuming unlocks would probably increase the general acceptance of secure lock screens.
Often Discussed Risks are Seldom Perceived
Secure unlock mechanisms shall prevent unwanted access. However, the risk of unwanted
access was perceived very low. According to the participants’ perception, it was possible
in only 8% of all sampled situations. In addition, most reported cases were rated unlikely
and most users would not expect severe consequences. Nevertheless, in public spaces par-
ticipants rated unwanted access more likely and tended to expect more severe consequences.
Similarly, observation resistance is an often discussed requirement for mobile authentica-
tion concepts. Chapter 2 showed that system designers often accept decreased efficiency to
achieve this goal. However, we found that observation risks are also seldom perceived. Even
if observation risks were perceived possible more often (17%) than the risk of unwanted
access, high risks with severe consequences were reported very seldom (0.3%).
We argue that the uncritical perception of risks does not suggest a general absence of risks.
As a consequence, the results neither indicate that secure lock mechanisms are dispensable
nor do they generally question the importance of observation resistance. However, we as-
sume that users are not willing to invest additional effort to be protected from risks which
are rarely perceived critical. Therefore, increased practical security is hardly a sales argu-
ment for novel authentication mechanisms and the additional effort a user is willing to invest
needs to be carefully assessed. As we cannot assume permanent high risk situations, secure
authentication mechanisms must be comparably fast to current concepts or demand extra
effort only if specific risks are actually present or perceived.
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Current Solutions are Sometimes Annoying and Seldom Satisfying
In the online survey, most participants attested that current unlock mechanisms are easy to
use. Nevertheless, every second respondent agreed that they can be annoying sometimes
and a quarter of the participants still desired easier mechanisms. In the field, we found
interesting differences between Slide-to-Unlock users and code lock users. While only 5%
of the Slide-to-Unlock events was rated annoying, both PIN and pattern users were annoyed
by 33% of the sampled unlocks. This indicates that secure unlock screens already demand
a noticeable extra cost compared to Slide-to-Unlock. Furthermore, we found that Slide-
to-Unlock users rarely felt the need for secure lock screens, while lock screen users were
dissatisfied with their settings in almost a quarter of all situations. This was particularly the
case when serious threats were perceived unlikely (e.g., in private spaces). In addition, we
found that many users felt protected, even when no secure lock screen was used. Such users
relied on physical countermeasures like concealing the smartphone or leaving it at a safe
place.
The results show that there is a very thin line between satisfaction and annoyance. While the
measured difference between unlock patterns and Slide-to-Unlock was marginal (0.3 sec-
onds), the effects on subjective ratings were strong. We assume that the dissatisfaction of
code users was mainly provoked by the knowledge of a faster, albeit insecure, alternative:
Slide-to-Unlock. Similarly, physical protection in risky situations is seen as a feasible al-
ternative to permanently using code locks. This confirms that users permanently evaluate
the perceived benefits of a system and put them into the context of existing alternatives. As
a consequence, we conclude that novel authentication systems need to be as satisfying as
current unlock mechanisms to get accepted. To satisfy Slide-to-Unlock users, secure con-
cepts may need to perform even better than PIN or patterns. Context-dependent security
mechanisms which adapt the security level (and extra costs) to the current situation may be
one promising direction. However, “context” is hard to define and cannot be simplified as
location information (e.g., public).
3.2.5 Limitations
Even if the online survey and the field study were thoroughly designed and conducted, they
have inherent limitations which need to be addressed.
The results of the online survey are based on self-reported data and should therefore only be
interpreted as an indicator for real-world behavior. The field study achieved higher external
validity by sampling user behavior and risk perception in-situ. However, it is important to
note that neither the number of samples per participant nor the proportion of lock screen
types or environments was counterbalanced. Nevertheless, we assume that the differences
between the different sample sizes are not crucial as high numbers were collected for ev-
ery combination. While participants confirmed that the results of the experience sampling
represented everyday life, we like to mention that some situations might still be underrepre-
sented. This might especially be true, whenever situations were very short (e.g., unlocks in
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an elevator). In addition, we assume that participants used the “not now” button primarily
in stressful situations where answering a questionnaire was not feasible. As a consequence,
such critical situations might be underrepresented as well. Still, we are confident that the
data is valid and representative as such situations were not reported during debriefing.
The experience sampling itself might have an impact on unlock behavior and risk percep-
tion which would influence the results. In the debriefing, participants were asked to report
potential study impact. Indeed, four participants reported a minor impact on their behavior.
Three participants mentioned that they might have used the device less frequently, especially
in the beginning of the study. Another participant increased the auto lock interval from 30
to 90 seconds. In addition, ten participants reported that taking part in the user study made
them more aware of their own unlock behavior without actually changing the behavior. We
argue that such reports indicate rather minor impact and are therefore confident that real-life
behavior was not significantly influenced.
Finally, we tested a convenience sample which was mainly based on students. As a conse-
quence, participants were higher educated and younger than the average population and the
results cannot be generalized to any specific population. However, we argue that students
were well suited for a first evaluation as they are very likely to experience a large set of
diverse situations ranging from office settings to uncontrolled public spaces (e.g., concerts).
3.2.6 Summary
In this Section, we presented the results of an online survey and a longitudinal field study.
The online survey provided an overview over users’ attitudes towards authentication on mo-
bile devices as well as alternative protection strategies. The field study which combined tra-
ditional activity logging with unobtrusive experience sampling allowed gathering in depth
insights into real-life unlock behavior and risk perception.
We learned that the decision to use or to not use secure lock mechanisms is influenced by
various factors. Non-users justified their behavior mainly by an absence of threats. But
inconvenience played an important role, too. Indeed, we showed that users check their
devices frequently and periods of use are usually short. As a result, high authentication
overheads were measured even with the currently used unlock mechanisms. In addition, we
showed that sensitive data is seldom accessed and that most unlocks take place in private
spaces. Moreover, since common risks were seldom perceived and mostly rated unlikely, it
was not surprising that a good portion of the code-based unlocks was rated annoying.
This Section did not focus on the peculiarities of gesture-based authentication but presented
important requirements for all feasible authentication mechanisms on mobile devices. Two
insights are particularly important for the remainder of this work. First, authentication meth-
ods must be very fast as every additional second has a high impact on the overall overhead.
Secondly, since risks are seldom perceived, users are most probably not willing to invest
additional effort for improved security.
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3.3 Usability of Grid-based Gestures in the Wild
The previous Section analyzed user attitudes and user behavior in the wild and defined im-
portant requirements which apply to all knowledge-based unlock mechanisms. In this Sec-
tion, we focus on the specialties of gesture-based authentication and assess how its usability
compares to the traditional PIN-based approach. Chapter 2 indicated that graphical gesture-
based authentication mechanisms provide superior usability and are especially well-suited
for mobile devices. However, the literature review did hardly provide evidence that this actu-
ally holds true in the user’s real life. To fill this gap of knowledge, we now compare the two
most prominent knowledge-based unlock mechanisms in a field study: Grid-based gestures
and PIN. We shed light on the following main research questions.
RQ1 How efficient are grid-based gestures and how is efficiency perceived?
RQ2 How effective are grid-based gestures and how is effectiveness perceived?
RQ3 How memorable are grid-based gestures and how are they learned?
RQ4 How satisfying are grid-based gestures and what are the influencing factors?
The presented results are based on a 21 days between-groups field study including 34 pattern
users and 26 PIN users. We increased internal validity by following a strictly structured
procedure. For example, PINs and patterns were controlled in length and complexity and
all participants contributed the same number of data points. Even if this means that external
validity was reduced, the study design allowed an accurate assessment of both authentication
concepts in the real world.
This Section will show that PIN performs better when looking at quantitative performance
data but gestures are perceived equally good (RQ1). Even if more errors were logged, unlock
gestures were perceived easy to use and error recovery was rated better (RQ2). The detailed
analysis of the observed errors revealed interesting insights into the relationship between
error prevention and error recovery. In addition, a novel taxonomy for gesture-based errors
will be presented. While gestures and PINs seem equally memorable (RQ3), participants
were generally more in favor of the gesture-based approach (RQ4). Overall, this Section
contributes by providing real-world evidence for the assumption that grid-based gestures are
a feasible unlock mechanism for touch-based mobile devices and a promising alternative to
(alpha)numeric solutions.
This Section is partly based on von Zezschwitz, E., Dunphy, P., & De Luca, A. (2013, August).
Patterns in the wild: a field study of the usability of pattern and pin-based authentication on
mobile devices. In Proceedings of MobileHCI’13. [266]. Please refer to the beginning of
this thesis for a detailed statement of collaboration.
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Figure 3.9: The two prototypes of the user study. The left image shows the interface of the
gesture-based system. On the right side, the PIN system is illustrated.
3.3.1 Research Context and Motivation
Chapter 2 provides an in-depth discussion of grid-based authentication concepts. The dis-
cussion indicates that grid-based gestures are easy to recall and well-suited for mobile de-
vices. While all presented concepts were specifically designed for mobile devices, Android
unlock patterns have become the first gesture-based system which was actually widely ac-
cepted [104]. In September 2015, 1.4 billion devices supported grid-based gestures9. At
the same time, none of the prior studies has evaluated such concepts over longer periods of
time and field performance has not been investigated systematically. Therefore, this Sec-
tion provides the results of the first empirical longitudinal study on the performance and the
likeability of gesture-based authentication in the wild.
3.3.2 User Study
The user study had the primary goal to collect performance data and user feedback over a
longer period of time and outside of the laboratory environment. The PIN group served as
a baseline and was added for comparison. Due to organizational reasons, the PIN group
started after the gesture group was finished.
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Prototypes
For each system, a distinct prototype was developed. The prototypes which are illustrated
in Figure 3.9 were implemented as standalone applications for Android 2.1 or higher. Both
systems represented common graphical user interfaces which can be found on current mo-
bile devices. To prevent graphical bias, the design was kept very simple. As customary, PINs
had to be explicitly confirmed using the “OK” button. In addition, input could be corrected
using “backspace” or “cancel”. The gesture system was inspired by current Android imple-
mentations. Therefore, input was confirmed implicitly by lifting the finger and could not be
corrected. However, in contrast to Android standards, our implementation allowed to revisit
and to skip dots. Therefore, the prototype supported more complex gestures and allowed to
examine the consequences of providing a larger theoretical patterns space.
Both prototypes provided two distinct modes: a training mode allowed unlimited interac-
tion and helped participants in getting used to the interface. The study mode requested 21
authentications with a maximum of one authentication per day. Each authentication session
could comprise a maximum of three attempts. After three failed attempts or after a success-
ful unlock, the system was disabled until the start of the next calendar day. In study mode,
user interaction was constantly logged. This included single touches as well as the input of
gestures (as a sequence of cell activations) or PINs.
Method
The user study was designed following a between groups longitudinal design. Since we
opted for a controlled setting, we assigned PINs and patterns and fixed the number of sam-
ples. In the gesture group, we randomly assigned Android-conform and more complex pat-
terns. After one day of training, the performance test started. Over the course of 21 days,
participants were asked to authenticate once a day using their assigned secret. After the per-
formance test, we collected qualitative feedback using a questionnaire. After further 14 days
had passed, participants were spontaneously asked to recall their secret (memory test).
Password Assignment By assigning secrets, we had full control over length and complexity
which was important for comparability. PIN users were assigned four-digit PINs which
represents a common length on mobile devices. Using four digits results in a theoretical
password space of 10,000 (104) secrets. The pattern group was assigned gestures which
comprised six cells. Considering Android restrictions this would result in a comparable
pattern space of 26,016 gestures10. However, allowing more complex gestures increases this
number to 294,912 (9 ∗ 85). That is, the starting point can be freely chosen from nine cells
and subsequent moves can reach eight cells (nine minus the current position).
9 http://www.androidcentral.com/google-says-there-are-now-14-billion-active-
android-devices-worldwide – last accessed: 2015/11/26.
10https://www.quora.com/How-many-combinations-does-Android-9-point-unlock-have – last
accessed: 2015/11/28
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Installation and Training On the first study day, participants received an email containing a
download link for the prototype, an installation instruction, a unique secret (PIN or gesture)
and an anonymous user id. After downloading and installing, participants were asked to
enter their user id. The user id determined the assigned secret and was used to relate the
logged performance data to the later questionnaire. Next, participants were encouraged to
play with the prototype and to repeatedly authenticate using the assigned secret (training
mode). Whenever participants felt ready, they could stop the training and the user study
began. However, the training stopped automatically after one calendar day.
Performance Study In the following 21 days, participants had to authenticate once per cal-
endar day. As already mentioned, we allowed a maximum of three attempts. That is, a
session finished with a successful authentication or after three failed attempts. E-Mail re-
minders were sent once a day. Such mails did not contain personal data, especially the secret
was not provided. If participants still forgot to authenticate, we allowed an extension of one
day. However, a maximum of five additional days was granted.
Debriefing After the performance test, participants were invited to the lab for debriefing.
We collected the log-data from the participants’ devices and helped with uninstalling the
application. Next, participants filled in a questionnaire which collected qualitative feedback
concerning usability and likeability. In exceptional cases, when participants were not able to
appear in person, the debriefing was performed remotely using video chat software.
Memory Test During the debriefing, we mentioned that we might contact participants in
the future if we had more questions. After 14 days had passed, we arranged a spontaneous
meeting and asked participants to recall their secret (PIN or pattern) using a printed version
of the prototype. We opted for a printed version of the user interface as it is independent
from specific form factors. Again, participants had three attempts. After the recall test, the
memorability of the respective system was rated using Likert scales.
Participants
Participants were recruited using the university mailing list and social networks. All partic-
ipants were required to own a smartphone with Android 2.1 or higher. For organizational
reasons, the PIN group was recruited after the pattern group had finished. As an incentive,
participants had the chance to win one of two gaming consoles.
The pattern group started with 38 participants of whom 29 finished both the performance test
and the recall test. The average age of the valid 29 participants was 26 years (SD = 4, 19-36).
Eleven participants were female, 18 male. 21% stated to use unlock patterns in daily life to
authenticate on the smartphone. The PIN group started with 30 participants out of which 24
contributed valid data sets. The average age of those 24 participants was 27 years (SD = 4,
21-42). Seven of them were female, 17 male. 46% stated to use PIN on their smartphone to
authenticate. Participants of both groups were highly educated as 93% of the pattern group
and 92% of the PIN group held a university-entrance diploma.
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Figure 3.10: The measured authentication times of PIN, Android-conform gestures and more
complex gestures mapped on the 21 days of the user study. PIN performed best, followed by
Android rules conform patterns and complex patterns.
Results
We focus on a general comparison of PINs and patterns. Furthermore, we compare 13
Android-conform patterns to 16 patterns, where dots are skipped or visited several times, to
examine if the larger password space comes with usability drawbacks.
Efficiency
Efficiency is analyzed based on the average input times of successfully finished authenti-
cations. Analyzing failed attempts would skew the results: For example, the set of gesture
errors comprises deliberately aborted attempts which are usually very short. For the gesture
scheme, time measurement started with the first touch event and stopped as soon as the finger
was lifted. For PIN, we started the time measurement with the activation of the first button
and finished after the last digit (button) was released. In contrast to the gesture mechanism,
the PIN system required explicit confirmation of the input. However, we excluded this step
from the analysis to get comparable input data.
Figure 3.10 illustrates the average authentication times of PIN and pattern users, mapped
on the 21 days of the user study. The data of pattern users was split according to the com-
plexity of the used gesture. To investigate the overall performance, we conducted a one-way
independent analysis of variance comparing the 21-days average of PIN and both pattern
groups. The results reveal that the used authentication token has a significant impact on
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Figure 3.11: Users’ opinions towards the efficiency of the tested systems. In contrast to the
measured data, the pattern system was not perceived slower than PIN.
authentication time, F2,52 = 30.66, p < 0.001. Bonferroni corrected post-hoc tests reveal
that PIN (1501 ms, SE = 165, 844-3141) users performed significantly faster than pattern
users, p < 0.001. In addition, using an Android-conform gesture (2714 ms, SE = 216, 1315-
4655) resulted in significantly faster authentication times than using a more complex gesture
(3531 ms, SE = 208, 1618-5364), p < 0.05.
To analyze if users became faster over time, we performed a one way repeated mea-
sures ANOVA. The results confirm the significant main effect of the authentication token,
F2,40 = 19.94, p < 0.001. However, no significant effect was found for the study days,
F6.33,253.37 = 0.73, p > 0.05, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected (ε = 0.32). Furthermore, no
interaction effect of token ∗ days was found, F12.67,253.37 = 0.73, p > 0.05. Bonferroni
corrected pair-wise comparisons of the authentication token revealed a significant mean dif-
ference between both PIN and complex patterns (1959 ms, SE = 321) and PIN and conform
patterns (1169 ms, SE = 321), p < 0.001. However, the observed mean difference between
conform and complex patterns was not significantly different (789 ms, SE = 368), p = 0.11.
In contrast to the pattern concept, PIN allowed undo operations. Over the course of 21 days,
we observed 20 corrected attempts (using backspace) and five cancelled attempts (using the
cancel button). Comparing such authentication attempts (Mn = 5720 ms, SE = 665) which
included undo actions with the other successful attempts (M = 1314 ms, SE = 33) reveals that
such undo operations significantly slow down the input process, t24.12 = −6.62, p < 0.001,
r = 0.80.
In addition to the quantitative data, we assessed the perceived efficiency using five point
Likert scales ranging from “fully agree” to “fully disagree”. Figure 3.11 illustrates the
data. Since a Wilcoxon rank-sum test showed no significant impact of pattern complex-
ity (p > 0.05) the data was combined and grouped by authentication system. Overall, 21
(92%) PIN users and 26 (90%) pattern user agreed that authentication speed was fast. When
asked for efficiency, 20 (83%) PIN users and 26 (90%) pattern users attested positive values.
While these differences were not significant (p > 0.05), we found that significantly more
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Figure 3.12: The number of errors subdivided by the complexity of the used gesture (pattern
only) and by the use of undo operations (PIN only).
participants using the pattern scheme (90%) assessed their authentication speed to become
faster over the three weeks period, Ws = 472.50, z = −3.30, p < 0.001, r = −0.45. In
the PIN group, only 46% stated the same. The results indicate that the measured differences
were not reflected by the users’ opinions as both systems were perceived fast and efficient
to use. In addition, even if the quantitative analysis did not reveal significant changes over
time, most pattern users reported training effects.
Effectiveness
Effectiveness is analyzed based on the number of errors. In addition, we assess the sources
of errors and the perceived ease of use. Android security usually allows up to five failed
attempts before the system will be locked for a certain period of time (usually 30 seconds).
However, the security configuration can vary between different device classes and between
different manufacturers. As a consequence, we decided to categorize errors more conserva-
tive and compare them to the stricter but standardized security policies of automated teller
machines (ATMs) [134]. ATMs allow a maximum of three failed attempts before the used
authentication token (i.e., PIN) becomes ineffective. After such an error, some form of
fallback authentication is required to reactivate the account. Therefore, we define three
consecutive failed attempts as critical error. Consequently, one or two failed attempts are
categorized as non-critical error.
The analysis is based on 504 (21 days ∗ 24 users) PIN-sessions and 609 (21 days ∗ 29 users)
pattern-sessions. In 273 (13 users) pattern sessions an Android-conform gesture was used,
the remaining 336 (16 users) sessions were conducted with more complex gestures. Each
authentication session can include one, two or three attempts.
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An independent t-test comparing the overall error rate of PIN and patterns reveals that PIN
was significantly less error-prone than gesture-based authentication, t29.93 = −6.26, p <
0.001, r = 0.75. Overall, we observed only two critical (0.4%) and two non-critical (0.4%)
PIN errors. In contrast, gesture-based authentication led to non-critical errors in 89 sessions
(14.6%) and to ten (1.6%) critical errors. However, error rate was not significantly influenced
by complexity (p > 0.05). Users with Android-conform gestures failed non-critically in
15.4% of the sessions while the use of more complex gestures led to non-critical errors in
14.0% of the sessions. In addition, 2.4% of the sessions comprised a critical error when
more complex gestures were used and two (0.73 %) sessions failed critically using Android-
conform gestures. In contrast to the pattern group, PIN users were able to correct input errors
using the provided undo operations. As this aspect reduced the resulting error rate of the PIN
prototype, we added all correct-ed sessions to the data set and performed a second analysis.
The results indicate that, even without undo operations, PIN users performed significantly
better, t51 = 2.81, p < 0.05, r = 0.37. Figure 3.12 compares the described error rates
considering gesture complexity and the use of undo operations.
To further investigate why more people failed when authenticating with gestures, we had a
closer look into the characteristics of the logged attempts and developed a novel taxonomy
for the categorization of gesture-based errors. Since the scheme was primarily based on a
thorough analysis of logged data and theoretical assumptions, we additionally presented the
results of the categorization to four randomly selected participants. Participants informally
confirmed that the assumed reasons matched their real reasons for failed authentications.
Overall, we defined five reasons for slip errors and three reasons for memory-related fail-
ures. As defined in Section 3.1.1, slip errors are the consequence of inaccurate input, while
memory-related failures are the consequence of inaccurate recall. The taxonomy will be
illustrated based on the pattern “ ” (see Figure 3.13, right).
Slips are described by the following stroke types:
Aborted A subset of the correct cells in the correct order (Figure 3.13,1).
Additional An additional stroke which is not part of the correct pattern (Figure 3.13,2).
Distributed A correct pattern which is distributed over multiple attempts (Figure 3.13,3).
Missing A missing stroke that is not at the end of the pattern (Figure 3.13,4).
Close A wrong stroke which connects a wrong cell close to the correct cell (Figure 3.13,5).
Memory-related errors are described by the following stroke types:
Repeated A repetition of the same wrong pattern (Figure 3.13,6).
Distant Wrong strokes that are not direct neighbors of the correct stroke (Figure 3.13,7).
Mirrored Wrong strokes that are mirrored versions of the correct strokes (Figure 3.13,8).
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Figure 3.13: The assessed origin of gesture-based authentication errors. The source of error
was assessed based on a novel taxonomy. According to our analysis, most observed errors were
based on slips. Memorability issues played a minor role.
Based on the taxonomy, we categorized 135 (93%) slips and 11 (7.5%) memory-related
errors. Whenever an error showed characteristics of both a slip and a memory-related failure,
we counted it as a memory-related problem. For example, we observed attempts which were
aborted after a mirrored (sub)pattern. We assumed that such mirrored strokes are hardly
performed due to inaccurate input. Figure 3.13 gives an overview of the observed sources
of errors. The analysis revealed that 58 (43%) slips and three (27%) memory-related errors
were performed with Android-conform gestures.
As indicated by Figure 3.13, most slips (53) led to distributed gestures which were cut in
multiple parts and thus were logged as separate attempts. 16 (30%) of these were based
on conform gestures. Those errors are the consequence of short interruptions which occur
whenever the user briefly lifts her finger from the display. Since the system has no explicit
confirmation mechanism, each interruption is logged as a (failed) authentication attempt
followed by another (failed) attempt. The second largest group is based on missing strokes
(36%), 28 (58%) of these based on conform patterns. Furthermore, we observed 30 (22%)
aborted attempts, 14 (47%) of these with conform gestures. Within the “aborted” group,
we found wrong and correct stroke sequences. Similarly to distributed patterns, the abort
of a correct pattern seems to be based on unintended interruptions (slips). In contrast to
distributed gestures, the interruption was probably recognized by the user. Furthermore, we
assume that the abort of a wrong pattern sequence is the consequence of a recognized error
and therefore represents an intended action and not an error itself. One frequently observed
error, which also led to the abort of many attempts, was accidentally touching a cell which
actually should have been skipped. Finally, we found that all but one critical error had been
a consequence of inaccurate input (slips).
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Figure 3.14: Users’ opinions towards ease of use. Both systems were rated easy to learn and
easy to use. In addition, pattern users were more positive about error recovery than PIN users.
In the PIN group, where six failed attempts were logged, one critical error was based on
inaccurate recall: The user entered three wrong PINs which were all based on the transposed
correct PIN. The second critical error was based on a hardware problem and thus does not
fit in any category. The non-critical failures were based on missing digits (slips).
The qualitative feedback is illustrated in Figure 3.14. The results indicate that gesture users
were not annoyed by the number of errors. Indeed, both groups rated the used prototypes
easy to use. This was the case for 27 (93%, Mdn = 5) pattern users and 21 PIN users (88%,
Mdn = 4), Ws = 595.50, z = −1.05,p > 0.05, r = −0.14. Interestingly, significantly
more pattern users (90%, Mdn = 5) stated that errors could be quickly recovered from,
Ws = 507.00, z = −2.73, p < 0.05, r = −0.37. Only 54% (Mdn = 4) of the PIN
users stated the same. This indicates that quick recovery is more important for the perceived
usability than error avoidance. Furthermore, 79% (Mdn = 5) of the pattern users and 54% of
the PIN users (Mdn = 4) stated that error messages were easy to understand, p > 0.05. This
is an unexpected rating of the gesture group, considering that 39% of all slips were based
on distributed patterns which indicates that error messages were not recognized or ignored.
Finally 96% (Mdn = 5) of the PIN users and all pattern users (100%, Mdn = 5) agreed that
the system was easy to learn.
Likeability
According to the participants’ performance ratings, gestures were perceived equally efficient
and equally effective to PINs. This somewhat contradicts the quantitative assessment which
indicated significant differences. This Section focuses on user experience and indicates that
likeability is an important factor that also influences the usability perception of the systems.
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Figure 3.15: Users’ likeability ratings. Most participants agreed that using the gesture-based
authentication system feels good. In addition, gesture users indicated satisfaction.
As seen in Figure 3.15, 59% (Mdn = 4) of the pattern users and 71% of the PIN users
(Mdn = 4) liked the graphical user interface, p> 0.05. This indicates that graphical attributes
have not been the main influencing factor for the rather positive perception of the systems.
Indeed, none of the GUIs was optimized for good appearance. We rather opted for reduced
designs that minimized the effects of graphical differences. When we asked for interaction
comfort, both prototypes were rated almost identical. Only 62% of the pattern users and 62%
of the PIN users agreed that interaction was comfortable, p > 0.05. Therefore, the specific
likeability ratings do neither indicate clear preferences nor do they indicate that one of the
systems was particularly pleasant to use.
Nevertheless, when we asked for the overall likeability, ratings were very positive and
skewed towards the pattern system. Most (86%, Mdn = 5) of the gesture users agreed that
using the system felt good. In the PIN group, 75% of the PIN users (Mdn = 4) stated the
same, p > 0.05. Finally, the overall likeability was confirmed by fact that 90% of the gesture
group and 83% of the PIN group indicated to be satisfied with the tested system, p > 0.05.
Memorability
In the questionnaire, participants were asked to indicate the number of inputs which were
required to memorize the assigned token. Twelve (41%) gesture users and 17 (70%) PIN
users reported they had memorized their token after the first input. Only four of these twelve
pattern users got assigned a complex gesture. Furthermore, 16 (55%) participants of the
gesture group and six (25%) PIN users indicated they required two or three inputs. One PIN
user and one pattern user (with a complex gesture) needed more than three inputs to learn
the token.
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The spontaneous recall test confirmed the good memorability of PIN and gestures. In the
PIN group, 22 participants (92%) remembered their token, 19 (86%) among them needed
only one of the three possible attempts. In the pattern group, 26 participants (90%) could
recall the correct gesture, 23 (89%) among them within the first attempt. Two of the three
participants who failed to recall their pattern had used a complex gesture. The participant
with the Android-conform gesture remembered the correct shape but failed to recall the
correct starting cell. While all users of the gesture group agreed that they learned their cre-
dentials on a motor or visual basis, 16 (67%) participants of the PIN group stated the same.
They reported to recall the pattern, which evolves from connecting the intended buttons with
imaginary lines. The rest of the PIN group associated previous knowledge or “learned it by
heart”. When we asked gesture users to compare their experiences to previous experiences
with PINs, all agreed that gestures were equally easy to memorize.
Overall, we found no evidence for the assumption that the gesture-based approach is actually
easier to recall than the numeric solution. Instead, good recall rates and steep learning curves
of both systems support the assumption that memorability is indeed a minor problem as long
as such concepts are frequently used.
3.3.3 Discussion and Implications
In this Section, we discuss the results of the longitudinal field study as well as the recall test
and draw implications for the feasibility of gesture-based authentication.
PINs are Measurably Faster and Less Error-Prone
The 21-days performance test revealed that the system-type significantly influenced the suc-
cess rate and the input speed of participants. We found that the PIN system allowed a more
efficient and a more effective authentication on mobile devices. Overall, users of the gesture
system needed more than twice as much time and made significantly more errors. While
gesture complexity did not influence error rates, the more complicated interactions of non-
conform patterns measurably slowed down the process.
At the first glance, the results seem to contradict previous findings reported in Section 3.2
which indicated that pattern users authenticate faster than PIN users. However, in contrast
to the previous study, the measurement was not biased by other user actions (e.g., viewing
notifications). Therefore, we argue that the data presented in this Section represents a more
precise assessment. The differences may be partly explained by the fact that PIN-based con-
cepts are widely-used and thus participants were more trained. At the same time, touching
six cells may generally take more time than entering four digits. However, Android users
need to select more cells to achieve a similar theoretical security to PINs. We conclude that
considering only quantitative performance data, grid-based authentication is neither more ef-
ficient nor more effective than PIN-based authentication. However, according to the lessons
learned from Section 3.2, the performance of the gesture system is still within an acceptable
range for mobile applications.
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Grid-based Gestures are Perceived Equally Fast and Easy to Use
In contrast to the measured differences, the usability ratings indicated no superiority of PINs.
Both systems were rated fast and easy to use. In addition to the perceived performance
aspects, we found that users overall liked the systems. Especially the gesture-based concept
was reported to trigger good feelings and most users were very satisfied.
Therefore, we conclude that despite being measurably slower and more error-prone, the
gesture-based system provided acceptable efficiency and effectiveness. At the same time,
users were probably willing to accept the slower input as they overall liked the system.
That is, the reduced performance might have been partly counterbalanced by good user ex-
perience. For example, the continuous movements of grid-based gestures might be more
comfortable than multiple interrupted interactions (i.e., PIN-entry). In addition, fast error
handling had a positive effect on the perceived ease of use. The next Section will discuss
this aspect in detail. In summary, the results show that qualitative and quantitative data
needs to be analyzed to assess the performance of a system. While measured performance is
a predictor for perceived performance, user ratings may be influenced by various additional
factors (e.g., likeability).
There is a Trade-off between Error Recovery and Error Prevention
The results show that the gesture prototype was rated significantly better in terms of error
recovery and in terms of error messages. This indicates that the type of error handling
significantly influences user perception. Indeed, both systems follow different strategies:
The PIN prototype supported corrective interaction and provided reset functionality. The
gesture concept did not support undo operations. Consequently, every input error resulted in
a failed attempt. In addition, the PIN prototype displayed an explicit pop-up window giving
a binary error message (true/false). This window had to be explicitly confirmed, before the
system was ready for the next attempt. In contrast, the gesture concept did not display any
dialogue window but wrong patterns were shortly highlighted before the system was ready
for the next attempt.
This indicates that, in contrast to focus on error prevention, the gesture concept prioritizes
fast error recovery. We claim that such quick error recovery is especially useful in the context
of mobile devices where input errors are likely but serious consequences cannot be assumed.
Indeed, the user feedback indicates that quick recovery from errors is more important than
error avoidance. In addition, the analysis of PIN-entry times revealed that error prevention
is a time-consuming task. This trade-off between error prevention and speedy error recovery
questions the importance of high success rates as a main usability factor for mobile authen-
tication methods. Furthermore, we found that the feedback of the gesture-based concept
was probably more comprehensible. As the prototype displayed the wrong pattern after a
failed attempt, users could easily understand the source of error. In contrast, the PIN concept
masked digits through dots and provided only binary feedback. This probably made errors
harder to trace. Nevertheless, it should not be ignored that such design decisions can have
implications for other aspects of the system (e.g., observability).
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We conclude that the success rate is an important usability factor. However, effectiveness
should not only be assessed based on the number of errors as some users deliberately fail to
quickly start over. In general, we found that fast error recovery and comprehensible error
messages are exceptionally important in the mobile context. This once again confirms that
designers of user authentication mechanisms need to consider the context of use, especially
when designing the process of handling errors.
Frequent Authentication Facilitates the Recall
Both concepts were easy to learn and both password types were easy to remember. Inde-
pendently from the used concept, most participants learned their secret within three inputs.
Consequently, most errors were based on inaccurate interaction and participants hardly had
recall problems. The good memorability was finally confirmed by the spontaneous recall
test. User feedback indicated that motor memory and visual aspects are very important for
the memorization of the assigned tokens. While this may seem obvious when gestures are
used, this was also the case for the PIN group.
The results suggest that the support of motor memory and visual memory are important
design goals. However, we found no evidence for the assumption that the gesture-based
approach is particularly easy to recall. For both concepts, we found that 21 repetitions are
enough to achieve good learning effects. Since Section 3.2 indicated that users actually au-
thenticate up to 50 times a day, we assume that, compared to other use cases where authenti-
cation takes place less often (e.g., ATM), memorability is a minor problem in the context of
mobile devices. While this indicates that good performance should be prioritized, security
tokens should still be designed in a way that makes them easy to remember.
The Benefit of Non-Restricted Gestures is Questionable
The theoretical security benefit of allowing a non-restricted gesture space is indisputable.
Considering only the tested length of six cells, the number of unrestricted gestures already
exceeds the number of Android-conform patterns by the factor of eleven. Considering ges-
tures of all lengths makes the difference even larger. The quantitative analysis revealed that
complex gestures were comparably easy to use and comparably memorable. However, we
also found that participants who used complex gestures needed more time to authenticate.
In addition, Chapter 2 already indicated that most users tend to select rather simple gestures.
Hence, it is questionable if more complex gestures would actually be used in the wild. At
the same time, allowing a non-restricted gesture set introduced input errors which would not
have been possible with the (restricted) Android system.
We conclude that allowing non-restricted gestures increases the theoretical security without
necessarily increasing practical security. At the same time, the results indicated that the
theoretical security benefit is counterbalanced by practical usability drawbacks. We claim
that usability should be prioritized to theoretical security benefits. However, slight usability
drawbacks may be justified if they allow to significantly improve practical security.
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3.3.4 Limitations
We collected usability data of PIN users and gesture users over the course of 21 days. The
study was performed outside of the lab and participants were free to authenticate at any time
of the day. However, we had to control various real-life factors to allow a valid comparison
of both concepts. For example, we limited the task frequency to one authentication per
day. We would like to note that most users are likely to authenticate more frequently in
practice. However, we opted for low effort to minimize the dropout rates. Furthermore,
we assigned secrets and controlled their length and complexity. We assume that most users
would probably not opt for using a complex gesture, if self-selection is allowed.
The application itself was delivered as standalone tool and not integrated in the device’s
lock screen. We argue that the restrictive study design was necessary to increase the internal
validity of the study and allowed a solid quantitative comparison. At the same time, the
procedure clearly decreased the ecological validity of the study. We argue that the results
gathered in this study are complementary to the insights gained from Section 3.2. Therefore,
combining the results from both studies helps to get the full picture of both the usability and
the utilization of current unlock methods.
Despite these limitations which were deliberately accepted to allow a sound comparison of
both concepts, we have to point out further potential limitations which could not be avoided.
First of all, we did not test interference effects. Even though the participants did not use their
own credentials, it is very likely that most participants were trained PIN users and actively
used various PINs on a daily basis (e.g., ATM). On the contrary, we cannot assume that all
participants had gained previous experiences with gesture-based concepts. These differences
may have influenced both the performance and the perception of the tested concepts. Finally,
the pattern prototype allowed a wider range of gestures than Google’s unlock concept. Con-
sequentially, the results are representative for grid-based gestures in general but might not
be generalizable to the specific Android unlock patterns.
3.3.5 Summary
In this Section, we presented the results of a 21-days field study which compared PIN and
gesture-based unlock mechanisms. The controlled study design allowed to collect quan-
titative performance data and qualitative feedback. In addition, a spontaneous recall test
gathered first insights into the memorability of both systems. Both concepts were compared
in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, perception, likeability and memorability.
The results indicate that PINs outperform gestures when looking at the measured perfor-
mance data. PINs were significantly faster and less error-prone. At the same time, gestures
were perceived equally fast and easy to use. We found that one main difference between
both concepts was the mechanism of error handling. While the PIN prototype provided
undo functionality to correct failed input, the gesture-based authentication system did not
support such operations. As a consequence, every wrong gesture was automatically logged
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as failed attempt. Even if this error handling method is likely to produce more logged input
errors, we found that users did not desire undo operations. On the contrary, the gesture-
based concept was rated significantly better in terms of error recovery. This indicates that,
considering the mobile device context, quick error recovery is more important than error pre-
vention. The results indicated that undo operations are often not used, even if failed attempts
could be avoided. The recall test revealed similar memorability features for both concepts
and indicated that recall problems are not a major issue if authentication systems are used on
a daily base. The good recall rates were finally confirmed by the qualitative error analysis.
The novel taxonomy revealed that most logged errors emerged from inaccurate input.
Overall, the study confirmed that gesture-based authentication methods are a usable and
memorable alternative to traditional PIN-based authentication methods. Besides providing
good usability, we found that most people were in favor of the pattern system and thought
that gesture-based authentication feels good. This is a very promising finding as it increases
the chance that gesture-based authentication systems will be adopted in the long run.
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3.4 Observation Resistance of Grid-based Gestures
Section 3.2 presented important general requirements for usable unlock methods and Sec-
tion 3.3 indicated that gesture-based authentication is a promising alternative to PIN. In this
Section, we focus on the practical security of unlock gestures. While Chapter 2 already il-
lustrated that the design of novel observation-resistant authentication methods has attracted
much attention in the research community, the observability of currently used methods was
not yet investigated systematically. Although it is often assumed that Android unlock ges-
tures are prone to observation attacks, this vulnerability of grid-based gestures has not yet
been quantified. This Section fills the gap in related work by providing answers to the fol-
lowing main research questions.
RQ1 How vulnerable are grid-based unlock gestures to observation attacks?
RQ2 Does gesture composition influence the vulnerability to observation attacks?
RQ3 Does gesture visualization influence the vulnerability to observation attacks?
To shed light on the research questions, we conducted an online study which simulated the
gesture-based unlock process. Overall, 298 participants attacked 5960 unlock gestures of
various length and complexity. Each attack consisted of an observation task and a drawing
task. After each attack, we collected qualitative feedback concerning the difficulty of the
performed tasks. The approach allowed to assess the relative impact of individual gesture
characteristics such as length, knight moves, overlaps and visual appearance.
This Section presents the first systematic evaluation of the observability of grid-based un-
lock patterns and provides ground truth for their shoulder surfing vulnerability. The results
indicate that unlock gestures are indeed prone to shoulder surfing attacks (RQ1). However,
pattern composition has a significant impact on security (RQ2). While all tested parameters
had significant influence, we found that pattern length is the most important factor. Fur-
thermore, the results show that visualizing gesture strokes significantly downgrades security
(RQ3). In addition to the quantitative analysis, we present a model that predicts the ob-
servability of a given unlock gesture. The contribution of this Section is twofold: Firstly,
researchers can use the prediction model to further investigate the found trade-off and to
develop feasible solutions. Secondly, gesture users can directly benefit by optimizing their
used secrets according to the presented results.
This Section is partly based on von Zezschwitz, E., De Luca, A., Janssen, P., & Hussmann,
H. (2014). Easy to Draw, but Hard to Trace?: On the Observability of Grid-based (Un)lock
Patterns. In Proceedings of CHI’15. [265]. Please refer to the beginning of this thesis for a
detailed statement of collaboration.
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3.4.1 Research Context and Motivation
Chapter 2 revealed that the design of observation-resistant authentication concepts repre-
sents an active research field. To confirm the theoretically assumed observation resistance,
most of such systems are tested in laboratory experiments where shoulder surfing attacks
are simulated (e.g., [6, 27, 151]). Wiese and Roth [279] reviewed various shoulder surfing
evaluations and found that such security studies are rarely performed systematically. The
authors claim that different study designs and different procedures make the results hard to
compare. For example, the input is sometimes performed by the experimenter and observa-
tion attacks are simulated by participants (e.g., [214]). In other studies, usability tests are
filmed and the videos are used for a later expert analysis (e.g., [72]). Furthermore, the litera-
ture review in Section 2.3 indicated that most evaluations focus on the interaction with novel
authentication systems and often forgo the comparison with baseline conditions (e.g., PIN,
unlock gestures). Likewise, important factors like password length are often ignored. As a
consequence, even though the vulnerability of current unlock methods is generally assumed,
it was not yet examined systematically.
Zakaria et al. [292] analyzed the observability of the Draw-a-Secret scheme. The authors
tested three symmetric shapes with the length of three, five and seven strokes. The user
study followed a between groups design where each concept was tested by 17 participants.
Participants observed the experimenter and reproduced the observed shapes using pen and
paper. The analysis revealed two important findings: Firstly, password length played an
important role as 100% of the 3-stroke shapes but only 52% of the 7-stroke shapes were
successfully reproduced. Secondly, visual countermeasures like disappearing strokes helped
to increase observation resistance. Schaub et al. [214] tested a mobile version of Pass-Go.
They included short shapes (length = 2) and long shapes (length = 6) and found out that
both lengths were successfully shoulder surfed in 70% of all observations. The input was
performed by the experimenter and the observation was done by participants. Gugenheimer
et al. [112] tested a novel concept called ColorSnakes. While the concept also provides more
secure modes, the baseline condition is most relevant for this Section. The interaction with
a direct path was comparable to the interaction with Android unlock patterns and can be
used as a first indicator for the vulnerability of such gestures. Shoulder surfing attacks were
simulated by three experimenters who reviewed the video footage of 24 participants. The
authors simulated cognitive attacks (one-time observations) and video attacks. Depending
on the grid size, the success rate was 96-100% when video attacks were allowed and 58-75%
when single observations were simulated.
van Eekelen et al. [258] conducted an online survey to investigate the benefits of a newly de-
veloped authentication mechanism (PicassoPass) and included Android unlock pattern and
PIN as a baseline. To simulate observation attacks, participants watched videos and selected
one of six predefined answers. While in the gesture group, 13 of 17 (76.5%) attacks were
successful, the success rate of PIN was even higher (94.4%). Unfortunately, the authors did
not provide any information about the composition of the used gestures. Finally, the most
relevant work was performed by Song et al. [232]. As part of the development process of
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a proactive password checker, a set of six unlock gestures was assigned to 101 participants.
The set contained gestures of different strengths: Two gestures were rated “weak”, two ges-
tures were considered “medium” and two gestures were rated “strong”. The strength was
derived from equally weighting length, number of non-repeated segments and number of in-
tersections. The unlock was performed by the experimenter and observed by the participants.
After the observation, participants were asked to reproduce the observed gesture. 432 of 606
(71.29%) inputs were successfully reproduced. The analysis indicated a strong correlation
between pattern complexity and observation resistance. Compromised gestures were signifi-
cantly shorter, had significantly less intersections and less non-repeated segments. However,
predefining the tested gestures limited the generalizability and thus the relative weights of
composition aspects could not be analyzed in detail.
The literature review indicates that unlock gestures are vulnerable to observation attacks
as most researchers report success rates around 70%. In addition, the results indicate that
pattern composition and pattern length influence observation resistance. However, the rel-
ative weights of these influencing factors are still not well understood. In this Section, we
fill the gap in related work by systematically investigating the observability of Android un-
lock patterns, the most popular gesture-based authentication system. We opted for an online
study to maximize both the range of attackers and the diversity of the attacked gestures. Our
approach allowed to weigh the most relevant composition aspects as well as the impact of
stroke visibility. In summary, this Section presents the first large-scale analysis of shoulder
surfing attacks on gesture-based authentication systems.
3.4.2 Online Study
The primary goal of the user study was to test a wide range of differently composed gestures.
At the same time, we needed to guarantee that attack conditions were comparable across
different participants. To maximize the range of tested gestures, we finally opted for machine
generated patterns. We built a web-based study software which generated such patterns and
then simulated the unlock behavior of humans. Participants observed the computer animated
input and reproduced the observed patterns using their own devices.
Threat Model
Section 3.2 revealed that casual observations are most likely in the context of mobile authen-
tication and therefore most relevant in the user’s daily life. We considered this finding in our
threat model and assumed a casual observation in a semi-public space (e.g., public transport).
The attacker has exactly one opportunity to observe the gesture input as there is no techni-
cal equipment involved. The attacker has perfect sight on the user’s device and the whole
authentication process can be observed. In addition, the attacker has no previous knowledge
about the specific characteristics (e.g., length) of the performed gesture. After performing
the shoulder surfing attack, the attacker gets into physical possession of the device and tries
to reproduce the observed pattern.
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1
Please observe the Pattern Please observe the Pattern Please draw the Pattern
3 trys remaining
Reset Confirm
Countdown Observation Reproduction Feedback
Correct
Please give feedback
On a scale from 1 (very easy) to 5 (very difficult), how difficult was it to observe this pattern?
On a scale from 1 (very easy) to 5 (very difficult), how difficult was it to draw this pattern?
Next
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
Figure 3.16: The study interface consisted of a 3 ∗ 3 matrix. After a three seconds countdown,
the gesture was displayed. Next, participants reproduced the gesture. After the attempt was
submitted, participants rated the task using five-point scales.
Study Software
The front end of the study software was based on JavaScript; the back end was created using
PhP and MySQL. The front end, which simulated a perfect view from above, is illustrated
in Figure 3.16. Each observation started with a three seconds countdown. Afterwards, the
animated authentication was displayed. Next, participants had three attempts to successfully
reproduce the observed pattern before feedback was collected.
The 3 ∗ 3 matrix was displayed with an edge-size of 500px. As seen in Figure 3.16, input
was additionally indicated using a virtual finger. This finger was the only visual indicator
whenever stroke visualization was deactivated. The animation ran with a fixed speed of
500ms per single stroke. The speed was derived from Section 3.3 which indicated an aver-
age real-world speed of 2.7 seconds for Android-conform five-stroke gestures. Due to the
larger distance between single cells, overlaps and knight moves took more time. User input
matched the standards known from common graphic editors as participants started drawing
by pressing the left mouse button and finished by releasing it. User interaction was logged
and sent to the back end.
Method
The study was conducted following a repeated measures design. Each session consisted of
an introduction, a training task and 20 observations. The introduction page explained all
important aspects of the user study. We gave details on the study goal, explained observation
attacks as well as the procedure and the interaction. After the introduction, a training task
was performed. The training task consisted of three gestures of different complexity. Finally,
the user study started and each participant was asked to complete 20 observation attacks.
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Independent Variables
Gestures were randomly generated based on the standard rules for Android devices. We
defined the following independent variables:
Line visibility [true/false] – specifics if a drawn pattern (strokes) is visualized or not. The
factor was alternated between the attacks and therefore “true” was assigned to exactly
50% of the gestures and vice versa. As a result, we were able to test similar gestures
(with similar complexity) with both, visible and invisible lines.
Length [4-9] – specifies the number of activated cells. According to the standard rules for
Android devices, patterns comprised a minimum number of four cells and a maximum
of nine cells. The number of cells was randomly assigned.
Knight Move [0-4] – specifies the connection of two distant cells which are not directly
neighbored (e.g., ). According to the standard rules of Android devices, only straight
lines are allowed (cells on a straight line cannot be skipped). Knight moves were
assigned with a probability of 20%, whenever possible.
Overlap [0-3] – specifies crossing over an already activated cell by connecting to a distant
cell (e.g., ). Overlaps were assigned with a probability of 20%, whenever possible.
Intersection [0-7] – specifies strokes which cross already drawn strokes (e.g., ). Intersec-
tions were randomly assigned.
Dependent Variables
The main dependent variable was shoulder surfing success. It was measured in two ways:
Binary Success [true/false] – specifies if a gesture was successfully observed. If binary
success equals “true”, the attacker would have been able to authenticate.
Percentaged Success [0-100] – specifies the portion of successfully observed cells. The per-
centaged success rate is given by the sum of correctly observed cells divided by the
length of the observed gesture (entirety of correct cells). A cell is correctly observed
when both the spatial position in the matrix and the temporal position within the ges-
ture match the values of the expected cell. Higher values indicate a higher chance for
the attacker to authenticate. A value of 100% equals “binary success = true”.
Procedure
Each participant performed the following steps. The whole procedure took 13 minutes
(SD = 5) on average.
Introduction Reading the introduction page.
Training Observing and reproducing three gestures of different complexity. All participants
tested the same three gestures.
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Attack Observing and reproducing 20 gestures. Each gesture was observed exactly once.
For reproduction attempts, correction was possible. A maximum of three attempts
was granted. After each attack, feedback was collected using five-point scales.
Questionnaire After 20 attacks, participants were forwarded to a questionnaire. We col-
lected demographical data and assessed relevant previous experiences (e.g., shoulder
surfing). Furthermore, the questionnaire investigated if additional equipment was used
during the study (e.g., pen and paper).
Raffle All participants had the chance to win one of two eBook readers. The chance of
winning was positively correlated with the number of successful observations. We
assumed that this aspect would additionally motivate participants.
Multiple participations were forbidden. If the use of additional equipment was reported, the
respective participant was excluded from the analysis. However, such participants still had
the chance to win one of the eBook readers.
Participants
Participants were recruited using a university-wide mailing list. As two of 300 participants
reported to have used additional equipment, the final data set was based on 298 participants.
The proportion of male (51%) and female (49%) participants was well-balanced. Partic-
ipants indicated an average age of 32 years (14-73, SD = 13). While most (59%) used
Android smartphones on a daily base, about one third (29%) reported the use of other smart-
phones (e.g., Apple iPhone). In addition, 12% of the sample reported that no smartphone
was used on a daily base.
When asked about the current lock screen configuration, 30% reported to use PIN, 28% used
the Android gesture unlock and 11% indicated other methods (e.g., fingerprint). Further
31% did not use a secure lock screen (e.g., slide-to-unlock). While 15 (5.0%) participants
had already been a victim of a shoulder surfing attack, 44 (14.8%) reported that they already
had observed code entries of others.
Results
Overall, we collected 5960 (20 observations ∗ 298 participants) samples. However, we had
to remove 61 patterns as their characteristics exceeded the defined maximum of the indepen-
dent variables11. That is, these patterns comprised more than four knight moves, more than
three overlaps or more than seven intersections. Including such extreme values would have
skewed the results as the number of observations was insufficient to allow a valid analysis.
Table 3.3 shows the main statistics of the final pattern set. The data set comprised very
simple patterns which are very likely to be used by humans (e.g., 12% of the patterns with
11 The removed patterns comprised extreme values which had been generated too infrequently to allow statisti-
cal analyses.
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Factor Mean (SD) Median Distribution
Line - - false [50.0%], true [50.0%]
Length 6.36 (1.72) 6,00 4 [19.5%], 5 [17.4%], 6 [16.5%], 7 [16.4%], 8 [15.4%], 9 [14.9%]
Knight move 0.92 (0.93) 1,00 0 [39.2%], 1 [37.4%], 2 [17.0%], 3 [5.1%], 4 [1.2%]
Overlap 0.38 (0.65) 0,00 0 [69.9%], 1 [23.5%], 2 [5.3%], 3 [1.4%]
Intersection 1.06 (1.39) 1,00 0 [48.4%], 1 [24.4%], 2 [12.3%], 3 [7.8%], 4 [3.9%], 5 [1.8%], 6 [1.0%], 7 [0.3%]
Table 3.3: Main statistics of the independent variables of the final data set.
visualized strokes did not comprise a special move) but also more complex patterns which
are unlikely to be used in the wild. A first analysis revealed that the outcome of the first
attempt of reproducing a pattern was a very good predictor for the overall success. That is,
in most cases (94%) where participants failed to reproduce the pattern in the first attempt,
the attack remained ineffective even after three attempts. As a consequence, we focus on the
analysis of participants’ first guesses.
Binary Feature Weights
To assess the relative feature weights on a binary basis, we define success as false (coded
as 0) and true (coded as 1). Overall, 3565 (51.7%) patterns were successfully shoulder
surfed, 57.9% of them had visible lines. In contrast, 62.2% of the resistant gestures had line
visualization disabled. Individual independent t-tests for each pattern feature and success
reveal that shoulder surfing resistant gestures comprised significantly more cells (M = 7.4,
SD = 1.4; t5897 = 44.5) than exposed ones (M = 5.7, SD = 1.5). In addition, resistant
gestures comprised significantly more knight moves (M = 1.3, SD = 1.0) than exposed ones
(M = 0.7, SD = 0.8), more overlaps (M = 0.6, SD = 0.8) than exposed ones (M = 0.3,
SD = 0.5) and more intersections (M = 1.7, SD = 1.6) than exposed ones (M = 0.6, SD = 1.0),
all p < .001.
To determine the relative weights of the different factors, we conducted a binary logistic
regression analysis. The main results are depicted in Table 3.4 (left). The analysis reveals
that all tested factors have a significant individual impact on the observation resistance of
a given pattern (all p < .001). The resulting prediction model is able to correctly esti-
mate 75.8% of the binary outcome of an observation attack (χ2(5) = 20089.9, p < .001,
R2Nagelkerke = 0.404). The odds ratio (see Table 3.4) reveals that switching off line visu-
alization reduces the chance of a successful observation attack by 67%. Furthermore, each
additional cell reduces the risk that the pattern is observed correctly by 45%. The use of a
knight move reduces the risk by 32% and each overlap lowers the chance of a successful
attack by 20%. Finally, each intersection reduces the risk of shoulder surfing by 12%.
Figure 3.17 illustrates the measured binary success rates for each composition factor. While
increased complexity generally improves observation resistance, switching off line visual-
ization has a significant impact at any level.
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Figure 3.17: Binary success rates subdivided by composition factors and line visualization.
While each factor has a significant impact, length and line visualization are most important.
Binary Logistic Model Linear Regression Model
B (SE) Odds Ratio (95% CI) B (SE) β VIF
Line -1.12 (.07) 0.33* (.29, .37) 14.42 (.69) .23* 1.00
Length -0.60 (.026) 0.55* (.52, .58) -5.27 (.27) -.29* 1.78
Knight move -0.38 (.05) 0.68* (.62, .75) -3.99 (.53) -.12* 2.02
Overlap -0.22 (.05) 0.80* (.72, .89) -3.20 (.60) -.07* 1.27
Intersection -0.13 (.04) 0.88* (.82, .95) -2.05 (.39) -.09* 2.52
Constant 5.52 (.17) - 97.59 (1.85) - -
Table 3.4: Left: B-values and odds ratio of the logistic regression model predicting binary
success; Right: B-values, standardized betas and variance inflation factor of the linear regression
model predicting the percentaged success rate. Line visibility was coded: 0 = false, 1 = true. All
tested features have a significant individual impact on observation resistance ( *p < .001).
Success Rate Prediction
Despite the binary success, we defined the percentaged success rate as the portion of cor-
rectly reproduced cells. Values can range between zero (no correct cell) and 100 (all cells are
correct). Analyzing the portion of correct cells helps to specify the observation risk of a pat-
tern even if it was not correctly reproduced. Therefore, percentaged success is an important
measure to assess the difficulty of the observation.
Overall, participants were able to correctly reproduce 78.8% (SD = 30.9) of the observed
cells (patterns). Analyzing the group of observation resistant patterns reveals that partici-
pants were overall able to observe 46.4% (SD = 28.1) of the input, even if the overall out-
come was wrong. In addition, we found that participants were able to correctly reproduce
71.4% (SD = 34.4) of the cells, when line visualization was deactivated. Switching on line
visualization increased the portion of success to 86.2% (SD = 24.9).
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We performed a simple multiple regression analysis to specify the relative weights of each
factor and to predict the observation risk for a given pattern. The data met the assumption of
independent errors (Durbin-Watson value = 2.035). Furthermore, preliminary analyses indi-
cated no multicollinearity and the histogram as well as the P-P plot of standardized residuals
indicated that errors were approximately normally distributed. The analysis resulted in a
highly significant regression equation (R2 = 0.263,R2Ad justed = 0.263,F(5,5893) = 421.32,
p < .001). The details of the model are depicted in Table 3.4 (right). The linear regression
model confirms the findings of the binary analysis. All factors are significant individual pre-
dictors for observation risk (p < .001). Looking at the standardized β -values indicates that
the number of cells has the biggest impact (β = .29), followed by line visibility (β = .23),
knight moves (β = .12), intersections (β = .09) and overlaps (β = .07).
Therefore, the observation resistance of a given pattern can be assessed by the following
equation:
ObservationRisk = | portion of correctly observed cells
97.59 | constant term of the prediction model
+14.42∗Xline | X = 1 if visualization on, else X = 0
−5.27∗Xcells | X = number of cells
−3.99∗Xknight | X = number knight moves
−3.20∗Xover | X = number of overlaps
−2.05∗Xinter | X = number of intersections
Further analyses revealed no significant impact for personal attributes like gender or the daily
use of unlock patterns.
User Feedback
After each observation, participants rated the ease of observation and the ease of input based
on two five-point scales ranging from 1 (“very easy”) to 5 (“very hard”).
A Spearman’s rank-order correlation indicates a strong positive correlation of the answers
to both questions, rs(5897) = 0.96, p < .001. Observation resistant patterns were rated both
harder to observe (Mdn = 5) and harder to reproduce (Mdn = 5). At the same time, both
tasks were rated easy (Mdn = 2) for patterns which were successfully attacked.
Overall, user feedback confirms that increasing complexity makes both tasks more difficult.
While short patterns with four cells were rated “very easy” (Mdn = 1) to draw and “very
easy” (Mdn = 1) to observe, both tasks were rated “medium” (Mdn = 3) for patterns with six
cells and “very hard” (Mdn = 5) for gestures with nine cells. The rating of patterns which
comprised knight moves, intersection and overlaps showed the same trend. Finally, both
tasks were rated “medium” (Mdn = 3) when gestures were visualized and “hard” (Mdn = 4)
when strokes were invisible.
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3.4.3 Discussion and Implications
We now summarize the results gained from the online study and discuss relevant implications
for both users and researchers.
Unlock Gestures are Prone to Observation Attacks
After observing the input once, participants were able to reproduce 51.7% of all tested pat-
terns. Even if the correct pattern was not reproduced, users were still able to recognize
almost half of the cells correctly. In practice, attackers could substitute missing cells with
additional information. For example, parts of the gesture could be gained from smudge left
on the screen or derived from known user preferences. Therefore, the results confirm that
Android unlock gestures are vulnerable to observation attacks, even in one-time observa-
tions. In addition, we assume that this is especially the case if multiple observations are
possible or video attacks are performed.
Gesture Composition and System Configuration Are Important Factors
Even if unlock gestures are generally easy to attack, we found that all tested factors have a
significant impact on observation resistance. The number of cells and line visibility are the
most important aspects. When users switch off line visualization, the chance of a successful
observation attack is immediately reduced by 67%. Every additional cell lowers the risk
of an observation attack by 45%. In addition, including “special moves” like overlaps or
intersections can significantly reduce the shoulder surfing risk. However, even if such long,
complex and invisible patterns are harder to observe, they are hardly a practical solution
as the use of such gestures increases error rates and input times. Therefore, we claim that
novel authentication mechanisms need to be found which provide a better trade-off between
observation resistance and usability.
Real-world Patterns are Particularly Easy to Observe
Prior work already indicated that users tend to select simple and short gestures which are
fast and easy to use [10, 254]. This is confirmed by the fact that participants from our study
rated more complex patterns harder to draw. In addition, as line visibility is usually activated
per default12, it can be assumed that most users draw visualized lines in practice. Therefore,
we assume that long, complex and invisible gestures are hardly used in the wild. When
considering such gestures which are likely to be used in the wild, we find that 93% of such
patterns with visualized lines and without any “special moves” were successfully reproduced
in our experiment. We therefore conclude that real-world gestures are particularly easy to
observe.
12http://www.tech-recipes.com/rx/32304/android-how-to-hide-patterns-unlock-phone/ –
last accessed: 2015/12/29
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Some Gestures Might be Easy to Enter but Hard to Trace
Even if patterns which are harder to observe are often harder to enter, we assume that some
“more secure” patterns can be still fast to use. While knight moves demand more accu-
rate interaction, overlaps and intersections do generally not demand additional input effort.
As the reproduction of gesture-based authentication is mainly based on motor memory, we
furthermore assume that most users would quickly get used to invisible patterns. Our pre-
diction model can be used to further investigate the interplay of usability and observability.
For example, it can be integrated in a proactive pattern meter which visualizes the estimated
shoulder surfing risk for a given pattern. Such systems could be displayed during pattern
selection and help users to avoid high risk gestures. At the same time, researchers could use
the system to systematically investigate patterns which are harder to trace, but still easy to
perform.
3.4.4 Limitations
The web-based study software, which controlled the pattern generation and simulated the
user input, allowed that a large number of patterns was observed by many different attack-
ers. Thus, the specific study design eliminated the effects of different observers and different
patterns. At the same time, we had to exclude some real-world factors. The input was per-
formed at a constant speed which was derived from field evaluations. This input speed would
vary in the real world. In addition, the study simulated a best case scenario for attackers as
they had perfect view from above. In reality, the angle of view would change and the view
could be disturbed by reflections or occlusions. Finally, the simulation was limited to right-
handed input. Thus, it is possible that the actual weight of individual factors will change
depending on the context and the performance of the user. However, we assume that the
relation of single features will stay the same. At the same time, we assume that most real-
life factors (e.g., faster input) are likely to reduce reproduction rates. Finally, the prediction
model is only applicable to one-time observations. Nevertheless, the results do not indicate
that any of the tested features provides significant protection from more advanced attacks.
Despite the specific limitations of the study procedure, online studies always comprise a cer-
tain lack of control. For example, we could not control the study environment as participants
performed the observations using their own devices. Furthermore, we could not control all
participants’ characteristics. For example, it is possible that long-sighted users performed
the task without glasses. Finally, we cannot guarantee that all participants reported the use
of additional equipment. However, as we recruited a very large number of participants, we
are confident that such external factors did not significantly influence the results.
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3.4.5 Summary
In this Section, we presented a systematic evaluation of the observation resistance of unlock
gestures and provided ground truth for their real world vulnerability. However, the analysis
of 5960 observation attacks did also show that each composition factor plays a significant
role. That is, the results indicated that using long invisible gestures would significantly
reduce the observability of the system. Finally, we presented a regression model that can be
used to predict the observability of a given pattern.
This Section provided valuable insights for current systems and for future developments.
First, we contributed to the understanding of the observability of unlock gestures and pre-
sented solutions that can be immediately applied to current systems. Secondly, the results
confirmed that currently used methods are often very easy to observe. While the use of long,
invisible and more complex gestures may somewhat reduce observability, the results gained
from Section 3.2 and Section 3.3 do not indicate that such strategies will be widely ac-
cepted. Therefore, we conclude that novel gesture-based authentication mechanisms need to
be developed. This novel class of gesture-based authentication mechanisms should combine
effective observation resistance with efficient and satisfying input methods.
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3.5 Practical Password Space of Grid-based Gestures
Section 3.2 and Section 3.3 showed that unlock gestures are particularly popular among
users as they are fast and easy to use. However, Section 3.4 showed that such systems
are prone to observation attacks. In addition to observability, Chapter 2 already indicated
that guessability might be a problem as many users follow predictable selection strategies.
Nevertheless, the actual strength of a given unlock gesture is still hard to define.
In this Section, we fill this gap of knowledge and present a novel metric that enables to
quantify and to compare the similarity of grid-based unlock gestures. We apply our metric
to a user-defined gesture set and provide answers to the following main research questions.
RQ1 How can we quantify the practical space of grid-based unlock gestures?
RQ2 How predictable are user-defined grid-based unlock gestures?
RQ3 Which are the most popular selection strategies and what are popular unlock gestures?
To measure the diversity of user-defined unlock patterns, we introduce a novel metric for
grid-based patterns which is based on geometric similarity and the assumption that unpopular
patterns are generally more resistant to guessing attacks [167,215]. The metric is inspired by
Li and Vitányis’s use of the Kolmogorov Similarity measure [163] and quantifies similarity
through the computational efforts required to derive a given representation of a gesture A
from another gesture B (RQ1).
We adopt the metric in a greedy clustering approach and measure the diversity of 506 user-
defined unlock patterns. The approach reveals popular gesture groups, which are often se-
lected by users. The gestures of such clusters show high similarity values in terms of shapes
and complexity. We will illustrate that user-defined grid-based unlock gestures can be clus-
tered to a small number of groups and are therefore very predictable (RQ2). We show that
applying up to two simple transformations (e.g., rotation) already reduces the number of dis-
tinct gestures by about two thirds. Further analysis of popular patterns reveals that users are
indeed in favor of short and simple shapes. For example, almost one third of all user-defined
gestures could be derived from five central patterns (RQ3).
Overall, this Section confirms that user-defined grid-based unlock gestures are very much
prone to dictionary attacks. Beyond that, the presented strength metric builds the basis for a
comparable evaluation of future developments. For example, it will be used in Chapter 4 to
evaluate and compare the effectiveness of proactive pattern checkers.
This Section has been partly included into von Zezschwitz, E., Eiband, M., Buschek, D.,
Oberhuber, S., De Luca, A., Alt, F. & Hussmann, H. On Quantifying the Effective Password
Space of Grid-based Unlock Gestures. To appear in Proceedings of MUM’16 [267]. Please
refer to the beginning of this thesis for a detailed statement of collaboration.
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3.5.1 Research Context and Motivation
Chapter 2 provides an in-depth discussion of guessing attacks on gesture-based authen-
tication mechanisms. Previous work already indicated that unlock gestures are easy to
guess [254]. Uellenbeck et al. [254] reported that most patterns are drawn from left to right
and that users prefer the upper left cell as a starting point. Andriotis et al. [11] confirmed that
a biased selection behavior limits the practical password space of the authentication system.
In addition, the predictability of Android patterns has recently been covered by the media13.
Proactive security checking was already discussed as a possible solution [10, 229, 232, 241].
Such systems work analogously to alphanumeric password meters and calculate the strength
of a given gesture based on specific composition aspects. Proposed features included length
[10, 232, 241], direction changes [10] or knight moves [10]. However, the actual weight of
these measures was not yet investigated and thus it remained unknown what exactly makes
a grid-based gesture hard to guess. In addition, it was already shown that statistical compo-
sition measures do not reflect actual user choice [97, 145, 177].
As a consequence, previous work proposed simulated guessing attacks as an alternative ap-
proach to quantify guessability. The performance of such guessing algorithms depends on
appropriate training data [273]. In the context of alphanumeric passwords, such data can be
collected from exposed databases. However, as unlock gestures are usually stored on the
owner’s device, researchers have to rely on training sets which are often collected during
simulated enrolments. We claim that the use of self-collected training sets questions the
comparability between different projects.
In this Section, we provide a novel metric which does neither require training data nor relies
on statistical assessments. As a consequence, the metric allows to compare the practical
password space of arbitrary gesture sets, even if they were collected under different condi-
tions. The metric is based on geometric similarity and the assumption that unpopular patterns
are generally harder to guess [167, 215]. Therefore, two factors are particularly important:
A) the similarity to known popular patterns and B) the similarity to other patterns in the
same gesture set. The more a given gesture differs from A) and B), the harder it is to guess.
Gesture sets which show less similarity represent a less predictable and thus more secure
practical password space.
3.5.2 Similarity Metric
We compare patterns according to their geometric similarity. In this Section, we define the
similarity metric and present the clustering approach.
13https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2015/08/22/surprise-people-choose-predictable-
android-lockscreen-patterns/ – last accessed: 2016/01/05.
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1Original Inversion Translation Rotation Mirror
Figure 3.18: All five gestures are based on a simple L-shape. The similarity metric proposed in
this Section assesses the distance between such gestures by analyzing the number of geometric
transformations needed to convert one gesture into another.
Definition
We aim to determine the portion of similar shapes within a given set of user-defined unlock
gestures. Therefore, we first define “similarity” inspired by Euclidean plane isometries [49]:
Two patterns A and B are n-similar for n ∈ N0 respecting a set of transforma-
tions T , if A can be transformed into B with exactly n geometrical or logical
transformations from T . If A and B are equal, they are assigned a distance of 0.
We define the following transformations T . Figure 3.18 illustrates examples for each trans-
formation.
Inversion Traverse a shape in inverted order
Translation Translate a pattern by one cell in north, east, south or west direction
Rotation Rotate a gesture by 90, 180 or 270 degrees
Mirror Mirror a pattern on the x-axis or y-axis
Example If we choose n = 1, this means that patterns of the same group are “1”-similar. In
other words, each gesture of the group could be transformed into a specific “central” gesture
of the group by applying exactly one transformation T .
As proposed by Li and Vitányis [163], we quantify similarity through the computational
efforts required to derive a given representation of a gesture A from another gesture B . Thus
a higher number of operations translates to less similar gestures.
Gesture Grouping Approach
We limit the analysis to groups of congruent gestures (with equal length), since we consider
shapes to be the most important property in the pattern creation process, and a change in
length often alters the shape of a pattern. Each group contains all patterns n-similar to a
“central” pattern within the group. Furthermore, each pattern is assigned to exactly one
group. Therefore, choosing the central patterns in a way that minimizes the total number of
groups presents an optimization problem.
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Figure 3.19: The results for n ≤ 2. Each white circle is a pattern; its size grows with its total
occurrence count in the database. Dark circles enclose groups of similar patterns.
Example Problem To motivate and explain the clustering approach, we start with the fol-
lowing exemplary problem:
A 1−→ B 1−→C
with n = 1 for the pairs {(A,B),(B,C)}. In practice, we could imagine transformations
of the popular “L”-shape. A would be an “L” aligned to the left ( ), B could be the same
“L” translated right ( ), and C would be the same as B but rotated by 90 degrees ( ). This
means that A has a distance of two to C, while B has a distance of one to both. Thus, the
optimization problem becomes evident: If we choose n = 1 (i.e., the maximum distance
within groups is 1) and start with A as a central pattern, we will get two groups {A,B} and
{C}. If we use B as the central pattern instead, we would only get a single group {A,B,C} to
cover all three shapes. Figure 3.18 illustrates another example: The distance of the original
and the inversion as well as the translation (assuming the same direction) is n = 1, the
rotation and the original differ by n = 2, the distance of the mirrored gesture and the
original is n = 3.
Approach - Greedy Clustering Generating the optimal set of central patterns is equivalent to
the Minimum Set Covering problem [60], and thus NP-hard. Therefore, finding the optimal
solution for gesture sets of interesting size is not feasible as it would either take too much
time or require too much computer power. Consequently, we opt to approximate the optimal
solution by using a greedy algorithm [156] instead.
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In each step, we add one ungrouped gesture to the set of central gestures. We choose the
gesture which is n-similar to the largest number of yet ungrouped gestures. This procedure is
repeated until each gesture is part of one group, possibly a group containing only one gesture
(i.e., a unique one, which cannot be derived with n transformations from any other gesture).
As we are particularly interested in very similar gestures, we consider a maximum of n=2.
Figure 3.19 visualizes14 the results of the greedy clustering applied to an exemplary dataset
which was collected under standard Android conditions. It shows that despite a number of
unique patterns (in the center), the vast majority of patterns belongs to groups, meaning that
they can be derived from each other within n≤ 2 simple transformations. The next Section
presents the online study and discusses its results in detail.
3.5.3 Online Study
The similarity metric is applied to a set of 506 user-defined unlock patterns which were
collected under Android standard conditions.
Threat Model
Even though the main purpose of this Section is to introduce a novel metric for pattern
strength, we present a potential threat model. According to our threat model, the attacker is
in possession of a device which is protected by a grid-based unlock gesture. The attacker
has no previous knowledge about the used gesture. However, the attacker knows the most
popular Android patterns. As a consequence, she performs a dictionary attack and starts with
the most popular pattern. Whenever the attack fails, the attacker tries another gesture which
results from simple geometric transformations. The smartphone allows up to 20 guesses
within a feasible amount of time (i.e., a few minutes), before the device gets blocked for
a longer period. It should be noted that the search space is further reduced, if the attacker
is able to gain additional information about the characteristics of the used gesture (e.g., by
smudge analysis or by observation).
Method
The goal of the study was to collect a huge set of user-defined gestures from users of var-
ious backgrounds. To quickly collect such patterns, we developed a web application for
mobile devices and recruited participants using Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). The
study started with an introduction page that explained the topic of the evaluation and pro-
vided details of the procedure. After the task was accepted, a link to our web application
was displayed. MTurk users were asked to open this URL on their smartphone. We utilized
PHP Mobile Detect15 to examine if participants actually used their mobile devices.
14 Generated with http://d3js.org Library released under BSD license. Copyright 2015 Mike Bostock.
15 PHP Mobile Detect released under MITLicense. (http://mobiledetect.net) – last accessed:
2015/11/15.
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Both the interaction and the graphical appearance of the user interface resembled current
implementations of the Android unlock system. The pattern creation process followed the
standard Android enrollment procedure16. That is, the patterns had to be conforming to the
standard Android rules and selected gestures had to be confirmed once. During the selection
process, participants were allowed to reset their input and start again. After the gesture was
confirmed and submitted, we displayed a short questionnaire which collected demographical
data and gathered information on the technical background. After the successful completion
of all steps, a secret code was provided. Participants had to enter this code in MTurk to
confirm the completion of the study. The whole procedure took 102 seconds on average
(SD = 53). Each participant was compensated with US$ 0.5.
Participants
We checked that all participants provided the correct confirmation code. In addition, we
validated the given answers and excluded participants who did not fulfill the requirements.
For example, we excluded participants who stated not to use mobile devices. Finally, 506
participants contributed to the data set. All participants indicated to be US citizens, 334 were
male and 172 were female. The average age was 28 years (SD = 8; 18-67). 50.2% reported
to use Android smartphones, 49.4% used iPhones and two participants used Blackberry de-
vices. Overall, 38.7% indicated to use PIN on their smartphone, 37.5% used no secure lock
screen, 17.7% used Android unlock gestures and 6.1% used other methods.
Results
Since each participant contributed one sample, the results are based on 506 unlock gestures.
Basic Statistics
The average pattern length was 5.0 points (SD = 1.4). The basic statistics confirmed the
findings of related work [11,254] as the favored starting point was at the top left with 41.1%.
Most patterns followed the western reading direction and 20.0% finished at the bottom right.
Most gestures were based on simple strokes. Special moves were hardly used: Only 7.3%
of the patterns included overlapping nodes and only 5.9% comprised knight moves.
Popular Gestures
The results of the similarity analysis confirm that users select their unlock patterns from a
limited pool of simple shapes. The groups for n≤ 2 with pattern length four deserve special
attention, as they include more than half of the patterns in the dataset. The largest observed
group is formed around the -shape (Table 3.5) and covers 17 different permutations.
Hence, attackers brute-forcing their way through all these 17 permutations of will get a
hit for 56 of the dataset’s 506 patterns – that is 11.1%. The second largest group comprises
-forms and covers nine different patterns, whose occurrences account for almost 5% of our
16 More details: http://phandroid.com/2014/03/20/android-101-lock-screen/ – last accessed:
2015/09/17.
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Rank Top Gesture # Permutations # Occurrences % Dataset
1 (1478) 17 56 11.1
2 (1596) 9 25 4.9
3 (5896) 13 24 4.7
4 (1256) 8 23 4.5
5 (1235) 12 18 3.6
Table 3.5: The five largest groups for n ≤ 2. The table shows the most frequent (top) pattern
of each group, the number of different patterns covered in the group, the accumulated absolute
number of occurrences for all patterns in the group, and the covered ratio of the whole dataset.
dataset. The group ranked three includes and covers 13 different patterns with 24 occur-
rences in our data (4.7%). Overall, the five largest groups presented in Table 3.5 comprise
59 different patterns. Their occurrences account for roughly 29% of the dataset.
Considering gestures which comprise more than four cells, reveals that the largest group
contains patterns of length seven. It is the sixth largest group in the whole data set. The
group covers 13 -shapes in four different permutations. This means that over 40% of all
length-seven-patterns can be derived from this single form. Most (8.4%) of the length-five-
patterns are based on -forms, 23.3% of the length-nine-patterns form -shapes. Patterns
with six or eight cells show most diversity.
Gesture Similarity
Figure 3.20 and Table 3.6 summarize the results: The total number of distinct gestures
shrinks from 506 to 350 when removing duplicates (i.e., n = 0). For a similarity distance
of 1, the total number of individual groups is 213. Hence, considering those patterns as
duplicates that differ only by a single transformation already reduces the number of unique
patterns by about 57%. If we set n≤ 2, only 169 groups are left, as determined by the greedy
grouping algorithm. That is, considering very similar gestures (n ≤ 2) as duplicates would
shrink the practical gesture space to a third of its size.
Gestures with length ≥ 5 show less similarity than gestures with only four cells. However,
the results in Table 3.6 imply that the ratio between the total gesture count and number of
similarity groups does not shrink linearly with pattern length. Instead, it reaches a minimum
for length six, where the number of diverse patterns is reduced by just 33%. Length eight is
close second with a reduction by 40%, and the unique pattern count for length nine – where
one might expect the biggest reduction – is reduced by 43%, indicating similar selection
strategies.
If we focus on the more than 50% of participants who used patterns with a length of four, we
find exceptionally high similarity values: As indicated by Table 3.6, the grouping algorithm
clusters 262 gestures to 44 similarity groups with n≤ 2 and thus reduces the practical gesture
space to 17% of its size.
108
Practical Password Space of Grid-based Gestures
506
350
213
179 169
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
Total n=0 n=1 n=2 n<=2
Distance
N
um
be
r o
f G
es
tu
re
s
Figure 3.20: Total number of unique gestures (groups) for n ∈ {0,1,2}. Considering a distance
of n≤ 2 as duplicates reduces the gesture space by 66%.
Length Total n = 0 n = 1 n = 2 n≤2
any 506 100% 350 69.2% 213 42.1% 179 35.4% 169 33.4%
4 262 51.8% 156 30.8% 68 13.4% 50 9.9% 44 8.7%
5 119 23.5% 94 18.6% 64 12.6% 56 11.1% 52 10.3%
6 48 9.5% 43 8.5% 38 7.5% 32 6.3% 32 6.3%
7 32 6.3% 22 4.3% 15 3.0% 15 3.0% 15 3.0%
8 15 3.0% 10 2.0% 10 2.0% 9 1.8% 9 1.8%
9 30 5.9% 25 4.9% 18 3.6% 17 3.4% 17 3.4%
Table 3.6: Absolute number of groups (unique gestures) by gesture length for n ∈ {0,1,2} and
their percentage of the dataset. The data indicates that gesture with four cells are exceptionally
similar while gesture with six or eight cells show most diversity.
3.5.4 Discussion and Implications
The analysis confirmed that users indeed follow predictable strategies when selecting grid-
based unlock gestures. We found that user-defined patterns are usually short (avg. 5 cells),
start on the top left of the matrix and end on the bottom right. In addition to these basic
results, the application of the proposed similarity metric revealed interesting insights which
will be discussed in this Section.
Length is an Important Security Feature
The analysis of user-defined unlock gestures revealed that primarily short gestures are very
similar. For example, we found that 21% of all patterns with the length of four could be
traced back to simple -shapes. Overall, the practical pattern space for such short gestures
was reduced to 17% of its actual size. This is a serious security issue as over 50% of the
participants in this group chose gestures of this length. When users decided to use more cells,
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the resulting gestures were less similar. We therefore conclude that (similar to alphanumeric
passwords) length is a fundamental security measure. However, the results revealed that
gesture length cannot be used as a linear security feature as the maximum diversity was
found for six and eight cells but dropped for patterns using seven cells or the whole grid
(length = 9). The manual inspection of such gestures indicated that this phenomenon results
from the users’ preferences for specific shapes. For example, gestures with seven cells were
mainly based on the -shape. The use of six or eight cells does not lead to such prominent
geometrical shapes.
But There is More to Strength than Length
The discussion of gesture length indicated that the human interest in geometric properties is
a strong influencing factor. The proposed metric is the first to reflect such special interest
as it considers similarity to other patterns as more important than specific properties of their
composition. We argue that specific composition aspects do not necessary increase guessing
security as most users prefer the same forms. For example, a minimum length requirement
does not increase security, if most users opt for the -shape. Our metric revealed that
knowing a single popular gesture, namely the center of the largest group in the dataset,
would have been enough to deduce more than a tenth of the whole dataset by applying only
two simple transformations.
This knowledge renders patterns much more susceptible to informed guessing attacks than
what is usually anticipated. In addition, the metric is able to identify popular shapes which
are not necessarily found in the top ranks of unique patterns but still cluster a significant por-
tion of the pattern space. We thus argue that pattern strength is better assessed by measures
that consider human factors, such as geometric similarity, compared to measures that are
purely based on obvious properties of pattern composition, such as their length. We assume
that one potential solution might be to implicitly manipulate the users’ geometric prefer-
ences during the selection process (e.g., through user interface design). If such manipulation
would be randomly applied, it could increase the overall diversity.
Popular Gestures are Easy to Guess and Easy to Observe
Overall, the analysis confirmed that most users prefer short patterns based on simple shapes.
Thus, the selection of Android unlock patterns is even more restricted than previous work
assumed. While the preferred use of -shapes and -shapes was already reported, we
found that most patterns which seem unique at first glance are close relatives of these shapes.
Therefore, we conclude that most gestures are easy to guess considering the top gestures and
up to two simple transformations.
In addition, the application of our prediction model (see Section 3.4) indicates that most
user-defined gestures are also easy to observe. 52% of the users used four cells without
special moves. Assuming that strokes are visualized, the model predicts an observability
quotient of 91. This indicates with almost absolute certainty that an observation attack is
successful. Indeed, the data reveals that 92.5% of the four-cell gestures were successfully
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shoulder surfed during the user study. We conclude that most real-life gestures are both easy
to observe and easy to guess. If attackers can combine knowledge from both attacks, they
are very likely to succeed.
3.5.5 Limitations
The metric reflects that users are guided by geometric properties when creating patterns.
However, we currently apply a simple gesture distance, namely counting geometric transfor-
mations. Furthermore, we do not know how different geometric transformations compare to
one another in terms of the users’ perceived similarity. That is, transformations should pos-
sibly be counted with different relative weights not all contributing to the total distance with
the same weight, as assumed here. Such weights need to be determined by future studies. In
addition, pattern groups found with the greedy approach may not match the global optimum.
However, as the main insights are derived from analyses of the largest groups and the most
popular patterns, we expect them to be rather stable.
Considering the evaluation strategy, not all confounding factors could be ruled out. The data
set was collected via Amazon Mechanical Turk and thus mostly collected from young US
citizens. Therefore, the data set might not be representative of other age groups and cultures.
In addition, since we could not collect real-life gestures, we based the analysis on gestures
which were collected during a simulated real-life situation. We like to note that real-life
gestures might slightly vary dependent from the used context. However, since the basic
statistics matched the findings of prior work, we are confident that most of the participants
contributed patterns which they would also have used in a real situation.
3.5.6 Summary
In this Section, we investigated the similarity of grid-based unlock gestures. For this purpose,
we proposed a novel metric and applied it to a corpus of 506 user-defined unlock gestures.
The analysis revealed that most users base their secrets on a small set of very similar shapes.
Considering all gestures with a distance n ≤ 2 as duplicates reduced the practical gesture
space of unlock patterns in the data set by approximately 66%. In addition, we found that
most gestures were short (avg. 5 cells) and comprised only straight lines. The results indicate
that user-selected unlock gestures are very predictable and prone to dictionary attacks. We
therefore conclude that solutions to make user-selections more diverse are required.
The insights presented in this Section are important for motivated users who want to
strengthen their choice of unlock gestures. Furthermore, this work provided both the motiva-
tion and the tools to research potential countermeasures against predictable pattern selection.
Chapter 4 will discuss such strategies and propose systems which have the potential to diver-
sify gesture choice. The systems will be evaluated based on the similarity metric presented
in this Section.
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3.6 Result Aggregation and Implication
We presented four research projects which explored the problem space of gesture-based
authentication on mobile device. The performed user studies provided valuable insight into
real-world aspects and contributed to an in-depth understanding of current systems. In this
Section, we summarize the main results and draw implications for future designs. Please
refer to the respective sections for a more detailed discussion.
3.6.1 Lessons Learned
In Chapter 2, we identified important open questions regarding the real-world unlock be-
havior and the real-world performance of current unlock concepts. In this Chapter, we sys-
tematically filled most the identified gaps by defining and exploring the problem space of
gesture-based authentication.
We learned that device unlocks are performed at high frequency but usage sessions are usu-
ally short. In addition, field observations revealed that risks are seldom received and users
are not willing to invest additional effort for additional protection. We concluded that this
specific unlock behavior in combination with low risk perception significantly increases the
importance of efficiency. In this context, we also found that perceived efficiency is actu-
ally more important than quantitatively measured values. However, results indicated that,
irrespective of the used authentication concept, unlock times up to four seconds were still
acceptable for most users. At the same time, the results indicated that high unlock frequen-
cies reduce memorability problems since the user’s memory is constantly refreshed.
Furthermore, the investigation confirmed the importance of effectiveness. However, we
found that effectiveness cannot be equated with success rate. This is especially true when-
ever deliberately failing is more efficient than error correction. In this connection, we found
that current unlock gestures outperform numeric approaches. Even if the quantitative as-
sessment indicated higher error rates, we found that the specific error handling of the gesture
approach was rated significantly better. This indicates that the mobile context renders fast
error recovery more important than error correction.
Even though gestures did not always outperform PIN, we found that they were perceived
to work equally well. In addition, participants stated that using gestures feels good and
most users were generally in favor of the gesture-based concepts. In terms of usability and
likeability, this indicates that current gesture-based concepts are already close to the goal
state. At the same time, we found that using current unlock concepts opens serious security
holes. The analysis indicated that users select gestures from a very limited pool of shapes.
In addition, we found that most real-world gestures are easy to observe. Even though we
found that such risks are seldom perceived and security can be partly improved through
gesture selection, the current state is far away from the goal state and thus, we argue that
such problems need to be solved by future designs.
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Finally, the Chapter contributed two strength models which help to assess the practical se-
curity of a given gesture. A prediction model helps to quantify observation risk, a similarity
metric considers the human preferences for geometric properties and helps to assess guess-
ability. The contribution of these models is twofold: Firstly, the metrics can help researchers
to further investigate human selection behavior and to benchmark potential countermeasures.
Secondly, the outcome can immediately help motivated users to select more secure gestures.
3.6.2 Implications for Future Designs
The analysis of the current state of gesture-based authentication mechanisms has important
implications for future designs. In Chapter 4, we will explore the design space and investi-
gate how gesture-based authentication methods can be designed in a way that improves the
current state and brings it closer to the goal state. For this purpose, we have to prioritize the
different aspects of the problem space according to both the distance between current state
and goal state and the importance in the users’ everyday life.
Usability
While the ultimate goal in terms of usability must be full accessibility, 100% effectiveness
and zero effort, we conclude that the usability of the next generation of gesture-based au-
thentication concepts must be at least comparable to current solutions. Current solutions are
already widely accepted and the current state is close to the goal state. Therefore, when
developing novel concepts, good efficiency must be the main goal. We argue that, indepen-
dent from provided security benefits, bad performance is a criterion for exclusion for any
mobile unlock mechanism. The same is true for effectiveness. In this connection, quick
error recovery shall be prioritized. Concerning memorability, we conclude that the factor
is less important in the context of mobile unlock systems. However, common limits of hu-
man memory need to be considered. That is, adequate theoretical security shall be reached
within a feasible number of memorable chunks (i.e., gestures) [17]. Furthermore, since the
results render perception aspects extremely important, we conclude that novel concepts shall
be designed in a way that increases likeability. This also implies that user perception and
likeability needs to be individually assessed during evaluations. Finally, all concepts shall
be as accessible as current solutions. That is, all solutions shall be tailored to the mobile
context (e.g., support one-handed interaction) and supported by current devices or shortly
available solutions.
Security
The field evaluation revealed that security risks are hardly perceived by users. At the same
time, the analysis of current gestures showed that current concepts are far away from the
goal state. We argue that, even if threats are rarely perceived, the next generation of gesture-
based authentication concepts must provide improved security. However, the results of the
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field study indicate that users are not willing to accept reduced usability for increased se-
curity. Concerning theoretical security aspects, we conclude that current concepts already
provide adequate protection. Therefore, novel concepts need to provide at least the same
level of security. That is, a minimum of 10,000 secrets should be provided and encrypted
storage of such secrets must be possible. In contrast, the practical security of current unlock
mechanisms shows major deficits. Researchers need to consider human preferences (e.g.,
for geometric properties) for specific gestures and develop concepts which have the poten-
tial to implicitly break such habits and make gesture selection less guessable. Furthermore,
practical security must be improved in terms of observation resistance. Since the field eval-
uation indicated that users are often casually observed but advanced shoulder surfing attacks
are seldom, we conclude that the protection from such casual attacks should be prioritized.
Nevertheless, the ultimate goal must be perfect protection, even from camera attacks. The
third serious threat is smudge. Even if smudge attacks were not investigated in this Chapter,
Chapter 2 indicated that current concepts are vulnerable. Therefore, the design of smudge
resistant unlock gestures must be a goal for future concepts. Finally, Chapter 2 indicated
that divulgation resistance is less a problem in connection with touch gestures. Still, this
factor should not be neglected and novel concepts should achieve at least similar protection
as current solutions.
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Chapter4
Exploring The Design Space of
Gesture-based Authentication
It’s not just what it looks like and feels like.
Design is how it works.
– Steve Jobs, Chairman and CEO of Apple Inc. (2003) –
Based on the insights of Chapter 3, this Chapter addresses the main problems of estab-
lished gesture-based authentication mechanisms: Smudge Attacks, Observation Attacks and
Guessability. For this purpose, novel concepts have been developed and evaluated in the lab
and in the field. The results of such studies illustrate the impact of different design factors
and contribute to the understanding of gesture-based authentication on mobile devices.
Section 4 illustrates the different aspects of the design space and gives an overview of the
research covered in this Chapter. Section 4.2 addresses the threat of smudge attacks and
investigates the utility of randomization to develop more resistant authentication mecha-
nisms. The evaluation shows that randomized interfaces can be both efficient and effective.
In Section 4.3, we focus on observation attacks and present two projects which especially
investigate the impact of visual cues. The evaluation shows that clever interaction design al-
lows building very efficient authentication methods which provide observation-resistance on
demand. Section 4.4 systematically investigates output elements and presents two concepts
which utilize static guidance to implicitly influence gesture selection. The results show that
minor changes in the interface of established authentication mechanisms can have a high im-
pact on practical security. Finally, Section 4.5 summarizes the main findings and discusses
the impact of different design decisions.
4.1 The Design Space
Chapter 2 illustrated various ways to design graphical gesture-based authentication mech-
anisms. Some concepts utilize gestures to activate visual elements represented on the
screen [18], other systems use the gesture itself as secret information [227]. In this Section,
we define the design space of graphical gesture-based authentication on mobile devices. The
first part presents the main design factors and points out potential influences on the usabil-
ity and the security of an authentication system. The second part gives an overview of the
research projects which were performed to explore the defined design space.
4.1.1 Definition
We like to note that the presented list of design factors is not exhaustive. We rather take
a simplified view which allows a systematic evaluation of the most important factors. Al-
though parts of the design space may apply to other device classes and other interaction
concepts as well, the presented design space is specifically defined to match the combination
of touch gestures and touch-based mobile devices. This especially means that the definition
does not consider multimodal concepts (e.g., sound or haptic cues). Inspired by Schaub et
al. [214], we define four main categories: Input Elements, Output Elements, Element Ar-
rangement and Interaction Style. Figure 4.11 gives an overview of the design space.
Input Elements
Input elements represent all active areas which can be used to enter data. Therefore, input
elements are essential for any touch-based authentication system. Input elements can differ
in size, shape, texture, text and number. In general, the design should comply with standard
design guidelines for mobile devices. First of all, it should be optimized for finger-based
interaction and input elements should be reachable with one hand. For example, Google
recommends a minimum size of 48 ∗ 48 dp (density-independent pixels) for touch targets
and at least 8dp between targets2. Similar values are recommended by Apple 3. In addition
to the compliance with general design guidelines, we identified the representation and the
reusability of the input elements as important design factors.
Representation The visual representation of the input element is distinguished into none,
abstract and concrete. None means that there are no visual representations of the input ele-
ments. This might be the case whenever the input element fits the whole screen or whenever
the input is guided by additional output elements. If input elements are visually represented,
1 All figures in Section 4.1.1 are based on flat icon designed by Freepik http://www.freepik.com, licensed
under CC BY 3.0
2 https://www.google.com/design/spec/layout/metrics-keylines.html – accessed: 2016/02/17
3 https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/UserExperience/Conceptual/
MobileHIG/LayoutandAppearance.html – accessed: 2016/02/17.
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Figure 4.1: The Figure illustrates the most important aspects of the design space of graphical
gesture-based authentication mechanisms on mobile devices.
they can be abstract or concrete. Abstract representations imply all shapes and colors with-
out physical referents. In contrast, concrete input elements represent physical objects or
well-known symbols like letters and digits. Figure 4.2 illustrates the different representa-
tions. While the abstract input elements are represented by black circles, the concrete input
elements represent food and kitchen objects.
none abstract concrete
Figure 4.2: Visual representations of input elements can be abstract or concrete.
We hypothesize that the representation of input objects influences both usability and security.
While omitting visual representations can increase observation resistance, the use of visual
representations is likely to increase usability. Section 4.2 will show that concrete represen-
tations can improve the user experience and support story-based memorization. Section 4.3
will present an authentication concept which supports eyes-free interaction and thus com-
pletely forgoes visual representations.
Example: The Android pattern unlock provides nine abstract input elements which are usu-
ally represented by dots.
Reusability The reusability of input elements defines how often an input element can be se-
lected (activated) during enrollment or authentication. We distinguish between limited and
unlimited reusability. Limited reusability represents cases in which input elements become
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unavailable after a certain number of activations. In contrast, unlimited reusability describes
the case where the number of activations is user-defined. Reusability is likely to affect the
composition of the secret as well as efficiency and effectiveness. Section 3.3 already indi-
cated that reusable elements increase the risk of unwanted activation. In contrast, limiting
the reusability of input elements usually reduces the theoretical password space. Figure 4.3
illustrates both cases. The limited interfaces allows to activate input elements once while the
right interface allows unlimited activation.
Example: The reusability of the Android pattern unlock is limited to one activation per cell.
limited unlimited
2..3...1!
Figure 4.3: Input elements can either support unlimited reuse or limit the number of activations.
Output Elements
Output elements represent all visual elements which are not interactive. Schaub et al. [214]
defined such elements as visual cues. Output elements can display any kind of informa-
tion (e.g., text). In contrast to input elements, the existence of output elements is optional.
Similar to input elements, the number and the visual appearance of output elements play an
important role for usability and security. In general, the presented information needs to be
easy to understand and optimized for fast processing [253]. We categorize output elements
according to their purpose: Feedback and guidance.
Guidance Guiding elements are used to guide the user’s actions or to influence her deci-
sions. This especially implies that the output is bound to subsequent interactions. If guidance
is available, we distinguish between static and dynamic elements. Static guidance describes
output elements which are independent from user interaction while dynamic guidance is
bound to user input or other events (e.g., unlock events). Figure 4.4 illustrates the character-
istics of guiding output elements. While the static elements illustrate general options for the
next target, the dynamic elements may recommend one specific target depending on previous
interactions.
Guidance can generally support usability as it simplifies the interaction. In addition, we
will learn how dynamic guidance can be used to improve the practical security of an au-
thentication system. Section 4.2 illustrates the importance of guidance in connection with
randomized interfaces. In Section 4.3, we will demonstrate how dynamic guidance can be
used to protect input from observation attacks. Section 4.4 will present several concepts
which exploit static guidance to diversify the selection of gestures.
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none static dynamic
Figure 4.4: If guidance is provided, it can be distinguished into static and dynamic elements.
Example: The Android pattern unlock does not provide guidance. However, it could be
implemented by highlighting the cells which are reachable from a certain position.
Feedback Feedback is important for any user interface to indicate the state of elements or
to confirm that touch input was received. In contrast to guiding elements, feedback elements
are bound to previous user input or an earlier event. We distinguish feedback according to
its information content: feedback is either aggregated or detailed. In addition, some systems
may also forgo visual feedback. Aggregated feedback informs the user in an abstract way,
while detailed feedback gives concrete information.
aggregated detailednone
Figure 4.5: If feedback is provided, it can be given in an aggregated or in a detailed manner.
Figure 4.5 illustrates the different options. The example shows that aggregated feedback
may acknowledge user input by displaying binary symbols (received versus not received). In
contrast, the example for detailed feedback visualizes the entered gesture. If an error occurs,
the user would be able to identify the exact source of error. Therefore, detailed input is likely
to increase usability and may also increase memorability in a way that the performed gesture
is visually perceived. On the other hand, detailed feedback may give away information to
potential observers. Section 4.2 presents several prototypes which make use of detailed and
aggregated feedback. In Section 4.3, we will deliberately reduce the detail level of feedback
to increase observation resistance.
Example: The Android pattern unlock gives detailed feedback per default. Gestures are
visualized by highlighting both the drawn path and the activated cells. Errors are represented
by visualizing the entered gesture in a different color (usually red). While the main feedback
can be switched off, error highlighting is always activated.
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Element Arrangement
Element arrangement is an important factor which directly influences the usability and can
influence the security. Input and output elements can be arranged in different ways. Follow-
ing Schaub et al. [214], we differentiate between spatial and temporal arrangements.
Spatial Spatial arrangement describes how elements are positioned on screen. We distin-
guish fixed and random arrangements. If an authentication system provides a fixed layout,
all elements appear at a predictable (usually the same) position. In contrast, a randomized
layout positions elements at unpredictable places. While fixed spatial arrangements support
motor memory and thus usually increase efficiency and effectiveness, randomized layouts
may increase practical security. Figure 4.6 illustrates both arrangements.
xed random
Figure 4.6: Input elements and output elements are either presented using a fixed spatial ar-
rangement or are positioned using a randomized layout.
Section 4.2 will present several concepts which illustrate how randomized layouts can be
used to prevent smudge attacks. In addition, Section 4.3 and Section 4.4 will present con-
cepts which rely on randomized output elements. We will learn how randomized output can
increase both observation resistance and the practical password space.
Example: The Android pattern unlock is based on a fixed spatial arrangement of both input
elements and output elements.
Temporal The temporal arrangement depicts both, the number of challenges and the con-
tinuity of the user interaction. According to Schaub et al. [214], we distinguish between
single challenges and multiple challenges. Single-challenge-arrangements are often based
on the input of one continuous gesture. In contrast, concepts which are based on multiple
challenges always require multiple discrete gestures. Figure 4.7 illustrates both configura-
tions. While the concept on the left requires a single challenge, namely the input of a single
gesture, the concept on the right requests multiple challenges.
Section 4.2 investigates the effects of single-challenge arrangements and multi-challenge ar-
rangements in combination with randomized spatial layouts. We will learn that the temporal
arrangement can have a significant impact on the perceived efficiency. In Section 4.3, we
discuss how multiple challenges can be used to protect gesture input from observation.
Example: The Android pattern unlock is based on a single challenge (i.e., one continuous
gesture).
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single multiple
Figure 4.7: Authentication concepts can be based on a single challenge or on multiple chal-
lenges which need to be accomplish in sequential order.
Interaction Style
While gesture-based interaction is a precondition for all concepts in the scope of this work,
the interaction style varies. We categorize the interaction style according to the relation of
the gestures and other elements (targets) and according to the directness of the interaction.
Relation Relation describes if the information content of a gesture is self-explanatory or
if the information is derived from other elements on the screen. It therefore describes the
relation of the gesture and other elements. If the performance of a gesture is not bound
to any targets, we call it self-contained. Gestures which are self-contained are often based
on relative movements. In contrast, gestures which are not self-contained are called target-
oriented as the information is depending on the activated target. Figure 4.8 gives an example
for each gesture type. On the left, the gesture is target-oriented as it is mainly guided by the
elements on screen. The concept on the right illustrates a self-contained gesture which is
defined by relative shifts in direction (i.e., right,up,right).
target-oriented self-contained
R
U
R
Figure 4.8: Target-oriented gestures are described by the activation of specific input elements
while self-contained gestures are often described by relative movements.
Section 4.2 will present several target-oriented authentication concepts. The evaluation will
show that the way of target binding plays a significant role for likeability and performance.
Section 4.3 will illustrate a concept that uses self-contained gestures to enable eyes-free
input and prevent observation attacks.
Example: The Android pattern unlock uses target-oriented gestures. The gesture becomes
ineffective if the set of activated targets differs from the set of expected targets.
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Directness Beside the relation of the gesture and the input elements, the relation of input
elements and output elements plays a significant role. Direct gesture input represents the
normal case. However, gesture input may also be performed independently from the repre-
sentation of the input elements. We hypothesize that such indirect gesture input can increase
practical security in terms of smudge attacks or observation attacks. Figure 4.9 illustrates
a target-oriented authentication concept. On the left, the gesture is performed directly on
the respective representation of the input element. On the right, the gesture is performed
indirectly as the input takes place at a position which differs from the position of the visual
element.
direct indirect
Figure 4.9: Gestures can be performed directly on the target element or indirectly. Indirect
gestures are described by input areas which differ from the visual representation of the respective
target elements.
Section 4.2 will present concepts that are based on direct gesture input, while Section 4.3
presents two concepts that exploit indirect gesture input to increase observation resistance.
Example: The Android pattern unlock is based on direct gesture input as the touch-
coordinates need to match the visual representations of the input elements for activation.
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4.1.2 Overview
This Chapter presents three research projects which were conducted to explore the design
space of graphical gesture-based authentication on mobile devices. The overall goal of all
projects was to find the right design to bring the current state of gesture-based authentication
closer to the previously identified goal state [8]. The projects are presented in three sections.
In each Section, we present and discuss the development process, the concepts and the results
of laboratory experiments and field studies. Each concept was implemented as interactive
prototype and thoroughly studied. The following gives an overview of the research covered
in this Chapter.
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On Preventing Smudge Attacks
Section 4.2 explores the design space in the light of smudge attacks.
We present several authentication mechanisms which were designed
in a way that smudge traces are hard to interpret. For this purpose, we
specifically focus on the effects of randomized spatial and temporal
arrangements. In addition, different aspects of reusability, guidance
and feedback will be discussed.
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On Preventing Observation Attacks
Section 4.3 explores the design space with the aim of developing
observation-resistant authentication mechanisms which are fast and
easy to use. We present two concepts which make use of direct and
indirect gesture input. Both systems allow the user to adjust the secu-
rity level according to the current situation. We make use of target-
oriented gestures and self-contained gestures and will learn how dy-
namic guidance can be used to prevent shoulder surfing.
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On Increasing the Practical Password Space
Section 4.4 differs in various ways from the other two sections as the
presented projects aim to diversify gesture selection. The two pre-
sented projects focus on the enrollment phase and not on the authen-
tication procedure itself. We will investigate the effects of implicit
guidance and learn that the spatial arrangement of visual cues can
significantly influence gesture selection. The resulting gesture sets
will be analyzed based on the metric presented in Section 3.5.
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4.2 On Preventing Smudge Attacks
This Section explores the design space in terms of smudge attacks. As revealed by Aviv
et al. [18] in 2010, current graphical gesture-based concepts are very much prone to such
attacks. We present eight instances derived from three different concept classes. All concepts
are particularly secure against smudge attacks as interaction leaves smudge traces which are
hard to interpret. The results of this Section are based on an iterative design process that
involved low-fidelity and high-fidelity prototyping and evaluations in the lab and in the field.
This Section sheds light on the following main research questions:
RQ1 How can randomized spatial arrangements be utilized to build smudge-attack resilient
but yet usable authentication mechanism for mobile devices?
RQ2 How does randomization influence user acceptance and user perception and which are
the important design factors?
RQ3 How does randomization influence effectiveness and efficiency and which are the im-
portant design factors?
RQ4 How does randomization influence learnability and memorability and which are the
important design factors?
The evaluation is based on three lab studies (n = 54) and on a field study (n = 18). While
this Section focuses on the rather limited threat model of smudge attacks, it allows a much
broader view on the interplay of the design space and the problem space.
While all concepts are based on direct target-oriented gestures, we will learn how random-
ized spatial arrangements of input elements can protect touch gestures from smudge attacks
(RQ1). At the same time, the evaluation will show that the temporal arrangement of such
randomized interfaces plays a vital role for user acceptance (RQ2). While multiple chal-
lenges tend to increase the input time, they are perceived more efficient. In contrast, pro-
viding single randomized challenges led to reduced user acceptance and lower perceived
efficiency even though these concepts were measurably faster (RQ3). In addition, the Sec-
tion will provide valuable insights into the design of input elements concerning reusability
and representation and show that guiding output elements play a significant role for both us-
ability and security. Finally, the field evaluation will show that randomized concepts indeed
allow learning effects (RQ4).
Parts of this Section are based on von Zezschwitz, E., Koslow, A., De Luca, A., & Hussmann,
H. (2013, March). Making graphic-based authentication secure against smudge attacks. In
Proceedings of the IUI’2013 [268]. In addition, parts are based on a bachelor thesis by
Alexander Kehr [144] which was carried out under my constant supervision. Please refer to
the beginning of this thesis for a detailed statement of collaboration.
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4.2.1 Research Context and Motivation
Since related work is already well covered in Section 2.3.2, this Section focuses on a short
overview. As mentioned, Aviv et al. [18] were the first to show that Android unlock gestures
are prone to smudge attacks. The authors presented the results of a lab study where 68% of
the entered gestures could be successfully deduced from oily residues left on the touchscreen.
In the following years, the work motivated several researchers to develop concepts which are
specifically designed to reduce the risk of smudge attacks. Two of the first concepts were
Vertical PIN and WhisperCore [4] which both introduced additional wiping tasks to blur the
actual smudge traces. Oakley and Bianchi [195] presented a modification of Android unlock
patterns which utilized multi touch. The authors assumed that the overlapping strokes could
reduce the risk of smudge attacks.
In addition to the work presented here, a few other concepts were recently published which
utilize randomized spatial arrangements to prevent smudge attacks. SmudgeSafe by Schnee-
gass et al. [218] uses a randomly applied set of geometric transformations (including rota-
tion) to alter smudge traces. The transformations are applied to background images which
serve as representations of input elements. SwiPass by Kosugi et al. [158] randomly displays
images taken by the user. As swipe directions are depending on the relative age of the im-
age, they dynamically change and smudge traces are hard to interpret. Finally, Amruth and
Praveen [7] proposed several concepts which are similar to WhisperCore [4] and multi-touch
gestures [195].
In addition to these randomized concepts, other approaches might also achieve smudge at-
tack resistance. TinyLock [161] minimizes the interaction area by minimizing the 3x3 grid
of Android unlock gestures. As a consequence, smudge traces overlap and become hard to
interpret. Chiang and Chiasson [52] propose multi-layered gesture input. Using multiple
layers may result in overlapping smudge traces. In addition, it may be hard to deduce the
actual layer a gesture was performed in. Glassunlock [281] combines a randomized PIN
layout with guidance through smartglasses. The combination makes authentication secure
against both smudge attacks and observation attacks. Finally, smudge attack resilience can
be achieved by adding implicit authentication layers using behavioral biometrics [69].
4.2.2 Threat Model
Mobile interaction goes far beyond authentication. As a consequence, smudge traces are
typically constantly modified and visual cues become harder to interpret with every addi-
tional input. However, our threat model assumes a best case scenario for an attacker who
tries to perform a smudge attack. According to the threat model, the attacker has temporary
access to the mobile device. For example, the mobile device was left unattended at am office
desk. The attacker uses this opportunity to clean the surface of the touch screen. As the user
returns she does not recognize the malicious activity and authenticates to check an incom-
ing text message. Besides reading the message, no interaction takes place. Next time the
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Chessboard Compass Connect
Four
Dial Marbles Pattern
Rotation
Input
Elements
Representation abstract abstract abstract abstract abstract or
concrete∗
abstract
Reusability limited unlimited limited unlimited unlimited or
limited∗
limited
Output
Elements
Guidance static static dynamic static static static
Feedback detailed detailed detailed detailed detailed detailed
Interaction
Style
Relation target-
oriented
target-
oriented
target-
oriented
target-
oriented
target-
oriented
target-
oriented
Directness direct direct direct direct direct direct
Element
Arrangement
Temporal single single single multiple multiple single
Spatial random random random random random random
Table 4.1: All concepts are based on randomized layouts, but the specific kind of randomization
is different. ∗For the sake of brevity, modifications of Marbles were grouped.
user leaves the mobile device unattended, the attacker gets again in possession of the device.
Since smudge traces are clearly silhouetted against the clean touchscreen and the device is
protected by a fixed grid-based unlock scheme (e.g., Android gesture unlock), the attacker
can easily deduce the entered secret and gains full access to the device.
4.2.3 Concept Overview
The following concepts were designed to leave smudge traces which are not easy to inter-
pret. However, as preliminary user studies indicated early that not all candidate concepts are
feasible for daily use, not all concepts ran through the whole development process. Table
4.1 gives an overview of the different approaches.
Consecutive Blurred Smudge Traces
Two concepts were mainly based on the idea of blurring smudge traces. Therefore, the
interaction is designed in a way that gestures usually pass the same screen location multiple
times. While the idea seemed promising at first, both concepts were rejected after low-
fidelity prototyping.
Compass is a drawmetric concept (see Figure 4.10, left). In contrast to Android unlock
gestures, input elements are arranged in circular order. We assume that the circular layout
will lead to an increased interference of smudge traces and hamper interpretation. In addi-
tion, smudge attack resistance is increased by randomly rotating the circle of input elements
(viewport). However, analogous to a real compass, the internal order of the elements stays
the same. The current orientation of the compass is indicated by static output elements: The
arrow and the initials of three cardinal points. A gesture results from connecting several
input elements, while the same input element can be visited multiple times.
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Figure 4.10: Both concepts are based on circular arrangements. With Compass (left) users
connect several input elements to authenticate. Dial (right) works analogous to a dial plate as
input elements are successively dragged to the center of the screen.
Dial is a numeric concept which uses gestures for input (see Figure 4.10, right). Similar
to Compass, input elements are arranged in circular order. Analogous to an old-fashioned
dial plate, the internal order of the input elements stays the same. In addition, the viewport
is rotated within a range of -45 degree and +45 degree. A password consists of an arbi-
trary sequence of digits. An authentication consists of multiple gestures. Each gesture is
described by dragging one of the input elements (digits) into the center of the screen. The
dragging path is specified by static output elements: Elements have to be dragged within the
margins and through the opening under the element “1”. As a consequence, smudge traces
are consecutively blurred.
Randomly Rotated Viewports
Two concepts are based on viewport rotations. Such concepts improve smudge resistance
by increasing the degree of freedom of a entered gesture. Nevertheless, if smudge traces
are clearly visible, attackers still have a good chance to guess the right gesture. While both
concepts were rejected during the development process, Pattern Rotation was the basis for
Connect Four, a promising concept which will be described in the next Section.
Pattern Rotation is based on the Android pattern unlock (see Figure 4.11, left). However,
the matrix is randomly rotated on the screen and translated along the y-Axis. The current
orientation is indicated by an arrow. We tested two different versions: A 90-degree version
with four different orientations (degrees of freedom) and a 360-degree version which allowed
arbitrary orientations. If the authentication takes place on a clean screen, the entered gesture
can still be derived. For example, the attacker would have a chance of 1:4 to guess the right
orientation whenever the 90-degree version was used. However, we assume that the varying
rotation of the matrix would usually blur smudge traces.
Chessboard is a modification of the pattern rotation scheme which was developed in the
second design cycle (see Figure 4.11, right). In addition to the viewport rotation known from
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Figure 4.11: Pattern Rotation (left) is based on the 3∗3 matrix layout which is randomly rotated
and translated across the y-Axis. Chessboard (right) is a modification of Pattern Rotation which
additionally implements a random spatial arrangement of input elements.
the pattern rotation system, the concept utilizes randomly floating input elements. That is,
active input elements are represented by circles and float within the borders of the squares
(cells). The orientation of the matrix is indicated by a white line. We assume that imple-
menting a fuzzy arrangement of the nine input elements leads to smudge traces which are
harder to interpret. However, even if the evaluation showed that this assumption is right, the
Chessboard layout had to be rejected due to usability drawbacks.
Randomized Input Elements
The two most promising concepts are based on a fully randomized spatial arrangement of
input elements. Marbles was developed in the first development cycle and constantly im-
proved; Connect Four evolved as a modification of Pattern Rotation. Both concepts ran
through all development stages and were evaluated in the lab and in the field.
Marbles is based on the randomly distributed input elements (see Figure 4.12). Over the
course of the project, three different versions were designed. The original Marbles concept
is illustrated in Figure 4.12, left. A secret consists of an arbitrary sequence of differently
colored input elements while each element can be selected multiple times. To authenticate,
input elements are dragged into the center of the screen. After a marble is logged, it imme-
diately reappears on its prior position. The position of the input elements is fixed during one
authentication but changes for each new attempt. Therefore, smudge traces reveal no infor-
mation on the used secret. In the second development cycle, we designed Marbles Story (see
Figure 4.12, center) which provides the same functionality as the original scheme but uses
concrete representations of input elements.
Marbles Gap is a modification of the original scheme which provides a different spatial
arrangement. In contrast to a circular arrangement, the screen is divided into three sections.
The top and the bottom Section provide the input elements while the Section in the center
is called “gap”. To authenticate, marbles need to be dragged into the gap. As indicated in
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Figure 4.12: The original Marbles concept (left) and Marbles Story (center) are based on the
arbitrary selection of circularly arranged input elements. In contrast, Marbles Gap (right) uses
the metaphor of a gap to limit reusability of input elements.
Figure 4.12 (right), each color is represented by two input elements (one in each segment).
Marbles of the same color are equivalent. In contrast to the original scheme, the reusability
of input elements is limited as marbles disappear as soon as they were dragged into the gap.
As a consequence, secrets can comprise a limited number of identically colored marbles
(i.e., two). Finally, choosing the same color twice requires more interaction effort (i.e., drag
elements from the bottom and the top) than choosing differently colored elements (i.e., drag
marbles from one side only). We assume that this interplay of input effort and password
diversity is likely to increase the practical password space.
Connect Four is a modification of the Pattern Rotation scheme. In contrast to Pattern
Rotation and Chessboard, Connect Four is based on a fully randomized arrangement of input
elements. As a consequence, Connect Four does not rotate the matrix itself but randomizes
the orientation of input elements. Input elements are represented by differently colored
items. In addition, each input element is tagged with an arrow. The arrows are static guiding
elements that randomly indicate one of four directions. Figure 4.13 illustrates the concept
during enrollment (left) and during authentication (right). During enrollment, the center of
the grid shows a specific color (i.e., green) and a direction (i.e., down). The user selects a
gesture following the common Android policy. As a consequence, the secret is a combination
of the color information, the orientation and the gesture. To authenticate, the user has to find
the center element and perform the gesture in relation to the indicated direction. As a 3 ∗ 3
grid is required to perform the gestures, the outer line of elements cannot serve as center
(guiding element). Therefore, smudge traces can result from eight different center elements
which can indicate four different directions. We assume that this factor shrinks the chance
for a successful smudge attack, even if the smudge trace can be interpreted. In addition, the
concept provides increased protection from observation attacks as one-time observers do not
know which color currently serves as guiding output element.
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Figure 4.13: Connect four is a modification of pattern rotation which is based on randomized
input elements and a secret cue. During enrollment, the system displays a specific color and a
direction (left). During authentication, the user recognizes the assigned color (right).
4.2.4 Building the Foundation for Smudge-resilient Gesture Input
As indicated by Figure 4.14, the concept development was divided in two phases. The first
development cycle built the foundation for smudge-resilient gesture input. It started with
an ideation phase which identified the spatial arrangement of input elements as the main
design factor. At the end of the ideation phase, we came up with four concept candidates.
Next, we performed two user studies which were based on low-fidelity paper prototypes and
high-fidelity software prototypes. The results provided valuable insights into the effects of
randomized spatial arrangements and built the basis for the second development cycle. The
first part of this Section presents the evaluation strategy and the designs of the performed
user studies. The second part focuses on the results.
Prototypes and Evaluation Strategy
The first development cycle included a paper prototyping study and a lab study.
Evaluation 1: Paper Prototyping
To get a first impression of user acceptance and to identify basic usability problems, we built
paper prototypes and evaluated them in a preliminary user study.
Design: The study was based on a repeated measure within participants design. The inde-
pendent variables were system with five levels (Marbles, Dial, Compass, Pattern Rotation
90, Pattern Rotation 360) and password type with two levels (given, self-selected). System
was counterbalanced based on a Latin square design, password type was alternated.
Procedure and Setup: Each system was tested with a given secret and with a self-selected
secret. The examiner explained the concept and handed the prototype over to the participant.
Whenever the participant felt ready, the prototype was used to create a password and to
authenticate once. Next, participants rated usability, likeability and perceived security using
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Figure 4.14: The concept development was divided into two phases and resulted in two promis-
ing authentication mechanisms: Connect Four and Marbles Story.
six-point Likert scales. Interactivity of the paper prototypes (e.g., rotation) was simulated by
a researcher. All sessions were filmed for later analysis.
Participants: The concepts were tested by twelve experienced smartphone users. The aver-
age age was 22 (19-26) years. Seven participants were female, five were male.
Evaluation 2: First Lab Study
Based on the results of the paper prototyping study, four concepts were implemented as
interactive prototypes. The prototypes were based on standalone applications which were
optimized for the device used in the lab study (HTC Nexus One, Android OS v2.1).
Hypotheses: Five (main) hypotheses were defined for the lab study.
H1 The randomization of input elements increases smudge attack resilience
H2 The randomization of input elements reduces efficiency
H3 The randomization of input elements reduces effectiveness
H4 The specific type of randomization has no effect on usability
H5 The specific type of randomization has an effect on security
Design: The user study was based on a repeated measure factorial design. The independent
variables were system with four levels (Android unlock pattern (baseline), Pattern Rotation
90, Marbles, Marbles Gap) and password type with two levels (given, self-selected). System
was counterbalanced using a Latin square design, password type was alternated.
Procedure and Setup: Each session started with an introduction to smudge attacks. Each
participant was assigned a unique ID which was used to specify the order of system. Each
concept was tested twice (alternating password type) using the following procedure:
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Camera
Figure 4.15: The Figure shows examples of the images used for the smudge attacks. The photo
setup is shown on the right. The images have not been edited (except cropping).
Training The user tries out the respective system until she fully understands the approach.
Password Selection The user selects a password (or receives a predefined password) accord-
ing to the policy stated below.
Cleaning The touchscreen is cleaned using a microfiber cloth.
Authentication The user enters the respective password. If the authentication fails, the pro-
cess starts over with step 3: Cleaning.
Picture If the authentication was successful, a picture is taken.
Authentication The user has to successfully authenticate two more times.
During the first and the second authentication, users were allowed to look up their secrets.
The third authentication had to be performed without memory aid. In the end of the study, we
collected user feedback via questionnaire and participants were compensated with a 10 Euro
shopping voucher. Based on the preferences observed in the preliminary study, passwords
were restricted to the length of five. This resulted in a comparable theoretical password
space for all concepts4. User interaction was filmed using a digital camcorder which was
positioned behind the participant and targeted on the touchscreen of the device. As indicated
by Figure 4.15, attacks were based on the approach presented by Aviv et al. [18]. We used a
high-resolution camera (Canon EOS 1000D) and a 650W ARRI spotlight.
Participants: 24 participants were recruited via social networks and word-of-mouth adver-
tising. The mean age was 25 (19-33) years. Eight users were female, 16 were male. All
participants reported to be experienced touchscreen users. Thirteen (54%) subjects had al-
ready heard about smudge attacks. Seven participants stated to protect their smartphone with
Android unlock patterns, six used PIN. The rest did not use secure lock mechanisms.
4 Five activated cells result in 7,152 combinations for Android pattern and pattern rotation. Using five marbles
results in 59,049 (15,120 without repeated colors) using the standard approach and 64,800 (30,240 without
repeated colors) using Marbles Gap.
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Figure 4.16: The Figure illustrates the paper prototypes were used in the first study. All proto-
types provided flexible input elements which allowed to simulate authentication.
Usability Findings
The user studies provided various interesting insights into the relation between randomiza-
tion and perceived efficiency. While this Section presents the most important results, more
details can be found in [268].
Evaluation 1: Paper Prototyping
Figure 4.16 illustrates the paper prototypes used in the lab study. The results indicated that
Marbles was the most promising concept. All participants acknowledged that Marbles was
“very easy” to understand. Furthermore, all but one participant (who rated it neutral) at-
tested “very good” usability. In addition, all but one participant stated that they would use
Marbles on their personal devices. While participants found the rest of the concepts easy to
understand as well, the overall rating was more negative. Even though Dial and Compass
performed well in terms of usability, only eight participants would use Compass on a daily
basis and only nine participants would use Dial. Pattern rotation was rated worst. Two par-
ticipants explicitly disagreed that Pattern Rotation 90 was usable, five participants disagreed
that Pattern 360 was usable. Users reported that both systems demand high mental load
and consequently, only the minority could imagine using such concepts on their personal
devices.
Evaluation 2: First Lab Study
Based on the promising results of the paper prototyping study, we decided to implement
Marbles. During the review of the results, we came up with the idea of a different Marbles
layout: Marbles Gap. Although we had no preliminary results according its usability, we
decided to include Marbles Gap into the laboratory study. User interaction was very similar
and thus we assumed comparable usability. Even though the preliminary results of Pattern
Rotation were not promising, we opted to include the 90-degree version for two reasons:
Firstly, the concept was very close to Android unlock gestures and thus allowed direct com-
parison. Secondly, we wanted to investigate the quantitative effects of viewport rotation and
confirm the increased mental demand.
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Figure 4.17: Efficiency was assessed based on authentication time. Splitting the authentication
process into orientation phase and input phase provides valuable insights: Overall, the Pattern
Rotation 90 concept performs second best. However, orientation time exceeds input time.
Efficiency is assessed based on authentication speed. Authentication speed was measured
as the sum of orientation time and input time. Orientation time represents the time a user
needs to prepare the interaction (i.e., recognize the arrangement of the input elements). It
was logged as the time span from the presentation of the authentication screen to the user’s
first touch event. The input time was measured from the first touch event and ended with the
confirmation (or cancellation).
The results are based on 576 samples (24 users ∗ 2 password types ∗ 4 systems ∗ 3 authen-
tications). However, we filtered the failed attempts as well as extreme values that exceeded
the doubled standard deviation as an upper or lower boundary. As mentioned, each test case
was tested three times (3 authentications). Since a repeated measure ANOVA indicated no
significant differences (p > .05) between those three steps, input time was analyzed based
on the average of all three steps. According orientation time, we could only use the third
authentication step and based the analysis on 192 samples (24 users ∗ 2 password types ∗
4 systems ∗ 1 (last) authentication)5. We performed a repeated measure ANOVA of the
orientation times and input times. Figure 4.17 illustrates the results concerning the third run.
In contrast to Password type (p > .05), the used authentication system had a significant
influence on the orientation periods, F2.1,48.4 = 16.64, p < .001, Greenhouse-Geisser cor-
rected: ε = .69. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests reveal that users needed significantly
more preparation time whenever the spatial arrangement was randomized. Pattern rota-
tion 90 (Mn = 2254ms, SE = 20) required most time, followed by Marbles (Mn = 1592ms,
5 The first and the second step were invalid due to logging errors. Nevertheless, we assume that the last run is
well suited to assess efficiency as users were already familiar with the respective secret.
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Figure 4.18: While the overall error-rate was 9.5%, Pattern Rotation 90 was significantly more
error-prone than any other system.
SE = 188) and Marbles Gab (Mn = 1383ms, SE = 113). Orientation times of Android unlock
patterns were significantly shorter (Mn = 768ms, SE = 84) but Marbles and Marbles Gap
performed significantly faster than Pattern Rotation 90 (p < .05).
The input time was influenced by both independent variables as we found significant main
effects for system (F2.1,41.6 = 315.32, p < .001, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected: ε = .69)
and password type (F1.0,20.0 = 27.25, p < .001). The post-hoc analysis indicates that using
Marbles (Mn = 5233ms, SE = 199) and Marbles Gap (Mn = 5982ms, SE = 261) demands
significantly more time (p < .001) than Android unlock pattern (Mn = 1611ms,SE = 111)
and Pattern Rotation 90 (Mn = 1664ms, SE = 97). However, no significant differences were
found when comparing marble-based and pattern-based approaches with each other (p >
.05). While marble-based approaches were not affected by password type, users performed
significantly faster when self-selected gestures were used on grid-based concepts (p< .001).
Effectiveness was assessed based on the number of input errors (576 samples). Overall, we
observed 55 failed attempts resulting in an error rate of 9.5%. In one instance, a participant
was not able to authenticate at all. The user failed three times in a row using Pattern Rotation
90 with a given password.
A repeated measure ANOVA analyzing the number of failed attempts indicates significant
main effects for system (F3.0,40.0 = 5.99, p < .05, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected: ε = .58)
and password type (F1.0,23.0 = 8.15, p < .05). The error rates are illustrated in Figure
4.18. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests reveal that Pattern Rotation 90 (n = 30) was
significantly more error-prone than any of the other concept (p < .05 for all contrasts). The
lowest error-rate was achieved by Marbles Gap (n = 6) while Android unlock pattern led
to nine failed authentications and using Marbles resulted in ten input errors. Furthermore,
given passwords led to significantly (p < .05) more errors as 78% (n = 43) were based
on this password type. A detailed analysis of the errors reveals that 90% (n = 27) of the
Pattern Rotation 90-errors were based on predefined gestures.
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Figure 4.19: Perceived usability based on six-point scales. Users preferred the baseline as well
as Marbles.
Perception and Likability were assessed based on 6-point scales and concept rankings. Fig-
ure 4.19 illustrates the results according to efficiency, effectiveness and memorability.
Interestingly, the perceived efficiency of the randomized concepts differs from the quantita-
tive results. Even though Pattern Rotation 90 performed second best in terms of measured
authentication speed, it was rated worst by the users. The median of the ratings indicates
“satisfactory” efficiency. Three users even disagreed that Pattern Rotation 90 was efficient.
In contrast, Marbles and Marbles Gap, which actually demanded most authentication time,
were both rated “good”. The static Android unlock pattern was rated consistently with the
measured values. The individual rating was confirmed by the final rankings.
The ratings of effectiveness and ease of use are more consistent with the measured values.
Users claimed that the rotation of the Pattern Rotation 90 approach was “cumbersome” and
“demanded high cognitive load”. Participants were often confused and stated that most
errors resulted from performing gestures in the wrong direction. The ratings illustrated in
Figure 4.19 confirm these statements: Pattern Rotation 90 was overall rated “satisfactory”,
while the other concepts were rated “good”. Furthermore, participants confirmed that self-
selected gestures were easier to perform: Pattern Rotation 90 was rated “satisfactory” when
used with self-selected gestures but “poor” otherwise. In the final ranking, Marbles Gap was
voted best; followed by Android unlock pattern, Marbles and Pattern Rotation 90.
The interaction problems resulted in perceived memorability issues. Even if the type of se-
cret is exactly the same for Android unlock pattern and Pattern Rotation 90, the memorability
was perceived differently. Based on the median, Android unlock patterns were rated “very
good” for self-selected gestures and “good” for given secrets. Pattern Rotation 90 was rated
“good” for self-selection but only “satisfactory” when gestures were assigned. Even though
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some participants informally mentioned that color-based secrets are odd, both marble-based
approaches were rated “good” independently from password type.
In terms of likeability, most users were in favor of Android unlock patterns followed by Mar-
bles and Marbles Gap. Pattern rotation 90 was the least favored concept. Even though most
(92%) of the users could imagine using Android unlock patterns on a daily basis, two partic-
ipants would not use this concept as “it was not secure enough”. Furthermore, 75% of the
users stated they would use Marbles and 67% could imagine using Marbles Gap. Criticism
on marble-based concepts was mostly related to the use of color coded input elements. Par-
ticipants, who did not want to use these concepts, suggested the use of numbers or symbols
instead. Finally, 42% of the users could imagine using the Pattern Rotation 90 concept on a
daily basis. Participants, who did not want to use this approach, claimed that it required too
much spatial imagination and rotating the mobile device itself was cumbersome.
Security Findings
Smudge-attack resistance was assessed based on the pictures taken during the user study.
Figure 4.15 shows examples of the images used for the smudge attacks. The shown examples
illustrate very clear smudge traces which are easy to identify. Nevertheless, the intensity of
the smudge residues depends on the oiliness of the user’s fingers and therefore some images
showed less clear traces. The security results are based on 192 samples (2 password types
∗ 4 systems ∗ 24 users) which were collected in the lab study. Attacks were simulated by a
researcher who was familiar with the used concepts. The attacker was informed about the
used password type but had no knowledge of the actual passwords. The attacker was allowed
to zoom in and to rotate but no other transformations or adjustments were made. We allowed
three guesses per image and calculated the success rate on a binary basis (true/false). In
addition to the attacker, a second researcher was present to note down the results.
As assumed (H1) randomization of input elements increases smudge resistance. The static
Android unlock patterns are very vulnerable as 83% of such gestures were exposed (inde-
pendent from password type). The remaining 17% were resistant due to very dry fingers.
The users did not leave enough oily residues for interpretation. The analysis of the number
of guesses indicates that 60% of the gestures were identified after the first attack and the rest
was found in in the second attack. The third attempt did not improve the success rate. This
indicates that smudge attacks are successful whenever enough residues are left on the screen.
Pattern Rotation 90 increased the practical security as only 46% of the gestures could be
derived. Assuming clear smudge traces, attackers had three attempts to guess one of four
possible directions (rotations). This results in a theoretical chance of 75%. Indeed, the
distribution of successful guesses indicates that the attacker randomly guessed the direction
as 36% of the exposed gestures were found in the first guess, 32% were identified in the
second attack and another 32% of the gestures were derived in the third guess. However, the
attacker informally mentioned that in some cases smudge residues indicated how the device
was grasped and that this cue could be used to derive the orientation of the matrix.
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Both marble-based concepts performed very good and allowed no successful attacks. Nev-
ertheless, it became apparent that attackers could use smudge attacks to derive meta infor-
mation of the used secrets. This information can limit the search space for other attacks
(e.g., educated guessing). For example, the limited reusability of Marbles Gap can expose
sensitive details. If smudge traces stem from only one segment, the attacker knows that no
color was used twice. The same is true for Marbles: As the spatial arrangement of the input
elements remains fixed during one authentication, smudge traces can give useful cues on the
diversity of the used tokens. In the worst case, if only one smudge trace is visible, an at-
tacker could conclude that only one color was used to compose the secret. If the length were
additionally known, the search space would be reduced to the number of input elements.
Summary and Implications
In this first development cycle, we designed several graphical gesture-based authentication
concepts which utilize different kinds of randomized spatial arrangements. The concept
candidates were implemented as low-fidelity paper prototypes and high-fidelity software
prototypes. The prototypes were tested in two user studies to evaluate the usability and
the security of the systems. The results indicated that the concepts are more secure against
smudge attacks than Android unlock patterns (H1). While efficiency was indeed decreased
(H2), we found interesting contrasts between the measured log data and the qualitative user
feedback. While Pattern Rotation performed second best when efficiency was quantitatively
assessed, it was rated worst. In contrast, Marbles was rated fast by the users, even if authen-
tications took more than twice the time. In terms of effectiveness, we cannot clearly reject
H3 as the Pattern Rotation concept became very error-prone when it was used with assigned
gestures. At the same time, all the other conditions performed as well as the baseline. We
conclude that the type of randomization has a significant impact on usability (H4), espe-
cially on perceived performance. Finally, while all randomized concepts were more secure,
the fully randomized Marbles concept worked significantly better (H5).
In addition, we gained valuable insights into the specific design of the concepts. For ex-
ample, Marbles was criticized for its color-coded input elements. In the next development
phase, we thus wanted to achieve mainly three goals: Firstly, Marbles needed to be further
improved. Secondly, based on the lessons learned from the (failed) design of the Pattern
Rotation concept, we aimed at developing an improved grid-based authentication system
which was both more usable and more secure than Pattern Rotation. Finally, we desired to
investigate the reasons for the observed contrasts between measured efficiency data and user
perception.
4.2.5 Improving Smudge-resilient Gesture Input
While Marbles performed well in terms of security and usability, Pattern Rotation 90 had
serious drawbacks. The second development circle started with an ideation phase which
built on the results of the first studies. As we were particularly interested in developing
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a feasible grid-based gesture concept, the ideation process resulted in two rotation-based
schemes: Chessboard and Connect Four. In addition, Marbles was redesigned with concrete
representations of input elements to improve both memorability and user experience. The
concepts were again evaluated in a lab study before the most promising concepts were tested
in the field. The first part of this Section presents the study design and procedure. The
second part presents the results of the performed evaluations.
Prototypes and Evaluation Strategy
First, the concepts were implemented as interactive prototypes for Android and tested in
the lab. Android pattern unlock, Connect Four and Marbles Story were then implemented
as lock screen replacements and tested in a longitudinal field study. This Section provides
details on the study designs. The results of both studies are represented in the next Section.
Evaluation 3: Second Lab Study
The second lab study was based on the approach of the first iteration.
Hypotheses: We defined the following main hypotheses for the second lab study.
H1-1 Chessboard and Connect Four are more secure than pattern rotation
H1-2 Chessboard and Connect Four are as usable as pattern rotation
H1-3 Using concrete representation of input elements improves the usability of Marbles
H1-4 The representation of input elements has no impact on smudge resistance
Design: The study was based on a repeated measure factorial design. The only independent
variable was system with six levels (Android unlock pattern (baseline), Pattern Rotation 90,
Marbles, Marbles Story, Chessboard, Connect Four). We opted to limit the evaluation to
self-selected gestures as this approach was more consistent with the real world and equiv-
alent to the later field study. However, selected gestures needed to correspond to a strict
policy. System was counterbalanced using a Latin square design.
Procedure and Setup: The approach matched the first user study with two minor changes in
the procedure. Firstly, the pictures for the later smudge attacks were taken after the perfor-
mance test was finished. That is, after participants had authenticated three times, the device
was cleaned and handed over for a fourth authentication. Secondly, the password policies
were adjusted to satisfy a higher theoretical level of security. With the exception of Connect
Four, gestures of the grid-based concepts needed to connect six cells. The two marble-based
concepts presented ten input elements and users needed to select four items. Connect Four
required the connection of five cells. The length was reduced as the additional uncertainty
of the unknown anchor point increases the search space by the factor eight. Besides the
new length requirements, composition policies remained the same. In addition to the mod-
ifications in the procedure, we used a slightly changed hardware setup. The concepts were
tested using a HTC One (Android v. 4.1.2.) and pictures were taken with a Canon EOS 50D.
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Instead of the Arri spotlight, a Bowens Gemini 500R flash light was used. Again, quanti-
tative data was automatically logged and qualitative data was collected via questionnaires.
Participants were compensated with a 10 Euro shopping voucher.
Participants: 18 participants were recruited via social networks and word-of-mouth adver-
tising. The mean age was 26 years (23-32). Six users were female, twelve were male. All
participants reported to be experienced touchscreen users. Five (28%) participants indicated
to be concerned about smudge attacks. Ten (55.6%) users protected their device with a PIN-
based lock screen and seven (38.9%) used Android unlock patterns. None of the participants
had taken part in the user studies of the first iteration.
Evaluation 4: Longitudinal Field Study
The second lab study identified Marbles Story as the most promising concept. In addition,
we opted to evaluate Connect Four in the field. It was the only concept which provided both
smudge attack resistance and observation resistance. Furthermore, we desired to analyze if
the usability of such concepts could be improved if they were used over a longer period of
time. The main goal of the field study was to investigate learning effects and to assess the
suitability for daily use.
To increase the external validity of the study, we replaced the lock mechanism of the users’
devices. Therefore, participants used the tested concepts with their personal smartphones
and integrate them into their daily routines. As a consequence, the prototype needed to
support different devices with different form factors. The application was developed for
Android v. 2.3 and higher. After the application was registered as device administrator, it was
able to replace the original lock screen. The prototype was tested in a one week pre-study.
In addition, we implemented a client-server architecture to remotely collect logging data and
to control important study factors (e.g., which concept was used). The communication was
based on an SSL-encrypted connection.
Hypotheses: We defined the following hypotheses for the field study.
H2-1 All concepts allow that authentications become more efficient over time.
H2-2 All concepts allow that authentications become more effective over time.
H2-3 Connect Four allows better learning effects than Marbles Story.
H2-4 Learning effects result in higher user acceptance rates.
Design: The user study was based on a repeated measure longitudinal design. The only in-
dependent variable was system with three levels (Android unlock pattern (baseline), Marbles
Story, Connect Four). System was counterbalanced using all possible permutations. The
user study lasted 30 days while each concept was tested for ten days.
Procedure and Setup: Participants were recruited based on a questionnaire. All participants
had to own an Android smartphone with Android v. 2.3 or higher. After selection, partici-
pants were invited to the lab for an individual meeting. Within this briefing, we introduced
the concepts, explained the study procedure and configured the participant’s device. When
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the application was opened for the first time, users were asked to select a PIN or password
as fallback secret. This secret was used whenever the authentication with the primary con-
cept failed (e.g., due to memorability problems). Next, the first concept was presented and
participants were asked to select a primary secret. To increase comparability, the secret had
to comply with the same policy as used in the lab study. The concept was then tested for the
next ten days. After ten days, participants answered a questionnaire. Whenever the ques-
tionnaire was completed, we remotely activated the next concept and users were again asked
to select a secret. After all three concepts were tested, users were invited for a personal
debriefing. Within the debriefing, the application was uninstalled and participants answered
a final questionnaire. In the end, participants were compensated with a 20 Euro shopping
voucher. During the 30 days of the user study, we logged primary authentications, fallback
authentications and configuration changes (e.g., setting a new secret). However, we did not
log the actual passwords.
Participants: We started with 19 participants and finished with 18 valid data sets. The
average age was 27 (23-32) years. Six participants were female, twelve were male. All par-
ticipants owned an Android smartphone and used it on a daily basis. Most (67%) participants
used Android unlock patterns to protect their device. None of the participants had taken part
in one of the prior user studies.
Usability Findings
This Section presents the usability results of both the second lab study and the field study.
Evaluation 3: Second Lab Study
The data is analyzed in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and user perception. Each concept
was tested 54 times (18 participants ∗ three authentications).
Efficiency was assessed analyzing the user-based average of three successful authentications.
Authentication speed was again split into orientation time and input time. The analysis is
based on a repeated measure ANOVA.
The authentication system had a significant impact on orientation time, F2.8,48.5 = 28.54, p<
.001, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected: ε = .57. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests reveal
that Android unlock patterns (Mn = 906ms, SE = 124) performed significantly faster than
all other concepts (p < .05). Marbles (Mn = 1565ms, SE = 130) and Marbles Story
(Mn = 1574ms, SE = 123) performed second best. Users needed significantly less time
with marble-based concepts than with rotation-based concepts (p < .05). Pattern Rotation
90 (Mn = 2974ms, SE = 333), Chessboard (Mn = 3226ms, SE = 234) and Connect four
(Mn = 3653ms, SE = 320) demanded most orientation effort. Notably, no significant differ-
ences were shown betweenPattern Rotation 90, Chessboard and Connect Four (p > .05).
Furthermore, the analysis revealed a significant main effect on input times,
F1.7,29.4 = 9.29, p < .05, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected: ε = .35. Bonferroni-corrected
post-hoc tests showed that Android unlock patterns (Mn = 1293ms, SE = 88), Connect Four
(Mn = 1350ms, SE = 115) and Pattern Rotation 90 (Mn = 1588ms, SE = 164) performed
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Figure 4.20: The Android pattern unlock performs best in terms of orientation times and input
times. Marble-based approaches have advantages considering the orientation phase, rotation-
based approaches tend to perform well in terms of input times.
significantly faster than marble-based approaches (p < .05). Even though the mean input
times indicated that Chessboard (Mn = 2834ms, SE = 579) was similarly time-demanding
as Marbles (Mn = 2838ms, SE = 209) and Marbles Story (Mn = 3080ms, SE = 233),
no significant differences were found when it was compared to the other rotation-based
concepts (p > .05). Figure 4.20 illustrates the measured times of the third authentication.
However, due to the different password length, the comparability to the results of the first
lab study is limited.
Effectiveness was assessed based on the number of errors. Overall, we observed 57 failed
attempts resulting in an error rate of 17.6%. Nine (17%) inputs failed with Android unlock
pattern. Twelve (22%) errors were logged with Pattern Rotation 90, 15 (28%) authentica-
tions failed when Connect Four was used and 23 (43%) errors occurred while using Chess-
board. Both marble-based approaches were less error-prone: Five (9%) errors were logged
with Marbles, two (4%) authentications failed with Marbles Story.
Perception and Likability was assessed using Likert scales and the final concept ranking.
Figure 4.21 illustrates the user feedback according to efficiency, effectiveness, memorability
and likeability. The overall feedback is analyzed based on the median values. Android
unlock pattern and Marbles Story score best in terms of performance as most users fully
agreed that the concepts are efficient, effective and memorable. In addition, most users fully
agreed that using Marbles Story was fun. The abstract Marbles approach was also rated
good but participants confirmed (slight) memorability drawbacks. The randomized grid-
based approaches were rated worse in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. This particularly
confirms the findings of the first lab evaluation that rotation-based concepts are perceived
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Figure 4.21: Perceived usability ratings based on five-point Likert scales. While Marbles Story
scored best, the randomized grid-based concepts were perceived inefficient and ineffective. Still,
Connect Four could outperform Pattern Rotation 90 and Chessboard in terms of likeability.
disproportionately slow. Nevertheless, Connect Four scored in terms of likeability as most
users agreed or strongly agreed that using this concept was fun.
Finally, ten users acknowledged that they would use Android unlock patterns on a daily
basis. Even more participants stated the same for Marbles and Marbles Story as eleven users
would use Marbles and 16 users would install Marbles Story on their devices. The rotation-
based concepts scored worse. Even if using Connect Four was fun, only three participants
would use it on a daily basis. The same was true for Pattern Rotation 90 and Chessboard.
Evaluation 4: Longitudinal Field Study
Based on the results of the second lab study, we finally selected Marbles Story and Connect
Four for the longitudinal field study. The goal of the study was to analyze if people can
get used to the randomized layouts and how orientation times and input times are affected
by training effects. Over the course of 30 days, we logged 22,061 authentications. Partici-
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Figure 4.22: The Figure illustrates the mean authentication time of the second lab experiment
and the field study. While input times generally decreased in the field, the approximated orien-
tation times decreased only for Connect Four.
pants performed 7,419 unlocks using Android unlock patterns, 9,578 unlocks using Connect
Four and 5,064 authentications using Marbles Story. For each user, we included the first
seven days per concept which comprised a minimum of two authentications. The data was
averaged per user and per day.
Efficiency was assessed based on the average authentication time of successful authentica-
tions. Again, authentication time was split into orientation and input time. Orientation time
started with screen-on events and ended with the first touch event. As indicated by Sec-
tion 3.2, mobile devices are often turned on to check notifications. As a consequence, not
every screen-on event is immediately followed by an authentication and measured orienta-
tion times may include other actions than preparation. To approximate orientation effort,
we excluded outliers by setting a cut off. The considered maximum was set to the doubled
maximum of the orientation time observed in the second lab study.
Figure 4.22 illustrates the average authentication speed of the field study and the second lab
study. A repeated measure ANOVA considering the average daily orientation times of each
user reveals a significant main effect for the authentication system, F1.4,21.2 = 40.07, p <
.001, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected: ε = .71. Post-hoc tests reveal that users needed signif-
icantly less orientation time using Android unlock patterns (Mn = 1335ms, SE = 41) than
using the other two concepts p < .001. However, no significant differences were found be-
tween Marbles Story (Mn = 2207ms, SE = 73) and Connect Four (Mn = 2242ms, SE = 125),
p > .05. In the second lab study, Marbles Story (Mn = 1574ms, SE = 123) had performed
significantly faster than Connect Four (Mn = 3653ms, SE = 320). Figure 4.23 illustrates the
measured average on a daily basis. Independently from the used concept, orientation effort
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Figure 4.23: Over the course of seven days, orientation times tend to decrease independently
from the used system. Furthermore, the input times of grid-based concepts remain constant
while the marble-based concept allowed faster input over time.
decreased over time. However, we found no significant interaction effect between system
and day, F4.0,60.3 = 2.43, p > .05, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected: ε = .34.
According to input effort, all three concepts performed faster in the field than in the lab study.
A repeated measure ANOVA comparing the average input times of each user per day reveals
a significant main effect of the used authentication system, F1.1,15.8 = 121.93, p < .001,
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected: ε = .57. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests reveal that input
times using Connect Four (Mn = 934ms, SE = 25) were significantly shorter than input times
using Android unlock patterns (Mn = 1046ms, SE = 34) and Marbles Story (Mn = 2166ms,
SE = 93), p < .05. Furthermore, users performed significantly faster using Android unlock
patterns than using Marbles Story, p < .05. In addition, we found significant interaction
effects of days and system, F3.9,54.9 = 5.94, p< .05, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected: ε = .33.
As indicated by Figure 4.23, users became faster over time using Marbles Story.
A final ANOVA comparing the total authentication times of all concepts revealed a signifi-
cant main effect of system, F2.0,30.0 = 74.88, p< .001. Corrected post-hoc tests indicate that
Android unlock patterns (Mn = 2441ms, SE = 65) allow the fastest authentication. Followed
by Connect Four (Mn = 3298ms, SE = 141) and Marbles Story (Mn = 4545ms, SE = 157) .
Overall, authentication times differed significantly between all three systems.
Effectiveness was assessed on the averaged portion of successful authentications. As every
participant performed a different number of authentications each day, the absolute number
of errors had limited value. A repeated measure ANOVA revealed a significant main effects
of system, F1.3,20.1 = 31.94, p < .001, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected: ε = .63. The average
success rate using Android unlock patterns was 82% (Ci95 = 77− 87). The success rate of
Connect Four was 72% (Ci95 = 63−81) and therefore significantly lower, p < .05. Marbles
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Figure 4.24: The success rate differs significantly between concepts. However, success rates
remain rather constant over time.
Story was most effective with an average success rate of 93% (Ci95 = 89−96). Figure 4.24
illustrates the average success rate for each system over the course of the seven days. While
the success rate differs between the tested concepts, it remains rather constant over time.
Perception and Likability was assessed using five-point Likert scales ranging from “fully
disagree” to “fully agree”. Figure 4.25 illustrates the user feedback according to efficiency,
effectiveness, memorability, likeability, learnability and acceptance. Even though Marbles
Story performed significantly worse than Connect Four, most users would agree that the
system is efficient. In contrast, effectiveness was rated more consistent with the measured
data. While Marbles Story was rated best, Connect Four was rated more negative as 39% of
the users would “disagree” or “fully disagree” that the system was easy to use. Memorability
was rated good for all systems. Interestingly, most participants favored the novel concepts.
While 50% would “disagree” that using Android unlock patterns was fun, 72% liked using
Connect Four and 78% agreed that Marbles Story was fun. To assess learnability, we asked
participants if authentications became easier and faster over time. While most participants
rated the performance constant when using Android unlock patterns, slightly more users
would agree that learning effects kicked in when using Connect Four or Marbles Story.
Finally, we asked participants if they would use the respective concept on a daily basis.
While 39% (7) of the participants “agreed” or “fully agreed” that they would use Android
unlock patterns on their personal devices, 39% (10) stated the same for Connect Four and
Marbles Story. At the same time, a substantial portion of the users disagreed concerning all
three concepts. This indicates that user acceptance is not generalizable and hard to predict.
Security Findings
Smudge attack resilience was analyzed following the approach of the first iteration. The
pictures of the second lab study were analyzed and attacked by a researcher who was highly
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Figure 4.25: While the perceived effectiveness matched the measured data, efficiency was rated
in favor of Marbles. In addition, the novel concepts scored in terms of likeability.
familiar with the concepts but had no knowledge of the used secrets. As the first security
evaluation had shown that smudge traces of the marble-based approach reveal no information
on the used secret, Marbles was excluded from the experiment. The chance of finding the
right combinations would be identical to an uninformed guessing attack.
The rest of the concepts were attacked after performing the lab study. The attacker was
able to identify 100% (18) of the secrets entered with Android unlock patterns. Pattern
Rotation 90 revealed 72% (13) of the entered gestures. In contrast, modifications of Pattern
Rotation 90 performed better. Nevertheless, 28% (5) of the gestures could be derived when
Chessboard was used. Focusing only on the attacked concepts, Connect Four performed best
as only one (6%) instance was successfully attacked. Even though the security of Marbles
Story was not empirically assessed, chances are high that none of the entered secrets would
have been guessed.
Summary
Based on the results of the first development cycle, we started with a thorough revision of the
concepts. We designed two modifications of the Pattern Rotation concept and improved the
visual representation of the Marbles concept. All concepts were implemented as software
prototypes and evaluated in the lab and in the field. While the second lab study provided
further valuable insights into the impact of specific design decisions, the field study shed
light on learning effects and real world performance.
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The second security analysis confirmed that both rotation-based concepts provide improved
smudge attack resilience (H1-1). However, the lab evaluation also indicated a decrease of
usability as both concepts demanded more authentication time (compared to Pattern Ro-
tation 90) and users failed more often. Therefore, hypotheses H1-2 cannot be accepted.
Nevertheless, users were in favor of Connect Four and stated that using the concept was fun.
According to Marbles Story, the results were clearer. The lab study confirmed that Marbles
benefits from a concrete representation of input elements as it increased memorability and
user acceptance improved (H1-3).
Due to the promising results, especially in terms of user experience and security, we decided
to test Connect Four and Marbles Story in a longitudinal field study. Indeed, it was shown
that both randomized concepts allow authentications to become more efficient over time (H2-
1). Interestingly, the fully randomized Marbles concept allowed faster input while Connect
Four seemed to support shorter orientation phases. In addition, the existence of training
effects was indicated by the fact that all three concepts performed faster in the field than in
the lab. While the data revealed that Marbles Story allows higher success rates than the static
Android unlock patterns, effectiveness remained constant over time. Therefore, H2-2 cannot
be accepted. Similarly, we cannot accept the hypotheses that Connect Four supports stronger
learning effects than Marbles Story (H2-3). Finally, the real-world application showed that
the new systems are widely accepted. Indeed people liked the novel systems more than the
static Android unlock patterns (H2-4).
4.2.6 Discussion and Implications
In this Section, we summarize the main findings and discuss their implications.
Randomized Spatial Arrangements Can Increase Smudge Attack Resistance
The findings confirmed that Android unlock patterns are vulnerable to smudge attacks and
thus confirm the findings of Aviv et al. [18]. In the first security evaluation, we were able
to identify 83% of the entered gestures, in the second analysis all gestures were found.
The novel randomized authentication mechanisms were significantly more secure against
smudge attacks. At the same time, we found that the type of randomization has a significant
impact on security. While rotation-based approaches like Pattern Rotation 90 are still prone
to smudge attacks, the smudge traces of marble-based concepts did not reveal any informa-
tion. This indicates that the randomization of input elements is preferable to the randomiza-
tion of the view port. In addition, Connect Four indicated that the temporal arrangement of
the challenges is another important factor. Technically speaking, Connect Four is based on
the randomized spatial arrangement of input elements. However, gestures are still entered
in one single challenge. Since this aspect would still allow effective smudge attacks, se-
cret guidance was implemented as additional security factor. We conclude that randomized
spatial arrangements are most effective when combined with multiple input challenges.
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Randomized Spatial Arrangements Can be Efficient and Effective
As assumed, the evaluation showed that randomized spatial arrangements tend to down-
grade the efficiency of the authentication. Overall, authentications using randomized meth-
ods took more time than authentications using Android unlock patterns. However, a detailed
analysis of authentication times indicated that the concepts influenced efficiency in different
ways. Using rotation-based authentication methods (e.g., Pattern Rotation 90) resulted in in-
creased orientation times, while marble-based concepts tended to increase input times. The
phenomenon can be explained by the different temporal arrangements. The single-challenge
procedure of rotation-based concepts requires more preparation effort. However, as soon as
the current setup is understood, gesture input is as efficient as with static concepts. In con-
trast, marble-based projects split the preparation effort over multiple challenges. With each
challenge, the current marble is located and logged. In all studies, rotation-based concepts
were significantly more efficient than marble-based concepts. In the longitudinal field study,
users needed about 3.3 seconds to authenticate using Connect Four and 4.5 seconds using
Marbles Story. We therefore conclude that both concepts are in acceptable range (cf. Section
3.2) and that randomized spatial arrangements indeed allow efficient authentication.
In terms of effectiveness, we conclude that the overall error rate was low. However, we
observed one exception in lab study one where the high error rate of Pattern Rotation 90
indicated low effectiveness. A detailed analysis revealed that 90% of the errors occurred
while using predefined gestures. We assume that participants did not correctly memorize
such predefined gestures and consequently mixed up directions more often. Marble-based
approaches indicated high effectiveness and even outperformed the Android pattern unlock.
We therefore conclude that randomized spatial arrangements have no negative impact on
effectiveness when self-selected or trained gestures are used but rotation-based systems tend
to be harder to use.
Temporal Arrangement Influences User Perception and Performance
Despite being measurably more efficient, rotation-based approaches were constantly rated
slower than Marbles. Even after one week of use, Marbles Story was perceived more effi-
cient than Connect Four although the latter allowed significantly faster authentications. A
detailed analysis of the authentication times shows that user ratings rather focus on the orien-
tation times than on the whole authentication effort. Indeed, all rotation-based authentication
methods which were based on single input challenges, demanded significantly higher orien-
tation effort before the first input could start. As a consequence, orientation times sometimes
even exceeded input times. In contrast, the temporal arrangement of the Marble concepts
led to a better relation between orientation and input times as using Marbles, the first input
could start quicker and the overall orientation time was split into multiple shorter phases
(one for each challenge). The effects were confirmed in the second lab study and in the field.
The results indicate that high orientation times are more annoying for users than high in-
put times and have a significant impact on the overall rating of efficiency. Neurobiologi-
cal experiments have indicated that time spans are perceived as longer if “more contextual
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changes are available for retrieval” [34,293]. Such context changes can be triggered by “dif-
ferent cognitive load variables (e.g., , degree of task difficulty)” [34]. In addition, it was
found that expectations and interruptions stretch the perceived temporal length of a given
task [101]. Using rotation-based concepts, both aspects seem fulfilled: Due to the single-
challenge setup, there is a significant contextual change between the orientation task and the
input task. Furthermore, the perceived time seems to be additionally stretched as users ex-
pect to start with the gesture. Using Marbles, the context remains constant and the expected
interaction task can start quicker as orientation effort is split into multiple challenges. We
conclude that generally, the orientation effort should be minimized. Especially, orientation
effort should not exceed input effort. Moreover, we recommend to design the whole authen-
tication task in a way which minimizes contextual changes. The evaluation of marble-based
concepts indicated that randomized spatial arrangements are perceived faster, when orienta-
tion tasks can be distributed over multiple challenges.
Spatial Arrangement and Representation can Influence Memorability and Learnability
It is often assumed that memorability is mainly affected by the type of secret. However, the
evaluation revealed that Pattern Rotation 90 and Android unlock patterns were differently
perceived in terms of memorability. Despite using the same grid-based gestures, users rated
the memorability of Pattern Rotation 90 worse. While the spatial arrangement during gesture
selection is identical, the difference is found during authentication. The randomized spatial
arrangement of Pattern Rotation 90 results in four different gestures (based on the same
shape). As a consequence, gesture recall becomes more difficult and quick learning may be
hindered. At the same time, we assume that the user will learn four distinct gestures in the
long run and memorability problems will be reduced. Interestingly, memorability of Marbles
was rated very well even though these concepts do not support motor memory. In addition,
user acceptance was improved by Marbles Story which provided concrete representations of
input elements and thus allowed story-based recall of secrets.
We conclude that memorability problems may arise if the spatial arrangements of the en-
rollment and the authentication are different. In addition, randomized spatial arrangements
have a negative impact if gestures are based on shapes (e.g., grid-based). Nevertheless,
rotation-based concepts may support motor-memory effects and therefore allow more effi-
cient authentications in the long run.
Randomization can Decouple Input Complexity and Password Strength
With regard to gesture selection, randomized authentication concepts provide several inter-
esting aspects. The results indicate that self-selected gestures are more efficient and more ef-
fective when used on grid-based concepts. In contrast, such effects were not observed when
Marbles was used. We assume that this phenomenon is based on the fact that grid-based ges-
tures provide a wider range of input complexity compared to marble-based passwords. The
fully randomized spatial arrangement of Marbles decouples input complexity and password
strength. That is, the gesture is not influenced by the complexity of the chosen secret.
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We conclude that fully randomized spatial arrangements lead to a more counterbalanced use
of secrets while the selection of grid-based gestures is biased due to varying input complex-
ity. However, marble-based concepts might have a negative impact on gesture length as the
use of additional input elements linearly increases search times and input effort.
Longitudinal Field Studies and Accurate Data Collection are Crucial
User studies are vital and lab evaluations are important to give first insights into the usability
and the security of novel concepts. However, authentication concepts are built for real life
and should therefore be tested in real settings. While a field study does usually not allow
fine-grained analyses of efficiency and effectiveness, the ecological validity gives important
insights into the real world suitability of concepts. We observed that randomized spatial ar-
rangements allow training effects and that both final concepts were feasible in the wild. User
acceptance and efficiency actually increased compared to the lab study and one participant
kept using Connect Four after the end of the study. According to security, we like to note
that lab evaluations allowed to simulate a worst case scenario. As a consequence, it was
justified to assume that no attacker would perform better in the wild and the field evaluation
could focus on usability aspects. We conclude that, whenever possible, authentication sys-
tems should be evaluated in the wild. Security evaluation can form an exception, if worst
case scenarios (attacker’s best case) can be simulated in the lab.
In addition, the evaluation showed the importance of accurate measurements and confirmed
that usability should be assessed quantitatively and qualitatively. In particular, we found
interesting contrasts between measured and perceived efficiency values. Due to the consid-
eration of all stages of the authentication process, we were able to interpret such contrasts.
Therefore, we conclude that orientation and clean up phases must be considered.
Lessons Learned from the Rejected Concepts
We argue that it is important to report and discuss the whole design process as crucial lessons
are learned from rejected concepts. Even though the results indicated that Pattern Rotation
90 is neither usable nor secure, the evaluation of the concept provided important insights into
the interplay of spatial arrangements and temporal arrangements. The same is true for the
other rejected concepts. For example, Chessboard taught us that not every additional ran-
domization aspect does necessarily increase security. Marbles Gap indicated an important
interplay of input effort and password selection which can inspire future concepts. Finally,
the report of failed ideas might prevent other researchers from making the same mistakes.
We therefore conclude that the discussion of rejected concepts is almost of the same value
as the discussion of promising concepts.
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4.2.7 Limitations
Even though the user studies were carefully designed and conducted, the approach had some
inherent limitations which will be addressed here.
We had to accept some restrictions concerning the external validity to increase the internal
validity and to collect comparable data. Most notably, gesture selection was guided by strict
policies. While such composition rules allow better comparison between concepts and be-
tween setups (e.g., lab versus field), they prevent insights into the users’ selection behavior.
According to the field study, it is crucial to keep in mind that the quantitative assessment of
performance can only be based on approximated values. As indicated by Chapter 3, mobile
interaction is usually a secondary task and often interrupted. As a consequence, we assume
that participants did not always authenticate as fast as possible. However, we argue that such
interruptions occur independently from the used concept and therefore the observed relations
are not affected by such errors. In addition, the static grid-based approach performed very
similar to the approach presented in Section 3.3. Since the user study presented in Section 3.3
was based on a more controlled field design, we conclude that the data is valid.
Concerning the presented concepts, we do not claim that we found the perfect solutions. We
rather illustrated feasible approaches and explored the design space. Even though, the sys-
tematic approach resulted in two very promising concepts, there are probably other concepts
which would work equally well. Finally, we have to acknowledge that all user studies were
based on a limited set of self-recruited users. Overall, participants were younger and more
tech-savvy than it would be expected from the general population. We therefore argue that
the results can give general insights on the usability and the security of randomized concepts
but the results are not directly transferable to other populations.
4.2.8 Summary
In this Section, we explored to design space of graphical gesture-based authentication mech-
anisms with the aim of increasing smudge resistance. Utilizing an iterative design process,
we confirmed the vulnerability of Android unlock patterns and proposed several alternative
concepts. The proposed solutions were implemented as low-fidelity paper prototypes and
high-fidelity software prototypes and then evaluated in the lab and in the field. In addition
to the presentation of two promising authentication mechanisms which were shown to meet
the requirements of mobile interaction, the Section contributed by providing general insights
into the design and evaluation of randomized authentication methods.
The evaluation revealed that randomized spatial arrangements can indeed be utilized to
build smudge attack-resilient but yet usable authentication mechanism for mobile devices
(RQ1). Based on the literature review and initial brainstorming, we proposed three general
approaches to achieve smudge attack resistance: Consecutive blurring, viewport rotation
and randomized input elements. Fully randomized arrangements of input elements (e.g.,
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Marbles) worked best when multiple challenges were considered. In addition, we showed
that rotation-based single-challenge concepts (e.g., Connect Four) can be usable and secure
when specific design conditions are fulfilled (e.g., unchanged context, additional cues).
Comparing quantitative and qualitative data, we found important aspects concerning percep-
tion and user acceptance (RQ2). Since users do not want to turn the device before input,
rotated view ports were perceived more cumbersome than (multiple) sequential search tasks.
The analysis indicated that perceived efficiency was mainly influenced by two factors: ori-
entation effort and context changes. High orientation times seem more annoying than high
input times and a changing context between orientation and input tasks seems to further
stretch experienced time. Since user perception is a critical factor for user acceptance, both
aspects need to be optimized. That is, orientation times need to be reduced and the context
should remain stable. In addition, the results showed that user acceptance can be further
increased by using colorful and playful representations of input elements.
While randomization generally increased authentication times, effectiveness was not af-
fected (RQ3). The field study revealed that error rates were very low for all tested con-
cepts and Marbles did even outperform Android unlock patterns. Nevertheless, the results of
the first user study indicated that rotation-based concepts are significantly more error-prone
when more complex gestures are assigned. Future work needs to investigate if users indeed
opt for easy-to-enter gestures when view port rotation is applied as this might reduce the
practical gesture space. In contrast, the Marbles concept illustrated that fully randomized
arrangements can decouple input complexity and gesture selection.
Finally, the field evaluation confirmed that randomized authentication concepts support
learning effects and become more efficient over time (RQ4). While memorability was not
systematically evaluated, user feedback indicated that all concepts were memorable and easy
to learn. Furthermore, the design of Marbles Story illustrated that concrete representations
of input elements can further improve such aspects.
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4.3 On Preventing Observation Attacks
This Section explores the design space concerning observation attacks. Section 3.4 revealed
that currently used gesture-based authentication mechanisms are very much prone to such
attacks and Chapter 2 already introduced alternative concepts which were developed to make
gesture input more resistant. However, the discussion indicated that most concepts are too
cumbersome and not efficient enough to meet the requirements of daily mobile interaction.
In this Section, we present a novel class of observation resistant authentication mechanisms.
The proposed concepts allow to adjust the usability-security trade-off to the current context
and remain very efficient in most situations.
We shed light on the following main research questions:
RQ1 How can we utilize gestures to allow adjustable authentication mechanisms on mobile
devices which remain very efficient in most situations?
RQ2 How can we utilize dynamic guidance to build efficient and observation-resistant au-
thentication methods?
RQ3 How can we design self-contained gestures that allow eyes-free and observation-
resistant authentication?
RQ4 How do directness and relation influence observation-resistance and usability?
The design space exploration resulted in two concepts: XSide and SwiPIN. XSide prevents
observation attacks by shifting parts of the authentication to the back of the device. There-
fore, attackers need to observe both sides of the mobile device to succeed. We designed a
novel class of gestures, built two prototypes and evaluated the concept in two lab studies
(n = 56). SwiPIN allows observation-resistant PIN-entry by utilizing dynamically guided
gesture input. While the interaction is too complex for observers to follow, users are not re-
quired to memorize any additional information. SwiPIN was developed in multiple iterations
and evaluated in four lab studies (n = 56) and one field study (n = 12).
This Section is partly based on three research papers: 1) De Luca, A., von Zezschwitz, E.,
Nguyen, N. D. H., Maurer, M. E., Rubegni, E., Scipioni, M. P., & Langheinrich, M. (2013,
April). Back-of-device authentication on smartphones. In Proceedings of the CHI’13. [74].
2) De Luca, A., Harbach, M., von Zezschwitz, E., Maurer, M. E., Slawik, B. E., Hussmann,
H., & Smith, M. (2014, April). Now you see me, now you don’t: protecting smartphone
authentication from shoulder surfers. In Proceedings of CHI’14 [71]. 3) von Zezschwitz, E.,
De Luca, A., Brunkow, B., & Hussmann, H. (2015, April). SwiPIN: Fast and secure pin-entry
on smartphones. In Proceedings of CHI’15 [262]. In addition, parts are based on a bachelor
thesis by Annika Busch [48] and a practical research project by Miriam Mickisch [182]
which were both carried out under my constant supervision. Please refer to the beginning of
this thesis for a detailed statement of collaboration.
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In contrast to Section 4.2, all presented concepts are based on fixed input elements and utilize
multiple challenges. We will learn how adjustable authentication mechanisms can increase
usability whenever additional security is dispensable but improve observation-resistance
when needed (RQ1). SwiPIN will illustrate that dynamic guidance can make gesture-input
secure and usable when needed (RQ2). In addition, the design of XSide will show how
self-contained gestures need to be designed to allow eyes-free interaction (RQ3). This new
gesture-class allows observation-resistant authentication without the need of randomization.
The discussion of both concepts will illustrate the impact of specific design decisions con-
cerning directness and relation. For example, we will learn that users tend to use direct ges-
tures whenever possible and that this aspect can significantly compromise security (RQ4).
4.3.1 Research Context and Motivation
Since Chapter 2 already covers related work in detail, this Section gives a short summary
and focuses on the novelty of the herein presented concepts.
The discussion of observation-resistant authentication mechanisms (see Section 2.3) indi-
cated that such concepts often introduce time-consuming input tasks (e.g., [207]), additional
secrets (e.g., [72, 258]) or require elaborated hardware (e.g., [281]). As a result, security-
optimized concepts are often perceived as cumbersome, inefficient and error-prone. On the
other hand, Section 3.2 revealed that serious shoulder surfing risks are perceived rather sel-
dom and that users often authenticate in trusted environments. This indicates that mobile
authentication methods need to be very efficient to get the chance of a wide user acceptance
and improved security is usually no selling point. Based on such results, the concepts pre-
sented in this Section were especially designed to be effective, efficient and easy-to-deploy.
XSide utilizes relative gestures which can be entered either on the back or on the front of
the device. Therefore, XSide allows the user to establish a “secret channel” by hiding the
input and can be compared to concepts like CoverPad [288]. Outside of the security con-
text, back-of-device interaction has been proposed to reduce occlusion problems [22, 280]
or to improve one-handed interaction with large devices [166]. Evaluating back-of-device
interaction, Hasan et al. [119] found that relative gestures are more efficient than absolute
input. Even though elementary interaction can already be enabled on most off-the-shelf de-
vices [284], more elaborated devices are becoming available: For example, the YotaPhone6
provides an additional e-ink display on the back of the device which supports input and out-
put. While mobile device interaction can generally benefit from allowing input on both sides
of the device [289], XSide was the first authentication concept to exploit such features.
SwiPIN is based on “visual overload and distraction” and can be compared to concepts like
ColorSnakes [112]. While the normal interaction is based on common PIN-entry, the secure
mode utilizes relative goal-oriented gestures. The expected gestures are communicated to
the user via dynamic guiding elements. Similar to TinyLock [161], SwiPIN shows that
6 https://yotaphone.com – accessed: 2016/04/11.
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slight modifications of the user interface can significantly improve observation resistance. In
contrast to previous work, SwiPIN does not require multiplexed input (e.g., [207]), additional
secrets (e.g., [72]) or multi-modal interaction (e.g., [30]). Observation-resistance is achieved
solely by switching from direct taps to relative gestures. The concept was featured on the
technology blog “Gizmodo” as one of “12 Fascinating Projects From the Bleeding Edge of
Interaction Design”7.
In summary, we illustrate how relative gestures can be used to provide adjustable, efficient
and effective observation-resistance on mobile devices. In addition, we show how gestures
can be used to support eyes-free interaction and how gesture can be utilized to authenticate
with traditional concepts (e.g., PIN). In contrast to the previous Section, the concepts pre-
sented in this Section comprise only little randomization and support a recall based on motor
or visual memory.
4.3.2 Threat Model
According to the threat model, the observer is in the direct vicinity to the victim. One possi-
ble scenario could be based on an attacker observing mobile device users on public transport.
The attacker can take any position (standing, sitting) and has perfect sight on the victim’s de-
vice as there are no occlusions or reflections. As indicated by Section 3.2, malicious attacks
are seldom. Therefore, we assume a casual observer performing a cognitive attack. The
input is only observed once and no technical equipment is involved. After the authentication
was observed, the attacker gains possession of the victim’s device and tries to authenticate.
We assume that in such a (semi-)public scenario, the victim would be aware of potential
observers and would thus opt for the more secure but less efficient interaction method. While
at home or in other trusted environments, the user would opt for the more efficient but less
secure interaction style.
4.3.3 Concept Overview
Both concepts provide ways to adjust the level of security to the current needs. As a con-
sequence, authentication can be performed very fast in most situations and slower (more
secure) interaction is only used if justified. Table 4.2 categorizes the concepts.
XSide: Back-of-Device Gestures
XSide is presented in Section 4.3.4. The system achieves observation resistance by utilizing
a “secret channel”. This secret channel is established through eyes-free interaction: Using
XSide, gestures can be entered on both sides of the device. In risk-free situations, users
7 http://gizmodo.com/12-fascinating-projects-from-the-bleeding-edge-of-inter-
1700656949 – accessed:2016/04/11.
156
On Preventing Observation Attacks
XSide SwiPIN
Input
Elements
Representation abstract abstract
Reusability unlimited unlimited
Output
Elements
Guidance none dynamic
Feedback aggregated aggregated
Interaction
Style
Relation self-contained target-oriented
Directness∗ (in)direct indirect
Element
Arrangement
Temporal multiple multiple
Spatial fixed fixed
Table 4.2: Both concepts are based on multiple challenges which are entered using a fixed
spatial layout. ∗XSide supports direct and indirect input. Even though preliminary instances of
SwiPIN allowed direct gestures, the final concept was based on indirect input.
can perform gestures on the front screen (which is assumed to be efficient and error-free).
However, if observation risk is perceived, users can adjust the level of security by using the
back of the device. A common scenario could be a user sitting in the bus, as gestures are
entered out-of-sight (on the back of the device), the secret is not exposed to the people next
to the user. If required, input can even be distributed using the front and the back of the
device.
Figure 4.26 illustrates the concept. To authenticate, a user enters n gestures (i.e.: n = 3).
Gestures represent arbitrary combinations of horizontal and vertical strokes. Each gesture
can be entered either on the front or on the back of the device. Since gestures are self-
contained and described by relative direction changes, they allow effective input out-of-sight
as neither the size nor the position of the entered gesture is relevant. To increase observation
resistance, the concept forgoes visual representations of input elements. Input elements are
described as interactive areas on the front and on the back of the device, input is confirmed
using aggregated feedback.
Figure 4.27 illustrates the gesture concept (called BoD-Gestures) in more detail. The avail-
able alphabet consists of four directions: Up, Right, Down, Left. While directions can be
combined to individual gestures, the actual secret is based on multiple instances of such sin-
gle gestures. For example, the secret used in Figure 4.26 is based on three individual gestures
and would be described as U,RU,R. As BoD-Gestures are translated to strings, the concept
supports securely encrypted storage. In the user studies, we tested secrets based on three ges-
tures with up to three direction changes each. Assuming this configuration, BoD-Gestures
provide a theoretical password space of 523 = 140,608 secrets8.
8 As direction changes matter, combinations like UU are not supported. As a consequence, there are 4 single-
stroke gestures, 4∗3 double-stroke gestures, and 4∗3∗3 triple-stroke gestures. That is 52 gestures overall.
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Input
no representation
unlimited reuse
Interaction
self-contained
direct
Output
no guidance
aggregated feedback
Arrangement
multi gesture
xed elements
Figure 4.26: XSide is based on self-contained gestures which can be entered on the both sides
of the device. Input elements are fixed but not visualized. The image on the right represents a
gesture which was entered on the back of the device.
Alphabet: 
Up, Right, Down, Left
U
RL
D
Examplary
1-Direction-Gesture 
translated to: U
Examplary
2-Direction-Gesture 
translated to: UR
Examplary
3-Direction-Gesture 
translated to: URD
{Examplary Secret Consiting of Three Gestures: U,UR,URD
Figure 4.27: Single XSide-gestures comprise an arbitrary number of vertical and horizontal
strokes. Every direction change counts as single stroke and is translated to a character (U,R,L,D).
Secrets are based on multiple instances of individual gestures.
SwiPIN: Secure Gesture-based PIN-Entry
SwiPIN is presented in Section 4.3.5. The concept is based on “visual overload”. In trusted
environments, the system provides a common PIN-pad and users can efficiently authenticate
by directly entering their PIN. Whenever observation risks are present, users switch to the
more secure mode where digits are entered using relative gestures. SwiPIN utilizes a small
redundant set of five simple gestures: up, right, down, left and tap. As the assignment of
gestures and digits changes after each input, the entered PIN is very hard to observe.
Figure 4.28 illustrates three different layouts of SwiPIN. To map ten digits to five gestures,
the SwiPIN-pad is subdivided into two differently colored sections. Each Section presents
five digits, mapped to a distinct set of gestures. The current assignment is indicated by
dynamic guiding elements which are represented by black arrows. Whenever no arrow is
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Figure 4.28: The SwiPIN-pad is subdivided into two differently colored sections. Each Section
presents five digits, mapped to a distinct set of five gestures. The assignment is indicated by
dynamic guiding elements which are represented by black arrows.
present, the “tap” gesture was assigned. Input elements are fixed and represented by colored
boarders. To authenticate, the user has to (a) recognize the current mapping and (b) per-
form the assigned gesture. The gesture has to start inside of the input element but can end
anywhere on screen. The assignments change after each input.
Let us now assume, a user wants to enter the digit “5” using the layout on the right. She
would focus the respective digit and (a) recognize the arrow directed to the right. As the
digit five is part of the red Section, the user would (b) perform a gesture to the right starting
in the red input area on the bottom of the screen. As soon as the input area is touched, the
mapping (guidance) disappears. The digit “5” is logged in and the system is ready for the
next input. To allow efficient orientation, the color mapping, the order of the digits and the
input elements are fixed. However, the gesture assignment changes after each input. That
is, after “5” was entered, the mapping would change and performing the same gesture in the
same input area would probably trigger a different digit.
The specific combination of dynamic guidance and static input elements allows users to
efficiently authenticate. In addition, there is no need to memorize any additional information.
In contrast, observers would need to memorize the assignments to be able to interpret the
entered gesture. We assume that this task is usually too complex for cognitive observers.
As illustrated in Figure 4.28, the three layouts utilize different input areas. The concept on
the left (called SwiPIN free) allows to start gestures anywhere in the respective Section of
the PIN pad. SwiPIN inside requires the user to start the gestures within the input elements
represented by dotted borders. The layout on the right (SwiPIN outside) isolates input and
output areas. As illustrated by the example above, users start their gestures within the colored
squares at the bottom of the screen. The evaluation will show that such indirect gesture input
can improve both security and user acceptance.
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Figure 4.29: Concept development was based on two phases: In the first development cycle,
we developed the gesture concept and compared it to common authentication methods. In the
second phase, we evaluated the effects of side switching using an improved physical prototype.
4.3.4 XSide: Designing Gestures for Back-of-Device Authentication
As illustrated by Figure 4.29, concept development of XSide was divided into two phases.
The first development cycle started with a literature review and ideation sessions. The brain-
storming was based on the prerequisite that the interaction style allows efficient and effec-
tive back-of-device input and resulted in the BoD-Gestures presented in Section 4.3.3. After
building a basic hardware prototype, we performed a preliminary accuracy study. Next, we
performed a fist lab study to compare XSide to PIN and grid-based gestures. In the sec-
ond development cycle, the hardware prototype was improved and a second lab evaluation
was performed to assess the impact of side switching. We firstly present the prototypes and
outline the evaluation strategies. The results of the performed studies are discussed in the
second part of this Section.
Prototyping and Evaluation Strategy
XSide was developed based on an initial brainstorming and three laboratory user studies.
This Section describes hypotheses as well as the evaluation strategies. Since XSide de-
manded sophisticated hardware prototyping, we start with a description of the hardware.
Prototypes and Implementation
One of the main challenges of the project was based on the fact that no feasible device
was available for purchase9. As a consequence, we needed to build a device which allowed
back-of-device interaction. We opted to simulate an interactive back side using a second
smartphone. Over the course of the project, two prototypes were built (see Figure 4.30).
9 As indicated in Section 4.3.1, we assume that this will change within the next years.
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First Prototype: The first version of the prototype was rather basic. We glued two hardcover
protective shells to each other and inserted two HTC One S smartphones. The smartphones
were mounted back-to-back and rotated by 180◦ to equalize the bulges of the camera lenses.
Hardware buttons and the lower 60% of the back side were covered with rubber band to allow
proper grasping and to prevent unintended activation. The prototype, which is illustrated in
Figure 4.30, was 1.5 cm thick and weighed 269 grams.
Second Prototype: Based on the lessons learned from the first two user studies, we built
an advanced prototype. The prototype matched the look and feel of a real smartphone to
improve user experience and to increase usability. We used 3D printed cases and thinner
smartphones. We opted for the Alcatel One Touch Idol Ultra which was advertised as the
“the slimmest smartphone in the world”. Weight was further reduced by removing the back
covers and the camera lenses. Finally, the interactive back side was increased to 50%. The
second prototype was 1.2 cm thick and weighed 247 grams (see Figure 4.30).
Software: The communication between the two devices was established using Wi-Fi Di-
rect. While both devices ran the same application, roles (front, back) where automatically
assigned on start up. Touch events of the rear device were then sent to the front device and
translated into the local coordinate system. Computation was handled by the front device:
BoD-Gestures were extracted and interpreted using the ShortStraw algorithm [282]. The
recognized strokes were matched to one of four directions and undefined combinations were
deleted (e.g., “up,up”). In the second iteration, gesture recognition (and error resistance) was
further improved by excluding all strokes that were shorter than 25% of the average stroke
length or shorter than 60 pixels in total.
Evaluation 1: Accuracy Study
The accuracy study was performed to inform the position of the input elements and to assess
the feasibility of accurate pointing and dragging on the back of the device.
Design: The study was based on a repeated measure within participants design. The inde-
pendent variables were target position with eight levels, dragging direction with two levels
and grasping style with two levels (one-handed, freestyle). Each dragging task (target posi-
tion ∗ dragging direction) was performed once for each grasping style. While the input tasks
were randomized, the grasping style was counterbalanced.
Procedure and Setup: The display of the back-of-device prototype was subdivided into
4x2 = 8 evenly sized squares, each representing one level of target position. The back
side was not covered by rubber band. Every task displayed two targets (circles) (labeled:
“1” and “2”) on the front screen. Participants pointed at target “1” and dragged it to target
“2” using the back of the device. Failed tasks were repeated up to three times. After a
training phase, 224 dragging operations were performed, half of them using only one hand.
Whenever participants lifted the finger, the outcome was indicated changing the target color.
However, the system did not provide any detailed feedback (e.g., virtual pointer).
Participants: 20 participants were recruited using mailing lists. The average age was 26
years (19-38). Thirteen were male, seven female.
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Figure 4.30: The first row shows two XSide prototypes with the white prototype being the
improved version. The lower row illustrates the camera setup used for the observation attacks.
The two images on the left originate from the first user study, the three pictures on the right show
participants of the second study.
2. Evaluation: First Lab Study - Concept Comparison
The goal of the first lab study was to prove the feasibility of BoD-Gestures and to compare
them to regular PIN-entry and to grid-based gestures. In addition, we tested a front-side
version, called Front-Gestures to isolate the effects of both the gesture concept and the back-
of-device interaction.
Hypotheses: Five (main) hypotheses were defined for the first lab study.
H1-1 BoD-Gestures allow effective and efficient authentication on the back of the device.
H1-2 Back-of-device interaction increases observation resistance.
H1-3 Back-of-device interaction reduces the efficiency and effectiveness.
H1-4 PIN and Grid-unlock are more efficient and more effective than Front-Gestures and
BoD-Gestures.
H1-5 Front-Gestures are as vulnerable to observation attacks as PIN and Grid-unlock.
Design: The study was based on a repeated measure factorial design. The independent
variables were system with four levels (PIN, grid unlock, BoD-Gestures, Front-Gestures),
secret type with two levels (given, self-selected) and secret complexity with two levels (easy,
hard). System was counterbalanced. Secret type and secret complexity was randomized.
PINs were based on four digits, grid-gestures used six cells and BoD-Gestures (and Front-
Gestures) were based on three challenges. Easy secrets were composed in a way that re-
duced input effort. Easy Front-Gestures and BoD-Gestures comprised two single-stroke
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gestures and one two-direction gesture. Hard instances were built upon one three-direction
gesture and two two-direction gestures. Hard PINs included only different digits and hard
grid-gestures included a knight move. Composition rules applied to given and self-selected
secrets.
Procedure and Setup: The user study was held in an isolated room at our premises. The
XSide-Prototype was equipped with the four authentication systems. PINs, grid-based ges-
tures and Front-Gestures were entered using the front of the device, BoD-Gestures were
entered on the back side. User interaction was logged for later analysis.
The session started with an introduction of the study goals and a presentation of the concept.
Afterwards, the first system was explained in detail and the participant performed a training
task. Whenever the participant felt ready, the study began. Every concept was tested with
four secrets (secret type ∗ secret complexity). Secrets were entered three times, failed authen-
tications were repeated with a maximum of three attempts. After all concepts were tested,
user feedback was collected via questionnaire and participants were compensated with a 5
Euro shopping voucher.
The videos for the security analysis were recorded with two cameras (see Figure 4.30, left).
One camera simulated an attacker from behind, the other camera simulated an attacker sit-
ting across from the user. The camera positions represented best case scenarios for the
attacks with perfect sight on the interaction areas. We did not note the security analysis but
mentioned that the recording was part of the usability analysis.
Participants: We recruited 24 participants via mailing lists and word-to-mouth advertise-
ment. The average age was 27 (21-33) years. Eight participants were female, 16 were male.
All participants used touch-based devices on a daily basis and were familiar with touch
screen interaction for several years (Mn = 3; SD = 1.7). Eighteen (75%) participants used
secure lock screens, nine of them used gesture-based concepts.
3. Evaluation: Second Lab Study - Side Switching
The first lab evaluation revealed that back of device authentication is usable and secure. The
second study aimed at investigating the effects of side switching. We assumed that using
both sides within one authentication attempt might further increase observation resistance.
Hypotheses: Two (main) hypotheses were defined for the second lab study.
H2-1 Higher numbers of switches reduce efficiency and effectiveness.
H2-2 Higher numbers of switches increase observation resistance.
Design: The user study was based on a repeated measure factorial design. The independent
variables were begin with two levels (front, back) and switches with four levels (0, 1start,
1end, 2). Begin specifies the side of the first gesture input, switches defines the number and
position of switches. As all secrets were based on three gestures, the independent variables
covered all possible combinations. For example, back∗1end required the user to start on
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the back of the device and switch before the last gesture is entered. Combinations with
switches = 0 represented the baselines: front only and back only. The independent variables
were counterbalanced using an 8× 8 Latin square design. All secrets were predefined and
comprised two-direction gestures.
Procedure and Setup: The procedure was very similar to the first user study. After the in-
troduction, participants started with a training task. Next, each condition was tested three
times and failed authentications were repeated up to three times. BoD-Gestures were pro-
vided on a piece of paper using graphical versions of the gestures similar to the example
in Figure 4.27. The intended side was color coded: red represented BoD-Gestures, black
represented Front-Gestures. After all conditions were tested, participants provided feedback
via questionnaire and were compensated with a 5 Euro shopping voucher.
In addition to the two cameras used in the first lab study, we positioned a third camera either
to the left or to the right of the participant. The position was derived from the handedness
of the user. We made sure that all cameras had perfect sight on the device. The side view
was introduced to allow attacks on authentications with switches > 0. The camera setup is
illustrated in Figure 4.30, right.
Participants: 32 participants were invited using mailing lists, word of mouth and social net-
works. Nobody had taken part in previous evaluations of XSide. The sample was comparable
to the first user study. The average age was 25 years (19-38) years. Fourteen participants
were female, 18 were male. Most (87.5%) participants owned a touch-based device and the
average experience was 3 years (SD = 1.95). 75% of the mobile device users used secure
lock mechanisms; eleven used a gesture-based concept.
Usability Findings
The results of the accuracy study indicated that users perform best when both hands are used
and interaction takes place in the top area of the screen. Overall, this combination resulted
in 102 (9%) errors. In contrast, one-handed interaction at the bottom of the screen resulted
in 440 (39%) input errors. As a result, both user studies allowed two-handed interaction. In
this Section, we present the efficiency, effectiveness and user perception of both studies.
Efficiency
The results of the first user study are based on 288 authentications per system (1152 overall),
the second user study provided 768 samples. As no concept required specific orientation
effort, we focus on the input times. Time measurement started with the first touch event and
ended with the last touch (“finger up”). The results are based on successful authentications.
Evaluation 2: Concept Comparison As grid-based gestures and BoD-Gestures did not re-
quire explicit confirmation, PIN-times were measured between the touch of the first button
and the release of the last button. One sample was removed as authentication time exceeded
25 seconds. The analysis of the video footage confirmed that the participant had been inter-
rupted.
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Figure 4.31: The average authentication times of first user study (left) and the second user study
(right). The graph on the right indicates that the number of switches has minor impact.
Figure 4.31 (left) illustrates the average authentication times of the tested con-
cepts categorized by secret-type and secret-complexity. A 4 x 2 x 2 (sys-
tem x secret-type x secret-complexity) repeated measure ANOVA revealed significant
main effects for system (F1.93,40.59 = 180.91, p < .001,ε = 0.64), secret-type
(F1.0,21.0 = 16.65, p < .001,ε = 1.0) and secret-complexity (F1.0,21.0 = 152.79, p <
.001,ε = 1.0). In addition, we found significant interaction effects for system x secret-
complexity (F2.21,46.40 = 35.35, p < .001,ε = 0.74), secret-type x secret-complexity
(F1.0,21.0 = 15.00, p < .001,ε = 1.0) and system x secret-type x secret-complexity
(F2.16,45.25 = 5.14, p < .05,ε = 0.72).
Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests revealed that PIN (Mn = 965ms, SE = 37) was sig-
nificantly faster than all other systems (p < .001). In addition, grid-based gestures
(Mn = 1840ms, SE = 93) allowed significantly faster authentication than both Front-Gestures
(Mn = 3335ms, SE = 173) and BoD-Gestures (Mn = 4204ms, SE = 203), all p < .001. Fi-
nally, front input allowed significantly faster authentication than back-of-device interaction
(p < .001) and self-selected secrets were significantly more efficient than predefined ones
(p < .05). This was especially the case, when more complex secrets were used. While the
data indicates that BoD-Gestures are generally more time-consuming, we found that very
efficient authentication is possible. Considering self-selected secrets, the fastest user needed
2.9 seconds on average using a hard gesture and 1.5 seconds using an easy one.
Evaluation 3: Side Switching Figure 4.31 (right) shows the average authentication speed
of all tested conditions. A 2 x 4 (Begin x Switches) repeated measure ANOVA revealed
significant main effects for both Begin (F1,31 = 14.673, p < .001,ε = 1.0) and Switches
(F2.310,71.601 = 12.18, p< .001,ε = 0.77). Furthermore, interaction effects were indicated:
Begin x Switches (F3,93 = 5,438, p < .05,ε = 0.83).
The Bonferroni corrected post-hoc tests revealed that authentications were performed signif-
icantly faster whenever input started on the front side (p < .05). In addition, input without
side switches was performed significantly faster than input with side switches (p < .05).
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Figure 4.32: The analysis revealed that Front-Gestures are as effective as grid-based gestures
while performing gestures on the back of the device is more error prone.
Interestingly, while side switches generally add time to the authentication, the contrasts be-
tween one (start), one (end) and two switches were not significant (p > .05). As a conse-
quence of the interaction effects, authentication using front only is most efficient.
Effectiveness
Effectiveness is evaluated based on failed authentications. We distinguish between basic
errors and critical errors. Basic errors allowed successful authentication after one or two
repetitions, while critical errors are based on three failed attempts.
Evaluation 2: Concept Comparison Figure 4.32 (left) illustrates the error rates of all tested
concepts categorized by secret complexity. Overall, the error rate is very low for PIN. While
Front-Gestures and grid-based gestures perform similar, BoD-Gestures are most error-prone.
Even though the number of errors is too small to justify statistical analysis, it indicates
that BoD-Gestures lead to more errors when complex gestures are used. Overall, 26.4% of
such authentication sessions comprised at least one failed attempt and another 7.6% failed
completely. To understand the sources of error, we performed a qualitative review based on
the taxonomy for the categorization of gesture-based errors which was presented in Section
3.3. All critical errors and 81% of the basic errors could be classified as one of three types:
Additional strokes 29% of the critical and 41% of the basic errors were based on uninten-
tional strokes. In such cases, users accidentally touched the back screen before or after
performing the intended gesture.
Mirrored or wrong strokes 50% of critical and 17% of basic errors resulted from mixing up
left and right. In such cases, users started the gesture in a wrong direction.
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Aborted strokes 21% of critical and 23% of basic errors were based on aborted strokes. In
such cases, the input stopped too early as users accidentally lifted the finger or input
was performed outside of the touch area.
Evaluation 3: Side Switching Figure 4.32 (right) illustrates the result of the second user
study. The overall error rate was 12.1%. Most notably, we observed only nine (1.2%)
critical errors. Even though the study was based on a different sample, this indicates that the
advanced prototype increased effectiveness. While front-only input was most effective, the
data does not indicate a specific impact of side switching.
A qualitative analysis of the failed attempts confirmed the findings of the first study as 39.3%
of the input errors were based on mixing up directions, 19.3% resulted from aborted strokes
and 14.3% were based on additional strokes. In addition, we found two error types which
resulted from the specific study design.
Mixing up sides 20.7 % of the errors were based on mixing up front and back side. Such
errors resulted from prescribing the order of side switches. It should be noted that a
productive system would support free selection of input sides. Therefore, users mixing
up different sides would not be possible in the wild.
False positives 6.4 % of the errors were caused by unexplained touch events. As these events
were not visible on the video, we assume that such false positives resulted from the
prototype itself: The prototype registered touch events through the 3D-printed cover.
We argue that such errors are unlikely to occur with a fully developed device.
Likeability and Perception
In both user studies, participants ranked the system according to usability and satisfaction.
Evaluation 2: Concept Comparison Figure 4.33 (left) illustrates participants’ answers to
5-point Likert scales ranging from “fully disagree” to “fully agree”. Overall, participants
were not in favor of the XSide prototype. Only 12% agreed that the concept was efficient,
33% stated it was effective and 29% reported that they liked the system. The usability of
the concept was perceived better, when gestures were entered on the front side. In addition,
when we asked participants if they would use XSide in real life, 13 (54.2%) said “yes”.
Another two participants acknowledged that they would use the system if simpler gestures
were allowed. One participant said “no” as she did not use unlock mechanisms in general.
The rest reported that the concept was too cumbersome for practical use.
Evaluation 3: Side Switching Participants’ ratings according to side switching are illustrated
in Figure 4.33 (right). Overall, users were more positive about the concept. In accordance
with the quantitative measures, “Front Only” was rated most effective and most efficient.
Furthermore, most participants agreed that using one switch is usable. 25 (78.1%) partici-
pants stated they would use XSide in the wild. Four users who disagreed would never use
any authentication concept on their smartphone.
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Figure 4.33: The user feedback indicates that users generally prefer front input. However, using
XSide with one switch provides a good trade-off between usability and security.
Security Findings
Observation attacks were simulated by human attackers who reviewed the video material
of the user studies. The attacks were performed assuming a worst case scenario. That is,
back-of-device input was attacked from behind, front input was attacked from the front.
After watching the authentication, attackers had three guesses. To isolate the effects of
observation, we removed any additional cues (e.g., sounds).
Concept Comparison: Attacks were performed by a member of the research team who was
familiar with the concepts but had no knowledge of the used secrets. Figure 4.30 gives two
examples of the attacker’s perspective.
Figure 4.34 (left) summarizes the results. BoD-Gestures were most resistant to observation
attacks, especially if complex gestures were used. Hard self-selected gestures performed
best with only 9 of 24 (38%) identified secrets. In contrast, front-input was very vulnerable
independently from the used concept, the secret complexity and the secret type. However,
even with PIN and grid-based gestures, some users managed to authenticate in a way that
made observation hard. The attacker reported that users entered their secret extremely fast in
such cases. Considering BoD-Gestures, the attacker mentioned that the viewing angle made
it hard to distinguish similar gestures. For example, he often mixed up angled movements
like “Left Up” with linear movements like “Left Right” or “Down Up”.
Side Switching: In contrast to the first user study the methodology was slightly modified:
We increased the number of attackers and provided a monetary incentive. The attacks were
performed by four volunteers (two male, two female) who were not part of the user study.
We paid a basic salary of 20 Euro and added 30 Cents per successful attack. Each attacker
observed eight participants corresponding to one complete cycle of the Latin square design.
Before each attack, observers were informed about the order of sides on which interaction
will take place (e.g., “front, back, front”). Each attack consisted of three guesses.
Figure 4.34 (right) illustrates the results. With a success rate of 53%, “front only” was
most vulnerable, followed by “front (one start)” (38%) and “back only” (31%). Overall,
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Figure 4.34: The results indicate that BoD-Gestures significantly increase observation-
resistance. Furthermore, the security level can be adjusted by increasing the number of switches.
the results indicate that security can be improved by starting on the back side of the device.
The highest level of security was achieved by starting on the back of the device and then
performing two switches (9%). During the attacks, we encouraged attackers to comment on
the task. The feedback indicates that slow interaction makes the input easy to observe, while
fast inputs were very hard to follow. In addition, observers confirmed the findings of the first
study that distinguishing angles on the back side is a difficult task. Besides these general
findings, more specific user behavior was mentioned. According to the attackers, some users
performed additional finger movements between the gestures. Such movements were hard
to distinguish from the actual input and thus increased observation resistance.
Summary
We presented XSide, a concept for gesture-based back-of-device authentication. In the first
development cycle, we developed the interaction concept, built a basic prototype and com-
pared it to PIN and grid-unlock. The results indicate that BoD-Gestures allow for effective
and efficient authentication on the back of the device (H1-1). The fastest users managed to
authenticate within 1.5 to 3.0 seconds. At the same time, the method significantly increased
observation resistance (H1-2). However, BoD-Gestures were less effective and less efficient
than the other concepts (H1-2). Considering Front-Gestures, results were more diverse:
While PIN and grid-unlock have been more efficient, Front-Gestures performed similarly to
grid-unlock in terms of effectiveness. Therefore, we cannot accept hypothesis H1-4. Finally,
the results revealed that Front-Gestures do not provide benefits in terms of security (H1-5).
The second development cycle started with the production of an advanced prototype and
aimed at evaluating the impact of side switching. We hypothesized that side-switching might
empower user to react more flexible to observation risks. The results indicated that side
switching increases observation resistance. However, we reject hypothesis H2-2 as one side
switch resulted in similar security improvements as adding two side switches. Moreover,
even though front-only input was most efficient, the results did not indicate that higher num-
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Figure 4.35: Concept development was based on two phases: In the first development cycle,
we developed the general concept and compared it to PIN. In the second phase, SwiPIN was
improved, implemented as fully functional prototype and finally tested in the field.
bers of switches generally reduce efficiency and effectiveness (H2-2). Overall, improving
the prototype already resulted in faster authentication, reduced error-rates and increased user
acceptance. Therefore, we are confident that the performance and the acceptance of XSide
will further improve as soon as it is more naturally integrated in real customer devices.
4.3.5 SwiPIN: Utilizing Gestures to Protect PIN-Entry
SwiPIN was developed as low-fidelity and high-fidelity prototypes and tested in the lab and
in the field. Figure 4.35 illustrates important milestones of the design and evaluation process.
The process resulted in a gesture-based authentication mechanism which allows efficient,
effective and observation-resistant authentication on off-the-shelf mobile devices. While the
first design phase was indispensable to elaborate the concept and evaluate different design
alternatives, we will mainly focus on the second phase which revealed interesting aspects
concerning user behavior and the feasibility of the concept itself. We will first present the
evaluation strategy and outline the designs of the different user studies. The second part of
this Section presents the results of the performed user studies in chronological order.
Prototyping and Evaluation Strategy
The SwiPIN concept resulted from testing various design alternatives. The main aspects of
the preliminary development process will be summarized in the first part of this Section. The
second part focuses on the evaluation strategy of the main user studies.
Evaluation 1: Paper Prototyping and Preliminary User Study
The development started with an initial brainstorming which aimed at finding efficient and
effective gesture-based interaction concepts that allow observation-resistant authentication
170
On Preventing Observation Attacks
Figure 4.36: Different design options were tested in a first user study using paper prototypes.
The study focused on the characteristics of the gesture-set and the spatial layout of the input
elements.
on off-the-shelf mobile devices. The ideas included to transfer existing methods for desktop
computers (e.g., [278]), use the built-in camera to establish a secret channel and various other
methods which are based on indirect input or distraction. After a review of all concept ideas,
using randomly assigned swiping gestures was identified as the most promising concept.
The concept was further developed in a prototyping study and a preliminary lab study.
Paper Prototyping: The idea was concretized in a preliminary lab study using low-fidelity
prototypes. Based on ten different paper prototypes, we informed the following design deci-
sions in terms of gesture sets, mappings and layout options:
Gesture Set We tested three different gesture sets: 1) the basic set including five gestures
(up, right ,down, left, tap), b) the multi-touch set including ten gestures (basic set +
basic set using two fingers), 3) the diagonal set including ten gestures (basic set +
right-up, right-down, left-up, left-down, double tap).
Number of Input Elements We tested two different sets. One set comprised 1) five input
elements, the other set comprised (2) ten input elements.
Secret Type We tested two types of secrets: (1) digits and (2) concrete symbols.
Number of Redundant Fields We tested different layouts comprising (1) six, (2) eight, and
(3) ten input fields. An input field describes a complete set of input elements.
Figure 4.36 illustrates examples of the tested paper prototypes which were tested by six par-
ticipants. We collected qualitative data via semi-structured interviews and a questionnaire.
Preliminary Lab Study: As the paper prototyping indicated that users desired both the basic
gesture set and ten input elements we opted to subdivide each input field in two sectors. The
design decision was kept until the final prototype. In contrast, no clear preferences for the
number of fields were found and it remained unclear if users prefer digits or symbols. To
shed light on these important questions and to gather preliminary insights into the usability
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and into the security of the concept, we performed a high-fidelity user study. For this pur-
pose, the concept was implemented for Android and evaluated in the lab. The user study
followed a repeated-measures design. The independent variables were field number with
four levels (zero, one, four, six) and secret type with two levels (digit, symbol). Field num-
ber = zero represented the two baseline conditions: PIN and SymbolTap, a version of PIN
using symbols. The order of the eight conditions was counterbalanced using a Latin square
design.
We recruited 16 experienced touchscreen users, ten were male, six female. The participants’
average age was 29 (23-59). Each secret was entered five times, three attempts were granted
per authentication. Quantitative performance data was collected via built-in logging mech-
anisms. Qualitative feedback was collected with questionnaires. In addition, the interaction
was filmed. The video footage was used for the later security analysis.
Evaluation 2: Starting Point Lab Study
The preliminary evaluation led to the concept of SwiPIN but revealed various areas for im-
provement. Most critically, user behavior had jeopardized observation resistance as users
often started the gestures on the intended buttons. As a consequence, we revised the concept
in the second development phase and modified SwiPIN in a way which enforced desired user
behavior (indirect gesture input). In addition, we rejected the idea of using multiple redun-
dant input fields and decided to discard the use of symbols to support seamless integration
into common PIN concepts. Figure 4.28 illustrates three modifications of the redesigned
SwiPIN concept. SwiPIN “free” (left) resulted from the first development phase and served
as baseline, SwiPIN “inside” and SwiPIN “outside” were designed to enforce indirect ges-
tures. The three versions of SwiPIN were evaluated in a repeated-measures lab study.
Hypotheses: Two (main) hypotheses were defined for the first lab study.
H1-1 All layouts of SwiPIN are equal in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and likeability.
H1-2 Indirect gesture input does significantly increase observation resistance.
Design: The study followed a repeated measure within participants design. The only inde-
pendent variable was layout with three levels (free, inside, outside). The order of layout was
counterbalanced. Entered PINs were randomly generated and comprised four unique digits.
Procedure and Setup: Each session started with an introduction to shoulder surfing threats.
We told participants to enter the digits as fast and as error-free as possible. Each concept was
evaluated using the following procedure: a) Explanation of the functionality and training. b)
Authentication with three different PINs. Each PIN was entered five times, failed attempts
were repeated up to three times. c) Users rated the concept. After all systems were tested,
participants answered a final questionnaire comparing all systems.
Expected PINs were communicated with alert dialogs. As soon as the dialog box was
dismissed, authentication started and quantitative data was collected using built-in logging
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mechanisms. In addition, the interaction was filmed for the later security evaluation. Finally,
participants were compensated with a 5 Euro shopping voucher.
Participants: We recruited 18 participants via the university mailing list and social networks.
The average age was 25 years (20-32), thirteen were male, eight female. All participants
reported to use touch-based smartphones on a daily basis.
Evaluation 3: Feasibility Lab Study
The starting point lab study indicated that SwiPIN “outside” performed best in terms of
usability and security. Therefore, this layout was specified as the final SwiPIN concept and
evaluated in a feasibility study. The study had two main goals: 1) It aimed at comparing the
final SwiPIN concept to traditional PIN-entry, 2) We investigated the feasibility of switching
between PIN and SwiPIN.
Hypotheses: Four (main) hypotheses were defined for the feasibility study.
H2-1 PIN is more efficient and more effective than SwiPIN.
H2-2 SwiPIN is more resistant to observations than PIN.
H2-3 SwiPIN is perceived to be sufficiently efficient and effective.
H2-4 SwiPIN allows seamless integration into PIN.
Design: The study was based on a repeated-measure within participants design. The inde-
pendent variable was system with two levels (SwiPIN, PIN). SwiPIN was based on the final
layout of SwiPIN “outside”, PIN was inspired by implementation of current smartphones.
System was counterbalanced.
Procedure and Setup: While the procedure followed the main steps of the previous study,
there were three modifications: 1) Only one PIN was tested per condition, 2) We added a
PIN training task and 3) We added a concept switching task. After the introduction, SwiPIN
and PIN were tested separately using the following procedure: a) Concept training followed
by PIN training. While the concept training allowed the participants to get familiar with the
prototype using arbitrary digits, the PIN training helped the user to adapt to the assigned
secret. For this purpose, the secret was entered ten times in a row. Next, b) the same
PIN was used to authenticate five times. After both concepts had been used separately, we
performed a switching task. For this purpose, a new PIN was assigned and trained ten times.
Afterwards, users authenticated five times using PIN, five times using SwiPIN and again five
times using PIN. Switching between PIN and SwiPIN was accomplished using a software
button which was positioned as the top-right corner of the screen.
Qualitative data was again collected via questionnaire, quantitative data was gathered using
logging mechanisms. The interaction was filmed, participants were compensated with a 5
Euro shopping voucher.
Participants: We recruited 16 participants via a university-wide mailing list. Participants’
average age was 27 years (21-37), twelve were male, four female. All participants reported
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to be experienced smartphone users. In addition, eight persons had taken part in the first user
study. However, no significant differences were found between novel users and users with
prior SwiPIN experiences.
Evaluation 4: Longitudinal Field Study
The next Section presents the results in detail. In summary, the feasibility study had indicated
that SwiPIN allows efficient, effective and observation resistant PIN-entry. However, we
aimed at testing the feasibility of the concept in the wild. For this purpose, we performed a
final field study.
Hypotheses: Four (main) hypotheses were defined for the field study.
H3-1 PIN is used for most authentications.
H3-2 SwiPIN is used whenever observation risks are perceived.
H3-3 SwiPIN is perceived as sufficiently efficient and effective for daily authentication.
H3-4 SwiPIN is a useful supplement to PIN.
Design: The evaluation was based on a longitudinal field study. Users installed SwiPIN on
their personal devices and used it as primary authentication mechanism for 14 days. We
applied an experience sampling approach similar to the procedure reported in Section 3.2.
That is, we presented short questionnaires to inform the user’s context. As we aimed at
observing natural user behavior, the switching between SwiPIN and PIN was not controlled.
Procedure and Setup: The prototype of the feasibility study was implemented as lock screen
replacement. We made sure that the application worked with different screen sizes and
manufactures. To ensure a familiar user experience, we integrated a clock and replicated
the common lock screen behavior. For example, users were able to answer calls without
authentication. Concept switching was again triggered with a software button which was
placed at the top-right corner of the screen. The concept allowed three failed attempts before
a fallback PIN was required.
Participants were selected based on their answers to an initial questionnaire. The survey
collected basic demographic information and ensured that the user’s smartphone met the
requirements of the study (e.g., Android v. 4.0+). On the first study day, participants were
invited to the lab. We helped with installing the software, ensured its functionality and
explained the procedure of the study. Participants then used the concept over the course of
two weeks.
We collected quantitative data using built-in logging mechanisms. We logged common per-
formance data as well as the number of digits used for the PIN. This information was re-
quired to interpret authentication times. However, we did not record the PIN itself. As
already mentioned, qualitative data was collected using an experience sampling approach.
For this purpose, we presented a short questionnaire 30 minutes after SwiPIN had been used.
The questionnaire comprised four questions concerning 1) the current situation, 2) the rea-
son for using SwiPIN, 3) the perceived usability and 4) the perceived security. While the first
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(a) Paper (b) Pre-Study (c) Redesign (d) Lab Study (e) Field Study
Figure 4.37: SwiPIN was gradually improved over the course of the project.
two questions presented common options (e.g., “at home” or “I felt observed”) and allowed
text input, the last two questions were based on the relative positioning of a slider. None of
the questions presented default answers. Users were allowed to postpone the questionnaire
by clicking a software button.
After the two weeks, participants returned to our office for a debriefing. We uninstalled
the application, collected the log files and asked participants to fill in a final questionnaire.
Finally, participants were compensated with a 20 Euro shopping voucher.
Participants: We recruited twelve participants via mailing list and word-of-mouth advertis-
ing. Unfortunately, four participants had to be excluded due to hardware problems. There-
fore, the final sample was based on eight participants, among them three females and five
males. The average age was 28 years (19 - 33).
Usability Findings
The previous Section presented the used prototypes and provided details on the design of the
performed user studies. This Section presents the results of the evaluations in chronological
order. We illustrate the evolution of SwiPIN from its first interactive version to a real lock
screen replacement. Each developmental stage provides valuable insights which show the
importance of a systematic design approach based on multiple iterations.
Efficiency
Efficiency was assessed using the mean authentication time. As recommended in Section
4.2, time measurement was again split into orientation phase and input phase. Figure 4.38
illustrates the average authentication times observed in the performed lab studies. As the
efficiency data of the field study can only serve as rough approximation, it was excluded
from this analysis. The results are based on correctly entered PINs, the data was normally
distributed and allowed for parametric tests.
Evaluation 1: Preliminary User Study The preliminary user study aimed at analyzing the
effects of redundant input fields using symbols and digits. As mentioned in the previous
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Figure 4.38: Efficiency of SwiPIN was gradually improved over the course of the project.
Section, we tested three versions with one, two and six input fields and compared them to
PIN and symbol-based PIN. The results are based on the average authentication times of the
fourth and the fifth run as initial analysis indicated unbalanced performance in the first three
runs. The results are depicted in Figure 4.38 (left).
A repeated measure ANOVA revealed a significant impact of field number on orientation
time, F3,45 = 30.62, p < .001. Bonferroni corrected post-hoc tests indicate that both base-
line approaches allowed significantly faster orientation times, p < .05. In addition, con-
cepts with one input field supported significantly faster orientations than concepts with four
and six fields, p < .05. Furthermore, secret type significantly influenced orientation times,
F1.00,15.00 = 34.35p < .001,ε = 1.0. The known layout using digits performed signifi-
cantly faster than the layout based on symbols, p < .001. The effect became even stronger
when more fields were present.
A repeated measure ANOVA comparing the average input times showed similar results.
Again, the number of fields had a significant effect on the input times, F3,45 = 59.09, p <
.001. Again, both baseline concepts performed significantly faster than all other layouts (p<
.001) and input using one field was significantly faster than input based on four or six fields,
p < .05. In addition, secret type significantly influenced input speed, F1.00,15.00 = 21.82p <
.001,ε = 1.0. Input was significantly faster when digits were used, p < .001. The effect
was stronger, when multiple input fields were present.
In summary, the preliminary user study indicated that SwiPIN was most efficient when a
known layout (i.e., PIN layout) was used and when interaction was based on one input field.
In this case, users needed about 4.1 seconds to authenticate.
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Evaluation 2: Starting Point Lab Study After the redesign of SwiPIN, we ran the second
user study to investigate the impact of different starting positions. We again excluded the
first three runs of each PIN × layout combination. As each participant contributed three
PIN entries, the results are based on the average of three authentications measured in the last
two runs. The results are illustrated in Figure 4.38 (center).
A repeated measure ANOVA found no significant main effect of starting positions on orien-
tation times, p > 0.05. However, a repeated measure ANOVA analyzing the average input
times found a significant main effect for layout, F1.44,24.50 = 13.48, p < 0.001,ε = 0.72.
Bonferroni corrected post-hoc tests showed that forcing users to start inside of the PIN pad
resulted in significantly slower input times, p < 0.05. In contrast SwiPIN free and SwiPIN
outside allowed similar input speed.
In summary, the results indicated that forcing users to start their gesture outside of the PIN
pad was most efficient and allowed users to authenticate within 4.3 seconds on average.
Evaluation 3: Feasibility Lab Study Using SwiPIN outside, the feasibility study aimed at
analyzing the effects of switching between PIN and SwiPIN. We assessed the efficiency of
PIN and SwiPIN using the last two runs. In addition, the effects of concept switching were
evaluated using the last input before the switching event and the first input after the switch.
Figure 4.38 (right) illustrates the results including the observed authentication times after
performing the concept switch.
We compared the average orientation effort and the average input times of PIN and SwiPIN
using two-tailed dependent t-tests. The results indicate that PIN demands significantly
shorter orientation phases (t15 = −4.29, p < 0.05,r = .74) and at the same time sup-
ports significantly faster input times, t15 = −10.38, p < 0.001,r = .94. Therefore, using
traditional PIN saves 2.3 seconds on average. A repeated measure ANOVA comparing the
orientation times of PIN and SwiPIN before and after switching the concept revealed that
both times are significantly increased after switching the concept, F1.00,15.00 = 70.49, p <
0.001,ε = 1.0. However, input times are not affected by the event of concept switching,
p > 0.05.
In summary, the results of the feasibility study revealed that PIN enables significantly faster
authentication than SwiPIN. At the same time, seamless integration of SwiPIN and PIN
seems feasible even though users required slightly more time.
Evaluation 4: Longitudinal Field Study The field study aimed at understanding user be-
havior and at assessing the real-world feasibility of SwiPIN. As the feasibility study already
indicated that efficiency drops after concept switches and as the data set is small, the ex-
planatory power of the measured authentication times is limited. The results are based on
the performance of seven SwiPIN users. Analogue to the lab studies, we used only successful
authentications and excluded outliers.10
10 We utilized the average authentication time observed in the feasibility study to identify outliers. The observed
lab study times were multiplied by three to set the cutoff for the field study. For PIN, we excluded 5.9%
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The participant, who used SwiPIN most often was also most efficient. The person needed
1165 ms per digit which corresponds to 4.5 seconds for a four-digit PIN. The overall average
is based on 4439 PIN authentications and 53 SwiPIN authentications. Using PIN, partici-
pants needed an average of 415 ms per digit (SE:2, 180-1000), using SwiPIN 1563 ms per
digit (SE:68, 812-2672) were used. Compared to the values of the feasibility study, this in-
dicates that interaction in the wild reduced the authentication speed by 24% (PIN) and 58%
(SwiPIN), respectively.
In summary, the field study indicated that PIN and SwiPIN perform slower when used in
the wild. At the same time, the results were promising as participants who used SwiPIN
frequently were able to authenticate efficiently (i.e., 4.5 seconds).
Effectiveness
Effectiveness was assessed by analyzing the number of input errors and corrected attempts.
The results are based on the same data as used for the efficiency analysis.
Evaluation 1: Preliminary User Study Both baseline approaches were easy to use: PIN
was most effective as we observed no input errors. When using symbols in the baseline,
one out of 32 (3.1%) authentications failed. Using SwiPIN with one field was still effective,
as we observed only two errors (6.3%), independently from the used secret type. However,
increasing the number of input fields did also increase the number of input errors. Using four
fields, 18.8% of the authentications failed in the numeric condition and 12.5% failed using
symbols. Using six input fields, 12.5% of the authentications failed in both conditions. In
summary, the results indicated that SwiPIN is effective, when only one input field is used.
Increasing the number of input fields made authentications more error-prone.
Evaluation 2: Starting Point Lab Study Overall, the error rates were low. Five out of 108
(4.6%) authentications failed using SwiPIN free, six (5.6%) attempts failed using SwiPIN
outside. SwiPIN inside was most error-prone with twelve errors (11.1%). In summary, the
results indicated that forcing users to start their gestures outside of the PIN pad did not have
any negative impact on effectiveness.
Evaluation 3: Feasibility Lab Study When testing PIN and SwiPIN separately, the error
rates were low. We observed one failed attempt (3.1%) in each condition. Overall, switching
between the two concepts was effective as well. Nevertheless, while switching from SwiPIN
to PIN was error-free, two participants failed within their first attempts on SwiPIN, after PIN
had been used.
Evaluation 4: Longitudinal Field Study Compared to the lab environment, the field study
revealed higher error rates for SwiPIN. While 143 of 4582 (3.1%) sessions failed when PIN
was used, 8 of 61 (13.1%) attempts failed using SwiPIN. The results indicate that PIN is
of the samples, for SwiPIN, 34.6% were cleaned. The participants’ feedback confirmed that such long
authentication sessions resulted from interruptions or from presenting the concept to others.
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Figure 4.39: Perception ratings of the different lab studies. Participants preferred the use of one
input field. Overall, participants were most positive about SwiPIN outside.
easier to use than SwiPIN. However, the data set of SwiPIN is very small and has limited
explanatory power.
Likeability, Perception and User Behavior
While the lab studies provided preliminary insights into user acceptance and perception, the
field study helped to understand user behavior and the context of use. Figure 4.39 illustrates
the user ratings of the lab studies which were collected using 5-point Likert scales.
Evaluation 1: Preliminary User Study The baseline approach was rated best in terms of
efficiency and effectiveness. However, SwiPIN was liked best, when one field and digits
were used. In this regard, none of the participants disagreed that SwiPIN with one field and
digits was effective and efficient. Overall, participants were not in favor of using multiple
fields or symbols. We furthermore asked participants if they would use SwiPIN on their
personal device. While no participant was willing to use the six-field version, the one field
version was accepted by 14 out of 16 participants.
Evaluation 2: Starting Point Lab Study Most participants agreed that SwiPIN free and
SwiPIN outside were efficient and effective. In contrast, SwiPIN inside was rated slightly
lower for both aspects. While SwiPIN outside was rated slightly more efficient than the free
version, more users reported that they would prefer free starting points. However, in a direct
comparison, most users (61%) preferred SwiPIN outside. While Free was favored by 39%
and thus scored second best, SwiPIN inside was not selected. Finally, 14 out of 18 (78%)
reported that they would use SwiPIN in the wild. Overall, forcing users to start their gestures
outside of the PIN pad did not hamper user acceptance.
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Evaluation 3: Feasibility Lab Study While PIN was rated very good in terms of efficiency
and effectiveness, SwiPIN was rated acceptable in terms of efficiency and good in terms of
effectiveness. However, most participants stated to like both PIN and SwiPIN. When asked
if they would use SwiPIN in daily life, 12 out of 16 (75%) participants acknowledged they
would use it as primary authentication system. Furthermore, all participants indicated that
they would use SwiPIN as an add-on to their primary lock screen. We additionally asked if
using SwiPIN could communicate mistrust. However, only one participant agreed and most
participants strongly disagreed.
Evaluation 4: Longitudinal Field Study In contrast to the self-reported data of the lab evalu-
ations, the field study provided insights into the actual user behavior. On average, 2% (range:
0-5%) of the logged authentications were performed using SwiPIN. In absolute values this
means that 95 of 4997 authentications were performed using the secure interaction method.
On subject level, SwiPIN was used between zero and 29 times and PIN was used between
29 and 1270 times. This indicates that the sample included various user types ranging from
infrequent users to power users. As a consequence, participants contributed a different num-
ber of mini questionnaires. Therefore, the data was summarized on subject level before it
was analyzed. Using the 10-point scales, participants indicated a median of 7 (range: 5-10)
concerning usability and a median of 9 (range: 5-9) concerning security.
Furthermore, participants reported that most of the SwiPIN input was performed at home
(54%), followed by public transport (18%), other (18%) and work or school (10%). We
logged only 13 instances, where participants actually felt observed, nine (69%) of them in
public transport. The rest of the SwiPIN input was performed due to other reasons: 53%
of the instances were tagged with “for no reason”, 19.0% were performed to show SwiPIN
to someone else and 11% had “other” reasons. This indicates that the results are biased by
novelty effects. The results of the final interview indicate that the concept was indeed well
accepted but user experience was downgraded by implementation flaws. Several participants
complained that the system lagged. In addition, some participants had to confirm two lock
screens (SwiPIN and the native mechanism) to authenticate. The feasibility of the concept
was finally indicated by the anecdotal fact that one participant continued using SwiPIN on
her personal device. Six weeks after the study was finished, we discovered that the applica-
tion was still sending log data.
Overall, the results of the field study indicate that SwiPIN would be accepted if it was na-
tively implemented. Furthermore, the observations confirmed the findings of Section 3.2 that
shoulder surfing risks are rarely perceived and most of the authentications are performed in
trusted environments.
Security Findings
The security analysis was based on the simulation of cognitive observation attacks. For this
purpose, the video records of the user studies were cut into single successful attempts and
reviewed by experienced SwiPIN users. Each attack consisted of three attempts while each
condition was attacked once using the first successful authentication event.
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Evaluation 1: Preliminary User Study The study aimed at analyzing the security benefits
of multiple input fields. Overall, 81% (n = 78) of secrets were successfully observed when
direct taps were used (baseline condition). Using SwiPIN with one input field allowed to suc-
cessfully observe 40% (n = 38) of the secrets. When four fields were present 15% (n = 14) of
the secrets were exposed and with six fields 7% (n = 7) of the authentications were success-
fully attacked. While this indicates that providing multiple input fields improves security,
we found that this was only the case when users actually used multiple fields for their in-
put. However, the analysis reveals that 35 out of 64 (55%) password inputs were based on
only one field even though multiple fields were present. 95% (n = 20) of the successfully
attacked authentications were based on this behavior. In contrast, only one authentication
was successfully attacked when multiple fields were used for authentication. Concerning the
secret type, the results indicate that more secrets were stolen using symbols as the unfamiliar
layout led to slow interaction which was easier to observe.
In addition to the quantitative analysis, we performed a qualitative analysis of the video
footage to understand why observation attacks were successful. The analysis revealed that
SwiPIN was often rendered ineffective by obvious user interaction. Many users revealed
the entered token by starting their gesture on the respective input element. Please note that
gestures can actually start anywhere in the respective half of the display. Another common
behavior was to hover over the intended button before performing the gesture. Even though
we found that increasing the number of input fields reduces the effect due to the smaller
areas, the problem was still present.
In summary, the user study confirmed that SwiPIN can effectively prevent observation at-
tacks but specific user behavior makes it vulnerable to observation attacks.
Evaluation 2: Starting Point Lab Study The study aimed at analyzing the security advances
of predefined starting points. This time, the security analysis was performed by three attack-
ers (1 female). Each of the attackers observed 54 authentications. The results are based on
binary success (true/false) and the relative success rate. The relative success rate is described
as the overlap of the guessed secret and the entered secret.
SwiPIN outside was most secure as only one PIN was successfully attacked (binary: 1 of 54;
overlap: 35.6%). In contrast, enforcing user to start their gestures inside of the PIN-pad led
to five successful attacks (binary: 5 of 54; overlap: 44.4%). A qualitative review revealed
that slow interaction enabled attackers to observe parts of the mapping and reduce the search
space for their guesses. As indicated by the preliminary security study, allowing free starting
points makes the system prone to observation attacks (binary: 8 of 54; overlap: 49.5%). The
video review confirmed that participants again started their gestures on the intended digit.
Therefore, the results confirmed that SwiPIN outside performed best in terms of security.
Evaluation 3: Feasibility Lab Study Finally, we again compared SwiPIN to traditional PIN.
The baseline results confirmed the findings of the preliminary user study as PINs were cor-
rectly identified in almost all cases (binary: 14 of 16; overlap: 92.2%). Nevertheless, two
participants managed to enter their PINs fast enough to prevent successful observation. In
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contrast to PIN, SwiPIN was significantly more resistant to observation attacks (binary: 2
of 16; overlap: 35.9%). The two successful attacks were based on the fact that attackers
managed to observe parts of the input and guessed the rest. For example, one attacker noted
that he had observed the sequence of colors: red, yellow, red and yellow. This gives a chance
of (15)
4 = 0.16% to guess the correct PIN. In summary, the results confirmed that SwiPIN
is significantly more secure against observation attacks than PIN.
Summary
We presented SwiPIN, a concept which allows secure PIN-entry based on simple touch ges-
tures. We reported the systematic design approach and illustrated how SwiPIN was suc-
cessively improved from the first idea to a working prototype. The Section illustrated the
importance of early user testing as the security of SwiPIN was significantly influenced by
user behavior. We learned that providing multiple input fields could theoretically increase
observation resistance but that such features are unlikely to be used in the wild. In addi-
tion, the results showed how specific user behavior can directly downgrade security. While
preliminary designs allowed free starting points for gestures, the improved version enforced
more secure behavior.
The evaluation indicated that SwiPIN outside was as usable as the free version (H1-1) but
significantly more secure (H1-2). At the same time, the relation of input elements and output
elements was important as enforcing gestures on the insight of the PIN pad turned out to be a
bad idea. Indeed, the final layout of SwiPIN was well accepted (H2-3), highly secure (H2-2)
and showed good performance. After some minutes of training, users already achieved an
average authentication speed of 3.7 seconds and low error-rates (3%). Nevertheless, tradi-
tional PIN-entry still performs better in terms of usability (H2-1). As a consequence, we
suggest to provide SwiPIN as a secure add-on to more efficient mechanisms. The last lab
study proved the feasibility of an integration of PIN and SwiPIN (H2-4). In addition, when
SwiPIN was tested in the field, participants were very positive about the concept (H3-3) and
agreed that it is a useful supplement to PIN (H3-4). Finally, SwiPIN was used as intended
as participants used traditional PIN-entry for most authentications (H3-1) and switched to
SwiPIN when required (H3-2).
Besides presenting a usable and secure authentication mechanism which is suitable for daily
use, the Section contributed by providing general insights: Firstly, we illustrated how a sys-
tematic design process helps to develop a feasible solution. Secondly, we showed how using
gestures can improve traditional authentication mechanisms and how this allows seamless
integration of efficient and secure interaction models.
4.3.6 Discussion and Implications
In this Section, we summarize the main findings concerning XSide and SwiPIN and discuss
implications for observation-resistant gesture-based authentication concepts.
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Gestures Allow Observation-resistant Authentication but Output Matters
The results show that touch gestures are well suited to build usable and secure authentication
mechanisms. Both XSide and SwiPIN allow reasonably fast authentications which are well
below the reported times of most related work (see Section 2.3.3). In addition, both concepts
are significantly more resistant to observation attacks than currently used methods like PIN
and grid unlock. However, it is important to note that the gesture itself is not observation
resistant but security is achieved by a clever combination of various design factors. In this
regard, the configuration of output elements represents the most important design factor.
While both systems provide aggregated feedback, the utilization of guidance is completely
different and illustrates two potential approaches.
XSide achieves observation resistance by forgoing visual guidance. Since target-oriented
gestures are not usable in this context, self-contained gestures were provided. As a con-
sequence, the system naturally supports eyes-free interaction. Eyes-free interaction allows
more secure authentication but may also provide usability benefits as users do not have to
focus on the device. In addition, XSide provides observation resistance without randomiza-
tion and thus allows motor learning. In contrast to XSide, the security concept of SwiPIN
is specifically based on visual guidance. While the spatial arrangement of input elements
is fixed, output elements are randomly positioned and need to be recognized during authen-
tication. Indeed, the concept appears random to observers but quasi-static to users. The
results indicate that participants used their spatial memory to keep search times short as they
performed significantly faster when a known layout (i.e., PIN) was used.
We conclude that output elements and interaction style are the most important factors when
dealing with observability. In addition, we suggest to minimize randomization. For example,
both systems benefit from fixed spatial positions of input elements.
Traditional Concepts can Benefit from Gesture-based Interaction
As already indicated, the design of SwiPIN and XSide also illustrates how the same gestures
(up, down, left, right) can be utilized in different ways. While XSide implements a new
secret type, SwiPIN utilizes such gestures to protect PIN-entry.
As popular grid-based interaction concepts are not feasible for back of device authentication,
it was an appropriate decision to design a novel type of secrets which would not require accu-
rate pointing and dragging. However, introducing new password concepts can have various
disadvantages. Unfamiliar concepts may alienate users and hinder adoption. Furthermore,
new secret types may require modified infrastructures (e.g., data bases). XSide was specif-
ically designed to minimize such negative effects. Firstly, the provided shapes were similar
to widely accepted drawmetric concepts (e.g., Android unlock). Secondly, we made sure
that no further modifications were required: XSide gestures can be translated and stored as
alphanumeric strings. In contrast, SwiPIN shows how changing the interaction style can
improve the security of traditional concepts and illustrates that minimal modifications of the
user interface have a significant impact. We argue that minimizing the differences to estab-
183
lished concepts can increase user acceptance. In addition, such concepts can be utilized in
other domains (e.g., ATMs) without the need of cost-intensive changes in the infrastructure.
We conclude that novel systems benefit from supporting concepts and secrets which are
already familiar to the user. However, introducing novel secret types is justified if significant
benefits can be expected which cannot be provided with traditional solutions (i.e., eyes-free
interaction).
Adaptive Interaction Concepts can Increase Usability and User Acceptance
Observation-resistant concepts often introduce more complex interaction tasks. For exam-
ple, switching sides naturally adds a certain amount of time. Similarly, the use of indirect
gestures takes more time than directly tapping the respective buttons. At the same time,
Section 3.2 revealed that most authentications are performed in trusted environments where
increased security is unnecessary. This aspect was taken into account by designing adaptive
interaction concepts which allow to increase observation resistance on-demand.
Both XSide and SwiPIN allow users to adapt the security level to the current environment.
The evaluation of XSide showed that switching sides increases observation resistance. How-
ever, in some situations, it might be beneficial to use only one side of the device for input.
Specifically, as long as no threats are present, users can authenticate using only the front
side. Front-only input was perceived efficient and was shown to be faster and less error-
prone than other conditions. Similarly, SwiPIN was designed to be used as an addition
to traditional PIN-entry. As a consequence, users can utilize efficient PIN interaction in
trusted environments and spontaneously switch to the more secure SwiPIN interaction when
needed. As both methods are based on multiple temporal challenges, interaction style can
be switched even within single authentications. For example, a user could enter three digits
using PIN and enter the fourth digit using SwiPIN. This allows very flexible adaptation.
If the secure interaction of a concept is not efficient, we recommend to design the concept
in a way that allows users to adapt the usability-security trade-off to their current needs. We
argue that this improves the overall usability of the system. In addition, we assume that extra
costs for more secure interaction are easier to accept if they are linked to risky situations.
Study Design can Increase Error-rates and Systematic Analysis is Required
Unfamiliar secrets, limited training time and synthetic authentication tasks can increase error
rates during user studies. The XSide project illustrated the importance of a qualitative error
analysis and indicated that our taxonomy for gesture-based errors (see Section 3.3) is very
useful for such tasks.
While error-rates were very high at first glance, the qualitative error analysis revealed that
most errors occurred due to three reasons: mixing up sides, unintentional strokes and mir-
rored strokes. We argue that most of the errors were introduced by the specific user study
design and would probably disappear in the wild. In the second user study, every fifth error
happened as gestures were entered on the wrong (i.e., unintended) side. This error type does
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not exist in the wild as users can arbitrarily switch between the front and the back. However,
we opted to control the sides in the study to compare the effects of front and back input.
Similarly, unintentional strokes are rather triggered by programming issues than by interac-
tion problems. We assume that most of the unintentional input can be avoided by applying
better filtering techniques. Finally, mirrored gestures are most likely a consequence of using
unfamiliar secrets. We assume that such errors will be significantly reduced when motor
memory effects kick in [221]. Finally, as already discussed in Section 3.3, error rates might
rise due to the fact that users deliberately fail to quickly restart the process. While the user
study design of SwiPIN did not introduce such errors, we observed that performance data
of the field study had limited value. The analysis of the mini questionnaires indicated that
several input errors were logged while participants showed SwiPIN around.
We recommend to assess sources of errors qualitatively. Gesture-based input errors can be
analyzed using the taxonomy provided in Section 3.3. Special attention needs to be paid to
the study design as it may introduce input errors which are actually not possible in the wild.
Clever Interaction Design can Prevent Unwanted User Behavior
The systematic design and evaluation process revealed that the users’ input characteristics
influence the security of the respective system. First of all, both projects confirmed that
efficiency can be a significant security factor. In several cases, traditionally entered PINs
were observation resistant due to extremely fast interaction. In addition, we like to point out
user behavior which was more specific to the tested system.
The security of XSide was mostly influenced by input speed and by the way participants lifted
their fingers. If gestures are entered quickly and fingers are lifted not too much, it becomes
very hard to distinguish single shapes. On the other hand, attackers could use longer breaks
between the challenges as a good indication for the start of a new shape. In addition, the used
side significantly influences the security of the system. As we were not able to test XSide in
the field, the question remains if people would use side switching in a secure way. Interim
solutions of SwiPIN indicated that security can be jeopardized by so called “bad lies” [73].
When participants had the freedom to select the starting point of their gesture, gestures were
often performed directly on top of the intended digit. Such cues could be effectively used
by attackers to guess the entered PIN. SwiPIN inside and SwiPIN outside illustrated that
such behavior can be prevented by clever interaction design. Finally, physically separating
output and input was shown to be the most effective solution. The indirect interaction style
of SwiPIN outside naturally prevented “bad lies” without explicitly restricting the input.
We conclude that systematic evaluation strategies are required to identify unwanted user
behavior. In many cases, unwanted user behavior can be prevented by adjusting specific
design factors concerning the representation and the directness of interaction.
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Field Tests are Important but Real-world Behavior is Hard to Assess
The importance of field evaluations was already mentioned. User acceptance, real-world
behavior and social aspects can only be assessed in the wild. However, this Chapter showed
several barriers which may limit the value or the feasibility of field studies.
Due to the lack of appropriate devices, we were not able to evaluate XSide in the wild. There-
fore, it remains open work to answer the question if users will actually utilize side switching
to protect their input from observation risks. Furthermore, the field evaluation of SwiPIN
indicated general problems of such studies which were detected by applying an experience
sampling method. Most of the logged SwiPIN events have not been triggered due to obser-
vation risks but due to other aspects. For example, participants played around or showed the
system to someone else. This behavior significantly limits the value of the collected data as
authentications were actually performed by several other persons. In addition, as observa-
tion risks are rarely perceived, the intended activation of secure interaction methods is rarely
observed. As a consequence, we collected a very small number of SwiPIN authentications
which did not allow parametric analysis. At the same time, we argue that this aspect is
actually promising as it shows that SwiPIN was used as intended.
We conclude that adaptive interaction methods are rarely used in the wild. While this con-
firms that participants used the concepts in the intended way, it implies that field studies
need to be performed over longer periods to draw valid conclusions. The use of experience
sampling methods can be useful to distinguish conventional use from other events.
4.3.7 Limitations
Even though the concepts were systematically designed and thoroughly evaluated, there are
inherent limitations which we address in this Section. First of all, the results are based on
experiments with self-recruited samples. Overall, participants were younger and more tech-
savvy than the general population. Thus, data might differ for other user groups and should
not be generalized. Besides this general restriction, the projects had individual limitation
which will be discussed below.
XSide
Even though the prototype was improved over the course of the project, the chunky form fac-
tor of the device may have introduced specific problems. Most notably, it was hard to interact
with one hand. As a consequence, the observed performance data is based on two-handed
interaction. It is likely that performance will improve with a slimmer device. However, this
means that the results cannot be generalized to one-handed interaction. Another major limi-
tation is based on the fact that we were not able to test the concept in the field over a longer
period of time. Therefore, field behavior and memorability aspects are still unexplored.
However, the results of the lab studies indicate that XSide gestures are easy to memorize.
Finally, the security analysis might have been influenced by the fact that attackers knew the
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length of the passwords. For example, attackers might have observed only one stroke of a
gesture but were aware of the fact that gestures were based on two strokes. Consequently,
they had a chance of 33% to guess the right direction of the second (unobserved) stroke.
SwiPIN
The final concept of SwiPIN has been shown to be resistant against most observation at-
tacks. Still, it was successfully attacked two times. This shows one limitation of the concept:
SwiPIN allows attackers to reduce the guessing space by observing the input elements. Con-
sequently, attackers can increase the probability of a correct guess from 0.01% to 0.16%.
The problem could be solved by applying a full set of ten gestures. However, the pre-study
indicated that using ten gestures would most likely reduce usability and user acceptance.
Compared to XSide, another limitation of SwiPIN is that it requires visual attention and does
not support motor memory effects. However, we assume that SwiPIN will only be used
for a small number of authentications where this limitation is acceptable. Concerning the
evaluation, the biggest limitations can be found in the field study. The performed study did
not provide enough parametric data to draw valid conclusions about field performance. In
addition, we did not collect field data on social aspects of the concept. For example, SwiPIN
users might be afraid of communicating mistrust to other. A long-term study over several
weeks needs to be performed to answer such questions. Finally, the results of the field study
might be influenced by implementation issues as several participants reported that the de-
ployed lock screen caused annoying errors. For example, some participants had to confirm
the lock screen twice to unlock. Such technical issues might have triggered negative feelings
which might have influenced the qualitative results.
4.3.8 Summary
In this Section, we presented two different concepts which allow efficient and observation-
resistant authentication on mobile devices using simple touch gestures. Both concepts were
designed following a systematic design approach using low-fidelity and high-fidelity pro-
totypes. While the iterative process allowed stepwise improvements, we also learned from
flawed interim solutions. Overall, this Section contributed by (1) presenting two feasible
gesture-based concepts, by discussing the (2) results of several user studies and by revealing
(3) general insights concerning the design and the evaluation of gesture-based authentication
methods for mobile devices.
Both concepts utilized the same set of gestures to provide observation-resistance on de-
mand (RQ1). XSide allowed to adjust the security by supporting eyes-free input. That is,
users can adapt their input to the current context and authenticate out of sight of potential
attackers while most authentications can be performed very efficiently on the front of the
devices. SwiPIN achieved the same effect by allowing seamless integration into more effi-
cient traditional authentication methods. Users would use PIN in most situations, but switch
to dynamically guided gesture-input when more security is required. Efficient and secure
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dynamic guidance was realized by combining fixed input elements with randomized output
elements. While first designs already indicated the feasibility of this approach, the overall
performance was further improved by spatially separating input and output elements (RQ2).
The implementation of XSide required a novel type of gesture-based secrets. As eyes-free
accurate pointing tasks were not feasible, we contributed by developing a self-contained
gestural alphabet (RQ3). The alphabet uses very basic gestures (up, down, left, right) which
can be combined to more complex shapes. The specific design of this password concept
allows both efficient and effective eyes-free interaction and a large theoretical password
space. In addition, XSide gestures are easily translated to textual strings and can therefore be
handled by common infrastructures.
Finally, we learned how directness and relation influence observation-resistance and usabil-
ity (RQ4). Allowing direct input jeopardized the security of SwiPIN as users tended to start
their gestures on the intended digits. When we changed the interaction concept from direct
to indirect input, both usability and security improved. In addition, even though SwiPIN
could have been realized using self-contained gestures, target-orientation allowed to provide
a smaller subset of gestures and improved efficiency.
188
On Increasing the Practical Password Space
4.4 On Increasing the Practical Password Space
In this Section, we will explore the design space in terms of gesture selection. The presented
concepts aim at increasing the practical password space. This naturally implies that we focus
on the gesture selection phase and not on the authentication event itself. Nevertheless, this
Section will illustrate that the graphical design of gesture-based authentication mechanisms
can be optimized in a way that nudges users to select a larger set of different secrets. Section
3.5 already revealed that current gesture-based approaches are prone to guessing attacks as
gesture selection is very predictable. Analog to the approach presented in Section 3.5, the
novel concepts will be evaluated in large-scale online studies and effects will be measured
utilizing our novel similarity metric.
This Section will shed light on the following main research questions:
RQ1 Can background images serve as guiding elements to influence gesture selection?
RQ2 Can animations serve as guiding elements to influence gesture selection?
RQ3 How do users perceive such visual effects and how does it affect user acceptance?
RQ4 Which features of a grid-based gesture can be modified using such static guidance?
We present two different approaches. The first approach utilizes static background images
and dynamic background images. The concept was evaluated in a lab study (n = 10) and an
online study (n = 496). The second approach is based on dynamic foreground animations
which are presented before the actual input takes place. The concept was evaluated in two
online studies with 321 participants and 288 participants, respectively.
The results are based on detailed quantitative analyses of the collected gesture sets and on
qualitative user feedback. We will learn that both background images (RQ1) and presentation
effects (RQ2) can serve as effective guidance that nudges users to select a more diverse set
of longer gestures. In this connection, the application of the similarity metric will show that
overall diversity is increased when such effects are present. Most users were positive about
the tested concepts and reported that the approaches simplified the gesture selection (RQ3).
However, the results also indicate that such effects can be distracting and not all users can
be influenced. Comparing the effectiveness of both approaches, we find that both concepts
can increase gesture-length and the diversity of the set. However, even though presentation
effects were shown to be effective in changing specific user behavior (e.g., starting position),
we find that some habits are hard to break and the use of common shapes is hard to prevent.
Parts of this Section are based on a bachelor thesis [148] and a practical research
project [149] by Anna Kienle. In addition, parts of this section have been included into
von Zezschwitz et al., On Quantifying the Effective Password Space of Grid-based Unlock
Gestures. To appear in Proceedings of MUM’16 [267]. Please refer to the beginning of this
thesis for a detailed statement of collaboration.
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4.4.1 Research Context and Motivation
Like traditional alphanumeric passwords (see Section 2.1), gesture-based secrets are often
vulnerable to dictionary attacks as users select predictable shapes. In Section 3.5, we quan-
tified the similarity of grid-based unlock gestures and found that using this widely accepted
unlock method results in very similar and thus guessable secrets. In this regard, Section
2.3 discusses several countermeasures including password polices [197], password assign-
ments [67, 89] and recommender systems [10, 241]. In conjunction with grid-based ges-
tures, the use of strength meters has been suggested. Such concepts assess the strength of
a given gesture and illustrate the expected guessing resistance using colors and progress
bars [10, 229, 232, 241]. While the results indicate that such concepts can increase gesture
length and complexity [229, 232], common selection strategies remain unchanged. For ex-
ample, most users continue starting their gestures on the top-left corner of the grid [229].
Therefore, we assume that gesture similarity cannot be adequately addressed using common
feedback mechanisms.
We argue that the design space of graphical gesture-based authentication mechanisms pro-
vides various options to influence selection behavior and gesture preferences using feed
forward effects and guidance. While gesture length and gesture complexity are certainly
important factors for guessability, this Section specifically aims to reduce the similarity of
selected gestures by implicitly nudging users to modify their selection strategies (e.g., start-
ing points). Psychological research indicates that such effects can be triggered with both
subliminal [13, 150] and supraliminal stimuli [251]. Subliminal stimuli are provided over a
very short period of time (t < 50ms) and are therefore not consciously perceived [154]. In
contrast, supraliminal stimuli [25] are provided long enough to be consciously perceived.
While both kinds of stimuli seem promising in general, we assume that subliminal effects
are harder to provide on mobile devices. Firstly, hardware limitations may hinder the presen-
tation of very short stimuli. Secondly, users may be distracted and may therefore not even
focus the screen while a (very short) stimulus is provided. As a consequence, we opt for con-
sciously perceivable stimuli which are more feasible for the mobile context. We specifically
focus on the evaluation of background images and presentation effects.
Background images have already been proposed to improve the selection of Draw-a-Secret
(DAS) [83]. The concept, called Background-Draw-a-Secret (BDAS) allows users to select
personal background images. Even though BDAS was only evaluated in a low-fidelity paper
prototyping study, the results were promising as users tended to select less symmetric shapes
and started their input on different positions of the grid. Later, the positive effects were con-
firmed with a modified version of Pass-Go [202]. So called presentation effects [251] have
been suggested in connection with Cued Click-Points [54], PassPoints [251] and Android un-
lock gestures [229]. Such systems provide supraliminal stimuli by presenting input elements
in such a way that some elements are more focused than others. Thorpe et al. [251] suggested
to influence the selection of PassPoints by presenting input elements in temporal order. In-
stead of showing the whole selection area at once, the system simulated a curtain which
opens either from the left or from the right side of the screen. Siadati and Memon [229]
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Background Presentation
Input
Elements
Representation abstract abstract
Reusability limited limited
Output
Elements
Guidance static static
Feedback detailed detailed
Interaction
Style
Relation target-oriented target-oriented
Directness direct direct
Element
Arrangement
Temporal single multiple
Spatial random random
Table 4.3: We apply specific static guidance to nudge users towards selecting a more diverse
set of gestures. Presentation effects are applied before the input takes place while background
images are presented during the whole process.
suggested to randomly highlight one specific cell of the 3x3 Android grid using blinking
effects. Indeed, both projects revealed that users are nudged towards specific selections by
applying such simple modifications of the user interface.
Based on the promising results of related work, we designed two concepts for grid-based
unlock gestures. Concerning the design space, we especially investigate the effects of output
elements and temporal as well as spatial arrangements. Both concepts have been evaluated
in large-scale online studies to collect a sufficient amount of data that allows the application
of the similarity metric presented in Section 3.5.
4.4.2 Threat Model
The threat model matches the situation illustrated in Section 3.5. An attacker gets in pos-
session of a mobile device which is protected by a grid-based unlock gesture. He starts an
educated guessing attack and tries to unlock the device within 20 attempts. From related
work, he knows the most popular gestures and might even get additional information from
smudge traces left on the screen. However, this time the owner of the device was nudged to
use a different starting point which resulted in a less common gesture. As s consequence,
the attacker is not able to authenticate within the limited number of tries and the owner’s
personal data remains secure.
4.4.3 Concept Overview
While two concepts have been evaluated in large-scale online studies, several other ideas
have been rejected after preliminary evaluation. Table 4.3 categorizes the two main concepts
using the design space for graphical gesture-based authentication mechanisms. However,
this Section will also present concept ideas which have not been thoroughly evaluated.
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Input
abstract 
representation
limited reuse
Interaction
target-oriented
direct
Output
static guidance
detailed feedback
Arrangement
single challenge
random position
Figure 4.40: Background effects were applied using still images and animated images. An
abstract image is randomly positioned in a way that specific input elements are highlighted.
Background Images
The concept is based on static guidance. For this purpose, a background image is displayed
under the regular grid. The concept exploits the effect that users tend to select passwords
based on visual hot spots [54]. Therefore, the background image is required to provide at
least one visual hot spot which is used to highlight specific regions of the screen. We tested
still images and animated images. The spatial arrangement of the image is adjusted to match
one of the outer corners of the grid. A randomized spatial arrangement of the image helps to
counterbalance the positions of the hot spots across different users.
Presentation Effects
Even though presentation effects utilize dynamic animations, we categorize them as static
guidance. That is, the animations are performed independently from user interaction. The
studied concept can be specified as providing multiple challenges as the effect is applied
before the actual gesture selection takes place. For this purpose, the enrollment process
starts with a grey square as indicated in Figure 4.41. The square conceals the grid of input
elements. As soon as the gesture selection starts, the square disappears using a dynamic
animation. The type of animation determines the presentation effect. We tested circular
zoom-like effects, rotations and sliding effects similar to related work [251]. The spatial
position of the focus area (target) should be counterbalanced to emphasize different input
elements across users.
Further Concept Ideas
Besides the thoroughly evaluated concepts presented above, several other concept ideas came
up during the ideation sessions.
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Figure 4.41: Presentation effects utilize dynamic animations. The animations are applied in a
way that emphasizes specific input elements.
Personalizing Input Elements The idea is based on the assumption that users prefer specific
shapes, colors and icons. Instead of using identical grid-cells, such concepts would use
different representations for different cells. Over the course of the project, we discussed
the utilization of symbols, abstract shapes and colors. A lab evaluation of an emoji-based
prototype indicated promising effects.
Gamification and Rewards Applying gamification elements to gesture selection has been
discussed in several dimensions. While obvious approaches would award secure gestures
with desirable elements like stars and badges, more unusual solutions were also discussed.
For example, the input area could comprise a hidden background image which would grad-
ually appear when the respective regions are touched. The concept is based on the idea that
curious users would touch more cells to see more of the background image’s content.
Feed forward and Priming Subliminal and supraliminal priming effects were discussed.
For example, secure gestures could be presented in advance of the selection tasks. Such
gestures could either be part of an introduction page (supraliminal stimulus) or presented for
a very short period of time (subliminal). The concept is based on the assumption that users
would copy the presented gestures or adopt specific selection strategies (e.g., starting cells).
Dynamic Guidance In contrast to the evaluated concepts described above, dynamic guid-
ance would respond to user interaction. The main approach is based on adaptive represen-
tations of input elements. While users enter a gesture, the representations of cells would
change to prioritize more desirable cells for the next move. The concept could exploit sev-
eral pop-out effects like color, size or distance. The approach is based on the assumption
that users would accept the dynamic recommendations and select cells which are presented
more prominent.
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Background (static) Cel (abstract) Cel (concrete) ForcedBackground (animated)
Figure 4.42: Five concept ideas were tested in a preliminary lab study.
4.4.4 Background Effects
In this Section, we aim at diversifying gesture selection by utilizing background images.
Even though previous related work indicated promising effects for free-drawn shapes [83],
the concept has never been evaluated for more restrictive grid-based unlock gestures. The
first part of this Section outlines the evaluation strategy. The second part presents the results
in terms of gesture selection and user feedback.
Prototyping and Evaluation Strategy
After an ideation phase and preliminary evaluations, we performed an online study using still
images and animated images. This Section describes the prototypes and the study designs.
Evaluation 1: Preliminary Lab Study
First concept ideas were generated in an initial brainstorming session. There were no prereq-
uisites for the ideas except that feasible concepts should visually highlight specific regions
of the grid. The brainstorming resulted in five concept ideas which are illustrated in Fig-
ure 4.42.
Prototype: The five candidate concepts were implemented as browser-based software pro-
totypes using HTML5, CSS and JavaScript. Background (static) was based on a grayscale
background image of a girl which contained several hotspots11. Background (animated) was
implemented using a looped video12. The animated background illustrated bubbles float-
ing from bottom to top. Besides potential effects on the starting cell, we were curious if
the direction of the animation would influence the direction of gestures. In contrast to the
background-based concepts, Cell (abstract) and Cell (concrete) were based on a modified
representation of input elements. Cell (abstract) highlighted one node and indicated a spe-
cific direction using an upward pointing arrow. Instead of abstract cells, Cell (concrete)
11 “love this face” by Jack Fussell, licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0
(https://www.flickr.com/photos/travelingtribe/3844008664) – last accessed: 2016/06/06.
12 “Air Bubbles Live Wallpaper”, reproduced with permission by Eugene Pestov
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v~=~fLbhOILIEcs) - last accessed: 2016/06/06.
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Figure 4.43: The final prototype presented static and animated images in different rotations,
each highlighting one of the outer cells.
provided nine different emojis13. We assumed that individual preferences for specific emo-
jis would trigger the selection of such cells. Finally, the Forced condition was based on a
predefined a starting point and represented the baseline.
Design: The preliminary lab study was based on a repeated measure within participants
design. The independent variable was scheme with five levels. The order of scheme was
randomized. Data collection included selected gestures as well as qualitative user feedback.
Procedure and Setup: At the beginning, we informed the participant about the general goal
of testing a novel authentication mechanism. User input was performed using a mouse and
an office computer. For each concept, participants were asked to spontaneously select one
unlock gesture. We did not provide further information on the scheme, nor did we set a
selection policy. After each concept, we interviewed the participant and collected qualitative
feedback. For example, we asked if there were any external factors which influenced the
gesture selection. After all concepts were tested, participants answered a final questionnaire.
Participants had the chance to win a 20 Euro voucher for an online shop.
Participants: We recruited ten participants with an age ranging from 25 to 34 years. Seven
participants were female, three male. All participants reported to use at least one touch based
mobile device on a daily basis. In addition, seven participants had gained experience in using
Android unlock gestures.
Evaluation 2: Online User Study
Based on the results of the preliminary lab study, we selected the background concept to be
evaluated in a large scale online user study. The online study aimed to collect an adequate
number of gestures to allow investigating the concept’s effects on starting points and on
similarity.
13 Based on Apple Color Emoji font
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Hypotheses: The following main hypotheses were defined for the online study.
H1 Background images serve as static guidance and increase the diversity of user-selected
grid-based gestures.
H2 Hot spots in background images serve as static guidance and nudge users to select
specific target cells first.
H3 Animated images are as usable as static images but lead to stronger nudging effects.
Prototype: As a result of the lab evaluation, we opted to use more abstract background
images for the final prototype. The background images were selected to have strong con-
trasts and clear hotspots. In addition, the animated condition was chosen to be calmer and
therefore less distracting. The image used in the static background condition showed several
spotlights on a dark background14. The animated condition was based on a looped video of
a drop falling in water15. In contrast to the preliminary version, the concentric ripple did
not indicate a certain drawing direction but specifically highlighted one cell. Therefore, the
animated condition and the static condition were more comparable. To rule out the impact
of colors, both concepts were based on grayscale images. Finally, both images allowed rota-
tion in different directions while each rotation had the effect that the main hot spot matched
one of the corner cells. To prevent uncontrolled side effects arising from the use of different
interaction methods and device classes, the prototype was optimized for the use of laptops
and desktop computers. Gestures were entered by pressing and releasing the left mouse but-
ton. Valid gestures had to comply with the common rules for Android unlock gestures. To
illustrate the context of the enrollment, the grid was placed within an abstract representation
of a mobile device. Interaction and user feedback was stored in a MySQL database.
Design: The online study was based on a between groups design with the two main vari-
ables: Background (static) and Background (animation). For each concept, we tested four
different rotation states. Therefore, participants were randomly assigned to one out of eight
conditions. As illustrated in Figure 4.43, each of the conditions highlighted one of the cells
“one”, “three”, “seven” or “nine”.
Procedure and Setup: After the introduction page, the gesture input started. We requested
two gestures per participant. The first gesture input was logged as training and allowed
users to get familiar with the system. After the first input, a second input was performed
using the same conditions. Please note that we did not provide any additional rules. That is,
participants were free to either perform the same gesture twice or to perform two different
gestures. Conditions were assigned based on a Round-robin scheduling. After the input
task, participants were forwarded to a questionnaire to provide demographic data and to give
feedback on the concept. Finally, all participants had the chance to win either one E-book
reader or one out of five 10 Euro shopping vouchers.
14 “Untitled” by I Love Trees is licensed under CC BY 2.0 (https://www.flickr.com/photos/
ilovetrees/2770624201 – last accessed 2016/06/06
15 “Water ripples” by ChoiceSlides bought on http://choiceslides.com/products/water-ripples –
last accessed 2016/06/06.
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Participants: We recruited 503 participants using an university-wide mailing list. However,
seven data sets had to be removed due to incomplete answers. The average age of the remain-
ing 496 participants was 27 years (17-72). Almost half (51.2%) of the participants indicated
to be female. Even though owning a mobile device was not a requirement for taking part
in the study, 86% of the participants used a mobile device on a daily basis, 64% of them
reported to use Android devices.
Results of the Gesture Analysis
In this Section, we assess the impact of background images on security. After summarizing
the main insights gained from the preliminary lab study, the gestures of the online study are
investigated in terms of composition aspects and similarity.
Evaluation 1: Preliminary Lab Study
The results of the preliminary lab evaluation were very promising as they indicated that
all tested concepts have a strong effect on gesture selection. Both, background effects and
modified cell layouts nudged users to start gestures at specific positions. In the Background
(static) condition, participants tended to avoid crossing the girl’s face which resulted in se-
lecting the cells “two”, “three” or “nine” more often. The animated background image
nudged users to perform gestures that followed the flow of the bubbles. That is, half of the
participants started their gesture at the bottom of the grid and ended in the top row. Us-
ing the abstract cell modification, 90% of the participants started their gesture above of the
arrow. In the concrete cell condition, participants tended to select happy emojis. Overall,
we concluded that all tested conditions were well suited to modify selection behavior. As a
consequence, the final decision had to be based on user feedback. As reported in the next
Section, both background concepts were finally chosen for further evaluation.
Evaluation 2: Online User Study
The results are based on the analysis of 496 user-selected unlock gestures.
Basic Statistics: Overall, gestures were based on 6.08 (SD = 1.59) cells on average. A de-
tailed analysis reveals that using the static prototype resulted in marginally longer gestures
(6.18, SD = 1.61) than using the animated version (5.98, SD = 1.57). A one-way ANOVA
comparing the average length of the collected gestures to the average length of the ges-
tures collected under standard conditions (see Section 3.5) revealed a significant main effect,
F2,1000 = 61.30, p < .001. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests indicated that both back-
ground conditions led to significantly longer gestures than the baseline approach (p < .001).
However, the comparison of the results of the animated condition and the static condition
did not indicate significant differences (p > .05).
An analysis of starting positions revealed that many (36.1%) users still started their gesture
at cell “one” and finished at cell “nine” (25.2%). While this indicates that most users still
followed predictable selection strategies, we found that gesture complexity was increased.
Compared to the baseline condition, participants utilized more special moves as 17.1% of
the gestures included overlaps and 10.1% of the gestures comprised knight moves.
197
Animation (all)
14%37% 10%
7% 7% 4%
15% 2% 4%
Static (all)
16%35% 13%
2% 5% 4%
17% 4% 4%
Background (all)Baseline (all)
15%36% 12%
4% 6% 4%
16% 3% 4%
7%41% 10%
8% 3%
14% 4% 4%
9%
Background (seven)
15%36% 11%
7% 5% 4%
10% 0% 7%
Background (three)Background (one)
11%35% 14%
4% 8% 3%
18% 2% 4%
14%39% 8%
6% 5%
17% 4% 2%
5%
Background (nine)
20%34% 13%
2% 3% 4%
16% 4% 3%
Figure 4.44: The analysis of starting cells indicates no significant impact of background images.
However, the right side of the grid was used more often when background images were present.
Starting Cells: Figure 4.44 indicates that background images nudged users to use the right
side more often. We ran a two-tailed binomial test to gather further insights. We defined the
cell which was highlighted by a specific rotation as the target cell. Next, gesture selection
was analyzed as binary event: Whenever the first cell of a selected gesture matched the target
cell, the case was tagged as “success”. All other combinations were tagged as “false”.
The test calculated the probability with which the number of selected target cells (successful
nudges) would have been the same within the baseline condition. That is, if no background
image was provided. The comparison revealed only one significant association between the
static background image focusing cell three and the actual selection of cell three (p < .05).
All other comparisons revealed no significant effects (p > .05).
Popular Gestures: Overall, the -gesture was selected most often (n = 12). Table 4.4 illus-
trates the top five gesture groups for n ≤ 2. The groups represent the most popular shapes.
In addition, we illustrate the most popular single gesture in each group. The data indicates
that both animated and static background images led to very similar shapes. Although dif-
ferent groups of participants contributed to each of the sets, the selected secrets show only
minor differences in form and complexity. Two of the most popular gesture groups of the
background study comprise gestures ( , ) which are also found in the top ranks of the
baseline study (see Section 3.5) . In addition, the gesture “ shows high similarity to two
other popular groups of the baseline study ( , ).
While this indicates a close match of popular gestures in both baseline condition and back-
ground condition, the popular gestures differ in length and number. In the baseline study,
all gestures of the top five groups were based on only four cells. In the background study,
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Rank Top Gesture # Permutations # Occurrences % Dataset
[ O | S | A ] [ O | S | A ] [ O | S | A ] [ O | S | A ]
1 | | 06 | 06 | 08 21 | 16 | 13 4.2 | 6.6 | 5.1
2 | | 14 | 09 | 06 20 | 11 | 11 4.0 | 4.6 | 4.3
3 | | 05 | 03 | 04 19 | 09 | 10 3.8 | 3.8 | 3.9
4 | | 09 | 04 | 07 19 | 09 | 07 3.8 | 3.8 | 2.7
5 | | 05 | 06 | 04 12 | 08 | 07 2.4 | 3.3 | 2.7
Table 4.4: The five largest groups for n ≤ 2. For each condition, the table shows the most
frequent (top) gesture of the group, the number of different gestures covered in each group, the
accumulated absolute number of occurrences for all gestures in the group, and the covered ratio
of the respective dataset. O≡overall, S≡static and A≡animated.
the overall top five of both background conditions comprises only one of such short gestures
( ). Two groups cluster length-five-gestures and the other two groups comprise gestures of
length seven and nine, respectively. The fact that a gesture of the maximum length is found
in the top five of the most popular gestures ( ) questions once again the importance of length
as a security factor. According to the number and distribution of popular gestures, it should
be emphasized that popular groups in the background condition cover less data than popu-
lar groups in the baseline condition. The baseline study revealed that the -gesture alone
already covered over 11% of the whole data set. In contrast, none of the gestures selected
with background images covers more than 4.2% of the whole data set. Assuming a similar-
ity distance of n ≤ 2, the top five gesture groups found in the baseline condition allowed to
describe 29% of the data set. In the background study, the top five groups cover 18%.
Pattern Similarity: Analog to the analysis reported in Section 3.5, the collected gestures
are analyzed using our similarity metric. Figure 4.45 illustrates the ratio of unique gestures
for the distances n ≤ 2. While the results indicate no significant differences for the type
of background images, a comparison to the baseline data reveals that gestures of the back-
ground study are more diverse. Comparing the set of the baseline study with the set of the
background study reveals that 31% of the gestures were duplicates (n = 0) when no back-
ground images were present. In the background study, 21% duplicates were chosen. By
allowing more transformations, the similarity increases for all sets. However, more gestures
in the background condition stay unique. By applying up to two simple transformations, the
overall set of the background study shrinks to 58% of its size while the set in the baseline
condition was reduced to 33%.
A length-dependent analysis of the gesture sets confirms the results of Section 3.5. Gestures
which are based on four, five or seven cells are based on more similar shapes than gestures
which are based on six or eight cells. Considering up to two transformations, we find that
33% of the length-four-gestures remain unique in the background condition. Without back-
ground images, only 17% stayed unique. In contrast, composing gestures of eight cells led
to more diverse shapes in both conditions. Considering a distance of n ≤ 2 as duplicates,
reduced the set of background gestures to 79%, the baseline set to 60%.
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Figure 4.45: While both background schemes show similar distributions of similarity, selected
gestures are overall more diverse than the baseline set.
User Feedback
In contrast to authentication, quantitative performance data has limited value for password
selection tasks as such tasks are rarely performed. Therefore, we focus on the analysis of
user feedback to asses usability and user acceptance.
Evaluation 1: Preliminary Lab Study
User feedback was the main factor for rejecting the Cell (abstract) concept and the forced
condition. Both concepts were perceived as too restrictive and were thus unpopular. In
contrast, most users were in favor of Background (static). Even though two users suggested
the use of more salient images. While the emoji-based concept was rated equally good, user
feedback indicated that modifying the representations of input elements is more polarizing.
One participant claimed that she disliked “smileys”, another participant claimed that the
concept was distracting. Using animated background images led to most diverse reactions.
While half of the users was in favor of the concept, the rest of the participants claimed that
the animation was ‘too busy” and “made it hard to see the actual nodes”.
Overall, the results of the preliminary lab study indicated that using static background im-
ages and using modified cells were the most promising approaches. However, we were con-
fident that the mentioned drawbacks of the animated background prototype could be mini-
mized using a calmer animation. In addition, including animated backgrounds would enable
a direct comparison of animated and static images. As we aimed to analyze if animated
backgrounds are more effective than still background images, we selected both background
schemes for further evaluation.
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Evaluation 2: Online User Study
User feedback was collected using five-point Likert scales and open-ended questions. The
open-ended questions were coded following the inductive coding approach reported in Sec-
tion 3.2. Two coders analyzed answers concerning general feedback and the specific impact
of background images. The process resulted in 362 and 318 code instances, respectively.
The five-point rating confirmed that dynamic background images are more eye-catching than
static images. In the static condition, 54% of the participants agreed or fully agreed to have
noticed the background image. In the dynamic condition, 68% indicated that the effect
was consciously perceived. However, only the minority of participants would agree that the
presented background images influenced their gesture selection. According to the Likert-
based answers, this was the case for 6% of the participants in the static group and 5% of the
participants in the animated group.
Most of the feedback focused on the general concept of grid-based gestures. However, the
remaining 18% of the answers provided valuable insights into the effects of background im-
ages. Participants who reported positive effects often indicated an impact on starting points
or mentioned visual details of the background image (n = 20). One user acknowledged that
he “[..] chose [the] starting point to be at the brightest spot in the image”. Another partic-
ipant reported that gesture selection was guided by “The waves [which] were mostly in the
upper left corner.”. In addition, participants indicated that the presence of background im-
ages facilitated gesture selection or made them rethink their selection strategies (n = 7). One
participant stated that the “big shining points left and right gave [her] an idea of the pattern
[she] could use”. Another user had “[..] simulated the movement of the background”.
Nevertheless, the feedback did also indicate negative effects and potential misconceptions.
For example, the presence of background images led to reverse effects as one participant
reported she opted for “the four dots where no white circles were [...]”. Three participants
specifically mentioned that they did not like the fact that the background image interfered
with input elements of the grid. Five participants claimed that the background was confusing,
distracting or irritating. While other users expressed general dissatisfaction with the visual
design, others did not understand the purpose of the images. One participant stated she
“thought of [the image] as a plain background without further function” and another user
hypothesized that the image was provided to “simulate the reflection of a real display”.
Summary
In this Section, we evaluated the feasibility of background images to implicitly nudge users
to select a more diverse set of gestures. After an exploratory design phase and a preliminary
lab evaluation, we evaluated two modifications of the background scheme in a large scale
online study (n = 496). The collected gesture set was analyzed using traditional composition
metrics (e.g., length) and the similarity metric presented in Section 3.5. While the lab-based
evaluation of the concept was very promising, the results of the more realistic online study
were mixed and indicated rather small effects.
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On the one hand, we found that the selected gesture set of the online study was indeed more
diverse than the set collected under baseline conditions. Overall, users utilized more cells
and the practical gesture space remained more diverse. Therefore, we accept the hypothesis
that background images diversify the selection behavior (H1). However, since a majority of
the participants reported that the background images were not recognized, the effects seem
to be subconsciously perceived. On the other hand, we cannot accept hypothesis H2. While
some users reported that visual hotspots influenced their starting positions, the statistical
analysis indicated only one significant association. Furthermore, we found no significant
differences between animated background images and static background images and reject
H3. Even though users stated that animations were more eye-catching, they had the same
effects on gesture selection as static images.
Overall, we conclude that background images can have positive effects on gesture selection
but the impact is rather small. The next Section will investigate the effects of foreground
presentation effects and show that such concepts have stronger impacts on selection behavior.
This is especially true for the selection of starting points.
4.4.5 Presentation Effects
This Section investigates the feasibility of foreground presentation effects [251] in connec-
tion with grid-based gestures. In contrast to background images, such effects are triggered
by simple time-dependent animations which unfold the input area step by step before the
input takes place. Therefore, presentation effects are not present during gesture selection.
The first part of this Section outlines the evaluation strategy. The second part presents the
results of the gesture analysis and the user feedback.
Prototyping and Evaluation Strategy
The evaluation of background effects indicated that (repeated-measures) lab studies have
limited value when dealing with gesture selection tasks. As a consequence, we decided
against lab evaluations. That is, after a qualitative focus group discussion and after a prelim-
inary online study, we performed a large-scale evaluation analog to Section 4.4.4.
Evaluation 1: Preliminary Online User Study
An initial brainstorming generated several ideas how to implicitly influence gesture selec-
tion. As already pointed out in Section 4.2.3, we considered visual modifications of the
interface, gamification approaches, feed forward mechanisms and dynamic feedback. The
different approaches were then discussed in a focus group with five smartphone users. Partic-
ipants of the focus group rated the concept ideas using ten-point scales. The results indicated
that presentation effects were widely accepted and overall most promising. To find a set of
feasible animation effects and to get a basic idea of animation speed and animation style,
we then built dynamic mock-ups using Adobe Flash. Informal tests resulted in a set of three
animations which were evaluated in a preliminary online study (see Figure 4.46):
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Slide (right) Zoom (seven) Rotation (clockwise)
Figure 4.46: Three presentation effects were evaluated in the preliminary online study. The
zoom effect was most promising and therefore tested in the final user study.
Rotation is based on a square which rotates and shrinks at the same time. The animation
starts as an overlay of the input field and disappears in the center of the grid. The
primary goal of the animation is to influence the drawing direction.
Slide is based on a square which slides out of the grid. The animation starts on the grid and
gradually disappears by sliding along the x-axis or along the y-axis. The animation
reveals the rows or the columns step by step and aims to influence the starting region.
Zoom is based on a circle which is gradually increased. The effect starts with an overlay
which then disappears by opening a hole. The animation aims to influence the starting
position and therefore starts on a specific cell of the grid.
Prototype: We built a responsive web-based prototype using PHP, JavaScript and HTML5.
The animations were implemented using CreateJS16. The prototype was based on the soft-
ware used in the background image study and mimicked the standard Android interface. In
contrast to the previous study, the prototype was optimized for mobile devices. The use of
mobile devices was checked using MobileDetect17. All effects started as a grey overlay and
disappeared according to the respective animation.
Design: The preliminary online study was based on a between-groups design. The inde-
pendent variable was scheme with three levels: Slide, Rotation and Zoom. Slide was tested
in each of the four directions: west, north, east and south. Rotation was tested in anti-
clockwise rotation and clockwise rotation. Zooms originated from the cells “one”, “three”,
“five”, “seven” and “nine”. In addition, we tested a baseline condition where the square
disappeared without animation. The twelve conditions were randomly assigned. We logged
user interaction and collected qualitative user feedback using a short questionnaire.
Procedure and Setup: After an introduction, users were forwarded to the input task. The
input task requested two gestures while the first gesture was logged as training input. Both
tasks started with a grey overlay as indicated in Figure 4.41. The square disappeared as soon
as the participant pressed a start button. In the first input task, the square disappeared without
16http://createjs.com – last accessed: 06/14/2016.
17http://mobiledetect.net – last accessed: 06/14/2016.
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animation. In the second input task, one of the twelve conditions applied. That is, the square
disappeared either without effect (baseline) or with a predefined presentation effect. In both
task, the input had to be confirmed by reproducing the gesture once. Finally, participants
provided feedback using a short questionnaire.
Participants: 321 participants completed the study. The average age was 25 years
(SD = 5.2). 165 were female, 156 were male. The majority (64%) of the sample used
Android smartphones, 58% of them indicated to use unlock gestures.
Evaluation 2: Online User Study
The preliminary online study showed no significant differences between the conditions but
indicated that the zoom out effect was most promising. Therefore, the online study was
repeated focusing on the four conditions of zoom. The main goal was to collect enough
samples per condition to allow a valid assessment of nudging effects.
Hypotheses: The following main hypotheses were defined for the online study.
H1 Presentation effects serve as guidance and increase the diversity of user-selected grid-
based gestures.
H2 Zooming out of a specific cell nudges users to start their gestures on the respective cell.
H3 Presentation effects are more effective than background images as the guidance is
more specific.
Prototype: We used the prototype of the preliminary online study. However, since the first
evaluation had revealed several problems concerning the presentation of animations using
mobile browsers, the software was optimized for desktop computers. Therefore, MobileDe-
tect was configured to prevent the use of mobile devices.
Design: The study was again based on a between-groups design. Zoom was tested in four
versions. Therefore, the independent variable was target with four levels: one, three, seven
and nine. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions.
Procedure and Setup: The procedure was the same as described in the preliminary online
study. The only modification was based on the fact that participants used a desktop computer
and a mouse to enter the gesture. Input was performed by pressing the left mouse button.
Participants: We recruited 292 participants using a university-wide email list. Four data sets
had to be removed due to incomplete answers. The average age was 26 years (SD = 8.9).
167 participants were female, 121 were male. Most (78%) participants used Android smart-
phones on a daily basis, 60% of them indicated to use unlock gestures.
Results of the Gesture Analysis
In this Section, the collected gestures are investigated in terms of composition aspects and
similarity aspects. Even though we focus on the results of the main study, we begin by
presenting the main insights of the preliminary online study.
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Evaluation 1: Preliminary Online User Study
Overall, the preliminary online study indicated only minor effects. Statistical analyses of
composition aspects revealed no significant differences between the conditions. In addition,
a manual inspection of the gestures indicated no effects on the sense of rotation. However,
the results indicated a minor impact on starting positions. For example, cell “three” was used
by 3% of the participants in the baseline condition and when a slide animation was focusing
the left side of the grid. In addition, when a zoom originated from cell “one”, no participant
started the gesture on cell “three”. In contrast, animations which focused the right side of the
grid tended to nudge user to start gestures on the right side. 10% started their gesture on cell
“three” when the region was emphasized by a slide animation and 24% started their gesture
on cell “three” when it was highlighted by a zoom effect. Similar effects were indicated for
the cells “one” and “seven”. Overall, the zoom effect seemed to have the strongest impact
on starting points and was therefore selected for further investigation.
Evaluation 2: Online User Study
Analog to the background user study, the data was analyzed in terms of popular gestures,
similarity and starting cells. Due to an error in the assignment algorithm, group sizes were
not perfectly counterbalanced and ranged between 54 and 113 samples per condition. Nev-
ertheless, we argue that such sample sizes meet the requirements for statistical analysis.
Basic Statistics: The overall length was 5.95 (SD = 1.61) cells on average. In addition, ges-
ture length rarely changed between the different zoom conditions. We measured a minimum
of 5.6 cells in group “three” and a maximum of 6.1 cells in group “nine”. We performed
a one-way ANOVA to compare the average length of the collected gestures to the average
length of gestures collected in both the baseline study and the background study. The results
indicate a significant main effect, F2,1290 = 65.89, p < .001. Bonferroni-corrected post-
hoc tests confirm that users selected significantly more cells when presentation effects were
present. However, compared to the background study, no significant differences were found.
Overall, 41.3% of the participants started their gesture at cell “one” and 33.3% of the gestures
ended with cell “nine”. These numbers match the observations in both the baseline study
and the background study. However, participants of the presentation effect study used more
special moves as 15.6% of the gestures comprised overlaps and 9.0% included knight moves.
Starting Cells: Figure 4.47 illustrates the ratio of selected starting cells in different condi-
tions. Comparing the overall data indicates no significant effects. However, a comparison of
the different conditions indicates significant influences. The strongest effects can be found
for cell “three” and cell “seven”. When cell “three” was focused, 27% started their gesture
on the target cell. When cell “seven” was emphasized, the target cell became the most often
(42%) selected starting point.
A two-tailed binomial test confirms that foreground presentation effects significantly influ-
ence starting cells. A comparison to the baseline data indicates significant differences for
the cell “three”, “seven” and “nine”. The respective cells were selected more often than
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Figure 4.47: The analysis of starting cells indicates a significant impact of presentation effects.
This was especially the case, when cells “three” and “seven” were focused.
expected under baseline conditions (all p < .001). However, the use of cell “one” was not
significantly different. A comparison to the background study reveals the same differences.
Cell “three” (p < .05), cell “seven” (p < .001) and cell “nine” (p < .001) were selected
significantly more often when presentation effects were applied.
Popular Gestures: “1235789” ( ) was selected most often (2.8%). This matches the data
of the background study, where 2.4% of the users selected this specific gesture. Table 4.5
illustrates the most frequently selected gestures of popular gesture groups for n≤ 2.
While most popular gestures are based on common shapes, we find interesting differences
compared to previous studies. Compared to the baseline condition, participants selected
more cells. Overall, three of the most frequently selected gestures were based on five cells,
the other two groups are based on six and seven cells, respectively. In addition, the analysis
of the individual gesture sets reveals that users tended to base their gestures on more complex
shapes. We found several gestures which were not present in the other two user studies.
Most remarkably, two popular gestures comprised overlaps ( , ). In addition, popular
gestures actually started on the target cells. This was the case for the gestures and
when cell “three” was focused and for the gestures , and when cell “seven” was
focused. Finally, emphasizing cell “nine” resulted in the use of the -gesture which is based
on a common shape but started at cell “nine”.
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Rank Top Gesture # Permutations # Occurrences % Dataset
[ A | 1 | 3 | 7 | 9 ] [ A | 1 | 3 | 7 | 9 ] [ A | 1 | 3 | 7 | 9 ] [ A | 1 | 3 | 7 | 9 ]
1 | | | | 06 | 03 | 02 | 03 | 03 16 | 06 | 05 | 04 | 06 5.6 | 8.6 | 9.1 | 7.5 | 5.4
2 | | | | 03 | 04 | 03 | 03 | 02 15 | 04 | 03 | 03 | 05 5.2 | 5.7 | 5.5 | 5.7 | 4.5
3 | | | | 07 | 02 | 02 | 01 | 04 10 | 03 | 02 | 02 | 05 3.5 | 4.3 | 3.6 | 3.7 | 4.5
4 | | | | 05 | 02 | 02 | 02 | 02 10 | 03 | 02 | 02 | 04 3.5 | 4.3 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 3.6
5 | | | | 05 | 01 | 02 | 02 | 03 09 | 02 | 02 | 02 | 04 3.1 | 2.9 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 3.6
Table 4.5: The five largest groups for n ≤ 2. The table shows the most frequent (top) gestures
of a group, the number of different gestures covered in each group, the accumulated absolute
number of occurrences for all gestures in the group, and the number of occurrences as a ratio of
the respective dataset. We report the whole set (≡ A) and the individual conditions.
Even though the most popular gestures are based on common shapes, no group covers more
than 5.6% of the overall gesture set. Nevertheless, the top five groups describe 20.8% of
the selected gestures. Within the same conditions, popular groups tend to describe slightly
more gestures as the percentage coverage ranges between 22% and 26%. For example, the
-shape covers 9.1% of all gestures selected in condition “three”.
Pattern Similarity: Figure 4.48 illustrates the ratio of unique gestures after applying n ≤ 2
transformations. Overall, the similarity values match the values observed in the background
images study. That is, users selected a more diverse set of gestures than in the baseline study.
Overall, 23% of the gestures were duplicates (n = 0) and the amount of unique gestures
drops to 48% when considering n≤ 2 transformations. The chart on the right illustrates the
similarity values after excluding all cases where participants were nudged to use cell “one”.
Indeed, the results indicate that the selected gestures are more diverse when participants
were nudged towards cell “three”, cell “seven” and cell “nine”. An analysis of the individual
gesture sets confirms this assumption. Focusing on duplicates reveals that 14% of the ges-
tures were selected at least twice when users were nudged towards cell “one”. Emphasizing
cell “three” or cell “seven” resulted in 5% duplicates and 4% duplicates, respectively. When
cell “nine” was focused, 10% of the patterns were selected at least twice. Considering up
to two transformations, the amount of unique gestures drops to 66% (“one”), 78% (“three”),
75% (“seven”) and 64% (“nine”), respectively.
The length-dependent analysis confirms the findings of previous evaluations. Considering
duplicates, length-five (28%), length-seven (30%) and length-nine (25%) gesture show the
highest values. In contrast, the set of length-six (18%) and length-eight (6%) gestures com-
prised less duplicates. In comparison to previous user studies, length-four gestures also
comprised less duplicates (16%). Considering up to two transformations indicates three
similarity classes. Gesture sets with four and five cells are reduced to 43% and 40% of the
original size. Gestures with six, seven and nine cells are reduced to 53%. Gestures which
are based on eight cells remain most diverse (75%).
207
69%
42%
35%33%
79%
57%54%50%
77%
57%
52%48%
80%
59%
54%50%
Baseline Background (all) Presentation (all) Presentation (w/o 1)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
n=0 n=1 n=2 n<=2 n=0 n=1 n=2 n<=2 n=0 n=1 n=2 n<=2 n=0 n=1 n=2 n<=2
Distance
In
di
vi
du
al
 G
es
tu
re
s 
[%
]
Gesture Similarity
Figure 4.48: Compared to the baseline set, presentation effects led to a more diverse gesture
choice. This is especially true, when the cells “three”, “seven” and “nine” were focused.
User Feedback
The user feedback provides valuable insights into users’ mental models and into the specific
impact of the tested schemes. We focus on a qualitative analysis of user statements.
Evaluation 1: Preliminary Online Study
The feedback was voluntary and collected with open-ended questions. About half of the par-
ticipants (36% overall) who answered the question reported that their gesture selection was
not affected by the animations. Many participants claimed that they already “had a pattern
[..] in mind before [..]”. However, some participants stated that the effects nudged them to
“be different” or to select a “more complicated password”. One participant reported that “the
displayed moving shape intuitively created a pattern in [her] mind.” Nevertheless, it became
apparent that a lot of participants did not recognize the animations. Comments like “which
behavior?” or “did I miss something?” indicated that animations may not have been cor-
rectly displayed on some devices. Later tests confirmed the assumption. As a consequence,
the final user study was performed using desktop computers.
Evaluation 2: Online User Study
The feedback of the online study was based on two open-ended questions. The answers were
analyzed using an inductive coding approach. With the first question, we investigated the
general impact on the gesture choice. Most participants reported general usability aspects.
Overall, 20% of the gestures were selected as they were “easy to enter” and 12% of the
participants claimed their gesture was “easy to remember”. For example, one participant
stated: “I think the U’s are easy to remember”. 14% specifically named “security” as one
reason for their gesture choice. Interestingly, only 7% said that the gesture was “fast to
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enter”. Other reasons included eyes-free interaction (1%), playfulness (1%) and convenience
(1%). Only four participants named the presentation effects at this point.
Next, we specifically asked for the impact of the animations. 42% claimed that the an-
imation had no impact on their gesture selection: “In no way, because I chose a pattern
beforehand”. However, 11% specifically mentioned that the effects influenced their start-
ing point. Some (2%) participants reported indirect influences as they “decided against the
[emphasized] starting point [..]”. Individual statements indicated also misconception: “The
starting point was influenced, but there was no other starting point possible, was it?”. Finally,
8% of the participants did not (consciously) notice any effect.
Summary
We investigated the feasibility of presentation effects to influence grid-based gesture selec-
tion. After a first ideation phase, three different animations were evaluated in a preliminary
online study (n = 321). The results indicated that circular zoom-like animations were most
promising. A second online evaluation (n = 292) tested the presentation effect in detail. The
collected gestures were analyzed analog to the approach presented in Section 3.5. Over-
all, the selected gestures were more diverse and more complex than gestures selected in the
baseline study. In addition, the results indicate that foreground presentation effects have a
strong impact on starting cells.
The analysis revealed that participants selected a diverse set of complex gestures. This was
especially the case, when animation effects focused on uncommon starting cells like “three”
and “seven”. We therefore accept H1 and argue that presentation effects can increase the
diversity of user-selected gestures. Furthermore, we accept H2 since emphasizing specific
cells effectively nudged users to start their gestures on such cells. In condition “seven”, cell
“seven” actually became the most used starting cell. Focusing on similarity and traditional
composition metrics (e.g., length), presentation effects seem as effective as background im-
ages. However, when focusing on the impact on starting cells, presentation effects seem
more effective than background images. We therefore accept H3 but note that the advantage
is specifically related to starting positions.
We conclude that presentation effects are indeed suited to diversify the selection of starting
points in a large data set. However, the concept cannot guarantee the selection of specific
cells since a majority of users indicated that they are not affected by such an approach.
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4.4.6 Discussion and Implications
We gained valuable insights into the impact of presentation effects and background images
on gesture selection. This Section links the main results and discusses their implications.
Graphical Guidance can Effectively Influence Gesture Selection
Both background images and presentation effects influenced gesture selection. We found
that users selected more cells than in the baseline user study and gesture sets were overall
more diverse. This indicates that simple graphical modifications can effectively influence
gesture selection. In contrast to traditional measures like password policies and strength me-
ters, the presented cues affected gesture selection more implicitly. Even though we do not
claim that the presented concepts are more effective than traditional measures, it is impor-
tant to understand that such small changes of the user interface can have significant effects.
In terms of effectiveness, we conclude that presentation effects are better suited than back-
ground images. Firstly, users were less distracted as the effects disappeared before the input
took place. Secondly, presentation effects had a significant impact on the starting position.
Overall, we conclude that well designed guiding elements have the potential to change se-
lection behavior. In this connection, well designed guidance is not intrusive but eye-catching
and communicates a simple message (i.e., “use this cell”).
Gesture Selection is Affected in Various Ways - Knowingly and Unknowingly
The user feedback indicated that background images and presentation effects can affect ges-
ture selection in various ways. The inductive coding of the statements revealed positive and
negative effects. While some effects were intended (e.g., selecting the target cell first), other
effects were not considered at first. For example, participants recognized the cues, recon-
sidered their selection and deliberately selected cells on the opposite side of the target cell.
Other participants accepted the recommendation without reconsideration, partly believing
they were forced to select the target. On the other hand, the feedback indicated that implicit
guidance can generally simplify gesture selection as some users stated that the cue gave
them a general idea of what gesture to take. Finally, we assume that some participants who
claimed that they did not perceive any effects were subconsciously influenced. We conclude
that presentation effects and background images can have a broader range of efficacy than
traditional feedback mechanisms (e.g., strength indicators). However, this also holds true for
negative effects as some users rated the concepts to be distracting and confusing.
Habits are Hard to Break and Popular Shapes are Hard to Prevent
Overall, the analysis indicated that selection habits can indeed be changed with background
images and presentation effects. Most notably, the presentation effects were shown to mod-
ify starting positions of gestures. However, we found that such effects are more likely if
cells are more in line with common starting positions and the directions of reading. And as a
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consequence, nudging effects became weaker when targets were uncommon. Moreover, par-
ticipants still favored common shapes even if they were nudged to using uncommon starting
position. For example, the -gesture was among the most popular groups when cell “nine”
was targeted.
One reason for this might be that many users actually used grid-based gestures on a daily
basis and therefore were already heavily biased towards specific selection strategies. We
assume that unconstrained guidance is not suited to entirely change existing habits. We thus
conclude that suitable concepts should not try to change existing behavior completely, but
can find useful opportunities in aiming at slight changes within these general habits.
Some Users are Resistant to Presentation Effects and Background Images
A large portion of the participants assigned to the background study and about 35% of the
participants assigned to the presentation effect study stated to not have noticed the effects.
Furthermore, only a minority of the participants agreed that effects did actually influence
their gesture choice. However, the results showed that users in both studies selected a more
diverse set of longer gestures. This indicates that several participants have unconsciously
changed their selection strategies. Nevertheless, we expect that such concepts affect only
a subset of users. We assume that the characteristics of both the used background image
and the used animations significantly influence its perceptibility. In addition, the response
to different presentation types might vary between users. We therefore conclude that the
interplay between specific features of the visualization and the impact on particular user
groups needs further investigation.
Evaluation Strategies Matter and Lab Studies seem Inappropriate
During the development process, we evaluated the background schemes and three other de-
signs in a lab-based user study. The outcome was very promising as all concepts had a
significant impact on the chosen starting points. In addition, this impact was confirmed
by the participants’ qualitative feedback. In contrast to such promising results, the online
studies indicated only minor effects, especially when background images were applied. In-
terestingly, previous evaluations [83,251] which also indicated significant behavior changes
were also performed in the lab. Even though this previous work considered different au-
thentication schemes which might lead to different results, we argue that one reason for the
strong effects might be the evaluation strategy. Since our lab study was designed following
a repeated-measures design, participants were exposed to different designs and adapted their
behavior accordingly. In the online study, each participant was exposed to only one condi-
tion. Our results indicate that the study type has a significant impact on the outcome and
repeated-measures lab studies are not feasible to gather valuable insights concerning behav-
ior changes. We argue that in such cases, data needs to be collected outside of the lab and
participants should be assigned to only one condition.
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4.4.7 Limitations
Considering the evaluation strategies, not all confounding factors could be ruled out. The
baseline dataset was collected via Amazon Mechanical Turk, mostly completed by US citi-
zens. In contrast, the background image study and the presentation effects study were both
conducted in Europe. This could have had an impact on specific aspects of the gesture se-
lection. In addition, the system setup was slightly different as gestures were entered using
a mouse and a desktop computer. Finally, it might be possible that some of the observed
differences resulted from testing different groups and not from applying different effects.
However, since we invited a large number of participants and all participants received the
same instructions, we believe that the data is comparable across different studies. This as-
sumption is supported by the fact that important selection strategies could be observed across
the different user studies. Finally, it is important to note that participants of all groups were
younger and higher educated than the general population. Therefore, the results might not
be representative of other age groups, cultures and contexts.
Even though the used background images and animation effects were selected based a thor-
ough design process including preliminary evaluations, it is possible that other visualizations
trigger different user behavior and might actually have stronger effects. Nevertheless, the
presented concepts contribute to the understanding of such systems and illustrate how visual
cues can be utilized in a way that influences password selection behavior.
4.4.8 Summary
In this Section, we presented several concepts which utilized output guiding elements to
implicitly influence gesture selection. The design and evaluation process was based on low-
fidelity mock-ups and high-fidelity prototypes and comprised both lab studies and online
studies. In summary, this Section contributed by (1) presenting and investigating two con-
cepts which utilized background images and foreground animation effects. The results indi-
cated that both concepts are feasible (2) even though users’ habits were hard to change. In
addition, we discussed general insights (3) into selection behavior, gesture similarity and the
evaluation process. Finally, we confirmed the utility (4) of the similarity metric which was
proposed in Section 3.5.
Concerning our research questions, we conclude that background images can serve as static
guidance and indeed increase gesture diversity. However, common selection behavior like
preferences for specific starting positions are hardly influenced (RQ1). For this purpose, dy-
namic animations seem overall better suited (RQ2). The results indicated that presentation
effects are overall more effective and less distracting. Therefore, we would generally recom-
mend this type of effect. However, background images might be an option when dynamic
animations are not feasible (e.g., due to hardware limitations). Both concepts were well ac-
cepted (RQ3) and users reported mostly positive effects. For example, the visual cues made
them reconsider the gesture selection or inspired them to use a different shape. However,
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especially background images were also rated confusing and sometimes triggered negative
feelings. Finally, we found that not all composition features can be addressed equally well
(RQ4). While gesture complexity was increased and starting positions could be slightly
changed, most participants still used a limited set of common shapes.
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4.5 Result Aggregation
We presented various research projects which investigated how mobile authentication meth-
ods can be designed in a way that improves both usability and security. Motivated by the
findings presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, we addressed three major problems of current
gesture-based authentication: Smudge attacks, observation attacks and guessability. Overall,
ten concepts were evaluated in detail using low-fidelity prototypes and high-fidelity proto-
types. Each candidate concept was iteratively improved and tested in lab or field studies.
Based on the findings presented in Chapter 3, all concepts aimed at providing the same
usability as current solutions while improving practical security. Overall, the presented con-
cepts showed low error rates and supported very efficient interaction styles. For example,
we learned that efficient input can even be supported by randomized spatial arrangements
(Section 4.2), even though the temporal arrangement plays a significant role for perception.
In addition, we learned how the directness and relation of gestures can be configured to de-
sign observation-resistant authentication mechanisms which can provide security on demand
(Section 4.3). SwiPIN showed that target-orientation can be useful to prevent undesired user
behavior while XSide illustrated that self-contained gestures enable eyes-free interaction.
Output elements were especially utilized to guide gesture input. SwiPIN and Connect Four
used such elements to prevent observation attacks and smudge attacks. Section 4.4 illustrated
that background images and presentation effects can be used to guide gesture selection. At
the same time, XSide illustrated that output elements are optional and gesture-based authen-
tication can completely forgo feedback and guidance. Even though Chapter 3 indicated that
memorability is a minor problem in the mobile context, we identified various influencing
factors. For example, the design of Marbles and Marbles Story illustrated how memora-
bility is affected by the used representation of input elements. In addition, we learned how
observation-resistant concepts can be designed in a way that supports motor memory effects.
Finally, the projects revealed that gesture-based interaction and graphical interface design
can help to improve established mechanisms. For example, we learned how gestures can
help to protect PIN-entry from observation attacks and how graphical design can help to
increase the practical password space of Android unlock gestures. On the other hand, we
showed how the design space can be exploited to design completely novel authentication
concepts which solve the same problems. For example, the evaluation of Marbles indicated
that secrets are less predictable when input elements are randomized and selection is based
on multiple temporal challenges.
In summary, we conclude that all factors of the design space play a significant role for the
design of usable and secure authentication mechanisms. Even though the aspects are inter-
connected in various ways and slightly different design decisions may lead to completely
different outcome, the results indicate main dependencies. The next Chapter will structure
the findings of both the design space and the problem space and derive recommendations for
action. In addition, we will provide valuable insights into the evaluation of mobile authenti-
cation concepts.
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Chapter5
Implications of the
Interconnection of Design Space
and Problem Space
The whole is greater than the sum of its parts.
– Aristotle, philosopher (384 BC - 322 BC) –
Chapter 3 provided valuable insights into the current state of mobile authentication. In ad-
dition, Chapter 4 illustrated how graphical gesture-based authentication can help to prevent
smudge attacks, observation attacks and guessing attacks. In this Chapter, we combine the
insights of both basic research and design-oriented research and illustrate the interconnection
of design space and problem space.
Firstly, Section 5.1 revisits the problem space and presents ten design objectives for us-
able and secure authentication on mobile devices. Secondly, Section 5.2 provides assistance
for a goal-oriented design and development process. We outline the impact of single de-
sign factors and illustrate how design decisions can affect the performance of the resulting
authentication mechanism. In addition, we provide recommendations for a systematic de-
velopment process and discuss how the gained knowledge facilitates future developments.
Finally, Section 5.3 addresses important aspects of the evaluation of mobile authentication
mechanisms.
5.1 Requirements and Design Objectives for Mobile Au-
thentication
In the first part of this Section, we revisit the problem space and discuss the main factors in
the light of the results of this thesis. In the second part, we present concrete design objec-
tives for feasible gesture-based authentication on mobile devices. While this Section already
mentions some influencing design factors and names recommended evaluation strategies,
Section 5.2 and Section 5.3 provide detailed recommendations for the design and the evalu-
ation of mobile authentication mechanisms.
5.1.1 Revisiting the Problem Space
Section 3.1.1 provided a definition of the problem space of graphical gesture-based authenti-
cation on mobile devices. This Section revisits the main factors and discusses new insights.
For the sake of brevity, security aspects will be combined to password exposure and pass-
word space. Accessibility and divulgation resistance will not be addressed as both factors
were out of scope of this work and were therefore not systematically evaluated.
Effectiveness
Effectiveness is the most important usability factor. If users are not able to authenticate, the
concept is not feasible. The results confirmed that the quantitative assessment of error rates
is a useful approach to assess effectiveness. However, we also found that the analysis should
not be limited to counting errors as the results indicated that the type of error recovery might
have a bigger impact on the perceived effectiveness of a system than the number of errors.
We found that critical errors or memorability-related errors are rather seldom in the mobile
context and most errors are based on slips. Since such slips frequently occur, recovery from
errors is more important than error prevention. This was confirmed by the fact that users
often deliberately failed in order to start over quickly. In addition, we found that error rates
are artificially increased by study procedures which request the use of unfamiliar secrets
or introduce error types which are not even possible in the wild. Overall, this renders the
sources of errors more important than the number of errors and indicates that effectiveness
needs to be assessed quantitatively and qualitatively. Section 3.3 presented a taxonomy for
gesture-based input errors which can help to gather detailed insights into the effectiveness
of a given (gesture-based) concept and indicates potential usability problems.
Efficiency
Efficiency was confirmed as a crucial usability factor as we found that poor efficiency makes
authentication concepts unfeasible for the mobile context. In this regard, various lab and
field studies indicated an acceptable upper bound of roughly four seconds for the whole
authentication process (orientation and input time). Even more important, we found that
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user’s perceived efficiency often differs from measured efficiency values. For example, we
found that Marbles was perceived faster than Four Connect even though it was measurably
slower. A detailed analysis of the different stages of the authentication process indicated that
the perceived efficiency is mainly determined by the relation between preparation effort and
input effort. In particular, we found that high orientation times are more annoying than high
input times. This indicates that the design of short preparation tasks is most important when
optimizing efficiency. Overall, the results confirmed the importance of assessing all steps of
the authentication process quantitatively and qualitatively. In addition, the performed field
studies confirmed that efficiency strongly depends on the context. Therefore, it is important
to assess the real-world efficiency of a system outside of the lab.
Perception
User perception has been shown to be a main factor for the acceptance of a concept. The ob-
served differences in quantitative performance measures and qualitative user ratings indicate
that measured performance is not always a good predictor for perceived performance. In
addition, we found that the perception of contextual factors (e.g., risk level) plays an impor-
tant role for user acceptance. Besides satisfaction, likeability was confirmed as an important
factor. In this regard, the results indicated that improved user experience (e.g., better visual
design) can directly increase performance ratings and showed that even early prototypes
should provide a nice look and feel. We conclude that the detailed analysis of satisfaction
and likeability are not a bonus to quantitative assessment but an equally important measure.
Memorability
Even though memorability was not systematically investigated, recall tests and qualitative
error analyses indicated that memorability is less a problem in the mobile context. Due to
the high frequency of use, unlock secrets are learned quickly, are continuously refreshed and
are therefore seldom forgotten. However, we found that memorability is not only influenced
by the type of secret but also by the type of interaction. For example, the analysis of ran-
domized authentication concepts revealed that the same secret becomes harder to remember
when the complexity of interaction is increased. On the one hand, this confirms that visual
memory and motor memory are indeed important factors for the memorization of gestures.
On the other hand, we learned that concrete representations of input elements can improve
memorability by supporting story-based memorization when motor memory effects are not
supported. We conclude that memorability is not a big problem as long as secrets can be
created with a limited number of memorable chunks. Nevertheless, there is always room for
improvement and memorability cannot be neglected.
Password Exposure
Password exposure was analyzed in terms of smudge attacks and observation attacks. The
results confirmed the vulnerability of currently used authentication mechanisms. However,
we found that such risks are rarely perceived as critical. As a consequence, most users are
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not willing to invest additional effort to be protected from password exposure. This implies
that feasible concepts must remain very efficient and security must be provided by design.
The systematic analysis of observation attacks revealed that observation resistance is influ-
enced by a variety of factors including efficiency, interaction style and gesture composition.
In contrast, smudge resistance is mainly influenced by the arrangement of input elements.
Overall, we conclude that observation resistance and smudge resistance are important re-
quirements for secure mobile authentication and gesture-based interaction design has great
potential to improve the security of current systems. However, practical security should only
be improved within the ranges of acceptable usability. As a consequence, designers should
prioritize usability and rather focus on slight improvements instead of developing secure
solutions which are not applicable to the real world.
Password Space
The systematic analysis of user-selected gestures provided important insights into the prac-
tical password space. We found that the relation of guessing resistance and input effort is
a critical factor. Concepts which allow users to choose from a wide range of input com-
plexity levels (e.g., Android unlock patterns) usually lead to a predictable selection of such
secrets which are particularly easy to enter. Concerning the assessment of gesture strength,
similarity was found as an important measure. While traditional composition aspects like
length are indeed important, we illustrated that such metrics cannot directly be transferred
from alphanumeric passwords to patterns. For example, it was shown that secret length has
limited explanatory power in combination with grid-based gestures. The analysis of various
concepts indicated that randomization can be applied in several ways to improve guessing
resistance. We conclude that authentication mechanisms need to be designed in a way that
increases the diversity of selected secrets. In addition to the optimization of the strength and
the diversity of used secrets, aspects like an adequate theoretical key space and support of
encrypted storage should be prerequisites.
5.1.2 Ten Concrete Recommendations for Future Designs
Each presented project provided valuable insights into the risks and potentials of gesture-
based authentication on mobile devices. This Section summarizes the most important de-
sign objectives and gives concrete recommendations for the design of feasible authentication
mechanisms. While some of the recommendations are consistent with general requirements
of user interfaces [228], other recommendations are more specific to mobile authentication.
1. Maximize Security without Sacrificing Usability
Guessing resistance, smudge resistance and observation resistance are all valid and impor-
tant security goals for knowledge-based authentication mechanisms. However, Chapter 2
and the analyses of this thesis illustrate that increased security often comes with reduced us-
ability. Even though we learned that security can be improved in many ways, we claim that
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improved security is not a selling point and usability must not be sacrificed for security. In
this regard, it is important to keep in mind that the mobile context makes greater demands on
usability than other environments. First of all, the high frequency of authentication renders
efficiency very important. In addition, since mobile device interaction is often a secondary
task, the authentication should be exceptionally easy to perform. As a consequence, design-
ers of mobile authentication methods must prioritize fast input, very short orientation times
and quick error recovery. We conclude that concepts which are more secure but not usable
(enough) cannot increase real-world security as there is no chance for wide user acceptance
in the field even though such concepts might be rated acceptable in the lab.
2. Tailor the Interaction to the Mobile Context
As already mentioned, mobile authentication does not take place in the vacuum. Rather the
context is a very important influencing factor for the design of mobile authentication mech-
anisms. Mobile devices are often used while the user focuses on a different main task (e.g.,
walking). Therefore, designers are required to reduce the visual, mental and physical load to
a minimum. The results of this thesis showed that gestures are well suited to achieve these
goals. XSide illustrated how gestures can help to minimize the load on the visual channel.
As the system was designed for eyes-free interaction, users could even authenticate without
looking at the device at all. Furthermore, we found that feasible solutions need to support
one-handed interaction and authentication should be optimized for portrait orientation. For
example, the evaluation of the Pattern Rotation schemes showed that users generally dislike
physical rotation tasks. Finally, as users might not focus on the authentication, the mental
effort must be kept very low. Gestures can support this goal by exploiting motor memory
effects which reduce the cognitive requirements. We claim that all these factors are specifi-
cally important in the mobile context and might have different value in other scenarios (e.g.,
ATMs). It is important to note that this aspect renders field evaluations very important since
the designed concepts need to be tested in the actual mobile context. We claim that lab stud-
ies have often limited explanatory power since authentication is usually presented as a main
task and important influencing factors are not considered (e.g., physical movement).
3. Exploit the Advantages of Touch-based Mobile Devices
As stated above, the mobile context makes great demands on the usability of authentication
systems. At the same time, mobile devices have specific characteristics which should be
considered and exploited to improve security and user experience. The concepts proposed
in this thesis were based on the assumption that mobile devices are (1) touch-based and (2)
hand-held. The results showed that gestures are well suited for such devices. In addition, in-
teractive touch screens enable different interaction styles and simplify the use of randomized
spatial layouts or dynamic output. Such features enable developers to design authentication
concepts which dynamically guide user input and adapt to the current situation. For exam-
ple, SwiPIN illustrated that traditional concepts like PIN-entry can significantly benefit from
touch-based interaction and dynamic guidance. In addition, hand-held devices enable the
use of physical features like tilt and rotation. Designers should consider that mobile devices
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can be grasped in different ways and interaction can take place on different sides and po-
sitions. Especially XSide illustrated that such features can be exploited to increase security
and at the same time maintain usability. Finally, even if it was out of scope of this thesis,
mobile devices provide various different sensors like GPS, gyroscopes and cameras. Such
sensors can be utilized to develop novel authentication concepts which utilize such features
to analyze the user context or to support novel types of interaction.
4. Provoke Desired User Behavior by Design
Designers should not assume that users will use the system in the desired way. The results
confirmed that gesture selection is often very predictable. In addition, we found that se-
curity is often jeopardized by users’ input characteristics. Even though participants of the
SwiPIN study were informed about the importance of not performing gestures directly on
the shown digits, most users did it subconsciously. This behavior made SwiPIN vulnerable
to observation attacks. However, we also demonstrated that unwanted user behavior can
be effectively prevented by adjusting specific design factors like visual representations and
interaction styles. We conclude that user behavior needs to be assessed in every stage of
the development process to identify drawbacks in design. In this regard, designers should
not assume that users consciously act in the most secure way. In contrast, feasible systems
should provoke secure user behavior by design. This implies that the most usable way of
interaction should accord with the most secure way of interaction.
5. Consider Providing Security on Demand
Increasing the security level of authentication methods often increases the complexity of
input tasks. Even though all concepts presented in this thesis were specifically designed
to provide good usability, a drop in performance was unavoidable. This is a critical issue
as we found that mobile authentication often takes place in trusted environments where ad-
vanced security features like observation resistance might not even be necessary. As users
are usually not willing to invest unnecessary additional effort, they often abstain from using
security-optimized concepts and stick to insecure but more usable methods. We argue that
adaptive security concepts represent a trade-off between security-optimized and usability-
optimized solutions. By designing flexible authentication methods which support different
security and usability levels, we can empower users to adapt the interaction to their current
needs. Section 4.3 showed that adaptive security measures can be implemented as an add-on
to established methods (e.g., SwiPIN) or as standalone authentication systems (e.g., XSide).
We argue that such concepts increase user acceptance for two reasons: Firstly, authentication
is very efficient in most situations where additional security is not required. Secondly, we
assume that users are more willing to accept extra costs for more secure interaction when
risks are actually perceived. However, it has to be noted that user-regulated security implies
a higher vulnerability to attacks as users may not be able or willing to correctly adapt to a
given risk level. We conclude that permanent security with high usability must be the main
goal but adaptive security concepts can be a practical compromise as secure but inefficient
methods are unlikely to be used in the wild.
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6. Minimize the Number of Context-Changes and Interruptions
We repeatedly observed differences between measured and perceived performance. In-depth
analysis of the tested concepts indicated that user satisfaction was downgraded by context-
changes and interruptions. Concepts were perceived as less usable when the authentication
process included different subtasks of varying difficulty. As a concrete example, we take a
look at the results of Pattern Rotation and Marbles: While the Pattern Rotation scheme per-
formed measurably faster than Marbles, it was perceived significantly slower. An analysis
of the respective subtasks of the authentication concepts reveals one potential explanation
for the phenomenon. While the authentication process of Marbles comprises identical sub-
tasks (i.e., selecting a marble), Pattern Rotation is based on two different tasks. First, the
user has to recognize the direction of the matrix, then the input is performed. Depending
on the user’s strategy, the first task (orientation phase) either increases the mental load (i.e.,
mentally rotating the matrix) or it increases the physical load (i.e., physically rotating the de-
vice). However, both strategies differ significantly from the subsequent input task. Similar
effects have already been observed in neurobiological experiments [34, 293]. We addition-
ally showed that the negative effect is stronger when the orientation effort exceeds the input
effort (as in Pattern Rotation). At the same time, the results indicated that gestures are gen-
erally well suited to reduce the number of interruptions. Firstly, the input is often based on
continuous movements which are perceived as efficient. Secondly, gestures allow informa-
tive but non-interruptive feedback by visualizing the user input. Finally, gesture-based input
usually supports implicit abort and confirmation which reduces the number of subtasks and
allows efficient recovery from errors. We conclude that besides minimizing the number of
subtasks and interruptions, context-changes between subtasks should be avoided, meaning
that mental or physical effort should remain at a constant level.
7. Minimize the Range of Input Complexity and Memorability
The analysis of user-selected Android patterns revealed that most users opt for simple shapes
which are particularly easy to enter and presumably easier to recall than other gestures. Un-
fortunately, this makes the selection behavior very predictable and reduces the overall se-
curity of the system. User feedback revealed that gesture selection is mainly influenced by
input complexity and memorability plays a secondary role in the mobile context. This in-
dicates that whenever authentication systems provide a wide range of differently complex
secrets, users are likely to opt for the lower range of complexity. Therefore, we argue that
the range of complexity directly influences the size of the practical password space. Android
gestures are a negative example, as a large portion of the theoretical gesture space is too
complex and not suitable for daily use. We argue that mobile authentication mechanisms
should be designed in a way that all available secrets are comparable in terms of input com-
plexity and memorability. The Marbles concept illustrated that randomized spatial layouts
can effectively decouple input complexity and security. As the order of input elements was
randomized, input complexity was comparable for all possible secrets of the same length.
The analysis of Marble Gap indicated that the interplay of input effort and gesture selection
could also be utilized to systematically influence user choice. We conclude that feasible
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concepts should generally provide low input complexity and high memorability. In addi-
tion, providing a small range of complexity can be a way to increase the practical password
space. If an authentication system supports a wider range of complexity, an adequate number
of secrets should be available in the low-complexity sector.
8. Improve User Experience and User Acceptance by Aesthetic Design
It is common knowledge that people like aesthetic designs and prefer things which are vi-
sually appealing. We found that this is also true for security measures like lock screens.
For example, we found that user acceptance increased for SwiPIN after the graphical user
interface was redesigned. Although Connect Four and Pattern Rotation are based on similar
principles, Connect Four was rated more satisfying. We argue that, similarly to other appli-
cations, users prefer authentication systems which are better designed. Since likeability is a
strong influencing factor for satisfaction, even early prototypes should provide a good look
and feel. We conclude that visual design is an important aspect at every development stage.
By improving the user experience of authentication mechanisms, we can directly increase
user acceptance. Similar findings have already been reported in connection with biomet-
ric concepts [70]. We claim that authentication systems should be designed as attractive as
possible without hindering performance and that visual design should not be limited to the
functional requirements.
9. Consider Supporting Established Secrets and Familiar Concepts
The evaluation of the first Marbles scheme revealed that people are not used to memorize
secrets based on color combinations. In the second iteration, we changed the representation
of the input elements and used concrete symbols instead of abstract colors. The results con-
firmed that this modification improved the usability as it enabled users to remember their
secrets based on objects and stories. In addition, SwiPIN illustrated that established con-
cepts like PIN-entry can be improved by slight modifications of the user interface. SwiPIN
users can keep their familiar secrets which lowers the barrier to accept the new system. We
argue that usability and accessibility is generally improved by supporting established con-
cepts which users are already familiar with. However, depending on the design objective, it
may not always be possible to utilize familiar concepts. For example, the preliminary eval-
uation of XSide showed that none of the established authentication concepts was feasible to
enable back of device interaction. As a consequence, secrets had to be based on a novel
type of gestures. We conclude that designers should try to minimize the differences to estab-
lished concepts and evaluate if the design goals can be achieved by modifying established
authentication methods before developing novel ways of authentication.
10. Reduce the Number of Required Authentications
The results of our field evaluation indicated that sensitive data is seldom accessed and that
authentication often takes place in trusted environments. Even though the design of context-
based authentication mechanisms was out of scope of this thesis, we argue that the number
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of required authentications should be reduced. First of all, designers of mobile authentica-
tion mechanism should reconsider the all-or-nothing access model. We assume that app-
dependent and context-dependent models can help to reduce the authentication overhead.
In addition, behavioral authentication mechanisms can help to strengthen the user-device
binding and obtain an adequate security level without explicit authentication. We assume
that such novel concepts can increase the security and the usability of mobile authentication.
Nevertheless, there is no straightforward solution to the problem of unnecessary authentica-
tions as the context of the device is hard to define and data sensitivity is hard to measure.
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5.2 Design Assistance for Gesture-based Authentication
This Section dissects the design space and illustrates the impact of specific design decisions.
At the end of this Section, we will illustrate how the provided mapping can serve as a valu-
able resource for a goal-oriented design approach and thus help in further research projects.
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Figure 5.1: The circle chart maps the observed interconnections between design and problem
space. Influences are represented by incoming and outgoing edges. The relative impact is rep-
resented by the width of the edges and the relative size of the respective sectors.
Figure 5.1 maps all influences observed and reported in this thesis. The visualization is
based on a circular plot which was originally proposed to visualize migration flows [210].
However, similar visualizations have already been used in connection with graphical pass-
words [214]. The circle’s segments are clustered using location and color and represent
the main factors of the design and problem space. Observed influences are illustrated by
incoming and outgoing edges. In addition, the relative impact of a factor was encoded us-
ing four width-levels ranging from minor to strong. The direction of a specific influence is
encoded by the color of the influencing factor. Finally, the relative importance (i.e., many
interconnections) of a factor can be derived from the size of the segment.
The visualization is cluttered and indicates a large quantity of interconnections. This Sec-
tion will outline each segment (factor) in detail. Please note that we make no claim to
completeness. We assume that besides these observed influences, there are various other
interconnections between design and problem space which have not been evaluated. We will
first discuss the impact of individual design factors before we illustrate how the mapping can
help in designing new authentication mechanisms which meet the requirements outlined in
Section 5.1.
226
Design Assistance for Gesture-based Authentication
5.2.1 Mapping Design Factors and Design Objectives
This Section revisits the main design factors and discusses their impact on usability and
security. In addition, the respective impact will be visually highlighted using the circular
chart presented above.
Input Elements
Input elements represent active areas which can be used to enter data. We specifically fo-
cused on the representation and the reusability of such elements. Figure 5.2 indicates that
the specification of these aspects has strong effects on the problem space. In addition, we
found interaction effects as some representation styles require specific interaction methods.
Practical Space
Theoretical Space
Observation Risks
Smudge Attacks
Security
Interaction Style
Element Arrangement
Output Elements
Input Elements
Design
Effectiveness
Efficiency
Memorability
Perception
Usability
Figure 5.2: Input elements influence most considered aspects of the problem space. In addition,
the representation of input elements can have influences on the interaction style.
Representation is categorized as “none”, “abstract” and “concrete”. We found that con-
crete representations of input elements are usually easier to recall than abstract tokens. The
analysis of Marbles indicated that pure color-codes should be avoided as users are not fa-
miliar with memorizing such secrets. In contrast, concrete symbol-like representations were
easy to remember. In addition, the representation style directly influences the user experi-
ence and nice visual designs are likely to improve satisfaction and user acceptance. Finally,
input elements should be designed in a way that makes them easy to recognize and easy to
distinguish to increase effectiveness.
The representation of input elements directly influences practical security. Firstly, it may
influence the size of the practical password space as users may prefer specific representa-
tions over others. For example, Section 4 indicated that positive emojis are more likely to
be selected than negative ones. Secondly, the representation of input elements influences
observation resistance. To increase observation resistance, it is beneficial to design input
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elements in a way that makes them hard to track from a distance. The evaluation of XSide
illustrated that giving up visual representations can significantly increase observation resis-
tance. However, this design decision interferes with interaction style as target-oriented input
becomes very hard without visual input elements.
We conclude that the main trade-off is found between memorability, user experience and
observability. Abstract representations may lead to an acceptable compromise between the
concrete representations (very usable) and no representation (hard to observe).
Reusability describes how often input elements can be activated (used). It is specified as
“limited” and “unlimited”. Limiting the reusability of input elements can increase effective-
ness. For example, Section 3.3 revealed that enabling unlimited reusability of Android grid
cells introduced novel types of errors and lowered the success rate. Therefore, limiting the
reusability may be beneficial whenever input elements are positioned close to each other and
users are likely to activate input elements accidentally. On the other hand, unlimited use of
the same input element may increase input speed as using the same element multiple times
enables faster input than using different elements. This is especially true when distances
between different input elements are larger. However, since this factor was not assessed in
our studies, it is not included in Figure 5.2.
Furthermore, reusability represents an important security factor. First of all, the reusability
of input elements influences the upper bound for the theoretical password space. If the
reusability of input elements is limited, designers need to provide a larger number of input
elements to achieve high theoretical security. In addition, the evaluation of Marbles Gap
indicated that reusability can be utilized to influence the size of the practical password space.
Limiting the number of inputs for a single element can nudge users to use different elements
and can diversify password selection. Finally, Section 4.2 indicated that the reusability of
input elements affects the vulnerability to smudge attacks. The order and type of input
elements is easier to deduce when input is limited to one (e.g., Android unlock gestures).
We conclude that, related to reusability, there is an inherent trade-off between effectiveness
and password space. However, no clear recommendations can be given as the effects of
reusability strongly depend on the specification of other design factors.
Output Elements
Output elements represent all visual elements which are not interactive. We distinguished
between guidance and feedback elements. Figure 5.3 indicates strong influences on pass-
word space, observation resistance and effectiveness.
Guidance is optional. If guiding elements are present, they are distinguished into static
and dynamic approaches. Similar to visual input elements the visual appearance of guiding
elements has strong influences on user perception. Especially static guidance is often used
to support the recall of secrets. Such cues may give hints which help users to remember their
gestures. Efficiency and effectiveness is directly affected whenever guidance is required to
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Figure 5.3: While output elements have a strong impact on the problem space, other design
factors are rather independent.
successfully authenticate. We presented several approaches which strongly relied on guiding
elements. Pattern Rotation used static guidance to indicate the direction of the grid, SwiPIN
used dynamic guidance to communicate the gesture mapping. In such cases, where user
interaction depends on guidance, the output elements must be designed in a way that makes
the guiding cues quick and easy to understand. Finally, dynamic guidance tends to slow
down the authentication process whenever users have to react to such cues in real time.
Nevertheless, we illustrated that suitably designed guidance allows for effective use of ran-
domized authentication mechanisms. Therefore, guidance is especially useful to develop
systems which provide increased protection from smudge attacks and observation attacks.
In addition, we showed that selection behavior can be effectively influenced by guiding el-
ements. For example, Section 4.4 indicated that guiding output elements can nudge users
towards the selection of specific grid cells.
We conclude that suitably designed user interfaces are usually not in need of guiding ele-
ments. However, guidance can be utilized in various ways to increase practical security.
Feedback is optional. If feedback is provided it can be based on aggregated or detailed
information. It is common knowledge of user interface design that comprehensible feed-
back increases efficiency and effectiveness [228]. However, the analysis of current mobile
authentication methods revealed specific aspects of feedback on errors. We found that failed
gesture input is usually communicated via detailed feedback. This feedback is often given
by visualizing the entered path of a gesture. As a consequence, users can easily understand
which aspect of the gesture was wrong. In addition, errors are detected earlier when feedback
is provided. Therefore, visualizing the entered path makes error recovery very efficient, an
aspect which is very important in the mobile context. In addition, we assume that providing
detailed feedback during input can increase memorability as it supports a visual coding of
the secret. Finally, feedback communicates interactivity and can improve user experience.
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On the other hand, we found that feedback is an important design factor in terms of security.
First of all, it influences the observability of the system. Section 3.4 revealed that grid-based
gestures are significantly easier to observe when gesture input was visualized. In addition,
we found that detailed feedback on errors can increase observation risks. For example, An-
droid unlock patterns give detailed feedback on input errors and visualize the entered gesture
even if input visualization has been switched off. This can expose parts of the user’s gesture.
Finally, Section 2 illustrated that feedback can be applied to improve gesture selection (e.g.,
strength meters).
We conclude that detailed feedback is preferable in terms of usability but it may increase ob-
servation vulnerability. Therefore, designers should consider to provide aggregated feedback
if possible. Finally, visual feedback may be omitted when it can be substituted by functional
feedback. For example, unlock screens do not need feedback on successful unlock events as
the feedback is given implicitly by unlocking the device.
Interaction Style
Gesture-based interaction was categorized according to the relation of the gesture and the
input element and according to the directness of the interaction. Figure 5.4 indicates strong
influences on usability and practical security.
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Figure 5.4: The interaction style characterizes the type of authentication system. It influences
all factors which are directly associated with the input process.
Relation specifies if a gesture is self-contained or target-oriented. First of all, the relation
of a gesture influences how gestures are retrieved from memory. Self-contained gestures
often exploit motor memory effects, while the memorization of target-oriented gestures is
often focused on the targets themselves. XSide represents an example for a self-contained
gesture concept which is mainly memorized in form of movements. On the other hand,
Marbles is a fully target-oriented concept which uses gestures solely for input, meaning that
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the gesture itself is not part of the secret. However, as illustrated by Android unlock patterns,
target-oriented concepts can also be designed in a way to support motor memory effects.
Naturally, the interaction style influences effectiveness and efficiency. For example, XSide
illustrated that self-contained gestures enabled effective and efficient eyes-free interaction.
SwiPIN showed that target-orientation can increase usability as the use of two input elements
allowed the use of a reduced and therefore simplified gesture set.
Furthermore, gesture relation can have strong effects on practical security if it is suitably
combined with other design factors. For example, SwiPIN illustrated that target-oriented
gestures can improve observation resistance as users can be forced to perform the gestures
at specific regions of the screen. On the other hand, self-contained gestures which allow
eyes-free interaction can be used to authenticate on the back-of-device and therefore in-
crease observation resistance. Finally, the relation of gestures can directly influence smudge
resistance and gesture selection depending on the design of the interaction concept itself.
We conclude that target-oriented and self-contained gestures can be used in various ways.
However, target-orientation is needed if users shall be nudged to specific regions or spe-
cific input behavior. Even though target-oriented gestures are the standard approach for
established concepts, self-contained gestures should be considered as they provide desirable
features in the mobile context.
Directness describes if gestures are performed directly on the input element (target) or
indirectly on another position. Directness is very likely to influence user perception. The
evaluation of SwiPIN indicated that indirect input should be designed in a way that clearly
separates input and output areas. If indirect input takes place near the actual target, users
may feel forced to use a specific input position. On the other hand, we observed that indirect
gesture input can positively influence effectiveness and efficiency as separating input areas
and target areas reduces occlusion and fat finger problems.
In terms of security, we found that the directness of interaction influences smudge attack
vulnerability and observability. Direct input makes smudge attacks specifically effective if
it is combined with fixed spatial arrangements. In such cases, the smudge traces on the
touchscreen tend to match the displayed input elements. In contrast, indirect interaction can
decouple activated target elements and the traces of interaction. In addition, Section 4.3
illustrated that observation resistance can be increased by indirect interaction as bystanders
need to observe two distinct areas simultaneously.
We conclude that directness is an important factor to increase the practical security level of
an authentication system. While direct interaction is the obvious choice for what probably
feels most natural for the user, the results showed that indirect interaction can also improve
usability factors and should be considered.
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Element Arrangement
Element arrangement describes how input and output elements are arranged on scree. It
is distinguished into spatial and temporal arrangement. Figure 5.5 indicates that element
arrangement relatively is the strongest of all factors (i.e., the largest segment).
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Figure 5.5: Element arrangement has a significant impact on usability and security. It is there-
fore the main factor to adjust the trade-off between both design goals.
Spatial arrangement describes how elements are positioned on the screen. We distinguish
between fixed and random arrangements. Randomization tends to increase error rates and
authentication times while fixed layouts support motor memory effects and short orienta-
tion times. Therefore, fixed layouts are preferable in terms of usability. If randomization
is applied, it should be designed in a way that allows efficient orientation and fast input.
In addition, clear guidance should be provided to allow for effective orientation and short
search times. Finally, randomization has a strong impact on user perception. We found that
randomized interfaces are particularly annoying when the orientation task makes high de-
mands in terms of mental effort or physical effort. Especially the evaluation of Marbles and
Pattern Rotation indicated that randomized spatial arrangements benefit from splitting the
orientation task into multiple sequential challenges as the randomization was well accepted
in such cases.
While randomization should be avoided in terms of usability, it can increase security in
various ways. First of all, Section 4.2 showed that a randomized spatial arrangement of
input elements can effectively fend off smudge attacks. Secondly, SwiPIN illustrated that
randomized position of output elements can be used to protect PIN-entry from observation
attacks. As the output elements were randomized but the input elements were fixed, the
system did not require extensive visual search tasks and enabled very short orientation times.
However, we also showed that observation resistance can be increased without randomizing
input or output elements. XSide provides two fixed input elements and therefore supports
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fast authentication and good memorization. Finally, spatial randomization can have a strong
influence on the practical password space. On the one hand, fully randomized concepts can
partly decouple input effort and secret composition. As the positions of elements constantly
change, users have no benefit from prioritizing specific regions on the screen and may select
a more diverse set of elements. Secondly, Section 4.4 illustrated that randomized positioning
of presentation effects can effectively influence gesture selection even if authentication is
based on a fixed layout.
We conclude that fixed spatial layouts should be preferred whenever possible. When ran-
domization is applied it should be designed in a way that minimizes orientation effort. Mixed
approaches with fixed input elements and randomized output represent a trade-off in terms
of usability and security.
Temporal arrangement describes the number and order of distinct input tasks. According
to Schaub et al. [214], we distinguish between single challenges and multiple challenges.
Single challenges are usually more efficient as users can authenticate with one continuous
gesture. On the other hand, multiple challenges can be useful to split longer and more com-
plex tasks in simpler and shorter subtasks. The evaluation of Marbles showed that authen-
tication concepts which are based on multiple very easy subtasks can be very effective and
easy to use. In addition, we found that the temporal arrangement has a very strong influence
on user perception. Section 4.2 indicated that context changes between multiple challenges
should be avoided and difficulty should remain constant to increase user satisfaction. This
is especially important if multiple temporal arrangements are combined with randomized
spatial arrangements.
In terms of security, we observed strong effects on observation resistance and smudge at-
tack vulnerability. This was especially the case, when randomized spatial layouts were used.
SwiPIN exploits the fact that subtasks (i.e., entering one digit) are too short to allow ob-
servers to make sense of the presented mapping. XSide supports a very flexible input style
as some challenges can be performed on the front side and others can be performed on the
back of the device. This additionally increases observation resistance as attackers are likely
to observe only a subset of the authentication task.
We conclude that quick and easy single challenges are generally preferable. However, us-
ability can benefit by splitting complex authentication task in multiple easier subtasks. In
addition, multiple challenges can help to improve security in terms of smudge-resistance and
observation-resistance. When multiple challenges are required, it is important to avoid con-
text changes between these challenges as such changes negatively influence user perception.
Further Influencing Factors
In addition to the impact of the design factors, we observed various interaction effects be-
tween factors of the problem space. Knowing of such interaction effects is crucial to be able
to set the right design goals. Figure 5.6 indicates that usability has strong effects on security.
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Figure 5.6: In addition to the actual design factors, efficiency, effectiveness and memorability
have strong influences on the practical security of authentication systems.
Usability factors have a strong influence on security. This again confirms that there is no
clear trade-off between usability and security but usability is a precondition for security.
As already discussed in Section 2, memorability influences the practical password space as
users prefer secrets which are easy to remember. However, in the mobile context efficiency
and effectiveness are very important factors, too. The analysis of grid-based gestures indi-
cated that users select secrets which are particularly fast and easy to enter. In addition, we
found that effectiveness and efficiency can influence observation resistance. Firstly, fast user
interaction is harder to observe. Secondly, input errors increase the number of possible ob-
servations which increases the success rate of observation attacks. Finally, user perception
is strongly influenced by the efficiency and effectiveness of a system.
Security factors rarely showed interaction effects. Nevertheless, the type and structure of
theoretically available passwords naturally influences the practical password space and the
memorability of secrets.
We conclude that high performance should be prioritized in the mobile context. The theo-
retical password space should provide a large number of easy to remember and easy to enter
secrets to achieve high practical security.
5.2.2 Recommendations for a Goal-oriented Design Process
The previous Section mapped various interconnections between design and problem space.
We claim that the presented insights can serve as a tool which enables a systematic and goal-
oriented design process for novel authentication systems far beyond the specific constraints
of this thesis. While the map was created focusing on mobile devices, we argue that the
insights can be useful in various other contexts. The only precondition to use the tool is a
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clear specification of the design goals. As we illustrated, the mobile context makes great
demands on efficiency. However, other authentication scenarios may have different require-
ments. Therefore, it may be necessary to analyze the problem space of the respective use
case to identify proper design objectives. As illustrated in Figure 5.7, we outline two poten-
tial application areas for our map: Bottom-up design and top-down analysis. The bottom-up
approach starts with the definition of individual design factors while the top-down approach
starts with analyzing an existing concept. The following text gives an overview of both
approaches.
Design
Evaluation
Concept
B
ot
to
m
-U
p Top-D
ow
n
Figure 5.7: The presented insights are useful for both bottom-up design and top-down analysis.
Bottom-Up Design
The bottom-up design approach is especially useful to develop novel authentication systems
from scratch. The development process often starts with a creative exploration of different
design alternatives. As soon as the design objectives are specified, designers can system-
atically explore the design space and identify the most promising characteristics for each
design factor. The design candidates are then improved based on an iterative process includ-
ing several design and evaluation phases. We argue that a systematic design process is useful
to tailor concepts to specific requirements and helps to avoid design errors a priori.
Example: To illustrate the approach, we give a simplified example. Let us assume that
we plan to design a novel authentication mechanism for a specific application area. The
analysis of the respective problem space has revealed that observation attacks do not occur
in the considered environment. However, we found that a feasible concept must be very
usable and should support eyes-free interaction. Based on these aspects, we specify the
following desired characteristics of the design space:
Input Elements As observability is not a problem, we specify that memorability shall be
optimized by using concrete representations of input elements. To reduce input errors,
we furthermore decide that reusability of such input elements shall be limited to one.
Output Elements As dynamic guidance often requires visual focus, we decide to use static
guidance instead. In addition, detailed feedback shall be given to support efficient
error recovery.
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Interaction Style As the authentication system shall support eyes-free interaction, we opt for
self-contained gestures which shall be performed directly.
Element Arrangement To improve usability and to enable eyes-free interaction, we provide
a fixed spatial arrangement of elements. In addition, authentication shall be performed
within a single challenge to further improve efficiency.
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Figure 5.8: An exemplary illustration of a possible concept. The visual design is similar to
established grid-based approaches. However, the approach supports eyes-free interaction as
input is based on self-contained gestures.
One potential solution is illustrated in Figure 5.8. The concept is based on a visual grid which
provides nine concrete elements. Interaction is similar to established grid-based concepts but
less target-oriented. In contrast, the concept supports self-contained gestures which can be
performed anywhere on the screen. As a consequence, the visual grid serves as a static
guiding element and not as an input element. The position of the grid is derived from the
location of the first touch event. As soon as the user touches the screen, the grid is presented
with the starting cell positioned under the user’s finger (see 5.8, center). The starting position
of the gesture is stored during enrollment. Eyes-free interaction is facilitated by the fact that
user input is not required to match the position of the grid as gestures are analyzed based on
relative direction changes. However, by visually representing the grid, the system supports
dual coded learning which might improve memorability. In addition, the system can be used
in the same way as established authentication systems which may increase user acceptance.
This is just one possible design and it certainly has limitations. For example, authentication
may fail if the user starts too close to the border of the screen. In addition, the presented
concept is likely to negatively influence gesture selection. We assume that users will select
simple shapes. However, the example illustrates how the gained insights can be used to sys-
tematically develop concepts from scratch. While such a systematic approach may simplify
the ideation, it is important that candidate concepts are thoroughly evaluated in the next iter-
ations. The results of user studies will help to reconsider design decisions and are required
to further improve the concept.
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Top-Down Analysis
The top-down approach is useful to identify possible areas of improvement in a given au-
thentication concept. Therefore, the approach starts with analyzing a working authentication
mechanism. Field evaluations of existing authentication systems often indicate potential
problems. For example, we showed that established concepts are easy to observe. We argue
that in such cases, it is beneficial to dissect the respective authentication system and compare
the current state of individual design factors to their goal state. The goal state of the respec-
tive design factors can be derived from previously defined design objectives. On the other
hand, top-down analysis can serve as an analytic tool which can supplement time-consuming
and cost-intensive field studies. For example, the analysis of the individual design factors
can point out potential drawbacks before the user study takes place.
Example: The approach is again illustrated by giving a simplified example. Let us assume
that we plan to improve the standard PIN-entry. The evaluation of the problem space has
indicated that PINs are well suited for the respective use case. However, we found that eyes-
free interaction would be beneficial as it could improve usability and even security1. We
would start by analyzing the standard PIN approach and specify its design factors:
Input Elements PIN concepts use abstract input elements which allow an unlimited number
of inputs.
Output Elements Static guidance is usually given by illustrating the edges of the active input
areas. In addition, most PIN concepts provide feedback when buttons are pressed and
communicate errors in form of aggregated feedback.
Interaction Style The input is based on direct target-oriented interaction.
Element Arrangement PIN concepts present input elements in a fixed spatial arrangement.
Authentication takes place in multiple challenges, whereby each subtask is described
by entering one digit.
Figure 5.9 illustrates one possible solution. The analysis revealed that target-orientation is
the main limitation in terms of eyes-free interaction: To enter a four-digit PIN, users need
to hit four small targets. Therefore, we might come up with the idea to provide larger input
areas. To provide a familiar look-and-feel, the additional input areas have no representation.
Figure 5.9 (left) illustrates one possible layout: Outer areas are positioned directly at the
borders of the device and center areas are enlarged. We assume that both aspects facilitate
eyes-free interaction. On the one hand, hitting the larger inner buttons does not require
precise pointing. On the other hand, the border of the device serves as haptic guidance and
facilitates hitting the outer buttons. Figure 5.9 (right) illustrates a user entering a “0”.
1 Observation resistance could be increased as authentication could easily take place out of sight.
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Figure 5.9: An exemplary illustration of a possible concept. While the appearance matches the
PIN concept, eyes-free interaction was facilitated by adding a second layer of input elements.
Based on a top-down analysis, we would assume that the alternative interaction concept is
more secure against observation attacks. In addition, we would assume that it is perceived
slower than the original PIN-entry as input complexity differs between some digits (sub-
tasks). Finally, we would assume that users prefer the standard PIN pad whenever they
are able to look at the screen. As a consequence, we would recommend to support both
concepts. To avoid unwanted interference between input modes, we could provide an ex-
plicit switching mechanism. Nevertheless, it is important to note that systematic top-down
analysis cannot substitute user studies and empirical evaluation.
5.3 The Evaluation of Mobile Authentication Methods
The research projects presented in this thesis provided valuable insights into the evaluation
process of mobile authentication mechanisms. While the recommendations presented in
this Section were gathered in connection with gesture-based mobile interaction, they are not
limited to the evaluation of gesture-based approaches. In contrast, we claim that the insights
are also useful for the evaluation of authentication mechanisms in other contexts (e.g., public
displays). While Chapter 3 presented mainly descriptive and exploratory basic research,
Chapter 4 presented more explanatory research projects. This Section presents the research
methods according to their main purpose. Please note that in practice, research projects
have mixed goals and explanatory studies often comprise exploratory elements. While we
specifically focus on the evaluation of authentication mechanisms, Kjeldskov and Paay [153]
provide a general overview of HCI research practices in the mobile context.
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5.3.1 Exploratory Studies
Exploratory studies help to understand the research problem. Therefore, they are especially
important at the beginning of a project to understand the authentication context and to define
the research objectives. Over the course of this thesis, we used brainstorming sessions, focus
group discussions, low-fidelity paper prototypes and pilot studies.
Brainstorming sessions are an important part of the ideation process as they help to come
up with new ideas for both authentication concepts and evaluation strategies. However, we
found that two aspects are critical for the outcome of such sessions: Firstly, it is beneficial
to invite participants with superior knowledge of the discussed topic. Even experienced
smartphone users are usually not able to correctly assess usability and security and thus
ideas are rarely feasible. Secondly, the topic should be well defined. For example, instead of
asking for “observation resistant” concepts, it is beneficial to present additional requirements
like desired interaction methods, performance needs or context of use.
Focus group discussions are useful to evaluate already specified authentication concepts or
evaluation strategies. In contrast to brainstorming sessions, we found that it is beneficial
to invite end users to such discussions. If possible, concept ideas should already be pre-
sented in a visual way. Focus groups are a powerful tool to evaluate user perception and
user behavior at an early stage. By discussing real world problems, researchers can identify
important design factors and determine independent and dependent variables for later eval-
uations. Therefore, the most important topics at this stage include authentication behavior,
risk perception and authentication context.
Paper prototypes are useful to identify design issues and to inform later study designs. We
found that paper prototyping is very useful in connection with mobile authentication mech-
anisms. Due to the exploitative character of the concept development process, researchers
often come up with various design alternatives. A thorough paper prototyping study can help
to reject some of the concepts before they are implemented. In addition, concept design can
be improved based on user feedback. It is beneficial to build interactive paper prototypes
which allow for the simulation of enrollment tasks and authentication tasks. Data collection
should focus on qualitative feedback. However, low-fidelity prototypes can also be useful to
gather first quantitative results (e.g., password selection). Interaction should be filmed for
later analysis. When testing multiple concepts, the order should be randomized.
Pilot studies are essential to identify critical issues in the study design or with the concept
itself. When planning a lab study, the whole procedure should be tested at least once. When
planning a longitudinal field study, concepts should be tested for several days. The prelim-
inary user studies will help to identify issues before a time consuming and cost intensive
study takes place. Special attention should also be given to automatic log files which need
to be checked for completeness and correctness.
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5.3.2 Descriptive Studies
Descriptive studies are essential to understand the current state of mobile authentication.
While exploratory studies are mainly useful to understand basic usability aspects, descrip-
tive analysis can effectively inform security aspects. Data collection should include both
qualitative and quantitative data. Chapter 3 presented different types of descriptive evalua-
tion. We found that ethnographic studies and controlled field studies are especially useful
to investigate usability and user behavior while online studies are feasible to analyze basic
security aspects.
Ethnographic studies are crucial to analyze user behavior and risk perception in the wild.
Section 3.2 illustrated that the users’ mobile devices can be utilized to enable long-term field
observations. Describing and understanding real world aspects is important for the develop-
ment of adequate solutions. While quantitative data (e.g., authentication frequency) can be
automatically collected, qualitative factors are more difficult to assess. Experience sampling
was shown as one adequate way to augment quantitative data with context information. We
found that usability aspects can be directly assessed, while the description of security aspects
is often based on user reported data which needs to be handled with care. For example, Sec-
tion 3.2 revealed that observation risks are rarely reported. However, this does not directly
indicate that observation risks do not exist. Another potential way to assess user behavior in
the wild is based on field observation. For example, observation risks could be quantified by
counting observation attacks in public spaces.
Experimental studies can be useful to describe the differences between different approaches
(e.g., authentication concepts). While experimental lab studies usually have an explanatory
purpose, we found that controlled field studies are feasible to describe the status quo of cur-
rent authentication. In contrast to natural studies, controlled studies allow a more accurate
assessment of quantitative data. However, increasing internal validity tends to decrease eco-
logical validity. Therefore, the trade-off between control and natural behavior needs to be
well considered. Section 3.3 presented a controlled field study which described the differ-
ences between grid-based gestures and PIN. While the study was performed in the natural
environment, we had to control several real-world factors to allow for accurate measurement.
For example, we controlled password choice and authentication frequency. We conclude that
such field experiments provide a good trade-off between controlled lab studies and natural
field studies. However, while the study type is well suited to evaluate usability aspects, we
found that security remains hard to assess.
Online experiments are well suited for descriptive evaluations and enable large-scale stud-
ies with limited funds and within a limited amount of time. Since authentication tasks are
usually based on short interactions which are relatively easy to describe, they are often easy
to simulate in online experiments. We showed that online experiments are especially useful
to describe security aspects. For example, Section 3.4 illustrated how gesture-input can be
simulated to analyze observation risks. With the available resources, it would not have been
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possible to perform such an experiment in the real world. However, since online experi-
ments limit both internal validity and ecological validity, real-world experiments should be
preferred whenever possible.
Self-reported data is crucial to assess user perception. In addition, it is often the only way
to assess password selection in the mobile context. As mobile secrets are stored locally on
the user’s device, databases of real-world passwords are usually not available. Section 3.5
presented a large-scale analysis of user-selected gestures which had been collected online.
We found that simulating the enrollment process of current devices is a feasible approach
to collect realistic secrets. For this purpose, the interface should mimic both the interaction
and the visual appearance of the original system. Finally, when collecting such data, it is
beneficial to ask participants for the truthfulness of their provided answers. For example,
collected passwords can be excluded from analysis if participants indicate that their input
was unrealistic.
5.3.3 Explanatory Studies
Explanatory studies are usually based on the results of exploratory and descriptive evalu-
ations. Instead of describing a phenomenon, explanatory research aims at understanding
the reasons of a phenomenon. Chapter 4 presented several types of explanatory studies.
Notwithstanding the concrete study design, we found that explanatory studies benefit from
following three aspects. Firstly, data should be collected on a high detail level. For ex-
ample, user feedback should be collected using open-ended questions. If the analysis of
open-ended questions is too costly, ordinal scales should be preferred to binary scales (yes,
no). Secondly, usability and security needs to be precisely defined. Finally, it is important to
design user studies in a way that both qualitative and quantitative data can be assessed. For
example, counting authentication errors is as important as analyzing the source of errors.
Lab experiments are the most important research method to analyze the impact of different
design decisions in a controlled environment. The prototype can be realized as a standalone
application and optimized for a specific mobile device. This facilitates the development pro-
cess and increases the level of reliability. The most important aspects to consider include the
study design, the assignment of passwords and the kind of baseline condition. We found that
a repeated measures design is well suited to analyze the usability of an authentication sys-
tem and to analyze practical security aspects like observation resistance and smudge attacks.
However, Section 2.5 indicated that between-groups designs are beneficial when password
selection tasks are required and tasks are very similar. Furthermore, password assignment
can have a strong impact on measured performance. We recommend to use different secrets
of similar complexity at this stage. In later field analyses, self-selected passwords may be
allowed. Finally, it is crucial to include the right baseline condition. We used the most popu-
lar gesture-based system and calibrated secrets in a way that the theoretical password space
was comparable.
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Overall, we found that lab experiments are well suited to collect performance data. However,
researchers need to be aware of the fact that the observed performance may differ signifi-
cantly from field performance. During lab evaluations, mobile authentication represents the
primary task. In the wild, mobile authentication often represents a secondary task. In addi-
tion, novelty effects and Hawthorne effects are usually stronger during short-term lab tests
than during long-term field evaluations. We assume that performance is likely to drop in
the field. In contrast to usability, security is often well suited for lab experiments as such
experiments often simulate worst-case scenarios. As long as the worst-case scenario can be
evaluated in the lab, there is no need to perform field studies.
Field experiments are crucial to assess the real-world performance of an authentication
system and to get realistic insights into user acceptance. To achieve the highest level of
ecological validity, participants should use their own devices and the tested authentication
concept should be implemented as real lock screen. As already mentioned, field experiments
should focus on usability issues as security levels can be simulated in the lab. Participants
should use the system for at least two weeks. To get a better understanding of the context,
experience sampling methods should be applied. Finally, researchers should be aware of the
fact that novel authentication mechanisms are shown around by participants and not every
logged authentication event is valid. This makes the assessment of real-world behavior and
real-world performance a major challenge.
Self-reported data is crucial for explanatory research. It is important to understand user
perception, authentication context and usability issues. Especially the inductive coding of
open-ended questionnaires can be very useful to get deeper insights into the effects of an
authentication system. In addition, user feedback should be collected during briefing and
debriefing. Finally, short in-situ questionnaires help to get instant feedback after authentica-
tion events.
Online experiments have limited value in explanatory research and should rather be used
for descriptive studies. Section 2.5 showed that online experiments can be used to systemat-
ically compare different conditions. However, researchers need to collect a very large set of
data to show significant effects. We argue that online experiments can serve as a last resort
when other experiments are not feasible due to time constraints or money constraints.
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Chapter6
Conclusion and Future Work
Mobile use is growing faster than all of Google’s internal predictions.
– Eric Schmidt, Executive Chairman of Alphabet Inc. (2011) –
This thesis investigated the risks and potentials of graphical gesture-based authentication
mechanisms on mobile devices. We provided an in-depth overview of related work and
presented results of diverse empirical research projects. The investigation of both established
methods and novel solutions gave us a detailed understanding of the challenges and the
opportunities of gesture-based authentication on mobile devices. This Chapter summarizes
the main contributions and gives an outlook on future work.
Section 6.1 revisits the main research questions stated in Chapter 1 and summarizes the main
contributions of this thesis. Section 6.2 provides four concrete perspectives for future work
concerning authentication on mobile devices before Section 6.3 presents some final remarks.
6.1 Summary of Contributions
The thesis analyzed the risks and potentials of graphical gesture-based authentication mech-
anisms on mobile devices. We provided answers to the following main research questions:
RQ1 How do established gesture-based concepts perform in terms of usability and security
[current state]?
RQ2 What are the requirements for improved authentication on mobile devices [goal state]?
RQ3 How must graphical gesture-based concepts be designed (and evaluated) to meet the
requirements of mobile devices [process] ?
The analysis was based on fundamental field studies and applied design-oriented research
and contributed to the understanding of mobile authentication at various levels. RQ1 was
mainly addressed by analyzing the usability and the security of established mechanisms in
the field. We investigated the authentication context, the usability of PIN and gestures and
the observability and guessability of gesture-based approaches. RQ2 was approached by
both field studies and the design of novel authentication concepts. Finally, we gathered
enough insights to give concrete recommendations for the design and evaluation of feasi-
ble authentication mechanisms (RQ3). This Section summarizes the main contributions of
the thesis and illustrates their usefulness beyond the scope of gesture-based interaction and
mobile devices.
Understanding the Requirements of Mobile Authentication
Chapter 2 illustrated that despite the diverse development of novel authentication mecha-
nisms, the actual requirements for feasible authentication mechanisms had not been inves-
tigated. The lack of understanding of real-world factors often led to impractical solutions
which were indeed more secure but not usable enough. This thesis contributed by specifying
the problem space of mobile authentication mechanisms and by systematically investigating
the relevance of individual factors.
Section 3.2 shed light on risk perception and unlocking behavior in the wild. The results
showed that authentication methods compete with alternative protection strategies. Instead
of relying on authentication, many users try to keep the device physically protected. We
learned that acceptable authentication mechanisms must be very efficient and lacks of per-
formance cannot be justified by increased security levels. Section 3.3 gave empirical evi-
dence for the benefit of gesture-based interaction on mobile devices. In addition, we showed
that the mobile context renders efficient error recovery more important than error prevention.
The design of novel authentication mechanisms revealed further important requirements for
usable solutions. For example, Section 4.2 illustrated the importance of short orientation
times and showed that perceived usability is even more crucial than measured performance.
In addition, Section 4.3 illustrated the importance of usability features like eyes-free inter-
action or one-handed interaction.
244
Summary of Contributions
We further contributed to a better understanding of security factors and showed that practical
security is an often unmet requirement. Section 3.4 quantified the observation resistance of
established gesture-based passwords and showed that currently deployed concepts are very
much prone to observation attacks. Section 4.2 showed that the same is true for smudge
attacks. In addition, Section 3.5 quantified the practical password space of user-selected
gestures and indicated that established methods are vulnerable to dictionary attacks.
Finally, Section 5.1 summarized the gathered insights and presented a revised version of the
problem space. In addition, we derived concrete directions for future developments which
support the specification of appropriate design goals and support the development of feasi-
ble solutions. While we assume that the presented requirements are specific to the mobile
context, we argue that the general approach can be applied to any other authentication sce-
nario. We argue that a thorough understanding of the authentication context is a prerequisite
for any development of feasible authentication mechanism. We conclude that the presented
problem space definition can be used as an expandable basis for the investigation of the
specific requirements of other authentication scenarios.
Usable and Secure Authentication Methods
The thesis contributed by illustrating the design and evaluation of novel usable and secure
authentication methods. Overall, we presented 17 concept ideas, out of which six concepts
were fully developed and extensively tested. By reporting both good and bad design deci-
sions, we contributed to an in-depth understanding of individual design factors.
Section 4.2 illustrated how gesture-based interaction can be designed in a way that smudge
traces are hard to interpret. We presented general approaches to prevent smudge attacks
and designed practical solutions. The two most promising solutions, namely Marbles and
Connect Four, were finally implemented as lock-screen replacements and tested in the field.
The results showed that both concepts were usable and significantly more secure. Marbles
was actually less error-prone than the insecure baseline approach. In addition, we gathered
valuable insights into the feasibility of randomized spatial arrangements and their impact
on performance and perception. Section 4.3 illustrated the development of two observation-
resistant authentication mechanisms which are fast and easy to use on mobile devices. We
presented XSide, a gesture-based system which enables back-of-device authentication and
SwiPIN, an observation-resistant input mechanism for PINs. Both systems were designed
in a way that enables the user to adjust the usability-security trade-off to the current situ-
ation. Both concepts were significantly more secure but yet usable. SwiPIN was actually
selected as one of “12 Fascinating Projects From the Bleeding Edge of Interaction Design”1.
In addition, both projects contributed to a general understanding of various design factors.
For example, we learned about the feasibility of direct and indirect input and illustrated the
benefits of spatially separating input and output elements. Finally, Section 4.4 presented two
concepts which aimed at diversifying user-selected gestures. The projects showed that back-
1 http://gizmodo.com/12-fascinating-projects-from-the-bleeding-edge-of-inter-
1700656949 – accessed: 2016/08/08.
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ground images and presentation effects can have a significant impact on gesture selection.
The application of the proposed similarity metric (Section 3.5) indicated that both concepts
lead to a more diverse set of gestures. In addition, presentation effects were shown to effec-
tively influence starting cells. Nevertheless, the results also showed that habits are hard to
break and many gestures remain predictable.
While the authentication mechanisms were specifically tailored to mobile devices, they can
be easily adapted to other authentication scenarios. However, most of the authentication
mechanisms require a touchscreen. We argue that public terminals are one possible area
of application. For example, SwiPIN could be used on touch-based ATMs to make PIN-
entry more resistant to observation attacks. In addition, XSide can be useful in any context
where eyes-free interaction is important and Marbles could be useful for digitally secured
door openers where smudge attacks might be a critical threat. We argue that the flexibility
of use is specifically supported by the fact that all concepts allow encrypted string-based
storage of secrets. As a consequence, the concepts fit into most backend infrastructures
without modification. Finally, we argue that many aspects of the proposed concepts can
be transferred to authentication scenarios where user interaction is usually not touch-based.
For example, the SwiPIN concept could be implemented for public displays using handheld
pointing devices or freehand gestures.
Assistance for the Design and Evaluation of Mobile Authentication Mechanisms
In addition to the tangible results concerning the usability and security of current methods
and novel solutions, the thesis provided more general insights into the design and evaluation
of mobile authentication mechanisms. As a consequence, the outcome of this thesis can sup-
port the design and evaluation process on different levels. Firstly, we pointed out specific but
important aspects of the design and the evaluation procedure (e.g., measurement). Secondly,
we provided feasible models and metrics which support the assessment of gesture-based au-
thentication concepts. Finally, we presented a general approach to investigate authentication
concepts and authentication scenarios in a structured way.
All presented projects contributed general insights into specific aspects of the design and
evaluation procedure of mobile authentication methods. For example, Section 4.2 illustrated
the importance of correct time measurement and Section 3.2 revealed that unobtrusive expe-
rience sampling is a powerful tool to gather insights into the authentication context. Overall,
we showed the importance of longitudinal field studies and evaluations outside of the lab. In
this regard, Section 4.4 particularly indicated that repeated-measure designs are not suited
to assess password selection strategies. In addition, Chapter 4 illustrated the benefits of
an iterative user-centered design approach which utilizes both low-fidelity and high-fidelity
prototypes. While the individual findings were discussed within the respective sections,
Section 5.3 summarized the most important aspects and discussed different study designs.
In addition to the presentation of best practices, we provided concrete tools for the assess-
ment of gesture-based authentication mechanisms. Section 3.3 presented a novel taxonomy
for gesture-based input errors. The taxonomy enables the systematic qualitative analysis of
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logged input errors and revealed that most failures resulted from inaccuracy and not from
memorability issues. Section 3.4 provided a prediction model for the observability of grid-
based gestures. The model assesses the vulnerability of a given gesture and can be utilized
to measure the strength of a gesture concerning observation attacks. Section 3.5 proposed
a novel similarity metric which can be used to assess the practical password space of grid-
based gestures. Section 4.4 illustrated how the metric can be applied to evaluate the effects
of novel security measures. Finally, Section 5.2 provided a more general tool for the de-
velopment of authentication systems. Even though we make no claim to completeness, we
argue that, once the design goals of a project are set, the provided map of interrelations can
serve as a valuable resource for the design process. In this regard, we provided two illustra-
tive examples to show how researchers and developers can utilize the findings for both the
development of novel solutions and the troubleshooting of existing methods.
While the proposed metrics are more specific to the context of gesture-based authentication,
we assume that the observed interconnections of design and problem space are applicable
to other authentication scenarios. However, depending on the considered authentication
approach and context, the presented model needs to be modified and extended. For instance,
the use of hardware keyboards would hamper the applicability of randomly positioned input
elements. Nevertheless, we argue that the presented approach can be used as reference
framework for other research approaches. Beyond that, we argue that the thesis illustrated a
useful problem-solving approach (in terms of design and problem space analysis) which can
be adapted to other applied research projects.
6.2 Directions for Future Work
Although the presented research contributed valuable insights into risks and potentials of
authentication on mobile devices, it raised new questions and opened opportunities for future
research. While each project raised specific issues which are worth investigating, this Section
provides a broader perspective of future research directions concerning mobile devices.
Understand Real-World Security Aspects
This thesis illustrated that field studies and controlled experiments are well suited to assess
the real-world usability of authentication mechanisms. However, it also illustrated that real-
world security is significantly harder to assess. The performed research represents a first
step towards quantifying real-world risks and towards understanding security in the wild.
However, the presented results had to be based on self-reported data and simulated attacks.
We assume that such data can only provide approximations to real world factors. Therefore,
we claim that password selection and often discussed practical risks need to be evaluated
based on real-world data.
Firstly, we argue that the practical password space of established mechanisms and novel sys-
tems should be assessed based on real user-selected secrets. However, since such secrets are
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usually stored on the device, collecting real-world data represents a major challenge in the
mobile context. In addition, researchers should strive for analyzing real-world enrolments,
which are embedded in productively used systems, to evaluate password selection strategies.
Secondly, we argue that the actual threat of observation attacks and smudge attacks needs to
be investigated in the wild. So far, the development of more secure interaction methods has
to be justified by the theoretical existence of such risks. However, the number and nature of
such attacks is largely unknown. Quantifying the real-world risk would allow to reconsider
the requirements of mobile authentication mechanisms.
In summary, we argue that the thorough understanding of real-world threats represents a
major challenge of future work. However, gaining this knowledge would allow to develop
security mechanisms which are even more tailored to the mobile context and further motivate
the investigation of security-optimized concepts.
Enable Context-based Security Mechanisms
Especially Section 3.2 indicated that mobile authentication mechanisms could benefit from
context-based access models. We showed that sensitive data is seldom accessed and unlocks
often take place in trusted environments. We claim that in such cases, mobile authentication
is dispensable and recognizing such dispensable authentication events would help to increase
both usability and security. On the one hand, reducing the number of authentications would
reduce unnecessary authentication effort. On the other hand, reducing the number of authen-
tications would reduce the potential for observation attacks and smudge attacks. We argue
that future research should especially investigate data-dependent, behavioral and environ-
mental cues to provide context-based security mechanisms for the mobile context.
Alternative authentication concepts (e.g., [234]) and implicit authentication (e.g., [137]) have
been discussed for several years. However, we argue that the functionality of up-to-date de-
vices and the sensor-rich environments of the Internet of Things (IoT) [110] can finally
enable reliable and practical solutions. It has already been shown that most users desire a
more flexible control model than all-or-nothing access [124]. Therefore, we argue that the
feasibility of data-driven access models should be further explored. One major challenge is
the assessment of data sensitivity. User-based assessment is likely to generate a high config-
uration overhead, automatic assessment is likely to be error-prone. In addition, we assume
that the actual sensitivity of the content is depending on the current context. Therefore, we
argue that flexible access models need to be combined with other context-based security
mechanisms. While such context-based authentication methods [121,206,220] have already
been discussed, we argue that the progress of smart environments [110] will open up new
possibilities. We claim that future work should consider utilizing information of smart in-
terconnected devices like fridges, vacuum cleaners or light bulbs to effectively enrich the
context of the user. Finally, future research should further strive to exploit the sensors of the
mobile device itself and investigate the feasibility of behavioral cues (e.g., [69, 137, 199]) to
improve usability and security.
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In summary, we argue that a reliable and detailed understanding of the context of mobile
devices remains a major challenge. However, the development of novel sensor-rich environ-
ments and feature-rich devices opens new opportunities for future research.
Analyze the Interplay between Biometrics and Knowledge-based Solutions
Although we argue that biometric authentication is hardly feasible without knowledge-based
fallback mechanisms (see Section 1.1), we assume that biometric solutions will become more
popular within the next years. While the reasonable use of biometrics can indeed increase
usability and security of mobile devices, it will certainly affect the use and perception of
knowledge-based solutions. We assume that the increasing popularity of biometrics will
push knowledge-based authentication into the background. On the one hand, knowledge-
based authentication will be used less frequently. On the other hand, knowledge-based sys-
tems will no longer be perceived as primary authentication mechanisms but rather serve as
secondary fallback mechanisms. This paradigm shift is likely to change the requirements of
knowledge-based concepts and poses new challenges for future research.
While the primary use of biometric solutions would theoretically enable the usage of stronger
fallback mechanisms without significant decreases in usability, Cherapau et al. [50] showed
that most users continue using four-digit PINs. We argue that PINs and gestures might even
become less secure when used in the context of fallback mechanisms. First of all, such
secrets are used less frequently than in the context of primary authentication. Secondly,
users may perceive such secrets as less important as they “only” serve as fallback solution.
We assume that both aspects are likely to influence password choice and password storage
habits. As a consequence, we claim that the interplay between biometrics and knowledge-
based solutions needs further investigation. On the one hand, future research should assess
the suitability of established concepts. On the other hand, the new demands of such fallback
mechanisms might require the development of novel authentication concepts.
In summary, we argue that the increasing popularity of biometric solutions is likely to affect
the use and the requirements for knowledge-based solutions. We claim that future research
should strive at understanding the interplay of both authentication approaches and consider
developing novel solutions which are particularly tailored to the context of fallback authen-
tication. However, we argue that this type of fallback mechanisms significantly differs from
traditional fallback solutions which are very rarely needed [114].
Investigate the Strengths and Weaknesses of Novel Types of Mobile Devices
The smartphone is the most prominent representative of mobile devices and wearable devices
like smartwatches have just started to become popular2. We assume that the number of
mobile devices will further grow and other device classes will become available over the
next years. We argue that such novel types of mobile devices are likely to have specific
requirements for usability and security and will pose new research questions.
2 http://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId~=~prUS40846515 – last accessed: 2016/08/09
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Besides smartphones, smartwatches have already been focused in recent research projects. It
has been shown that wearable devices are well-suited to collect behavioral cues for authen-
tication (e.g., [141, 162]). In addition, research came up with novel authentication scenarios
(e.g., [93]) and novel authentication concepts (e.g., [291]). However, we assume that touch-
based wearable devices are only the beginning of a new interconnected era of mobile devices.
Novel areas of research may include authentication on smart glasses [217] or authentication
on devices without displays. In addition, future threat models and authentication concepts
might consider virtual reality environments. Finally, the interconnection of smart devices is
likely to create new security challenges [21]. Research questions include when to authenti-
cate a user and how to propagate access rights between different types of mobile devices.
In summary, we argue that novel types of mobile devices will create new demands on us-
ability and security. While we assume that most of the gathered insights presented in this
thesis can be transferred to other touch-based mobile devices, novel form factors may have
significantly different requirements. We assume that providing usable and secure security
concepts for novel classes of mobile devices will be a major challenge for future research.
6.3 Closing Remarks
This thesis aimed at providing an in-depth understanding of the risks and potentials of graph-
ical and gesture-based authentication for touchscreen mobile devices. By the beginning of
this research project in 2012, Android had just recently announced the activation of 190
million devices worldwide3. Only four years later, 1.4 billion people were using Android
devices4. Based on such numbers, I claim that we are just at the beginning of a new era of
interconnected devices. Within the next years, the average user will probably utilize smart-
watches, smart fridges, smart televisions and smart cars. I assume that the results presented
in my thesis will be valuable for some of these devices but certainly not for all. Therefore, I
argue that the presented research approach is even more important than the specific findings.
With reference to Bruce Schneier, who claimed that “The more technological a society is,
the greater the security gap is”5, I argue that usable security research is likely to become
even more important in the future. With this thesis, I want to raise awareness for the im-
portance of a problem-oriented research process. I argue that it is crucial to understand the
problem space before proposing novel (security) solutions. Too often, security mechanisms
are designed without consideration of the context of use and thus lack practical relevance.
The design of novel security concepts should never be an end in itself but strive for having
a significant impact on real-world issues. Ultimately, human-centered security mechanisms
have to be used to actually provide real-life security.
3 http://thenextweb.com/google/2011/10/13/google-190-million-android-devices-
activated-worldwide-thats-about-576900-a-day-since-may/ – last accessed: 2016/09/08/
4 http://www.ubergizmo.com/2015/09/over-1-4-billion-people-are-now-using-android/ –
last accessed: 2016/09/08/
5 https://books.google.de/books?id~=~WpEfAwAAQBAJ&pg~=~PT239&dq – last accessed: 2016/08/09
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